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Abstract 
 
The biologist E.O. Wilson suggested that spirituality can be understood as “just 
one more Darwinian enabling device”. In opposing this reductionism, the current 
enquiry develops a model of a relationship between spirituality and evolutionary 
theory which offers an understanding of spirituality based on evolutionary theory 
without reducing the former to the latter. 
For the purposes of this enquiry, “spirituality” is taken to entail an awareness 
of and response both to a transcendent dimension to human existence, and to 
the ethical dimension. Its universality is suggested by the ubiquity of religion in 
human history and prehistory, although in contemporary Western society spirit-
uality is no longer the prerogative of the specific canonical religions. From a 
theological perspective, an understanding of the universality of spirituality 
despite the diversity of religious traditions is provided by the approach of 
religious pluralism. The model also draws on Alvin Plantinga’s model of our 
being endowed with a sensus divinitatis, but modifies it in two ways: i) rather 
than our having an inbuilt sense of the divine as God, the current enquiry 
proposes that we have an inbuilt sense of the transcendent (termed the sensus 
transcendentis); ii) this sensus transcendentis is a product of evolutionary 
processes. 
The discipline of evolutionary psychology holds that the human mind is best 
understood as a suite of “mental modules”, psychological adaptations which 
evolved in response to the challenges posed by the total environment (physical, 
social and biotic) during the long reaches of human evolution. In the proposed 
model, the sensus transcendentis is one such module, opening us to meaning, 
purpose and value which transcend the material environment whilst being 
embedded within it. Evidence is provided to support the contentions both that 
we possess a sensus transcendentis, and that it has evolutionary origins. 
Possible implications for theology and for religious faith arising from the 
proposed model are discussed. 
 
Key words: adaptation, altruism, evolution, evolutionary psychology, Hick, 
mental module, Plantinga, religious pluralism, sensus divinitatis, sensus 
transcendentis. 
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Introduction  
 
1. On the Origins and Purpose of the Thesis 
In Sociobiology: The New Synthesis, entomologist and evolutionary biologist 
E.O. Wilson writes that from an evolutionary perspective, “spirituality becomes 
just one more Darwinian enabling device” (Wilson 1975: 120 – emphasis 
added). 
With my life-long involvement in the Protestant strand of the Christian church 
I find the religious/spiritual dimension of life important, and Wilson’s belittling 
“just” grates; but with my background in the natural sciences I find develop-
ments in evolutionary theory, particularly evolutionary psychology, both 
intriguing and exciting. Hence the current enquiry, the aim of which is, contra 
Wilson, to develop an understanding of how “spirituality” (and related phenom-
ena such as “religious experience” and “religion”) can be integrated with the 
insights into human nature being developed and explored within the discipline of 
evolutionary psychology (itself a development from sociobiology), without 
spirituality being thereby reduced to “just” something else.  
At the same time, I have no intention to (mis)use religious – or quasi-
religious, or pseudo-religious – arguments to dismiss the claims of evolutionary 
theorists or to introduce a supernaturalist element into the naturalistic nexus of 
science – for I am a thorough-going evolutionist, accepting that mainstream 
neo-Darwinian theory is currently by far the best theory going to explain a wide 
range of phenomena, though also accepting that “[s]cience proceeds, not 
because it is always certain and complete, but precisely because it is corrigible” 
(Bowker 2005: xii). That corrigibility is very much in evidence with the rise of 
epigenetics (Carey 2011), evolutionary-developmental biology, also known as 
“evo-devo” (Carroll 2005), developmental systems theory (Oyama et al 2001) 
and niche construction theory (Odling-Smee et al 2003) which together will 
doubtless alter quite considerably the landscape of evolutionary theory in 
decades to come, and I am conscious that my focusing upon evolutionary 
psychology entails insights of considerable importance from these other 
disciplines being missed out. But lack of infinite time, space and competence 
render comprehensiveness, however desirable, impossible (and see McGrath 
[2011] for a discussion on the appropriateness and accuracy of referring to 
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contemporary evolutionary theory as “Darwinian” or “neo-Darwinian” in the light 
of all these other developments). 
The end point of the current enquiry, then, which should really be seen as a 
staging post for further enquiry, is the development of a model of human nature 
that fruitfully incorporates both spirituality and evolutionary psychology, and in 
brief I am arguing that: 
Through the processes of evolution, human beings have become endowed 
with a faculty by the operation of which we are predisposed to be aware of, 
open to and capable of responding to an aspect or characteristic of our total 
environment that is, or is experienced as being, transcendent. This faculty, 
termed the “sensus transcendentis”, is a mental module, a part of our psycho-
logical make-up, which in keeping with other mental modules evolved as an 
adaptation conferring enhanced fitness to our forebears in the ancestral 
environment, and which continues functioning today in response to the same 
aspect or characteristic of our total environment. Although the “sensus 
transcendentis” is a human psychological universal, its deliverances of trans-
cendent experiences, being mediated through the interpretative concepts and 
categories pertaining to specific cultures, have historically been experienced 
and embodied variously in both theistic and non-theistic forms of religion, and 
increasingly in secular forms in the modern era. The operation of the “sensus 
transcendentis” constitutes what I term the “vertical dimension” or “diameter” of 
spirituality; and the “horizontal dimension” or “circumference” of spirituality is 
identified as being our capacity for moral awareness in general and altruism in 
particular. Since this latter is also an evolved faculty, spirituality in both its 
dimensions – the vertical dimension (its diameter), and the horizontal dimension 
(its circumference) – can be understood as a biologically-based aspect of 
human nature by which we experience and make sense of our world, both inner 
and outer.  
This summary contains several concepts which will be explained as the 
current enquiry unfolds, and the proposal rests on a number of arguments, both 
theological and evolutionary, the explication and justification of which form the 
bulk of what follows. 
A secondary objective emerged as the enquiry proceeded. It became 
evident that the concept of religion which evolutionary theorists adopt tends to 
be extremely “thin”, often reduced to the single dimension of supernatural 
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agency with only lip service being paid, if at all, to the other dimensions (Smart 
1996). Hence this thesis also contributes to evolutionary discourse by 
challenging (albeit somewhat indirectly) the uni-dimensional view of spirituality/ 
religion that many evolutionary theorists claim to explain (away). 
 
2. Method 
The process by which the model I am presenting has been developed is 
literature-based. It has entailed identifying key texts both in the field of evolut-
ionary psychology (including those inimical to the discipline) and in the relevant 
areas of theology, particularly those relating to spirituality and to religious 
experience, along with a number of “cross-over” texts which already address 
the issue of a scientific, and particularly a biological, perspective on religion and 
spirituality.  
Growing familiarity with the texts allowed an interplay between the 
disciplines, and a gradual identification of overlapping concerns. It became 
apparent that the work of John Hick (1989; 1999) and the thesis of religious 
pluralism which I was already aware of and had long found attractive, could 
prove helpful in providing an understanding of how the bewildering range of 
religious traditions, both theistic and non-theistic, potentially constitutes a 
“human universal” of the kind that evolutionary psychology concerns itself with. 
Arguments for and against religious pluralism were considered at length, and an 
initial, somewhat uncritical, enthusiasm for that position was tempered by 
theological and philosophical arguments to a slightly more nuanced position, as 
will (I trust) become clear. 
Various references in the literature, and one or two fortuitous conversations, 
led me to the work of theologian-philosopher Alvin Plantinga, and in particular to 
his development of John Calvin’s notion of the sensus divinitatis (Plantinga 
2000). Ironically, for Plantinga is avowedly anti-naturalistic, this came close to 
providing the link I required between evolutionary psychology and spirituality, 
but it required adapting in the light of religious pluralism, resulting in my 
proposal that it is a sensus transcendentis that has an evolutionary grounding 
rather than a sensus divinitatis, and Plantinga’s rigorous treatment of the 
sensus divinitatis has proved helpful in clarifying the characteristics of the 
proposed sensus transcendentis. 
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The possibility of applying principles and insights derived from evolutionary 
psychology required a far greater immersion in the discipline than I had yet 
ventured, and the process was daunting but fruitful. As with religious pluralism, 
close reading of the literature led to a modified position in favour of “strong-ish” 
(rather than “strong”) evolutionary psychology, as will be described at the 
relevant point. It became evident, though, that a complete acceptance of all the 
pronouncements of evolutionary psychologists was not necessary for the core 
ideas to contribute greatly to an understanding of the spirituality of human 
beings.  
 
3. Definitions (or not) 
How do you define “religion”? Is Buddhism a religion? How do you define 
“species”? Are Homo habilis and Homo ergaster the same or different species? 
In the realms both of religion/theology/spirituality and of evolutionary theory, 
there are a number of concepts which cannot be defined and applied precisely 
and unambiguously. “Religious experience” is a fuzzy concept (Swinburne 1991 
[1979]), and “gene” has a number of different, albeit closely related, uses 
(Ridley 2003). Spirituality, mysticism, transcendence, faith, morality, ethics, 
altruism, species and human nature are likewise fuzzy concepts, though each 
has a “focus of convenience”, or more than one foci of convenience, where they 
are maximally applicable, and a “range of convenience” where they are usefully 
applicable1.  
Regarding “spirituality” itself, one of the twin foci of the enquiry, I decided to 
allow the concept to clarify as the enquiry proceeded, knowing the general area 
with which I was concerned being that epitomised by but not confined to the 
work of William James with his exploration of religious experience (1902), and 
Alister Hardy (1979). and David Hay (2006) with their researches into “spiritual 
awareness.” In effect, I allowed not only the subject of the enquiry to shape the 
process of the enquiry, but also for the process of enquiry itself to shape what 
was being identified as the subject of the enquiry.  
In due course, although the potentially relevant literature for exploring these 
issues is vast and cannot conceivably all be read, let alone assimilated, 
sufficient had eventually been taken into consideration to allow a tentative 
                                            
1
 “focus of convenience” and “range of convenience” are terms employed in PCP (Kelly 1955). 
See appendix 1. 
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definition – albeit a stipulative one – to be advanced for “spirituality”, and will be 
found in the discussion concluding chapter 1.  
 
4. Preliminaries 
4a. What is truth?  
If jesting Pilate had really wanted an answer he could have consulted the 
Oxford Companion to Philosophy and chosen from among more than half-a-
dozen theories (Honderich 1995), the three main contenders being the 
correspondence theory, the coherence theory and the pragmatic theory.  
The correspondence theory of truth refers to the commonsense under-
standing that truth is whatever corresponds to that which is the case, and 
propositions are true “if and only if they correspond with the facts” (Honderich 
1995: 166). The aim of science is to encapsulate reality such that there is a 
one-to-one correspondence between what is expressed in its formulae and 
equations, and the aspect of reality to which they relate: “[the] theories must 
agree with data” (Barbour 2007: 37). But this is problematic, for there is no way 
of knowing whether correspondence between the equation and the underlying 
reality has actually been achieved, there being “no theory-free data with which a 
theory can be compared. Many theories postulate unobservable entities only 
indirectly related to observable data. We have no direct access to reality to 
compare it with our theories” (Barbour, 2007: 37-8 – emphasis added). 
Since we can never be certain that we have obtained ultimate truth, that 
correspondence has been reached between a statement of alleged fact and the 
underlying reality to which it purportedly refers, we need alternative ways of 
addressing the truth or otherwise of statements and propositions.  
One alternative is the pragmatic theory of truth. This asserts that “truth, like 
other concepts, is to be understood in terms of practice” with the important rider 
that “[t]he notion of truth as a relation of correspondence is not rejected but 
clarified by reference to actions, future experiences, etc….” (Honderich, 1995: 
709-10 – emphasis added). On this understanding, what is true is determined 
by what works, and those scientific theories that survive “survive because they 
‘work’ better than the others” (Ruse 1986: 50). 
The pragmatic theory is applicable to the areas of particular interest in the 
current enquiry. To what extent can the theory of evolution by natural selection 
be said to correspond to that which is the case? We cannot be certain. But truth 
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claims are made for evolutionary theory on the basis of how well it works as an 
explanatory system – and it works extremely well, its pragmatic credentials are 
remarkable (Dawkins 2009; Ruse 2006). And to the extent that it does work, it is 
taken to correspond (more or less) to the reality about which it is a theory; but 
nevertheless it is being assessed on pragmatic criteria.  
The pragmatic theory of truth is also relevant in religious and theological 
discourse. As will be argued in the section on religious pluralism, our contact 
with ultimate reality is mediated by and through (inter alia) our conceptual and 
psychological categories and concepts of thought and cognition. So how do we 
tell whether a religious theory, a religious belief, is “true”? Hick puts forward the 
“soteriological” criterion for assessing the validity of a religious tradition – does it 
promote a re-orientation away from self-centredness and towards Reality-
centredness, is it successful in addressing the unsatisfactory aspects of human 
existence? (Hick 1989). In other words, does it work?  
But a pragmatic approach to truth inevitably has its problems too. It is 
possible for a belief that is false (in a correspondence understanding of truth) 
still to work, to have utility. Thus the utility of a belief is no guarantee of its 
(correspondence) truth; and the pragmatic theory of truth if divorced from the 
correspondence theory of truth, is potentially highly misleading. 
The third main truth theory is that of coherence, which asserts that “a state-
ment is true if it ‘coheres’ with other statements – false if it does not” (Honderich 
1995: 140) – that is, if you have a belief system (religious or scientific) that you 
accept as true, another statement or proposition is true if and only if it coheres 
with, is consistent with, the already-accepted propositions and statements.  
Coherence is significant in science. The truth revealed by one area of 
science is required to cohere with the “truths” revealed by other sciences, and a 
new scientific theory that does not cohere with prevailing scientific orthodoxy is 
given a rough ride (Milton 1994). The theory of evolution as propounded by 
Darwin was assisted by its coherence with the emerging understanding of 
geology as propounded by Charles Lyell (1830), in that the former required vast 
tracts of time for evolution to occur, and Lyell’s theory (arrived at independently 
from Darwin’s thinking) provided such vast tracts. The two separate theories 
each provided, by their coherence, support for the other.  
Coherence has its part to play in the religious domain. One of the criteria for 
testing the authenticity of purported truths revealed to mystics is that of “consist-
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ency with orthodox doctrine” (Davis 1989: 71), a criterion which, for example, 
creates a tension in the writings of Julian of Norwich as she strains to stay within 
orthodox Catholic teaching that there is no salvation outside the church, whilst 
herself advancing a universalistic thesis (Harries 1985).  
But of course the principle of coherence has its problems. It is logically 
possible for a set of statements to be coherent in being consistent with each 
other, but which taken in toto are false; for coherence to be a valid principle, 
“some statements must be assigned a truth-value independently if others are to 
be assessed by way of their coherence” (Honderich 1995: 140). 
In light of all this, I am assuming that although correspondence is the core 
meaning of truth, truth is unattainable, or perhaps it is more accurate to say that 
even if it is attained we can never be certain of the fact. At successive refine-
ments our theories, statements, beliefs and propositions might well approach 
objective reality asymptotically, or even attain it, but there is no guarantee. 
Hence the necessity of relying on pragmatic and coherent considerations as 
proxies for or signposts to truth as understood in a correspondence sense. 
This assumption is important for the current enquiry since my aim is to 
develop a model in which a religious/theological perspective and an evolution-
ary psychological perspective both cohere and work together, fulfilling the 
criteria of the two “proxies” to truth. But the degree to which such a model 
corresponds to that which is the underlying reality will, regrettably, remain 
unknown. Hence, in what follows I am looking for coherence and pragmatism 
with the expectation that if I achieve that, it is at least plausible that some 
degree of “correspondence” with that which is the case has been reached. That 
is the most to be hoped for. 
 
4b. Critical Realism 
The current enquiry adopts the stance of “critical realism”. This starts from the 
acceptance that there is a real, external world existing independently of the 
human individual, but that our knowledge of it arises as the product of an inter-
action between objective reality and the human mind, as the latter “attempts to 
express and accommodate that reality as best it can with the tools at its 
disposal – such as mathematical formulae or mental models… [There is an] 
active involvement of the knower in the process of knowing” (McGrath: 
2002:195-6). In summary, critical realism has been described as: 
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“a way of describing the process of ‘knowing’ that acknowledges the 
reality of the thing known, as something other than the knower (hence 
‘realism’), while also fully acknowledging that the only access we have to 
this reality lies along the spiralling path of appropriate dialogue or 
conversation between the knower and the thing known (hence ‘critical’). 
This path leads to critical reflection on the products of our enquiry into 
‘reality’, so that our assertions about ‘reality’ acknowledge their own 
provisionality. Knowledge, in other words, although in principle con-
cerning realities independent of the knower, is never itself independent of 
the knower” (Wright, quoted in McGrath 2002: 196 – emphasis in 
original).  
 
This understanding thus differs from naïve realism which considers that reality 
“impacts directly on the human mind, without any reflection on the part of the 
human knower”, and from post-modern anti-realism which claims that there is 
no such thing as objective reality, and that the human mind is responsible for 
constructing its ideas “without any reference to an alleged external world” 
(2002: 195). 
A critical realist approach undermines reductionism, since it allows for a 
“stratified” reality where emergent properties manifest themselves at different 
levels, and those properties cannot be reduced to the laws which govern the 
lower levels: “One cannot ‘reduce’ biology to chemistry and physics, precisely 
because the biological stratum possesses characteristics which go beyond 
those in which it is rooted” (2002: 216), though phenomena at one level – such 
as the biological – do not contravene the laws that operate at the lower levels 
(such as those of physics and chemistry), but neither are they fully deducible 
from them.  
Since, according to critical realism, our experience of the external world is 
the product of that world interacting with our mind’s constructive activity, all 
knowledge is provisional or corrigible. The provisionality and corrigibility of 
scientific theories are givens (Bowker 2005) but the critical realist approach also 
entails the acceptance that religious propositions are likewise provisional and 
corrigible. Within theological circles, critical realism has come to designate “a 
style of realism which is sensitive to the historically situated and personally 
involved character of theological knowledge, while resolutely declining to let go 
of the ideals of truth, objectivity and rationality” (McGrath 2002: 195).  
Thus, to return to Julian of Norwich and her sixteen “sheweings” or revelat-
ions of divine love (Julian of Norwich 1966 [1393]), whereas from Julian’s own 
perspective of naïve realism she interpreted her experiences as being literally 
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of Christ revealing himself to her, from a critical realism perspective the under-
standing is that “she had become so open to the transcendent, within her and 
beyond her, that it flooded into her consciousness in the particular form 
provided by her Christian faith. She was aware of the goodness – from our 
human point of view – of the Real as the unconditional love of a personal God, 
expressed in the characteristic fourteenth-century form of the bodily agonies of 
Jesus on the cross. Her experience was thus a genuine contact with the 
Transcendent, but clothed in her case in a Christian rather than a Hindu, 
Buddhist, Islamic or other form” (Hick 1999: 42). 
The active contribution to our experiences of the mind, with its culturally 
acquired categories and concepts of thought, is considered further when the 
views of Katz (1978) in chapter 3 and Hick (1989) in chapter 4 are discussed. 
For now, it is sufficient to acknowledge that the current enquiry is pursued from 
the perspective of critical realism with its understanding of the provisionality and 
corrigibility of all purported knowledge, religious or scientific. 
 
4c. Construing 
As the current enquiry proceeds, I will on occasions also draw upon the ideas 
and terminology of personal construct psychology (PCP) as developed by the 
psychologist George Kelly (1955) and further elaborated by, inter alia, Bannister 
and Fransella (1986), and Procter (1985; 2008). With the same basic premise 
as critical realism of the real existence of the extra-mental world but that it is not 
directly accessible, PCP not only provides a coherent theory base but also has 
given rise to a range of practical techniques and strategies for those involved 
with counselling and psychotherapy, the context in which I encountered and 
used it as a member of a psychotherapeutic team under the guidance of Harry 
Procter (1985). In particular, when it comes to discussing the operation of the 
sensus transcendentis, I make use of the notion of “construing” being an activity 
of the whole person (thinking, feeling and doing), not just an act of intellectual 
interpretation or inference. Appendix 1 gives an outline of PCP. 
 
4d. Models of the science-religion relationship 
Since the current enquiry offers a contribution to the never-ending science-and-
religion debate, a few words are in order about the range of possible relation-
ships that obtain, or could obtain, between the two disciplines. Barbour (2000) 
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identifies a number of typologies on offer, including his own four-fold scheme 
with which I am best acquainted.  
In Barbour’s typology there is the conflict model in which science and 
religion are considered incompatible with proponents on each side making “rival 
literal statements about the same domain... so a person must choose between 
them” (2000: 11); the independence model with variations on the theme that the 
two disciplines address separate compartments of life, science being concerned 
with questions about how things are and the formulation of laws to explain and 
predict phenomena, and religion being concerned with issues of meaning, pur-
pose and value; the dialogue model, which, while acknowledging major differ-
ences between them, “emphasizes similarities in presuppositions, methods and 
concepts” of the two disciplines (2000: 23), allowing each to inform the other by 
way of conceptual models and analogies; and finally there is the integration 
model. 
This last, which is important for the current enquiry, comes in three flavours: 
natural theology, a theology of nature, and a systematic synthesis. Natural 
theology claims “that the existence of God can be inferred from (or is supported 
by) the evidence of design in nature, of which science has made us more 
aware” (2000: 27). By contrast, the “theology of nature” variant (2000: 31) does 
not lead from science to God, but starts from a religious tradition which then 
needs to be modified, perhaps extensively, in the light of scientific knowledge. 
Thus the biblical account of creation cannot be taken literally if scientific knowl-
edge is accepted. According to this model, theology is not simply in dialogue 
with science, but has to take science on board and alter accordingly.  
Finally, there is a systematic synthesis version of the integration model 
which draws on process theology and entails science and religion each contrib-
uting to “a coherent worldview elaborated in a comprehensive metaphysics” 
(2000: 34).  
From a theological/religious perspective, there are potential problems with 
all four models. Adopting the conflict model requires implausibly dismissing a 
huge body of evidence about how the universe works; adopting the independ-
ence model leaves unresolved such issues as which of science and religion has 
jurisdiction over a topic such as “creation”; adopting the dialogue model carries 
the risk of flirting with a beguiling “god-of-the-gaps” (Coulson 1958); and adopt-
ing the integration model could result in its advocates, having reformulated 
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religious/theological understanding in the light of particular scientific theories, 
being left high and dry and looking pretty stupid if and when those theories 
change.  
None is therefore foolproof, but a stance needs to be taken. The assumption 
on which the current enquiry is based falls under the banner of the integration 
model, second variant (“theology of nature”) in that it takes a topic (spirituality) 
which is conventionally considered to belong to the religious/theological sphere 
of human activity, and examines it in the light of a current scientific theory 
(evolutionary psychology) to offer an explanation couched, at least in part, in the 
terminology of that theory. This is in keeping with Barbour’s view of integration, 
in that “scientific theories may strongly affect the reformulation of certain 
doctrines, particularly the doctrines of creation and human nature” (2000: 27-8 – 
emphasis added). There is, however, one tweak to make: Barbour is referring to 
“theology”, but as the current enquiry encompasses non-theistic as well as 
theistic traditions a term such as “theology and atheology” should perhaps be 
employed. As this is a clumsy locution, I stretch the term “theology” to cover 
non-theistic as well as theistic traditions, beliefs and experiences. 
 
4e The personal equation 
Though a cradle Baptist, I have been a member of the Anglican church for 
many years situated – if we have to use labels – in the liberal/radical wing, and 
experiencing (as will become obvious in the course of this enquiry) a strong pull 
towards religious pluralism. Even if a “view from nowhere” (Nagel 1986) were 
desirable (and I’m not convinced it is) I think it is impossible to attain – we all 
stand somewhere, and where we stand influences what we see, interpret and 
report to others. Which is to say, there is bound to be bias in what follows even 
though I attempt to take a non-confessional stance, and if there weren’t bias, 
then I probably wouldn’t have been interested in pursuing the topic in the first 
place. But the bias needs to be acknowledged even if it can’t be eliminated. 
 
5. Chapter outline  
In chapter 1, a discussion of the use of the term “spirituality”, from its origins in 
Christianity to refer to living a life in accordance to the Holy Spirit, to contemp-
orary manifestations of developing and enriching one’s inner life in ways not 
necessarily related to traditional religions, leads to a characterization of its two 
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dimensions as being a (metaphorically) “vertical” relationship with God/ trans-
cendence/Ultimate Reality, and a (metaphorically) “horizontal” relationship with 
others (both human and non-human). In chapter 2 the vertical dimension is 
explored through a brief account of primal religion and a range of accounts 
purportedly of religious experiences and instances of spiritual awareness 
collected and collated principally by James (1902), Hardy (1979) and Hay 
(2006); and the term “Rose” is introduced as an acronym for “religious or spirit-
ual experience”. Chapter 3 critiques a number of views from the literature as to 
the epistemological status of such experiences, whether they can be accepted 
as evidence for “Something There” (Hay 2006) or whether they should be 
construed as creations of human preconceptions. In chapter 4 the approach 
known as religious pluralism is discussed, drawing principally but not exclusive-
ly on Hick (1989), and offered as a way of understanding how the plurality of 
religious traditions can nevertheless be understood as manifesting a human 
universal capacity to be open to and respond to Ultimate Reality (“the Real”) by 
drawing upon a Kantian-type of epistemology. This proposed human universal 
capacity is the subject of chapter 5 in which Plantinga’s (2000) concept of the 
sensus divinitatis is outlined, by the operation of which all humans purportedly 
have an awareness of God, though with both religious pluralism and evolution-
ary principles in mind this is offered as a template for the later development of 
the sensus transcendentis model. 
In chapter 6, the focus is on evolutionary matters with an outline first of 
evolutionary theory in general, and then of human evolution, included the role of 
culture and of the potential for gene-culture co-evolution; this providing the 
context for chapter 7, in which evolutionary psychology is specifically described 
with its contention that the human mind consists of a suite of “mental modules” 
which evolved in response to various selection pressures in the ancestral 
environment. The operation of several relevant modules is described, including 
intuitive psychology, or the “Theory of Mind” module, by which we are able to 
attribute mental states to other people, and respond accordingly. One mental 
module of particular significance for the current enquiry, that of intuitive morality 
and the capacity for altruism, is the subject of chapter 8, in which a distinction 
between “evolutionary altruism” and “moral altruism” is outlined, with the 
parable of the Good Samaritan being invoked to discuss the latter.  
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Chapter 9 discusses a number of explanations already advanced by evolut-
ionary theorists for the origin and function of religion/spirituality, and finds that 
although their conception of religion is “thin”, they usefully identify a number of 
mechanisms and functions to be incorporated into the sensus transcendentis 
model, which is then proposed, explained and defended in chapter 10. This is 
the chapter towards which the others have been leading, as it contains the 
original contribution I have to offer. With insights taken from religious pluralism, 
from Plantinga’s sensus divinitatis model and from evolutionary psychology, I 
put forward a model to explain that human beings have come to possess a 
faculty which is the product of evolutionary processes, and which delivers 
experiences of transcendence, of meaning, purpose and value, resulting in the 
wide range of faith traditions. Evidence is given supporting the contention that 
we have such a faculty, and coupled with our capacity for altruism the argument 
is advanced that together these two evolved faculties – the sensus transcend-
entis and altruism – constitute human spirituality. 
In Chapter 11 I suggest what contribution the proposed model could make to 
the gaiety of nations – or at least to the gaiety of theologians – proposing that it 
offers an understanding of human nature which is relevant in the continuing 
debates over the two theological issues on which it draws, namely religious 
pluralism (which it supports) and the sensus divinitatis model (which it challen-
ges). Also included is a brief discussion about the possible impact on the 
practice of a proponent of a given faith (or lack of faith) tradition. Chapter 12 
offers a few final comments on what the thesis has covered and failed to cover. 
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SECTION ONE 
SPIRITUALITY  
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Chapter 1: Of spirituality 
 
Introduction 
Ideally, since the aim of the present enquiry is to develop a model by which 
spirituality can be understood as an integral part of our evolved human nature, 
a user-friendly definition of “spirituality” on which all interested parties could 
agree would start the proceedings with a swing. However, it seems to be a term 
which, as has been said of the word “reality”, “refuses to lie down and be 
stunned to death by definition” (Bowker 1973: 15), a situation exacerbated by 
the developing split between current uses and practices of “spirituality” and its 
traditional location within religion (Heelas and Woodhead 2005).  
In this chapter, therefore, rather than attempting to fashion a definition of 
“spirituality” that stuns, I survey a number of uses of the term, including its 
origin in Christianity, from which I identify two factors or dimensions of human 
existence that I take to be central to what most people, if not all, mean by 
“spirituality”: an experiential dimension (that of transcendence) and a practical 
dimension (that of ethical engagement) which, using the traditional spatial 
metaphor, I refer to as the “vertical” and “horizontal” dimensions respectively 
(Underhill 1933). It is our capacity to be aware of and respond to these 
dimensions of existence which, I will be arguing as the enquiry proceeds, is 
conferred on us by the proper functioning of evolved “mental modules” of which 
evolutionary psychology speaks (Buss 2005). 
 
Spirituality: clarifying the term 
Before we can get there, though, some clarification is required, for spirituality is 
a concept which, as theologian and parish priest Kenneth Leech wrote, has 
increasingly been used “in so general and vague a way that its continued 
usefulness needs to be questioned” (Leech 1992: 3), as illustrated by William 
Stringfellow’s (1984) caustic comments that use of the term spirituality 
“may indicate stoic attitudes, occult phenomena, the practice of so-called 
mind control, yoga discipline, escapist fantasies, interior journeys, an 
appreciation of eastern religions, multifarious pious exercises, 
superstitious imaginations, intensive journals, dynamic muscle tension, 
assorted dietary regimens, meditation, jogging cults, monastic rigours, 
mortification of the flesh, wilderness sojourns, political resistance, 
contemplation, abstinence, hospitality, a vocation of poverty, non-
violence, silence, the efforts of prayer, obedience, generosity, exhibiting 
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stigmata, entering solitude, or, I suppose, among these and many other 
things, squatting on top of a pillar” (quoted in Leech 1992: 3).  
 
Stringfellow’s verbal attack on a whole range of practices for which spirit-
uality claims are frequently made is all good fun, but there is another, positive, 
side to this diversification of spirituality. David Tacey, who runs university 
courses on spirituality, describes what he terms “the Spirituality Revolution” as 
“…a spontaneous movement in society, a new interest in the reality of spirit and 
its healing effects on life, health, community and well-being. It is our secular 
society realising that it has been running on empty, and has to restore itself at a 
deep, primal source, a source which is beyond humanity and yet paradoxically 
at the very core of our experience” (Tacey 2004: 1). This spontaneous move-
ment involves “finding the sacred everywhere, and not just where religious 
traditions have asked us to find it. Things previously considered worldly or even 
unholy are being invested with new spiritual significance, such as the body, 
nature, the feminine, sexuality, and the physical environment…” (2004: 4). 
There is a touch of wheel-reinvention in this claim, in that the sacredness of 
“the body, nature, the feminine, sexuality, and the physical environment” is 
already inherent in the Judaeo-Christian tradition (Fox 1983) among others; 
nevertheless Tacey’s point is that a common perception of the main religious 
traditions, Christianity in particular, is that they suppress or deny these areas of 
the sacred, and that in response a spirituality has arisen outside the confines of 
the mainstream faith traditions.  
Tacey, however, is not advocating some wacky, anything goes New 
Ageism, for like Stringfellow he sees that “ersatz formulas, escapisms, 
parodies, fakes, phony gurus, false prophets, and frauds surround us. It is hard 
for the earnest seeker to steer a successful course through the pitfalls and 
dangers of the spiritual landscape” (2004: 5), and his warning later continues 
that “[p]opular spirituality is… one-sided with its tendency to celebrate the good 
and ignore evil or sin. Its spiritual optimism and romantic attitude need to be 
complimented (sic) by religious ‘realism’ and a deeper understanding of the 
conflict between good and evil” (2004: 85). 
Another one-sided tendency that has been perceived is in the favouring of 
the individual’s inner quest for personal change and wholeness over the need 
for social transformation and the "larger context of globalization and the now 
global quest for spirituality,” with the danger that “a spirituality exclusively 
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focused on personal concerns such as finding inner peace, one’s true self, or a 
purpose in life – however valuable for an individual – can produce a rather 
escapist attitude” (King 2009: x, 11). There has also arisen a commodification 
of spirituality, with its becoming an add-on extra to life: Karen Armstrong in a 
magazine interview bemoans the fact that “we've lost the sense that spirituality 
is hard work. It is often turned into a commodity to make us feel good. But it 
isn't just wandering lonely as a cloud and hoping you'll see a clump of daffodils 
to enthuse about. I believe the Dalai Lama was reduced to tears when an 
American audience asked him how they could get instant enlightenment. He 
hadn't realized things were that bad…” (Roemsicher 2005: n.p.). A spirituality 
app for your i-pad is doubtless being devised even as I type (googling 
“spirituality app” has just registered 31 million hits). 
Themes are already emerging of spirituality not being confined to institution-
al religion, of its having a social as well as personal dimension, of its entailing 
hard work; but what actually is “spirituality”? To what does it refer, if not to the 
collection of activities that Stringfellow lampoons?  
The board of editors of the 25-volume “World Spirituality” series take spirit-
uality to refer to “that inner dimension of the person called by certain traditions 
‘the spirit’. This spiritual core is the deepest center of the person. It is here that 
the person is open to the transcendent dimension; it is here that the person 
experiences ultimate reality” (Cousins 1989: xii), that is to say, spirituality is 
concerned with the state of being of the individual; whereas theologian John 
Macquarrie, writing from a Christian existentialist perspective, does not refer at 
all to an “inner core” of a person but deems “spirituality” to be a “process of 
learning by which the disciple becomes more proficient in the Christian life and 
advances along the way of sanctification”, and anticipating the comments of 
both Armstrong and King he continues that this should not be perceived as a 
retreat into an inner world, “for spirit is precisely the capacity to go out, and the 
truly spiritual person is one who is able to go out or to exist in the full dynamic 
sense” and that “[o]nly a perverted spirituality is concerned with one’s own 
condition, and true sanctification comes as a gift to those who have been 
reaching out to God and their neighbors” (Macquarrie 1977: 497-8 – emphasis 
in original). Macquarrie, then, is not simply leaving it in a value-neutral state of 
“being open to the transcendent dimension….” as the World Spirituality editors 
have it, but includes what one might term (appropriately enough, given Jesus’ 
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trade) a bench mark for one’s spirituality, namely “the Christian life”, which 
means a life lived “as modeled by Jesus Christ’s own manner of life as 
described in the Gospels” (Wiseman 2006: 3). 
Another Christian theologian, Sandra M. Schneiders, expresses both the 
“inner core” and the “process” ideas. In an essay originally written in 1989, she 
documents how the Roman Catholic church, though suspicious of “spirituality” 
as entailing too emotional an approach to faith and being academically dubious 
because of its perceived subjectivism, has, post-Vatican II, had to “contend with 
an increasing interest in spirituality”, and has witnessed “(not without apprehen-
sion) the birth of a new discipline” (Schneiders 2000: 249). It is this new discip-
line that is the focus of Schneiders’ essay, and in her definition of the key term 
she acknowledges that “spirituality” is “unavoidably ambiguous” since it can 
refer to “(1) a fundamental dimension of a human being, (2) the lived experi-
ence which actualizes that dimension, and (3) the academic discipline which 
studies that experience” (2000: 250). She further defines the lived experience 
of spirituality (rather than the academic study of it) as “the experience of 
consciously striving to integrate one’s life in terms not of isolation and self-
absorption but of self-transcendence toward the ultimate value one perceives” 
(2000: 254). Unlike Macquarrie, then, Schneiders does not explicitly tie 
“spirituality” to Christianity, citing with approval the anthropologist Jean-Claude 
Breton’s argument that spirituality “could be described as a way of engaging 
anthropological questions and preoccupations in order to arrive at an ever 
richer and more authentically human life” (quoted in Schneiders 2000: 253). 
Terms like “striving”, “richer” and “more authentic” suggest, if not quite a bench 
mark, at the very least the idea that spirituality as experienced is a process 
deriving from a fundamental aspect of being human, and this, for Schneiders, is 
not limited to Christian experience. Spirituality involves “engagement with the 
Absolute”, and if that engagement is through the person of Jesus Christ then it 
would indeed be Christian spirituality, but in principle “it is equally available to 
every human being who is seeking to live an authentically human life” (2000: 
253). Spirituality in this formulation is not necessarily even explicitly “religious”, 
let alone Christian. 
The broader-than-Christianity understanding of spirituality is echoed by the 
feminist theologian Joann Wolski Conn who identifies spirituality as “a general 
human capacity for self-transcendence, for movement beyond mere self-
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maintenance or self-interest… [or to] a religious dimension of life, to a capacity 
for self-transcendence that is actualized by the holy, however that may be 
understood… [or to] a specific type of religious experience such as Jewish, 
Christian, Muslim, or Buddhist” (Conn 2000: 356 – emphasis added). The self-
transcendence that she sees as the “core of any definition of spirituality” occurs 
“within the horizon of whatever one imagines or judges to be ultimate. Spiritual-
ity, then, depends on what is judged to be of ultimate value. Christian spirituality 
presupposes that ultimacy is God revealed in the death and resurrection of 
Jesus, known in the sanctifying power of the Holy Spirit poured out in the 
community. Humanistic spirituality derives from the ultimacy of the individuated 
self. The definition of spirituality in terms of self-transcendence fits the full range 
of spirituality, nonreligious as well as religious” (2000: 356). There is an 
implication here of being able consciously to choose what constitutes one’s 
ultimate value, that which one self-transcends towards, but it is debatable 
whether one can choose what to experience to be of value (cf James’ Will to 
Believe, 1917 [1896]), rather than choosing how to respond to whatever one 
experiences to be of ultimate value. Nevertheless, Conn’s inclusion of “human-
istic spirituality” helpfully labels the category of “spirituality” applicable to the 
process of striving towards “an authentically human life” (Schneiders 2000: 
253) outside a religious setting. 
That “spirituality” is not confined to Catholic Christianity, Christianity in 
general, or indeed religion in general is emphasised by a number of other 
writers, and indeed “religion” and “spirituality” are perceived by some people to 
be opposites, identifying “religion primarily… with external, institutional aspects, 
while spirituality is reduced to something internal, a personal inwardness that 
has little bearing on social and institutional life” (King 2009: 2).  
Tacey too notes that conventional religion is often perceived as being 
inimical to spirituality, but although the latter is no longer the exclusive province 
of the former, religion nevertheless provides valuable spiritual resources, for “if 
the dogma and doctrine are peeled away, religion can be an aid to spiritual 
journeying, and not just an external or extrinsic system of empty signifiers” 
(Tacey 2004: 103-4). Of course, contra Tacey, it can be argued that to “peel 
away” the dogma and the doctrine would be to throw the baby out with the 
bathwater, in that dogma and doctrine used wisely can themselves be valuable 
resources for developing a spiritual maturity; for example, “[t]he doctrine of the 
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Trinity fills out what it means to ‘participate’ in the divine wisdom” (Fiddes 2002: 
55). 
Two more voices of particular relevance to the current enquiry are those of 
Alister Hardy and David Hay, researchers into religious experience and spiritual 
awareness. Hardy argued in the Gifford lectures of 1963-4 for understanding 
“religious experience” as a biological phenomenon, arising through the pro-
cesses of natural selection (Hardy 1965), and in 1969 he founded the Religious 
Experience Research Unit (RERU) at Oxford2, and instigated a programme of 
inviting members of the general public to submit accounts of their own “religious 
experiences” that they might be compared, contrasted and analysed for 
common themes. Under his directorship RERU published a number of accounts 
of different aspects of their research (Beardsworth 1977; Hardy 1975, 1979; 
Robinson 1977), which has continued under the later directorship of David Hay 
(Hay 1982, 1990, 1994; 2006; Hay and Hunt 2000; Hay and Nye 2006; Hay and 
Socha 2005). Since this current enquiry explains and draws upon their work at 
some length later on, it is sufficient for now just to give an outline of their 
understanding of “spirituality”. 
Given the nature of Hardy’s original intention to explore the phenomenon of 
“religious experience”, a term he deliberately adopted from James’s (1902) 
classic exposition, his understanding inevitably focused on the experiential 
element. Since his early appeals in newspaper articles to the general public to 
submit their accounts had resulted in “examples of the more ecstatic, dramatic 
types of experience” (Hardy 1979: 18) he subsequently clarified his interest in 
“seemingly more ordinary but deeply felt experiences… [and]… accounts of 
that continuing sense of spiritual awareness which many people feel makes a 
difference to their lives” (1979: 19). His subsequent analysis of the first 4,000 
accounts, including both the dramatic and the more ordinary, led him to 
describe what he conceived to be essential features of our spiritual nature: 
“the main characteristics of man’s religious and spiritual experiences are 
shown in his feelings for a transcendental reality which frequently 
manifest themselves in early childhood; a feeling that ‘Something Other’ 
than the self can actually be sensed; a desire to personalize this 
presence into a deity and to have a private I-Thou relationship with it, 
communicating through prayer” (1979: 131). 
 
                                            
2
 RERU is now renamed the “Religious Experience Research Centre”, and is based at the 
University of Wales, Lampeter. 
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There are several points to be noted here: the “feeling” element, the construal 
of the “transcendent” and “something other” being involved, the personalization 
of the “something other”, and the relational aspect, for which he uses the term 
“I-Thou”, taken from Buber (1987 [1937]). This relational characteristic is 
prominent in the continuing research subsequently conducted by Hay who, 
discussing the spirituality of children, describes how his research has identified 
three connotations of the term spirituality: “religious devotion; being fully aware 
of one’s ‘species-being’ [a term from Karl Marx – see below]; and being 
aesthetically or ethically aware”, with the key point being that “all refer to a 
heightening of awareness or attentiveness… Each of us has the potential to be 
much more deeply aware both of ourselves and of our intimate relationship with 
everything that is not ourselves” (Hay and Nye 2006: 21-2). Hay and Nye 
identified as the “core category” of children’s spirituality something they term 
“relational consciousness”. This reflects two patterns that emerged from the 
children’s conversations with the researchers, namely “[a]n unusual level of 
consciousness or perceptiveness, relative to other passages of conversation 
spoken by that child; [and] conversation expressed in a context of how the child 
related to things, other people, him/herself, and God” (2006: 109). And a further 
point Hay makes relating to his research in general, not just with children, is 
that “the most important single finding of my research over the past 30 years is 
the very strong connection there appears to be between spiritual awareness 
and ethical behaviour. Almost without exception, people link their spiritual or 
religious experience with a moral imperative” (2006: 29).  
I will return to Hay’s work later in the enquiry; but for now I wish to note that, 
following Hardy’s lead, Hay has developed an understanding of spirituality 
which involves 1) being aware of “something other” which transcends the 
individual; 2) relational consciousness; and 3) a link between spiritual aware-
ness and ethical behaviour. Moreover, this is within Hardy’s original context of 
the spiritual nature of man being a natural, evolved function (Hardy 1975). 
Social scientist Brian Zinnbauer also notes that “the terms spirituality and 
religiousness have been used interchangeably and inconsistently” (Zinnbauer 
et al 1997: 550), and his research shows how the concepts of “spirituality” and 
“religion” are diverging in common understanding, and that spirituality “is now 
commonly regarded as an individual phenomenon and identified with such 
things as personal transcendence, supraconscious sensitivity, and meaningful-
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ness… Religiousness, in contrast, is now often described narrowly as formally 
structured and identified with religious institutions and prescribed theology and 
rituals” (1997: 551). This is echoed in the work of Heelas and Woodhead (2005) 
who researched the emergence of non-institutional forms of spirituality, leading 
them to distinguish between “life-as” and “subjective life”. The former refers to 
living a life “in terms of external or ‘objective’ roles, duties and obligations”, and 
the latter refers to “life lived by reference to one’s own subjective experiences” 
(2005: 2). Religion is a “life-as” phenomenon, whereas according to an 
increasingly widespread understanding, spirituality (as epitomised by the “Mind, 
Body, Soul” section in all bookshops) is related to the “subjective life”. Put more 
crudely, this distinction sees religion as obedience to an external authority 
(God, creeds, the moral law), and spirituality as obedience to oneself, and is at 
the heart of the “spiritual revolution” which the authors are researching.  
I could go on, for there are many other descriptions of spirituality both within 
and outside formal religious traditions (for example, the other essays in Collins 
2000, in which Schneiders’ and Conn’s articles appear, and the contributions to 
Spirituality and the Secular Quest edited by Van Ness [1996]), but enough has 
been said to give a rough idea of the contemporary use(s) of the term. But 
contemporary uses of the term have not sprung out of nothing, they are devel-
opments or changes or variations on the original understanding, addressed in 
the following section: 
 
A brief history of spirituality 
A consideration of the origins of the term “spirituality” and tracking some of the 
mutations it has undergone over the centuries will help clarify what contribution 
the current enquiry can make to an understanding of human nature. According 
to William Principe, the concept of “spirituality” arose within a Christian context, 
deriving, unsurprisingly, from the Latin “spiritus” (a noun) and spiritalis/ 
spiritualis (an adjective), which in Paul’s epistles referred specifically to a life 
lived according to the Holy Spirit. Paul, Principe notes, did not take the human 
spirit to be an independent entity inhabiting the physical body, but rather to 
refer to the human person as open to and influenced by the Holy Spirit. The 
human “spirit” is contrasted to “flesh” (caro), the latter term denoting not the fact 
that the body is a material entity, but the individual’s state of being when not 
open to the influence of the Holy Spirit: “the ‘spirit’ within the human person is 
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all that is ordered, led, or influenced by the Pneuma Theou or Spiritus Dei, 
whereas…‘flesh’ is everything in a person that is opposed to this influence of 
the Spirit of God... The ‘spiritual’ person is one whose life is guided by the Spirit 
of God” (Principe 2000: 44-5). The term “flesh” does not refer to the corporeal 
body, “but rather to creatureliness. To live ‘according to the flesh’ means to live 
according to purely self-centered inclinations” (Wiseman 2006: 2). Schneiders, 
citing Paul’s letter to the Corinthians, attributes to him the coining of the 
neologism “spiritual” precisely in order to distinguish “the ‘spiritual person’ 
(pneumatikos) from the ‘natural person’ (psychikos anthropos)” (Schneiders 
2000: 252).  
The first recorded instance of the term “spirituality” (rather than simply 
“spirit” or “spiritual”) occurs in a 5th century letter (once but no longer attributed 
to St Jerome) where the recipient is urged to “so act as to advance in 
spirituality”; the context making it clear that “the author is urging a life according 
to the Spirit of God” (Principe 2000: 45), that is, the Pauline sense is still 
primary. As the centuries passed, however, a new meaning started to be 
attributed to “spirit” whereby it came to refer to an alleged entity in its own right, 
foreshadowing “the confusion of spirituality with disdain for the body and 
matter” (2000: 45). This shift in meaning was under way with Thomas Aquinas, 
in a few of whose texts “spiritualitas… is set in opposition to corporeity or 
matter” (2000: 45).  
Philip Sheldrake, director of the Institute of Spirituality, observes that as 
interest in interiority or subjective spiritual experience gradually developed, so 
“spirituality became separated from social praxis and ethics” (Sheldrake 2000: 
32), a tendency illustrated by the life of hermit and poet Richard Rolle, for 
whom spirituality consisted of “‘urgent longing’, ‘interior sweetness’ that set the 
heart ‘aglow’, ‘infusion of comfort’ and ‘perfervid love’. Rolle heard heavenly 
music, inaudible to the outward ear, which released a flood of pleasurable 
feeling that he identified with the love of God…” All very fine, to be sure, but 
“Rolle regularly insulted anybody who uttered the slightest criticism of his 
eccentric way of life with a stridency that jars with his lush descriptions of the 
love of God” (Armstrong 2009: 149-50).  
This tendency to chase after exotic experiences as being the essence of 
“spirituality” was warned against by Meister Eckhart, Rolle’s contemporary, who 
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preached that the attempt to practice special and exotic ways of experiencing 
God could result in God being missed: 
“… if a man thinks he will get more of God by meditation, by devotion, by 
ecstasies or by special infusions of grace than by the fireside or in the 
stable – that is nothing but taking God, wrapping a cloak round his head 
and shoving Him under a bench. For whoever seeks God in a special 
way gets the way but misses God, who lies hidden in it. But whoever 
seeks God without any special way gets Him as He is in Himself…” 
(Eckhart 1987: 117-8).  
 
This Eckhartian view of God to be found in the ordinary goings-on of life (by the 
fireside, in the stable) is also expressed by the 17th century poet and priest 
George Herbert in his poem The Elixir: “Who sweeps a room, as for thy laws/ 
makes that and th’action fine” (Herbert 1960: 32 – though it has been pointed 
out that Herbert probably had a maid servant to sweep his rooms…).  
With the increasing development of both secularism and individualism from 
the 16th century onwards as the Enlightenment advanced, and the concomitant 
split between “logos” (reason, or the pragmatic mode of thought) and “mythos” 
(concerned with finding and making of meaning in life) (Armstrong 2005, 2009) 
spirituality became increasingly privatised, and by the 17th century “spirituality 
came to refer to the interior life of Christians, but often with suspicious over-
tones of enthusiasm or even heresy… by the nineteenth and mid-twentieth 
centuries, spirituality automatically meant the interior life of those striving for 
perfection” (Conn 2000: 356).  
That, however, is perhaps putting it too strongly, for there continues to be a 
determined representation of the view that “spirituality” is not and cannot be 
understood purely in interior, subjective terms. For many years Kenneth Leech 
(referred to above) worked at the sharp end as a parish priest in the East End 
of London, where he continued to be a vocal and persuasive advocate of social 
spirituality, spirituality as inherently involving political and social action. 
Appalled at the way “in which ‘spirituality’ is being promoted as a way of 
avoiding and evading the demands of justice and of struggle for a more equal 
world” (Leech 1992: ix), he is suspicious of any claims that spirituality is a 
private, individual affair: “Christian spirituality is social spirituality. It is the 
spirituality of the Kingdom of God, of a pilgrim people, of the Body of Christ… 
There is very little in the New Testament about personal spirituality. The centre 
of gravity is always the body, the solidarity…” (Leech 1992: 150). Significantly 
however, despite his suspicion of “personal spirituality”, Leech considers that 
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critical to social spirituality is contemplative prayer, with the centrality of silence 
in his life as an activist: “silent waiting on God is the heart of prayer, a simple 
abiding in emptiness, weakness and attention, a recognition of the fact that it is 
the Spirit who prays within us in inarticulate groanings…” (1992: 194-5). That is 
to say, although Leech is suspicious of the notion of a “personal spirituality” in 
the sense of its being an individualistic enterprise where one is concerned for 
one’s own state of grace or otherwise, but not relating that to issues of social 
justice, he does not deny nor decry attention to the interior life as an aspect of 
Christian spirituality; it is more that he recognises that such interiority must not 
be an end in itself, but an essential concomitant of the social spirituality that he 
advocates. The latter needs the former, but the interiority on its own would 
result in “spirituality [becoming] separated from social praxis and ethics” 
(Sheldrake 1992: 32). 
From the above considerations, I am taking it that there are two crucial 
dimensions to “spirituality” as understood within a Christian context: 1) aware-
ness of and openness to God and to the influence of the Holy Spirit in all 
aspects of life; and 2) the social/ethical response to that influence. These are 
the “inner life and outer engagement, spiritual contemplation and social action” 
(Tacey 2004: 148). These two dimension are often referred to by the use of a 
spatial metaphor as relating “vertically to God…[and]... horizontally to other 
souls” (Underhill 1933: 19), and I will continue to use the terms “vertical” and 
“horizontal”, with the caveat that it does run the risk of implying that we are 
talking about two independent variables, rather than interdependent factors, for 
“[t]o recover one’s ‘vertical’ connection with the sacred other is at the same time 
to restore and renew our ‘horizontal’ connections with self, others and the 
world” (Tacey 2004: 122), and a focus purely on devotion “may even by itself 
be a form of self-indulgence, unless it issues in some costly and self-giving 
action... The spiritual life of any individual, therefore, has to be extended both 
vertically to God and horizontally to other souls; and the more it grows in both 
directions, the less merely individual and therefore the more truly personal it will 
be” (Underhill 1933: 19).  
An alternative metaphor could draw upon the properties of a circle, with the 
diameter standing for one’s relationship with the transcendent and the circum-
ference one’s relationship with self, others and the world. The diameter and 
circumference co-vary exactly for different sized circles, mathematically 
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expressed by the symbol π. To try changing one without changing the other 
destroys the circle. Similarly, perhaps, with spirituality. This metaphor inevitably 
has its own limitations, suggestive as it is of a quantitative relationship between 
transcendence and ethical action, which feels too mechanical and rigid; but 
since no metaphor can cover all possibilities (Soskice 1985), I will take the two 
metaphors to be complementary. 
 
Spirituality in action: Jesus of Nazareth 
The two dimensions of spirituality, vertical/diameter and horizontal/circum-
ference, manifested in a human life can easily be illustrated, the obvious 
example from Christianity being the figure of Jesus of Nazareth, though it 
should be remembered that, Jesus being not a Christian but a Jew, his 
teaching and activity belong within the context of Judaism (Sanders 1985; 
Vermes 1983; Wright 1996). Yet since the accounts of his life, death, resurr-
ection and teaching are the basis of Christianity, however much they might 
have become distorted over the past 2,000 years, it is still appropriate to 
consider his attitude as being normative for (Christian) spirituality.  
In the gospel according to St Matthew, Jesus is recorded as saying that 
“You must love the Lord your God with all your heart, with all your soul, and 
with all your mind… and… you must love your neighbour as yourself” (Matt 22: 
37-39), and in Luke’s gospel Jesus commended the lawyer who summarised 
the Law in identical fashion (Luke 10: 25-28). “Loving the Lord your God…” 
constitutes the vertical/diameter dimension, and “love your neighbour as 
yourself” the horizontal/circumference, and that Jesus not only enjoins both but 
is depicted in the gospels as manifesting both in his life and, according to 
Christian understanding, in the manner of his death and subsequent resurr-
ection is clear. For although we have no written accounts by Jesus himself to 
give us access to his subjective world, it is reasonable to suppose that we can 
infer his openness to God from his recorded behaviour, for there is “nothing in 
principle inaccessible about the settled intentions, aims, or ambitions of an 
individual. Even if little is said about them, they will gradually become apparent 
in actions performed, in choices made, in lifestyles adopted” (Wright 1996: 
101), a view which chimes with the evolutionary psychological concept of 
“theory of mind”, the putative faculty by which we infer the state of mind – 
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beliefs, intentions, desires and so forth – of another person, as discussed in 
chapter 7 of the current enquiry.  
We can infer something of Jesus’s interior life from his observable behav-
iour such as praying fervently, and there are a number of instances in the 
gospels where the reported actions of Jesus make good sense if understood as 
being the behavioural concomitants of a particular state of his interiority. For 
example, the gospel accounts depict his baptism by John being accompanied 
by his awareness of being chosen by God: “You are my Son, the Beloved, my 
favour rests on you” (Mark 1: 11) after which “the Spirit drove him into the 
desert and he remained there for forty days, and was put to the test by Satan” 
(Mark 1: 12-13 ). His time in the desert is usually and plausibly construed as a 
time of self-examination as he wrestled with what he was called to be and to 
do; it was a “struggle… about the nature of [his] vocation and ministry” (Wright 
1996: 458), “where it will become clearer what the deeper meaning of his 
messianic calling is” (Leuking 2001: 20) – a struggle memorably conveyed in 
Dennis Potter’s (1971) television play Son of Man. During the period of his 
active ministry he engaged in practices to maintain his openness to God, for we 
are told that he “went into the synagogue on the Sabbath day as he usually did” 
(Luke 4: 16), that “in those days… he went onto the mountain to pray; and he 
spent the whole night in prayer to God” (Luke 6: 12 ), that he taught his 
disciples the prayer universally known as the Lord’s Prayer (Matt 6: 9ff and 
parr). 
Near the other end of his ministry, the gospel accounts speak of Jesus in 
the garden of Gethsemane praying that God would, if willing, “take this cup 
away from [him]” and that “his sweat fell to the ground like great drops of blood” 
(Luke 22: 42, 44); and on the cross according to one account, he cried out, 
quoting from Psalm 22, “My God, my God, why have you forsaken me?” (Mark 
15: 34); and according to another account his final words quoted from psalm 
31: “Father, into your hands I commit my spirit” (Luke 23: 46). It would be 
perverse to deny that Jesus is being depicted as undergoing an inner struggle, 
seeking to remain open to the Spirit of God that God’s will might be done.  
Jesus’s openness to God was clearly of a piece with his attitude and active 
response to people he encountered, for as well as a preacher he is depicted as 
an exorcist and healer (Vermes 2000), constantly responding with compassion 
and action to those around him, to the extent of challenging the accepted 
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practices of the day by healing the “man with the withered arm” on the Sabbath 
(Luke 6. 6-11), and eating with the despised tax-collectors and sinners, 
scandalising the Jewish authorities in the process (Luke 5: 29-32). One of his 
best-known parables, following on from the above-mentioned lawyer’s question 
“But who is my neighbour?”, is that of the Good Samaritan (Luke 10: 29-37), in 
which the eponymous figure manifests outstanding altruism in the help and 
compassion he extends to a member of a hostile nation (“Jews, of course, do 
not associate with Samaritans” [John 4:9]); and in the more chilling parable of 
the sheep and goats (Matt 25: 31-46) Jesus commends the compassion and 
active help extended to the hungry and thirsty, the stranger, the sick, the 
imprisoned – “social praxis”, to use Sheldrake’s (1992: 32) expression. 
This (albeit brief) summary of spirituality, based on Jesus as the exemplar, 
clearly entails the vertical (or diameter) dimension of openness to what he 
understood and accepted as God the Father, and the horizontal (or circum-
ference) dimension of an openness and self-giving response to others.  
 
Non-Christian spirituality  
Even if this understanding of spirituality is a reasonable encapsulation of 
Christian spirituality, is it transferable to other faith (and, indeed, non-faith) 
traditions? Given the Christian origins of the term, it might seem best to confine 
“spirituality” to a Christian context and to what it means to live a life “guided by 
the Spirit of God” (Principe 1983: 45), but it is clear that the term has slipped 
out of its exclusively Christian (and, more specifically, Catholic) usage to 
become far more widely applicable. Schneiders comments that:  
“It is truly remarkable that a term which only 20 years ago [from 1989] 
connoted suspect enthusiasm or mindless piety in Protestant circles and 
was virtually unknown to Judaism, Eastern traditions, Native American 
religion, the new religious movements, or secular systems of life 
integration is now used freely within all of these circles. Even those who 
know that the term is historically Catholic do not seem to feel that it 
belongs to Catholicism or that to discuss spirituality is to appear on 
Catholic turf or to accept Catholic ground rules. It is very interesting that 
the Crossroad series includes a volume on ancient Greek, Roman, and 
Egyptian spirituality. Although from a strictly historical perspective this 
use of the term is clearly anachronistic, it functions well for a discussion 
of a particular dimension of the experience of classical antiquity” 
(Schneiders 2000: 259). 
 
In applying the term “spirituality” to non-Christian religions and to atheism and 
secularism, there is of course the danger of a form of religious or cultural 
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imperialism, of implying in effect that such other traditions need Christian 
concepts to improve and complete them. But the Crossroad series consists of 
25 volumes with the overall title “World Spirituality: an Encyclopedic History of 
the Religious Quest”, including volumes on “Buddhist Spirituality” (Yoshinori 
1995), “Hindu Spirituality” (Sivaraman 1989), Islamic Spirituality (Nasr 1987), 
Jewish Spirituality (Green 1985), and Spirituality and the Secular Quest (Van 
Ness 1996), each with contributions from practitioners belonging to the various 
traditions who clearly accept the term “spirituality” as validly pertaining to those 
traditions. Elsewhere, Buddhists such as the current Dalai Lama (2006) and the 
monk Thich Nhat Hanh (1996), the Jewish scholar Abraham Joshua Heschel 
(1986) and the Islamic writer on philosophy and religion, Aziz Esmail (1998), 
among others, also freely use the term.  
Moreover, King notes that every language and culture has its own word for 
“spirit”. In Hinduism and Buddhism “moksha and nirvana, sometimes translated 
as ‘liberation’ and ‘enlightenment’, come perhaps closest to some of the ideals 
referred to as ‘spirituality’ in English… Similarly, there exist specific spirit words 
in Arabic and Japanese, in Chinese, African, and indigenous tribal languages, 
each with their own connotations” (King 2009: 8). And not just religion has the 
spirit word: the avowed atheist Sam Harris devotes a chapter of his anti-religion 
polemic to a positive view of his understanding of spirituality as referring to “our 
attempts to explore and modify the deliverances of consciousness through 
methods like fasting, chanting, sensory deprivation, meditation, and the use of 
psychotropic drugs” (Harris 2005: 210). Likewise, Daniel Dennett (2006), 
another of the so-called “new atheists”, is happy to describe what he under-
stands by “spirituality”, and philosopher André Comte-Sponville (2008) devotes 
a book to atheistic spirituality. And then there is Marxist spirituality. According to 
Hay, although author Nancy Bancroft has no time for religious belief, she 
nevertheless constructs a Marxist version of spirituality on the basis of Marx's 
term “species being” which refers to “the deepest centre or spirit of humankind 
as a collective. The term asserts that there is no division between individual 
and society: ‘Human’ means precisely social" (quoted in Hay 2006: 29), which 
chimes with the horizontal/circumference dimension. 
These considerations, and recalling that the definition of “spirituality” offered 
by the general editor of the Crossroad series referred to “the deepest center of 
the person [where] the person is open to the transcendent dimension” (Cousins 
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1989: xii), we can see that spirituality has become a generic word with its focus 
on a perceived dimension of human nature, rather than on the original Judeao-
Christian conception of the Holy Spirit; that is to say, the referent of the term 
has shifted from the divine towards the human, and with it Christian spirituality 
has become a subset of a broader conception of spirituality. Nevertheless, the 
original Christian understanding can still provide a template for understanding 
spirituality in this broader sense, and here I would echo William Alston (1991) 
on the closely related topic of mysticism: 
“mystical perception was marked out in terms of the perceiver supposing 
herself to be directly experientially aware of God. ‘God’ was explained in 
standard theistic terms. But then how do we locate ‘mystical perception’ 
in nontheistic religions? How do we determine what counts as a practice 
of forming beliefs on the basis of mystical perception in Buddhism or 
nontheistic forms of Hinduism? To do so we must enlarge our conception 
of mystical perception as follows. In the major religions of the 
contemporary world… the religious responses of devotion, commitment, 
faith, hope, prayer, worship, adoration, and thanksgiving are directed to 
what is taken to be Ultimate, the ultimate determiner of one’s existence, 
condition, salvation, destiny or whatever. This Ultimate is conceived of 
differently in different religions. It may or may not transcend the world of 
nature, may or may not be personal, may or may not exhibit a tight unity. 
Thus as a wider conception of mystical perception I suggest the 
following. It is what is taken by the subject to be a direct experiential 
awareness of the Ultimate” (Alston 1991: 258). 
 
This appears to be an admirable way forward. As far as the “vertical” dimension 
of spirituality is concerned, “the Ultimate” in Judaism, Christianity and Islam 
goes by the name of YHWH, God the Father, or Allah respectively. For non-
theistic traditions, the term “the Ultimate” can be used to denote moksa 
(Hinduism), nirvana (Buddhism), Dao (Daoism) and so forth. This approach fits 
with the religious pluralism developed by John Hick, which I will be drawing on 
at length later in this enquiry. Hick settles on the term “the Real” to refer to that 
which is Ultimate (Hick 1989). I will follow him in this, and later will develop at 
greater length my reasons for accepting this as a valid approach, taking it for 
now that the transcendent dimension (the vertical, the diameter of spirituality) 
can be understood as referring to one’s being open to, and responding to, “the 
Real”, by whatever names it goes by, or has ascribed to it, in different faith and 
humanistic traditions. As will become clearer later on, when I discuss in chapter 
10 the operation of the proposed sensus transcendentis, the terms “the Trans-
cendent”, “the Real” and “the Ultimate” do not necessarily have to be construed 
as referring to something not of this world, but to that which is discernibly and 
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detectably embedded within the world, an aspect of our “total environment” 
which entails (inter alia) the biotic, social, physical and built components. 
The other dimension I have identified as being necessary to the under-
standing of Christian spirituality is the horizontal (the circumference of 
spirituality), involving social praxis and ethics. It is easy to see this as applying 
to the spirituality of other religious traditions, both theistic and non-theistic. Hick 
has detailed how universal among religions is the Golden Rule in some guise or 
other, describing how “it is the basic teaching of all the world religions that we 
should behave towards others as we would wish others to behave towards us,” 
and he proceeds to quote lines from the scriptures of ten “Axial” religions 
including, “‘One should never do that to another which one regards as injurious 
to oneself’ (the Hindu Mahabharata)… [and]… ‘As a mother cares for her son, 
all her days, so towards all living things a man’s mind should be all-embracing’ 
(the Buddhist Sutta Nipata)” (Hick 1999: 227). A good illustration of the 
importance accorded to the horizontal dimension of social praxis and ethics is 
the practice of yoga. A spiritual discipline to achieve self-forgetfulness, it could 
not be undertaken without commitment to the ethical dimension such that a 
beginner “was not allowed to perform a single yogic exercise until he had 
completed an intensive moral programme. Top of the list was ahimsa, ‘harm-
lessness’. A yogin must not swat a mosquito, make an irritable gesture or 
speak unkindly to others but should maintain constant affability to all, even the 
most annoying monk in the community” (Armstrong 2009: 30-1). 
 
Conclusion  
Although the witnesses I have called, like witnesses in a court case, are not 
giving identical accounts of spirituality, I am taking their corporate expert 
testimony as justifying what, for the purposes of this enquiry, I will mean by the 
term “spirituality”. I am not willing for the term “spirituality” to be applied simply 
to dimensionless inner sensations of “interior sweetness” and “infusion of 
comfort”, á la Richard Rolle, in the absence of the vertical dimension of open-
ness to transcendence and the horizontal dimension of response to others; and 
King, I accept, is right to warn of “a spirituality exclusively focused on personal 
concerns” (King 2009: 11). Spirituality, in the sense that it is used in traditions 
other than Christianity as well as Christianity itself, entails the vertical/ diameter 
dimension (awareness of and openness to transcendence or “the Real”) and 
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the horizontal/ circumference dimension (social and ethical praxis). The former 
is generally the realm of “religious experience” (though as will be seen such 
experiences are not necessarily construed by the subject as belonging to or 
arising out of a specific religious tradition), and the latter is generally the realm 
of ethics. I take Schneiders’ point that “spirituality” can also refer to an academ-
ic discipline, but the present enquiry is concerned with what she refers to as “a 
fundamental dimension of a human being, [and] the lived experience which 
actualizes that dimension” (Schneiders 2000: 250); though the present enquiry 
is, I trust, by way of a contribution to spirituality in the academic sense as well.  
I also draw attention to the fact that a number of the witness I have called 
upon posit the existence of what is variously described as a “spiritual core 
[where]… the person experiences ultimate reality…” (Cousins 1989: xii) or “a 
fundamental dimension of a human being” (Schneiders 2000: 250) or “a 
general human capacity for self-transcendence” (Conn 2000: 356). That is to 
say, a basic element of what constitutes humanness is a natural predisposition 
for spirituality. And I will, in due course, be arguing that human beings do 
indeed have a predisposition for spirituality – both dimensions of it – and that 
how this predisposition has arisen can be understood by means of concepts 
developed within the discipline of evolutionary psychology. 
Having identified the two dimensions of spirituality, the next issue is that of 
their human universality. It is an essential part of the model to be presented that 
the capacity for spirituality in both its dimensions is universal in the human 
species, and is not just the acquired ability of a particular subset, for it is with 
human psychological universals that evolutionary psychology concerns itself. 
Given the impossibility of testing every single member of Homo sapiens, alive 
or dead, for spiritual capacity, I will advance evidence and arguments in the 
next chapter to support the contention that the vertical/diameter capacity is 
widespread and in all likelihood universal. The horizontal/circumference 
dimension, under the guise of altruism, will be discussed in chapter 8. 
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Chapter 2: Of religious experience, spiritual awareness and roses 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter evidence is outlined that H. sapiens has had and continues to 
have experiences which constitute the vertical dimension or diameter of 
spirituality, namely our awareness of and openness to transcendence; and in 
chapter 10 these experiences will be attributed to the deliverances of a 
specialised “mental module”, the sensus transcendentis, whose proper function 
is to respond to intimations of transcendence in the total environment; and also 
that these experiences therefore constitute evidence supportive of the model.  
Although having established in the previous chapter that the contemporary 
usage of “spirituality” often distinguishes it from religion, in what follows I 
continue to use the term “religious experience” for two related reasons: first, for 
most of human history and prehistory spirituality was embedded in the religious 
culture of a given group or tribe (Rappaport 1999); and, second, the term “relig-
ious experience” is the one that continues to be used in much of the literature in 
this area. I do however, below, introduce a new term (“Rose”) which incorpor-
ates but is not limited by “religious experience” in order to take into account the 
division perceived by many to have occurred, or to be occurring, between 
religion and spirituality (Heelas and Woodhead 2005).  
First I address the area of prehistoric and primal religion before commenting 
on the transition period in human history known as the Axial Age, concluding 
with a longer discussion on more recent explorations into the “varieties of 
religious experience” (James 1902). 
 
Primal religion 
Religion, understood broadly, was arguably a major factor in the emergence of 
humanity from its pre- or proto-human condition, given the “absolute ubiquity of 
religion… [n]o society known to anthropology or history [being] devoid of what 
reasonable observers would agree is religion” (Rappaport 1999: 1), and the 
costliness of religion in terms of the “energy, blood, time and wealth that have 
been spent building temples, supporting priests, sacrificing to gods and killing 
infidels” strongly suggests that it is “in some way indispensable to the species” 
(1999: 2). Religion, in other words, rather than being simply a contingent 
cultural artefact that was invented and bolted on to our ancestors’ lives at some 
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arbitrary point in the evolution of H. sapiens, was integral to the gene-culture co-
evolution of our species, without which (Rappaport implies) we would not be 
who or what we are. 
It would be illuminating to observe first hand what constituted prehistoric 
religion, but since beliefs do not fossilise and the symbolic nature of rituals and 
ceremonies could hardly be unambiguously recorded before the invention of 
writing, the actual details of prehistoric religion can never be known for certain, 
nor the chronology of its origins and development. Archaeological evidence, 
however, gives pointers, and apart from some equivocal finds of red ochre 
engraved with motifs of crosses from around 75 kya (thousands of years ago), 
the evidence for the religious activities of our ancestors dates back to the Upper 
Palaeolithic, the period from roughly 50 to 12kya (Lewis-Williams 2010).  
By way of example, consider the evidence to be found in the deep limestone 
caves of France and Spain, with their extraordinary wall paintings often in 
places extremely difficult to access. Lewis-Williams, referring to the cave 
system known as Les Trois Frères in south-western France, describes how: 
“After one leaves the entrance to the Chapelle de la Lionne, the floor… 
slopes steeply down. Deeper and farther into the cave is the Sanctuary. 
On the left, high above this chamber, a narrow ledge leads to the 
ultimate parts of the cave, Le Tréfonds. Here there are paintings and 
engravings, including a red horse, fine engravings of bison, finger, stone 
or bone scrapings in the form of a grid, and a claviform (sic). In the 
nearby Galerie des Chouettes are two owls with what appear to be their 
young, and a mammoth; these representational images were made by 
scraping the clay surface with fingers… 
     On the right-hand wall of the Sanctuary is the famous image of the 
therianthropic ‘sorcerer’… Engraved and painted, this fusion of human 
and animal forms is on the wall behind a ledge some 4m above the floor 
of the Sanctuary” (2010: 218). 
 
The “sorcerer”, which has “owl-like eyes, antlers, human legs and a horse’s tail”, 
and seeing which was “probably the climax of a person’s visit to the cave”, 
would have been reached in prehistoric times by crawling through a narrow 
ascending tunnel with sides embellished with “swirling images”, which “may 
point to another and even deeper level of altered consciousness and consequ-
ently more overwhelming mental imagery associated with the close proximity to 
the ‘sorcerer’ that the narrow ledge necessitates” (2010: 219). 
In the same cave system there is also evidence of vast quantities of animals’ 
bone having been burned deep underground, possibly indicating “a nascent 
notion of sacrifice” (2010: 213); and further curious evidence in the same cave 
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system is of hundreds of small pieces of animal bone thrust into cracks in the 
rock walls. One possible explanation of this involves  
“the notion of immanence: something inside something apparently solid. 
The pieces of bone may be evidence for some sort of communication, or 
mediation, between the subterranean space in which people were and a 
spirit realm beyond the rock face. A belief along these lines would have 
heightened the emotional impact of what we see merely as a rock 
surface: for Upper Palaeolithic people, touching the rock was touching a 
powerful, perhaps dangerous, cosmological interface. We must also 
notice that it was fragments of dead animals that people were passing 
from one cosmological space to another. Was there, we may again ask, 
some notion here of sacrifice? Were dead animals seen as conduits 
between cosmological and spiritual areas? Were Upper Palaeolithic 
people ‘feeding’ supernatural beings behind the rock face?” (2010: 213). 
 
It is impossible to know how close to the true explanation these various surm-
ises are, but it seems clear to all who study them that the contents of the caves 
cannot be dismissed as random graffiti and the detritus of meaningless behav-
iour, but are indicative of a purposive, powerful and highly symbolic activity.  
The other source of possible ideas concerning prehistoric religion is 
contemporary tribal religions, for although these are as distant in time from 
prehistoric societies as are contemporary manifestations of the major world 
faiths like Christianity, examples such as African primal religions “perpetuate 
practices such as divination, spirit-possession, animal sacrifice, and witchcraft, 
which the written canonical traditions have gradually overlaid with more 
rationalized and moralized conceptual systems” (Ward 1994: 60). They can 
therefore at least provide hints and possibilities as to earlier forms of religion 
which in due course gave rise to the more developed traditions.  
A central role is played by ritual, considered by some to be the fundamental 
category of religion such that “the sacred, the numinous, the occult and the 
divine, and their integration into the Holy, are creations of ritual” (Rappaport 
1999: 3). The performance of ritual is a recognition of the gap between how 
things are and how things could or should be, and an attempt to bring about a 
closing of that gap; it is “a means of performing the way things ought to be in 
conscious tension to the way things are in such a way that this ritualized 
perfection is recollected in the ordinary, uncontrolled, course of things” 
(Jonathon Z. Smith, quoted in Bellah 2011: 135). 
An example of ritual is from the Bear cult of the Ainu of Japan, for whom 
bears are not regarded as distinct individuals but as:  
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“bearers of species-powers which can be reincarnated in successive 
individual bears. After being kept for some years, a bear cub is ritually 
killed in a great feast, so that its soul may return to its parents and tell of 
the kindness of the tribe in which it has lived… The important parts of the 
ritual are the killing, the offering, and the sharing of the sacrifice. The 
bear is killed only after it has been enraged by teasing, so that its full 
strength is expressed. One might say that the power of its life is 
concentrated in this way… It is both victim and the one to whom life is 
offered, so that it is in a sense a self-sacrifice, an offering of strength to 
the source of all strength. The way to the world of spirits is a way of 
discipline and renunciation. When the bear is ritually eaten, the people 
participate in that strength, binding themselves to the one they must kill 
in the hunt, yet on whose life they depend… What is important is the 
bringing to expression of the power which is vital to the survival of the 
tribe, the reverencing of that power by the offering of life, and the 
participation in that power by the tribe” (Ward 1994: 63-4; citing Joseph 
Campbell [1959]).  
 
Bellah (2011) gives brief sketches of contemporary “mythic cultures” including 
the Kalapalo of Brazil whose rituals are strongly musical, and he quotes Ellen 
Basso, who lived with this people in the late 1960s: 
“This world [of powerful beings and the Dawn people] is reproduced 
during ritual performances, in which Kalapalo collectively adopt the 
powerful mode of communication through which they engender the 
experience of a unity of cosmic forces, developed through the unity of 
sound formed by creative motion. In rituals, too, they most vividly realize 
their powers of presence. For by collectively performing music, they not 
only model themselves upon their images of powerful beings, but they 
feel the worth of those models by experiencing the transformative 
powers inherent in human musicality” (Basso, quoted in Bellah 2011: 
140). 
 
For the Walbiri, a semi-nomadic people who lived in the central desert of 
Australia, their identity (as for many of the Aboriginal peoples) is defined by 
their relationship to their “country”, that is, “locations to which they had a 
particular ancestral affiliation – because they believed that they had themselves 
come from their country and would after death return to it. Thus it is impossible 
to understand Aboriginal society without getting into ideas that we would call 
religious” (Bellah 2011: 147). In the myths of the “Dreaming”, the ancestors “are 
described as forming the natural world [and also] forming the social world, 
establishing customs and rituals as they travel through the landscape” (Bellah 
2011: 150), and establishing also the moral law and how one should act in 
society. As Nancy Munn, who studied the Walbiri in the 1960’s, discovered, the 
myths remain close to daily life:  
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“Occasional tales include behavior of an extraordinary kind, such as the 
transformation of a man into a snake, which Walbiri do not believe 
happens today; but such occurrences are exceptional. A large part of 
story behavior consists simply of the action patterns of daily life; food 
acquisition, mourning rites, ceremonies of various kinds… 
    While all these stories are regarded as traditional accounts of 
ancestral activities, it is obvious that we have here a narrative projection 
of the cyclical day-after-day experience of daily routine and a recounting 
of the sorts of incidences and behavior also possible for the most part in 
the ongoing present of Walbiri daily life. It is, in effect, this repetitive daily 
existence that is going under the label djugurba, ancestral way of life” 
(Munn, quoted in Bellah 2011: 149 – emphasis added). 
 
There is more that archaeology and anthropology can offer about the nature of 
primal religions and the putative prehistoric origins of religion, but the above 
comments are sufficient for present purposes, there being a number of 
characteristics to highlight which will be of use later in the current enquiry.  
The first characteristic is that primal religion arises from, or is an expression 
of, the perception that the experience and understanding of the world is not 
confined to its physical materiality but also includes or entails a “suprasensory” 
dimension which “underlies the perceived world and gives it meaning, purpose, 
and value” (Ward 1994: 53). This perception of “meaning, purpose and value” is 
dependent on the capacity for what Bellah refers to as “symbolic transcend-
ence, for seeing the realm of daily life in terms of a realm beyond” (Bellah 2011: 
9 – emphasis in original). 
A second characteristic of primal religion, or possibly an extension of the 
first, is of its everyday significance. The rituals are intended to ensure that the 
appropriate relationship is created or maintained with the “suprasensory powers 
for good and ill”, which will affect the “well-being and prosperity of the tribe” 
(Ward 1994: 61). Although drawing upon the tribal myths of cosmogony and 
ancestral beings, primal religion is concerned with the life of the tribe now, and 
how to ensure that the spirit powers are working in its favour. 
A third characteristic to highlight is the collective nature of much of the relig-
ious or spiritual experiences depicted, illustrated by the above brief accounts of 
the Ainu and the Kalapalo. Whereas in contemporary discourse the concept of 
“religious experience” has generally come to refer to, or at least to imply, a 
special kind of experience undergone by an individual (James 1902 – see later 
section of this chapter), in primal religion it is the people collectively who 
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engage in the rituals, and the powerful experiences are undergone by all in the 
presence of all: it is “primarily a social phenomenon” (Ward 1994: 61).  
The fact that rituals are collective does not prevent there being individuals 
who play a particular role in their tribes or groups, such as the shamans who 
were the “primordial religious specialists” (Sanderson 2009: 4). The shamans 
performed a variety of activities such as “healing and curing of illness, divin-
ation, protecting and finding game animals, communicating with the dead, 
recovering lost souls, and protecting people from evil spirits and the practit-
ioners of malevolent magic” (2009: 5). It is significant for the current enquiry, 
and its dependence on the universality of religious and spiritual experiences, 
that similar shamanistic practices are found to occur throughout the inhabited 
world, suggesting that there is “a common psychobiological basis to shamanic 
traditions, and thus that they are the result of independent invention rather than 
cultural diffusion” (2009: 5). A link with the “canonical” faiths is indicated by 
shamanistic practices being detectable in parts of the Hebrew scriptures with 
“claims to possession by spirits or gods in visions and dreams” (Ward 1994: 90) 
The understanding that the world is not exhausted by its materiality but that 
the “totality of the world is spiritual as well as material” (Ward 1994: 62) paves 
the way for the model I am developing, which entails our possessing an evolved 
“mental module” which tracks or perceives “intimations of transcendence” 
immanent in the world – in other words, it tracks or perceives the spiritual in the 
material. If indeed it is the case that religion is foundational in the evolution of 
humankind, and that the origins of religion lie in the apprehension that the 
spiritual and the material, the sacred and the secular, are one – or, at the very 
least, they mutually and fully interpenetrate – then it is feasible for a module, 
rooted in the physical world, to evolve in response to the spiritual. Moreover, 
since for primal religions “the world of sensory experience manifests a deeper 
reality of very varied character, which can be apprehended at a preconceptual 
level by minds which have been prepared for it” (Ward 1994: 68 – emphasis 
added), then this current enquiry is extrapolating from that to argue that all 
minds have been prepared for the apprehension of a deeper reality by the 
evolutionary processes of natural selection. This is supported by the character-
istic already noted that the religious rituals and experiences were/are collective 
as well as individual, not confined to a specialised few but species-wide. 
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The Axial Age 
The “Axial Age”, an expression coined by Jaspers (2011 [1953]), refers to a 
transitional period in human history lasting from roughly 800 BCE to 200 BCE 
(Armstrong 2000, 2006; Bellah 2011; Hick 1999), which saw a shift in the 
religious and spiritual life of human existence. Rather than seeing the divine 
embodied in diverse deities, “people increasingly began to worship a single, 
universal transcendence and source of sacredness” (Armstrong 2000: xii), 
epitomised by the development in the Hebrew scriptures of Yahweh from tribal 
god to the one true God (Armstrong 2000). 
But the development was not confined to the emerging Jewish faith. In other 
parts of the world during this period new insights were being promulgated by 
such as Confucius, Lao-Tzu, Gautama the Buddha, Mahavira (the founder of 
Jainism), the writers of the Upanishads, Zoroaster, Pythagoras, Socrates, Plato 
and Aristotle; and given that Christianity emerged from Judaism, and Islam 
presupposes both Judaism and Christianity, then “all of the present major world 
religions trace their roots to this axial period” (Hick 1999: 5). And though there 
were major differences among them, the Axial Age religions had (and have) 
important commonalities: “they all built on the old traditions to evolve the idea of 
a single, universal transcendence; they cultivated an internalized spirituality, 
and stressed the importance of practical compassion” (Armstrong 2000: xii-xiii).  
The factors catalysing this development included the increase in the scale of 
war and urbanization, raising levels of insecurity and anxiety, such that “an all-
powerful, loving God was an excellent prescription for people’s new sense of 
threat and danger” (Sanderson 2009: 13). The rise of the agrarian society 
brought agricultural surplus, in turn fuelling trade and a shift in power towards 
the market-place, and with the resultant wider perspective “the old local cults 
seem[ed] limited and parochial” (Armstrong 2000: xii).  
Hick emphasises a developing “sense of the unsatisfactoriness, the felt 
incompleteness of our ordinary human existence” (1999: 6), which led to a 
“soteriological” focus in various emerging religious traditions, that is, offering a 
path to, variously, salvation, enlightenment, liberation or fulfillment; but whereas 
one set of traditions (the “western”) refer to the problem of the unsatisfactori-
ness of human life as sin, “thus identifying guilt as the problem”, another 
tradition (the “eastern”) refer to spiritual blindness, “thus identifying false 
consciousness as the problem” (1999: 8). Either way, the Axial religions offer, or 
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claim to offer, an escape from or resolution of the unsatisfactoriness, a “trans-
formation from sinful and/or deluded self-centredness to a radically new 
orientation centred in the Divine, the Transcendent, the Ultimate” (1999: 8). 
For the current enquiry it is not necessary to delve further into the Axial Age 
transition (Armstrong 2006 and Bellah 2011 give full accounts); it is enough to 
note two points that I assume to be the case: first, the human faculties which 
underlie the Axial religions are the same as those which underlie the prehistoric/ 
primal religions, since it is generally accepted that “Upper Palaeolithic people 
had the same brain and cognitive abilities as we do” (Lewis-Williams 2010: 
210). This means that the transition was essentially a cultural rather than a 
biological process, and any mental module responsible for mediating the 
experiences of the prehistoric/primal religions would still be functioning in the 
context of Axial religions. 
Second, I assume that no single one of the range of primal/prehistoric 
manifestations of spirituality and religion can be taken a priori to be authoritat-
ively “true” and all the rest “false” – there are no sensible grounds on which, 
say, the Bear cult of the Ainu could be elevated above the Dreaming of the 
Walbiri in the truth stakes; and since the Axial religions arose from the prehist-
oric/primal religions there are likewise no a priori grounds for considering one of 
them to be authoritatively, one-hundred-percent true and the others false, and 
there should be “no assumption of the priority of one tradition as the norm" 
(Smart 1996: 4). 
 
Religious experience in the Axial age and after 
Religion has continued to be “a vital and pervasive feature of human life” (Smart 
1977 [1969]: 1), for despite the advance of secularization since the Enlighten-
ment, particularly in western Europe, there is “considerable persistence in some 
aspects of religious life”, namely “feelings, experience, and the more numinous 
religious beliefs” (Davie 2000: 7), and although many Europeans “have ceased 
to belong to their religious institutions in any meaningful sense… so far they 
have not abandoned many of their deep-seated religious aspirations” (2000: 8). 
Since the model that I am proposing entails the capacity for experiences of 
transcendence being a human universal, the continued widespread occurrence 
of such experiences despite the decline in formal attachment to religious 
structures will offer support for the model’s claim of universality. Hence the 
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accounts given below include experiences which occur outside formal 
structures of a specific religion. The standard expression “religious experience” 
is not, therefore, entirely satisfactory with its connotations of institutional 
religion, but the alternative term “spiritual awareness”, adopted by Hardy (1979) 
and Hay (2006) to emphasise that the focus of investigation is not the exclusive 
property of “religion”, also has its problems with connotations of the whole rag-
bag of human endeavours and experiences parodied by Stringfellow (1984). I 
therefore use where possible the label “Rose”, which is the acronym of 
“religious or spiritual experience”, for the general type of phenomena under 
consideration.  
But what counts as a “Rose”? “Religious experience” is a fuzzy concept 
(Swinburne 1979) and the Rose concept is fuzziness squared, containing two 
fuzzy concepts in “religious” and “spiritual”. A particular problem is whether 
these and related terms refer to some quality or other which is intrinsic to the 
experience, or whether they refer to a quality which is ascribed to the exper-
ience (Taves 2009). Referring to the former understanding as the “sui generis” 
or “intrinsic” model, and the latter as the “ascriptive” model, Taves clarifies that 
they “differ over whether there are uniquely religious (or mystical or spiritual) 
experiences, emotions, acts, or objects. The sui generis [i.e. intrinsic] model 
assumes implicitly or explicitly that there are. The ascriptive model claims on 
the contrary that religious or mystical or spiritual or sacred ‘things’ are created 
when religious significance is assigned to them. In the ascriptive model, 
subjects have experiences that they or others deem religious” (2009: 17).  
This is an important distinction to keep in mind regarding the sensus 
transcendentis model that I will be proposing, where the question will arise 
whether in delivering an experience of transcendence to the human organism, 
the sensus transcendentis is dealing with an intrinsic transcendence, or with an 
ascribed transcendence. For present purposes, however, I am not coming 
down on either the intrinsic or the ascriptive side, but am presenting a number 
of accounts to illustrate the range of experiences that are usually considered to 
be religious/spiritual (“Roses”), whether intrinsically or ascriptively so. This is 
the approach of Caroline Franks Davis, who allows both the objective and the 
subjective approaches to be included in the religious experience family. Looking 
upon “the quest for a neat, precise definition of ‘religious experience’... as 
fruitless”, she offers the observation that generally religious experiences “are 
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experiences which the subjects themselves describe in religious terms [i.e. 
ascriptively] or which are intrinsically religious ” (Davis 1989: 29, 31).  
As for categorising the various experiences, there would appear to be as 
many typologies as there are writers on the subject (Batson and Ventis 1982; 
Davis 1989; Glock and Stark 1965; Hay 2006; James 1902; Swinburne 1991 
[1979]; Yandell 1993; et many al), which would suggest that none of them are 
self-evidently cleaving nature at its joints. To avoid creating yet another ad hoc 
typology, but needing something to help ensure that a reasonable spread of the 
phenomena under discussion is considered, I am making use of two existing 
typologies – that of Davis (1989), since it is her description of “religious 
experiences” I have adopted, and that of Hay (2006) since unlike many other 
typologies it is based on empirical research. 
The great majority of what follows are examples of “focal” experiences 
(Alston 1991), those which, in principle at least, could be given a specific time 
and date of their occurrence, rather than “background” experiences that have 
more of a continuous, albeit fluctuating, character. The latter, although not so 
eye-catching, are no less important than the former. I pick up on this distinction 
below.  
 
Davis’s typology 
Davis (1989) offers a six-fold typology, with a number of subdivisions. Of the 
illustrative examples that follow, a number are those offered by Davis herself, 
culled from various sources, and the rest I supply, also variously gathered. I 
also provide a code for each to simplify future reference to individual accounts. 
 
CFD1) Interpretive experiences 
These are experiences taken to be religious because “a prior religious inter-
pretive framework” (1989: 33) is placed on them, such as seeing a misfortune 
as being a consequence of sins in a previous life, and “going through an illness 
with joy because it is a chance to ‘participate in Christ’s suffering’” (1989: 33). In 
the following, a religious interpretive framework gets applied to what is, in any 
case, a striking incident:  
“I was a young married woman with a 6 month old baby daughter. My 
husband and I got an evening off to see a film at K--- about 6 miles 
away. One of the hotel staff had volunteered to baby sit… We had not 
been long seated in the cinema when a terrible uneasiness overcame 
 51 
me. I could distinctly smell burning… eventually I told my husband I was 
leaving. He followed me reluctantly, muttering something derogatory 
about women. 
    At last we were sprinting down the lane leading to the cottage. The 
smell of burning was now very definite to me though my husband could 
not smell a thing. We reached the door which I literally burst in. As I did 
so the dense smoke poured out and a chair by the fire burst into flames. 
I rushed through to the bedroom and got the baby out while my husband 
dragged out the unconscious girl. She had fallen asleep in the armchair 
and dropped her lighted cigarette into the chair which had smouldered 
for hours. Yes, God sent me home to save my baby. God was with me 
telling me to hurry home; of that I am convinced and also my husband” 
(Davis 1989: 34). 
 
Davis notes that “[t]here is no evidence that the woman sensed a divine 
presence guiding her. Up to the last two sentences, the experience could have 
been described by an atheist” (1989: 35). Nevertheless, the woman interprets in 
retrospect her unease and olfactory sensation as being a message sent by 
God. 
 
CFD2) Quasi-sensory experiences 
This refers to experiences “in which the primary element is a physical sensation 
or whose alleged percept is of a type normally apprehensible by one of the five 
sense modalities… These include visions and dreams, voices and other 
sounds, smells, tastes, the feeling of being touched, heat, pain, and the 
sensation of rising up…” (1989: 35-6). She further subdivides this category into 
three (headings supplied by myself): 
 
CFD2a) quasi-sensory (sense of presence) 
In this category, experiences are taken to be of a spiritual entity that is actually 
present. In a strong parallel to Saul/Paul on the Damascus Road, the Sikh 
Sadhu Sundar Singh had a dramatic conversion experience to Christianity. 
Dissatisfied with Sikhism and violently opposed to Christianity, he had decided 
to kill himself if God didn’t revealed the right path to him: 
“In the room where I was praying I saw a great light. I thought the place 
was on fire. I looked round, but could find nothing. Then the thought 
came to me that this might be an answer that God had sent me. Then as 
I prayed and looked into the light, I saw the form of the Lord Jesus 
Christ. It had such an appearance of glory and love. If it had been some 
Hindu incarnation I would have prostrated myself before it. But it was the 
Lord Jesus Christ whom I had been insulting a few days before. I felt that 
a vision like this could not come out of my own imagination. I heard a 
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voice saying in Hindustani ‘How long will you persecute me? I have 
come to save you; you were praying to know the right way. Why do you 
not take it?’ The thought then came to me, ‘Jesus Christ is not dead but 
living and it must be He Himself.’ So I fell at His feet and got this 
wonderful Peace which I could not get anywhere else” (Davis 1989: 37). 
 
CFD2b) quasi-sensory (noetic communication)  
This refers to experiences which “are taken to be like pictures “‘sent’ by a divine 
being and requiring a certain amount of interpretation” (1989: 37) – that is, 
information is (believed to be) imparted – hence the term “noetic” (from “nous” 
meaning mind, understanding, or intellect). A well-known example is the visual 
parable of the master and the servant in one of Julian of Norwich’s revelations, 
and which took her 20 years of meditating upon to penetrate to the core of what 
she took to be its meaning:  
“I saw physically before me two people, a lord and his servant. And God 
showed me its spiritual meaning. The lord is sitting down quietly, relaxed 
and peaceful: the servant is standing by his lord, humble and ready to do 
his bidding. And then I saw the lord look at his servant with rare love and 
tenderness, and quietly send him to a certain place to fulfil his purpose. 
Not only does that servant go, but he starts off at once, running with all 
speed, in his love to do what his master wanted. And without warning he 
falls headlong into a deep ditch, and injures himself very badly. And 
though he groans and moans and cries and struggles he is quite unable 
to get up or help himself in any way. To crown all, he could get no relief 
of any sort: he could not even turn his head to look at the lord who loved 
him, and who was so close to him. The sight of him would have been of 
real comfort, but he was temporarily so weak and bemused that he gave 
vent to his feelings, as he suffered his pains… I was greatly surprised to 
see with what humility this servant endured such suffering and I sought 
most carefully to find some fault in him, and to know if his lord regarded 
him as blameworthy. And, in truth, I could see neither. Basically it was 
his own good will and great longing that had caused his fall; he was still 
as loyal and goodhearted as when he stood before his lord, ready to do 
his bidding. And it is thus that his master always sees him…” (Julian of 
Norwich 1966: 141-142). 
 
Julian proceeds to offer interpretations of this visual parable (the lord as God, 
the servant variously as Adam; everyman, and Christ – in the latter role, Christ 
‘falls’ into Mary’s womb), and understands God to be telling her that the “much 
beloved servant should be truly and gladly rewarded beyond anything he could 
have had had he not fallen” (Julian of Norwich 1966 [1393]: 143). 
 
CFD2c) quasi-sensory (religious context) 
Here, quasi-sensory experiences such as “light… beautiful music, bells, sweet 
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odours, and heat” only gain religious significance from the context in which they 
occur, such as during prayer or meditation, or “because the subject has been 
taught to expect such experiences as ‘favours’ from God or signs of progress” 
(1989: 38). An example is the account by R. M. Bucke, who coined the term 
“cosmic consciousness”: 
“I had spent the evening in a great city, with two friends, reading and 
discussing poetry and philosophy. We parted at midnight. I had a long 
drive in a hansom to my lodging. My mind, deeply under the influence of 
the ideas, images, and emotions called up by the reading and talk, was 
calm and peaceful. I was in a state of quiet, almost passive enjoyment, 
not actually thinking, but letting ideas, images, and emotions flow of 
themselves, as it were, through my mind. All at once, without warning of 
any kind, I found myself wrapped in a flame-colored cloud. For an instant 
I thought of fire, an immense conflagration somewhere close by in that 
great city; the next, I knew that the fire was within myself. Directly 
afterward there came upon me a sense of exultation, of immense 
joyousness accompanied or immediately followed by an intellectual 
illumination impossible to describe. Among other things, I did not merely 
come to believe, but I saw that the universe is not composed of dead 
matter, but is, on the contrary, a living Presence; I became conscious in 
myself of eternal life. It was not a conviction that I would have eternal life, 
but a consciousness that I possessed eternal life then; I saw that all men 
are immortal; that the cosmic order is such that without any peradventure 
all things work together for the good of each and all; that the foundation 
principle of the world, of all worlds, is what we call love, and that the 
happiness of each and all is in the long run absolutely certain. The vision 
lasted for a few seconds and was gone but the memory of it and the 
sense of the reality of what it taught have remained during the quarter of 
a century which has since elapsed. I knew that what the vision showed 
was true. I had attained to a point of view from which I saw that it must 
be true. That view, that conviction, I may say that consciousness, has 
never, even during periods of the deepest depression, been lost” (quoted 
in James 1902: 385). 
 
Davis notes that in most religious traditions such quasi-sensory experiences 
are of trivial importance, and are even viewed as obstacles to further spiritual 
growth if they are mistaken for the ultimate goal.  
 
CFD3) Revelatory experiences 
These comprise “sudden convictions, inspiration, revelation, enlightenment, ‘the 
mystical vision’, and flashes of insight” (1989: 39), experiences which, 
according to Davis, entails the acquisition of (alleged) new knowledge that 
seems to have been ‘poured in’ by an external agency rather than acquired 
through the exercise of reason or by sense perception, and which carries utter 
conviction though impossible to put into words:  
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“A great inward light seemed to illuminate my thoughts, I experienced a 
magnificent sensation of arrival. I was filled with joy as though I had just 
discovered the secret of world peace. I suddenly knew. The odd thing 
was that I did not know what I knew. From then on I set out to define it” 
(Davis 1989: 41). 
 
The knowledge allegedly gained in this kind of experience can range from the 
highly ramified, such as Christian claims regarding the Holy Trinity, to much less 
ramified claims such as Bucke’s just quoted revelation of love being “the 
foundation principle of the world”. Such private revelations, however, are “not 
accorded a high degree of trust” by religious authorities (1989: 43). 
 
CFD4) Regenerative experiences 
These experiences “tend to renew the subject’s faith and improve his spiritual, 
moral, physical, or psychological well-being”, ranging from mild to overwhelm-
ing, from regular occurrences to one-offs, from being “a vague feeling of peace 
during prayer to [being] a combined vision, revelation, and ‘sense of holy 
presence’” (1989: 44, 45).  
One example is John Wesley’s diary entry of listening to a sermon based on 
Paul’s letter to the Romans:  
 
CFD4a) holy presence 
“… while he [the preacher] was describing the change which God works 
in the heart through faith in Christ, I felt my heart strangely warmed. I felt 
I did trust in Christ, Christ alone, for salvation; and an assurance was 
given me, that He had taken away my sins, even mine, and saved me 
from the law of sin and death” (1989: 46 – emphasis in original).  
 
A second example is of Leslie Weatherhead’s “Vauxhall Station” experience, 
though as Davis acknowledges it borders on the mystical or numinous. The 
following is from the fuller account given by Hardy (1979) 
 
CFD4b) regenerative/mystical 
“Vauxhall Station on a murky November Saturday evening is not the 
setting one would choose for a revelation of God!... The third-class 
compartment was full. I cannot remember any particular thought 
processes which may have led up to the great moment... For a few 
seconds only, I suppose, the whole compartment was filled with light. 
This is the only way I know in which to describe the moment, for there 
was nothing to see at all. I felt caught up into some tremendous sense of 
being within a loving, triumphant and shining purpose. I never felt more 
humble. I never felt more exalted. A most curious, but overwhelming 
sense possessed me and filled me with ecstasy. I felt that all was well for 
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mankind... All men were shining and glorious beings who in the end 
would enter incredible joy. Beauty, music, joy, love immeasurable and a 
glory unspeakable, all this they would inherit... An indescribable joy 
possessed me… 
     All this happened over fifty years ago, but even now I can see myself 
in the corner of that dingy third-class compartment with the feeble lights 
of inverted gas mantles overhead and the Vauxhall Station platforms 
outside with milk cans standing there. In a few moments the glory 
departed – all but one curious, lingering feeling. I loved everybody in that 
compartment. It sounds silly now, and indeed I blush to write it, but at 
that moment I think I would have died for any one of the people in that 
compartment” (Hardy 1979: 53). 
 
CFD5) Numinous experiences  
These consist of “creature-consciousness, that is, the feeling that mortal flesh is 
somehow despicable in the face of eternal majesty”, and of mysterium 
tremendens involving “awe, dread or terror” before the “wholly other” numen 
(1989: 48-9, citing Otto [1958 (1923)]). 
 
CFD5a) numinous (creature consciousness)  
Exemplified by the passage from Isaiah:  
“In the year that King Uzziah died, I saw the Lord seated on a throne, 
high and exalted, and the train of his robe filled the temple. Above him 
were seraphs, each with six wings: With two wings they covered their 
faces, with two they covered their feet, and with two they were flying. 
And they were calling to one another: Holy, holy, holy is the LORD 
Almighty; the whole earth is full of his glory. At the sound of their voices 
the doorposts and thresholds shook and the temple was filled with 
smoke. Woe to me! I cried. I am ruined! For I am a man of unclean lips, 
and I live among a people of unclean lips, and my eyes have seen the 
King, the LORD Almighty. Then one of the seraphs flew to me with a live 
coal in his hand, which he had taken with tongs from the altar. With it he 
touched my mouth and said, See, this has touched your lips; your guilt is 
taken away and your sin atoned for. Then I heard the voice of the Lord 
saying, Whom shall I send? And who will go for us? And I said, Here am 
I. Send me!” (Isaiah 6:1-8 – New International Version, UK). 
 
CFD5b) numinous (awe)  
The Bhagavad Gītā, itself part of the great Sanskrit epic, the Mahābhārata, tells 
of the revelation of Krishna to Prince Arjuna on the battlefield as he is about to 
enter into combat with members of his own family. Arjuna believes Krishna, his 
charioteer, to be simply a prince who has volunteered for the role, and he asks 
him if it would be better to let himself be killed rather than kill his kinsmen. After 
Krishna counsels him at length, the account continues: 
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“When Krishna, the God of Yoga, had thus spoken… he appeared then 
to Arjuna in his supreme divine form. And Arjuna saw in that form 
countless visions of wonder: eyes from innumerable faces, numerous 
celestial ornaments, numberless heavenly weapons; celestial garlands 
and vestures, forms anointed with heavenly perfumes. The Infinite 
Divinity was facing all sides, all marvels in him containing. If the light of a 
thousand suns suddenly arose in the sky, that splendour might be 
compared to the radiance of the Supreme Spirit. And Arjuna saw in that 
radiance the whole universe in its variety, standing in a vast unity in the 
body of the God of gods. Trembling with awe and wonder, Arjuna bowed 
his head, and joining his hands in adoration he thus spoke to his God. I 
see in thee all the gods, O my God; and the infinity of the beings of thy 
creation, I see god Brahma on his throne of lotus, and all the seers and 
serpents of light. All around I behold thy Infinity: the power of thy 
innumerable arms, the visions from thy innumerable eyes, the words 
from thy innumerable mouths, and the fire of life of thy innumerable 
bodies. Nowhere I see a beginning or middle or end of thee, O God of 
all, Form Infinite! I see the splendour of an infinite beauty which illumines 
the whole universe. It is thee! with thy crown and sceptre and circle. How 
difficult thou art to see! But I see thee: as fire, as the sun, blinding, 
incomprehensible” (Bhagavad Gita: 89-90). 
 
CFD5c) numinous (evil) 
Davis explicitly recognizes that an experience of evil can also be regarded as a 
religious experience, and even have a numinous quality to it, as in the following: 
“Suddenly I became aware of a sense of the uttermost evil, so much so 
that I became awake. I could feel this sense of evil enveloping me. I had 
the terrifying impression that this evil force or presence was bent upon 
taking possession of me. How does one describe evil? I only knew that I 
was enveloped by this revolting force, so vile and rotting I could almost 
taste the evil. I was in terror, so much so I could not call out or move. A 
part of my mind told me I must at all costs act or I would be lost. I recall 
that I managed by a great effort to stretch out my right hand and with my 
index finger I traced the shape of the Cross in the air. Immediately on my 
doing this the evil enveloping me fell away completely, and I felt a 
wonderful sense of peace and safety” (Davis 1989: 51). 
 
CFD6) Mystical experience  
Although the term “mysticism” is another of the fuzzy brigade, carrying “different 
connotations to different minds” (Happold 1970: 36), Davis restricts her use of 
the term to those experiences manifesting the characteristics of “i) the sense of 
having apprehended an ultimate reality; ii) the sense of freedom from the 
limitations of time, space, and the individual ego; iii) a sense of ‘oneness’; and 
iv) bliss or serenity” (Davis 1989: 54). 
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CFD6a) sense of oneness (extrovertive) 
An extrovertive mystical experiences is one in which “the multiplicity of 
external objects is seen as somehow unified and divine” (1989: 54).  
“One day I was sweeping the stairs down in the house in which I was 
working, when suddenly I was overcome, overwhelmed, saturated, no 
word is adequate, with a sense of the most sublime and living LOVE. It 
not only affected me, but seemed to bring everything around me to LIFE. 
The brush in my hand, my dustpan, the stairs, seemed to come alive 
with love. I seemed no longer me, with my petty troubles and trials, but 
part of this infinite power of love, so utterly and overwhelmingly 
wonderful that one knew at once what the saints had grasped. It could 
only have been a minute or two, yet for that brief particle of time it 
seemed eternity” (1989: 58). 
 
CFD6b) sense of oneness (introvertive)  
Introvertive mystical experiences are “usually obtained through the practice of 
‘introspective’ meditative technique, [and] are ‘unitary’ rather than ‘unifying’; 
subjects shut out all external and internal diversity and dive deep within them-
selves to discover ‘the One’” (1989: 54-5). St Teresa of Avila, a theistic mystic, 
who elsewhere uses the image of marriage to describes her experience, here 
uses the image of absorption: 
“… it is like rain falling from the heavens into a river or a spring; there is 
nothing but water there and it is impossible to divide or separate the 
water belonging to the river from that which fell from the heavens” (Davis 
1989: 63).  
 
Hay’s typology 
Initially drawn up by examining the thousands of accounts collected by Hardy at 
the RERU, Hay’s typology was central to the studies conducted using a 
sampling methodology in 1987 and 2000 (Hay 2006). The following are the 
eight most common types of experience Hay has found. 
 
DH1) A patterning of events/synchronicity 
Hay reports that according to his surveys, “the commonest kind of experience 
reported in Britain is the recognition of a transcendent providence: a patterning 
of events in a person’s life that convinces them that in some strange way those 
events were meant to happen” (Hay 2006: 11). 55% of Hay’s national sample 
reported this type of experience, as in this account from an informant who had 
decided to kill herself: 
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“…at that moment I let out a loud challenge into that dark and lonesome 
night, into that desolation of land and soul and I shouted:.. IF THERE IS 
SUCH A THING AS A GOD THEN SHOW YOURSELF TO ME – NOW... 
and at that very instant there was a loud crack, like a rifle shot [coming 
from the bedroom]... I stumbled through the open door to my bedroom. I 
fell into the bed shaking and then something forced my eyes upward to 
the wall above my bedside table and where I had a very small 
photograph of my father hanging... The picture had gone – I just looked 
at the empty space... but in looking closer I saw the photograph, face 
down on the little table and the narrow silver frame was split apart, the 
glass broken and from behind the cardboard on the back there had 
slipped out... the last letter [my father] had written me... When I picked 
up that letter and read over and over again the words of this beloved 
caring father of mine, I knew that was HIS help to me, and God 
answered me directly in the hour of this soul being in anguish” (Hay 
2006: 12-13) 
 
Hay comments “Much more commonly, people speak of coming to recognise an 
unfolding pattern in their lives that has not been dictated by their personal 
choice, as for example in the selection of a career. Almost without exception 
this configuration is interpreted as something ‘given’, though not necessarily 
with an overtly religious connotation” (Hay 2006: 13).  
 
DH2) Awareness of the presence of God 
38% of those polled in 2000 reported that they had had an experience of 
“personal awareness” of a divine presence (Hay 2006: 13). Two illustrative 
experiences: 
 
DH2a) presence of God (adult experience)  
"I was looking after the Friends Meeting House high on a spur of the 
forest, and sleeping on a camp bed in the sitting-room of the dwelling 
next door. One night I awoke slowly at about one o'clock to a feeling of 
absolute safety and happiness; everything in the world around me 
seemed to be singing 'All is very well'. After an almost unbelieving (sic) 
few minutes I got up and went to the window and saw the valley filled 
with the love of God, flowing and spreading from the roadside and the 
few houses of the village. It was as though a great source of light and 
love and goodness was there along the valley, absolutely true and 
unchangeable. I went outside and looked down over the hedge, and the 
light and assurance were most truly there; I looked and looked, and, to 
be honest, I was not thankful, as I should have been, but trying to absorb 
the awareness of safety and joy so deeply that I would never forget it” 
(2006: 13-14). 
 
DH2b) presence of God (childhood experience) 
"My father used to take all the family for a walk on Sunday evenings. On 
one such walk, we wandered across a narrow path through a field of 
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high, ripe corn. I lagged behind, and found myself alone. Suddenly, 
heaven blazed upon me. I was enveloped in a golden light, I was 
conscious of a presence, so kind, so loving, so bright, so consoling, so 
commanding, existing apart from me but so close. I heard no sound. But 
words fell into my mind quite clearly – Everything is all right. Everybody 
will be all right" (2006: 14). 
 
The informant herself, Hay reports, connected this with the famous saying of 
Julian of Norwich (1966 [1393]).  
 
DH3) Awareness of a presence not named 
Although not included in Hay’s 2000 poll, over 20% of respondents in the 1987 
sample referred to this kind of experience, including this from an adult 
recounting an experience as a young child: 
“… dusk, summertime, and I one of a crowd of grown-ups and children 
assembled round the shore of an artificial lake, waiting for full darkness 
before a firework display was to begin. A breeze stirred the leaves of a 
group of poplars to my right; stirred, they gave a fluttering sound. There, 
then, I knew or felt or experienced – what? Incommunicable now, but 
then much more so. The sensations were of awe and wonder, and a 
sense of astounding beauty… that child of 6 or 7 or 8 knew nothing of 
Wordsworth or about mysticism or about religion” (2006: 16).  
 
DH4) Awareness of prayer being answered  
37% of the 2000 survey “felt they had received such help” (Hay 2006: 17). One 
correspondent had been waiting through the night with his dying father: 
“I was stretched out hardly a foot away from my father as his life slipped 
from his body, and came to the shocking conclusion that I was of very 
little help to him. He lay there not making much sound, just enough to 
make me aware that he was in distress… I thought to myself, this is the 
worst night of my life. I found I was praying. Not words. Just a despairing 
reaching towards God to help me through the night. Then, slowly, an 
extraordinary change began to take place. I became more and more 
strongly aware of God’s presence filling the room, indescribably powerful 
and… drawing my father and me, all things, together in a vast, rich 
harmony. Then it seemed as if something like a hard crust was 
dissolving or falling away inside me. I knew what was happening. The 
wounded relationship was being tenderly uncovered and healed. I was 
filled with joy. The rest of what I experienced is beyond words” (Hay 
2006: 18). 
 
DH5) Awareness of a sacred presence in nature  
Reported by 29% of Hay’s respondents (2006:19), this category would seem to 
overlap with the above category of “a presence not named”. Hay records this 
example:  
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“I was staying in Ireland in a cottage by the sea, with a beach, sand 
dunes and mountains. Walking through the dunes to call the family home 
from their fishing in the river, I came to the hollow I had walked through 
many times. This time I was halted by a voice saying clearly ‘Take off 
your shoes, the ground on which you stand is holy ground.’ I had no 
shoes on, but I was compelled on to my knees and then into a crouch so 
that I was as close as I could be to the ground. Then a tremendous 
silence came around me; I almost felt it touched me, I was enclosed in it. 
Yet I could hear the insects, bees, beetles, ants, etc. in the small flowers 
in the short grass, and I was one with them, creatures and flowers. I 
could hear the sheep and the breakers beyond on the beach, and I was 
one with them and the sea. Rivers, and for some reason the Victoria 
Falls (which I have never seen) came into my mind, and I was one with 
all waterfalls, all trees, all living things everywhere. A farmer’s wife in the 
valley had just had a baby and I was one with them, and the old woman 
on the mountain who was dying and her relatives who were with her 
before they left for America, and I was one with them. Not only ‘one with’, 
somehow I was them. Then I thought, ‘God is here, with me and in me, 
the Creator’, and for that moment I was one with and in God…” (2006: 
19-20). 
 
Hay gives no contextual information regarding the informant, but it would be 
plausible to assume that he/she was Biblically literate, with the “take off your 
shoes, the ground on which you stand is holy ground” a direct quote from 
Moses’ burning bush experience (Exodus 3:5). 
 
DH6) Awareness of the presence of the dead 
25% of Hay’s respondents “felt they had been in touch with someone who has 
died” (Hay 2006: 20)  
“After the sudden death of my husband about nine years ago, I had 
several experiences, which proved to me that there is life after death. 
After his passing, I both saw and spoke to my husband and held his 
hand. This hand was strong and not at all ghost-like, nor was his 
appearance. I was alone at the time, so no medium there to act as a link” 
(2006: 20).  
 
DH7) Awareness of an evil presence 
Hay reports that 25% of his 2000 sample “felt they had been aware of an evil 
presence… These experiences are qualitatively different from all the other 
categories… in that they are associated with a sense of great dread and 
unhappiness” (2006: 21). An example is given above (category CFDc). 
 
DH8) Awareness that all things are One  
5% of Hay’s 1987 sample reported such an experience, which involves 
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“coherence, unity, shading into the mystical ‘All is one’” (this category was not 
explored in the 2000 survey) 
“I was walking across a field, turning my head to admire the Western sky 
and looking at a line of pine trees appearing as black velvet against a 
pink backdrop, turning to duck egg blue/green overhead, as the sun set. 
Then it happened. It was as if a switch marked ‘ego’ was suddenly 
switched off. Consciousness expanded to include, be, the previously 
observed. ‘I’ was the sunset and there was no ‘I’ experiencing ‘it’. At the 
same time – eternity was ‘born’. There was no past, no future, just an 
eternal now… then I returned completely to normal consciousness 
finding myself walking across the field, in time, with a memory” (2006: 
23). 
 
 
Further examples 
The overwhelming majority of accounts quoted above concern experiences 
which are, at least in principle, datable – that is, each occurrence took place at 
a particular time in a particular place. But the term “experience” is not only used 
for one-off occurrences, but also for an accumulated awareness of how things 
are, as in statements such as “in my experience, Dartmoor weather can change 
in an instant” or “her experience as a lawyer is extensive” – not specifying single 
instances, but referring to background, almost tacit, awareness. Alston (1991) 
draws a distinction between “focal” and “background” religious experiences, 
acknowledging that both are important, but “[t]he former get the big press: these 
are the cases in which the awareness of God occupies one’s attention to the 
exclusion of all else… There are many testimonies to a sense of the presence 
of God that is of much lower intensity and persists for long periods of time as a 
constant background for the flux of everyday experience” (Alston 1991: 32).  
The focal and the background need not be thought of as mutually exclusive 
– an analogy being the relationship between a couple who have been together 
for years: their love for each other may well have become “background”, simply 
part of the assumptive world in which each partner lives, yet with occasional 
“focal” experiences of their love in special times together, including making love. 
An example of the background religious experience is the following: 
 
X1) an habitual sense of the presence of God: 
"God is more real to me than any thought or thing or person. I feel his 
presence positively, and the more as I live in closer harmony with his 
laws as written in my body and mind. I feel him in the sunshine or rain; 
and awe mingled with a delicious restfulness most nearly describes my 
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feelings. I talk to him as to a companion in prayer and praise, and our 
communion is delightful. He answers me again and again, often in words 
so clearly spoken that it seems my outer ear must have carried the tone, 
but generally in strong mental impressions. Usually a text of Scripture, 
unfolding some new view of him and his love for me, and care for my 
safety. I could give hundreds of instances, in school matters, social 
problems, financial difficulties, etc. That he is mine and I am his never 
leaves me, it is an abiding joy. Without it life would be a blank, a desert, 
a shoreless, trackless waste” (James 1902: 85). 
 
It is slightly ironic that the above example comes from James, since the general 
interest in focal experiences rather than the background experiences can be 
attributed in a large part to his pioneering work. Although he acknowledged the 
latter, his main interest was in the experiences of individuals and not in the 
institutional structures of religion, and he favoured the “more developed 
subjective phenomena recorded in literature produced by articulate and fully 
self-conscious men, in works of piety and autobiography” rather than the 
experiences of “your ordinary religious believer, who follows the conventional 
observances of his country” (1902: 26, 29).  
 
X2) The collective experience  
Although James’s demarcation of the territory allowed considerable progress to 
be made in the understanding of the varieties of religious experience, it also 
demoted certain other experiences. James took religion (and hence religious 
experience) to mean “the feelings, acts and experiences of individual men in 
their solitude, so far as they apprehend themselves to stand in relation to 
whatever they may consider the divine” (1902: 50 – emphasis added), but, 
given the collective or communal nature of prehistoric and primal religion, one 
would expect the collective or communal also to be a valid context for Axial 
religious experiences as well, such that “the link between the believer and the 
divine (or whatever), may be essentially mediated by corporate, ecclesial life” 
(Taylor 2002: 23). There are ways in which the communal life itself mediates the 
religious experience, as in the call to “live together in brotherly love, and to 
radiate outward such love as a community” (2002: 24). A practising Catholic 
himself, Taylor suggests that the church as “a sacramental communion… raises 
more explicitly the idea of God’s life interpenetrating ours, and of this interpenet-
ration being made fuller, more intense and immediate through our own 
practices… [and] the connection gains a certain intensity in the signs instituted 
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to manifest it, which are called sacraments” (2002: 24-5). Membership of the 
church and involvement in its life can constitute a collective, not simply 
personal, religious experience. And it is not exclusive to Catholicism that one’s 
relation with God can be through the community: “this is the way that the life of 
the Christian church has been conceived, among many Protestants as well as 
Catholics; and also the way Israel and the Islamic umma have been conceived” 
(2002: 24). Moreover, the collective or communal are necessary contexts for 
some of the experiences, for "[w]ithout the traditions, the cultural and linguistic 
institutions, of the people of Israel, Jesus could not have had his 'personal' 
experience of the mystery he called Father, in the way that he had it, nor could 
Paul have had his 'personal' experience of the mystery of Christ" (Lash 1988: 
57 – emphasis in original). The equivalent, I would take it, is applicable to 
Moses, Buddha, Muhammad, Guru Nanak et al. 
There is another possible way of perceiving a Rose in a non-individualistic 
manner which, having found no mention of it in the literature, I advance with 
caution. It is based on an analogy with the “systemic” approach in psycho-
therapy, as exemplified in Family Therapy. Although the great majority of 
psychotherapies on offer have an individualistic focus (Dryden 1989), an 
alternative approach has arisen with its theoretical roots in General Systems 
Theory (Bertalanffy 1968), whereby individuals are seen as being part of larger 
systems (typically, the family) such that any symptom an individual is manifest-
ing (anxiety attacks, depression, eating disorders…) is construed as belonging 
to the system as a whole (i.e. the family), not just to the individual him or her-
self. Since the symptom belongs to the system, not to the individual, the task 
ceases to be about “curing” the individual, but about discovering what role that 
symptom plays in the life of the system (the family) and enabling the family to 
change its functioning such that the symptom no longer has a part to play 
(Carter and McGoldrick 1981). 
Since (or “if”) a psychiatric symptom can be seen as belonging to a family 
(or to a wider system of people) rather than just to the individual who is 
manifesting it, then what is perceived to be a religious experience undergone by 
one individual may equally well be construed as belonging to the (or a) wider 
system of which he/she is an active participant. That is to say, the religious 
experience of the individual is also the religious experience of the collective, 
and without the collective the religious experience would not occur. The 
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individual who undergoes the experience does so, perhaps unwittingly (as with 
psychiatric symptoms) on behalf of the corporate body. In Christian terms, this 
perhaps has parallels with Paul’s image of the body of Christ (1 Cor. 12) in 
which different members perform different functions – the eye sees, not for its 
own good but for the body entire. If this analogy holds, it implies that a religious 
experience, or Rose, is not a purely private affair nor a private possession, but 
belongs to and can only be fully appreciated in the wider system or community.  
 
X3) The spiritual through the aesthetic: redemption through form  
A further possible category not covered by the examples given so far is that of a 
sense of the sacred conveyed by the aesthetic. Although it is contentious as to 
where the boundary between the religious and the aesthetic lies (Paffard 1973), 
the creation of and/or response to a work of art clearly acts for some either as 
such an experience in its own right or as an antecedent for such an experience. 
Artist Mark Rothko commented that “the people who weep before my pictures 
are having the same religious experience that I had when painting them” 
(Hudson 2008); and fellow artist Ben Nicholson remarked that “[a]s I see it, 
painting and religious experience are the same thing” (quoted in Hardy 1979: 
82). Richard Harries, referring to a contemporary “increasing awareness of the 
spiritual dimension of the arts” (Harries 1993: 1), quotes art critic Peter Fuller, 
one time passionate Marxist: 
“For myself, I remain an incorrigible atheist; that is my proclamation of 
faith. Yet there is something about the experience of art, itself, which 
compels me to re-introduce the category of the ‘spiritual’. More than that, 
I believe that, given the ever-present absence of God, art and the gamut 
of aesthetic experience, provides the sole remaining glimmer of 
transcendence. The best we can hope for is that aesthetic surrogate for 
salvation: redemption through form” (quoted in Harries 1993: 2). 
 
X4) The non-exotic 
Roses are generally being presented as occurrences that are somewhat 
dramatic or out of the ordinary or “exotic”. In contrast, Wynn offers the 
possibility of non-exotic religious experiences which are materially-mediated, 
whereby “the sense of God is mediated by way of an appreciation of the 
existential meanings which are presented by a material context” (Wynn 2009: 
147). These experiences are not of God as a supernatural object: neither by 
some form of direct apprehension as is suggested by Alston’s “mystical 
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perception” (Alston 1991), nor by apprehending God through perceiving an 
ordinary non-religious object as suggested by Swinburne (1979 [1991]) but 
more of apprehending God as “a kind of context or ultimate frame of reference 
in light of which we can make sense of individual things” (Wynn 2009: 149). 
God not as the efficient cause of the experience, but as being “realised in some 
recognition of the existential meaning which attaches to a material context” 
(Wynn 2009: 150). Drawing upon the concept of sacred space (Barrie 1996) 
and sacred architecture (Jones 2000), Wynn posits three kinds of experience 
mediating existential meaning within a material context, deriving from its history, 
such as sites of pilgrimage; or its representative character, as with sites which 
“are thought to provide a kind of miniaturised replica of the cosmos…” (Wynn 
2009: 155); or its capacity to induce reverential seriousness which is bound up 
with the bodily meaning of a place, as with the size and lighting of a cathedral 
which “may evoke a response of hushed wonderment” (Wynn 2009: 156)3. 
Although not part of Wynn’s paper, this reverential seriousness is plausibly 
closely related to, and is the shadow side of, the effect on a visitor to Dachau or 
Auschwitz, where inevitably a knowledge of the history of such places is a 
potent part of the experience. 
 
X5) The “this-is-not-a-religious-experience” experience 
Author Philip Pullman has described experiences which would seem to have all 
the hall-marks of focal Roses, but to which he does not make that kind of 
ascription, believing as he does that since there is only a materialist universe 
then the experiences could not have been ones of a “spiritual world” (interview 
on BBC radio 4 “Sunday” programme, June 19th 2011). He is quoted in the New 
Statesman magazine:  
“Religion is something that human beings do and human activity is 
fascinating. I have never had an experience that I could call religious, 
though I have known two or three short passages of intense, 
transcendental feeling – that is to say, experiences of about 15 to 20 
minutes, during which my perception of things in the external world (one 
was a storm on a beach; another was a journey home on a winter 
evening on the Tube and bus from Charing Cross Road to Barnes) 
seemed to become enlarged and clarified to include many things, all of 
which I was able to see without losing sight of everything else.  
                                            
3
 Philip Larkin’s poem Church Going (Larkin 1988: 97-8) powerfully evokes this awareness of 
reverential seriousness. My thanks to Alison Goodlad for drawing this to my attention.  
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     These visions of the real world were laced through with patterns and 
connections and correspondences. They were accompanied by a feeling 
of intense, calm excitement. I felt that I was seeing the truth, that all 
things were like this and that the universe was alive and conscious and 
full of urgent purpose” (Pullman 2011). 
 
 
X6) The spiritually delusional 
Several commentators (e.g. Glock and Stark 1965; Polkinghorne 1998; Hick 
1999) explicitly acknowledge religious experiences of the dark side, what in my 
terminology might be described by the alternative acronym of “Sores” rather 
than “Roses”; experiences that are potentially highly destructive. An observation 
of my own provides an example – comprising both background and focal 
elements.  
When I worked as a psychiatric nurse on a locked ward, there were many 
patients whose pathology included a religious element. One such was a young 
woman diagnosed as schizophrenic who had been in the psychiatric system 
since her teen years. She experienced hallucinated voices – usually malevolent 
– as well as having ideas of reference (such as hearing the television talking 
about her) and as a consequence by the age of 23 she had accrued a long 
history of self-harm: mainly wrist and arm slashing, but also suicide attempts – 
in particular jumping from a motorway bridge. She spoke of sometimes hearing 
two voices, Jesus in one ear and Satan in the other ear, both telling her to kill 
herself because she had committed the sin against the Holy Spirit (she had 
been associated with a charismatic house church and was familiar with such 
terminology). For her, these were not experienced as internal voices but as 
objective realities, as evidenced by the fact that one day she thrust a knitting 
needle into her ear, later explaining with a plausible logic that she hoped to 
make herself deaf so she wouldn’t be able to hear the voices. As far as she 
was concerned, Jesus and Satan were external to her and speaking to her 
(though they were invisible) – she was construing her experience as involving 
supernatural entities central to her religious understanding.  
Now we might (and I certainly did and still do) understand her hallucinations 
and delusions as arising from her unconscious, betokening a severe psychiatric 
disorder, rather than as a conspiracy by Jesus and Satan to induce her to 
commit suicide; but given that, to her, the experiences involved those two 
figures, it is consistent to count her experience(s) as religious, at least 
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ascriptively so. Whether they were intrinsically religious/spiritual is another 
matter. 
 
Conclusion 
The above accounts are intended to illustrate and support the contention that 
there is a human capacity or faculty for profound experience(s) of transcend-
ence charged with meaning, purpose and value, a triumvirate traditionally – but 
not solely – the province of religion (Runzo and Martin 2000; Flanagan 2009); a 
capacity which our forebears possessed tens of thousands of years ago, and 
which we possess today. A capacity which has different personal and cultural 
manifestations but which can be regarded as an aspect of human nature. 
But how has it come about that we have this capacity to experience that 
which is – perhaps intrinsically, perhaps ascriptively – transcendent to our 
material existence and yet embedded within it? In the model being developed, 
this capacity is the result of the functioning of a biologically evolved faculty, 
enabling us to respond adaptively to our total environment. However, as noted 
above, there is a distinction between the intrinsic and ascriptive models of 
religious experience (Taves 2009), and the same distinction clearly applies to 
the broader category of Roses. The proposed biologically evolved faculty could 
be responding to something intrinsic in our total environment, or it could be 
ascribing such qualities to that which is not intrinsically transcendent, 
meaningful, purposive or of value.  
In the next chapter, different views are considered as to the status of these 
experiences. After all, if part of our evolved cognitive equipment is delivering 
these experiences to us, how trustworthy are they? 
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Chapter 3: Of epistemology 
 
Introduction 
The many accounts of religious experiences or examples of spiritual awareness 
or “Roses” in general, of both the “focal” and “background” variety, give rise to 
the question of reference – that is to say, to what do they refer, if anything? If I 
have the experience of seeing a tree, that experience refers to the tree which I 
take to exist independently of my seeing it. My not having an experience of 
seeing the tree doesn’t entail its non-existence. Although theoretically I cannot 
prove the tree’s existence – it might be a mental construct with no objective 
reality as idealist philosophers like Berkeley maintain – I am taking it that, 
inferring to the best explanation, my experience of seeing a tree means the tree 
exists, a stance which conforms to Swinburne’s (1991 [1979]) Principle of 
Credulity (see below). 
But if someone has an experience of, say, sensing a presence (account 
DH3), can we, should we, take it that the presence which is sensed also has 
some kind of objective reality, particularly if (or “as”) it is not a publicly verifiable 
perception? Is it, rather, a purely subjective phenomenon? In account CFD2 
above, Bucke writes on seeing “that all men are immortal; that the cosmic order 
is such that without any peradventure all things work together for the good of 
each and all; that the foundation principle of the world, of all worlds, is what we 
call love, and that the happiness of each and all is in the long run absolutely 
certain” (James 1902: 385) – but is that objectively true knowledge? Does it 
have warrant? Or is it simply a remarkable illusion? Or if someone claims to 
have a perpetual sense of God (account X1) are they really open to the creator 
and sustainer of the universe or simply suffering from a chronic God delusion 
(Dawkins 2006)? Do these and the other experiences have an objective referent 
(or referents) which would still exist (in the broadest possible sense of that 
slippery word “exist”) had those experiences not occurred to those individuals? 
Do those experiences supply knowledge to the individuals concerned, 
knowledge they would not gain by other means? What is their epistemological 
status? 
Views inevitably differ, and in what follows some of the various arguments 
are outlined. The reason for spending time on this is simple: as will be repeated 
several times, it is recognised in evolutionary theory that natural selection 
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operates on what is useful to an organism, not on what is true in the corres-
pondence sense of “truth” (Ruse 2006). An appreciation of some of the non-
evolutionary arguments about the truth status of these experiences will help 
clarify how the proposed mental module, the sensus transcendentis, operates. 
 
William James  
James concludes from his survey that a religious life characteristically includes 
the belief that the visible world is part of a more spiritual universe “from which it 
draws its chief significance” (James 1902: 464), and that the true meaning or 
purpose of life is union or harmonious relation with the spiritual. In a rather fine 
metaphor he takes the divine to refer to a group of qualities each of which finds 
expression through the different temperaments and characteristics of different 
people, such that “each attitude being a syllable in human nature’s total 
message, it takes the whole of us to spell the meaning out completely” (1902: 
466). 
Despite the wide discrepancies in many of their distinctive propositional 
beliefs, the various religious traditions agree that “there is something wrong 
about us as we naturally stand” and that “we are saved from the wrongness by 
making proper connection with the higher powers” (1902: 484 – emphasis in 
original); and this connection entails two elements: a subjective element which 
is an aspect of a person’s psyche – a “subconscious” element as James 
designates it, though the current term would be “unconscious”; and an objective 
element, “the MORE” (1902: 484), which is the higher part (as he calls it) of the 
objective universe. These two elements are not however completely separate, 
for “the ‘MORE’ we feel ourselves connected with in religious experience is on 
its hither side the [unconscious] continuation of our conscious life” (1902: 487).  
It is not easy to follow James in detail, but the upshot appears to be a belief 
that there is a higher part of the universe which, continuous with a higher, 
unconscious part of ourselves, is the supreme reality whence comes the saving 
power; with “God” as the “natural appellation… for the supreme reality… and in 
opening ourselves to his influence our deepest destiny is fulfilled” (1902: 491). 
Religious experiences are for James double-headed arrows, pointing simultan-
eously into the subjective psyche and out to an objective supreme reality. The 
referent(s) of the experiences I am terming Roses has/have a real existence; 
and the experiences are not purely subjective phenomena. They are subjective, 
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but they are the subjective response to an objectively existing supreme reality, 
and, in turn, the experiences themselves are evidence for the existence of an 
objectively existing supreme reality. 
Lash (1988) in particular critiques James’ position, and is discussed below. 
 
Richard Swinburne 
Swinburne also takes religious experiences as experiences of something 
objective, namely God, and he uses the argument from religious experience as 
one argument among many which, in his view, taken together render more 
probable than not the truth of theism (Swinburne 1991 [1979]). His argument is 
dependent on two principles, those of credulity and of testimony.  
For the Principle of Credulity he starts from the view that the experience of 
seeming to see a table in front of you is generally good evidence for there 
actually being a table in front of you, although it is conceivable that you are 
mistaken. More formally, the Principle of Credulity states “that (in the absence 
of special considerations) if it seems (epistemically) to a subject that x is 
present, then probably x is present; what one seems to perceive is probably so” 
(1991 [1979]: 254). (His bracketed “epistemically” refers to a distinction drawn 
by Chisholm [1957] between two different uses of words such as “seem” and 
“appear”, and need not detain us here).  
The application of the principle of credulity to religious experiences entails 
accepting that “in the absence of special considerations, all religious experi-
ences ought to be taken by their subjects as genuine, and hence as substantial 
grounds for belief in the existence of their apparent object – God, or Mary, or 
Ultimate Reality, or Poseidon” (1991 [1979]: 254). But it is all very well for an 
individual to be convinced by her own religious experiences, but to what extent 
do the accounts of such experiences justify Joe Public in believing in the 
existence of God (or Mary, or Poseidon)? To resolve this, Swinburne’s invokes 
the Principle of Testimony which states “that (in the absence of special consid-
erations) the experiences of others are (probably) as they report them” (1991 
[1979]: 272). This is how we generally operate in ordinary life: we accept what 
other people tell us has happened, provided that there are no “positive grounds 
for supposing that the others have misreported or misremembered their 
experiences, or that things were not in fact as they seemed to those others to 
be” (1991 [1979]: 271). That this is so is supported by the realisation that the 
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overwhelmingly vast majority of facts that we claim to know is based on the 
testimony of others rather than discovered by our own exertions and experi-
ences, and our “beliefs about geography and history and science and every-
thing else beyond immediate experience are thus based” (1991 [1979]: 271). 
There may of course be reasons to doubt someone’s claimed experiences, 
perhaps he is known to be an habitual liar, or to be prone to exaggeration or 
misremembering, and “[i]n these cases his reports on his religious experiences 
are to be viewed with scepticism. But this is not the normal situation” (1991 
[1979]: 272). 
Applying the two principles specifically to theistic religious experiences, 
Swinburne’s argument that such experiences should be accepted as evidence 
for God’s existence is a three-stage process: 1) some people have experiences 
which to them seem to be of God, and they are by and large justified in 
accepting the evidence of their own experiences; 2) people in general are by 
and large justified in accepting the testimony of other people’s experiences; 
hence 3) people in general are by and large justified in believing in the 
existence of God on the basis of other people’s religious experiences.  
Swinburne’s two principles are essential for the continuance of ordinary 
human interaction and discourse. Without by and large accepting the evidence 
of our own experiences as telling us what the world is like, and without by and 
large accepting that other people’s testimony of their experiences is also in the 
neighbourhood of truth, it is impossible to see how we could continue to make 
any sort of sense at all of our world, ourselves and each other. But whether 
those two principles are applicable wholesale to the phenomenon of religious 
experiences and what they might be telling us about life, the universe and 
everything is perhaps another matter. Can we be as confident as Swinburne in 
taking religious experiences to be reliable evidence?  
The problem with applying these two principles to this area of human 
experience is that the experiences and testimonies of individuals who stand in 
different religious traditions clash. Applying the principle of testimony to the 
reported experiences of Julian of Norwich, Arjuna and Buddha leads to 
accepting them (provisionally) as evidence for the existence respectively of a 
post-mortem Jesus, Krishna, and the reality of nirvana. Are they compatible? 
Neither of Swinburne’s principles can help us here. He has arbitrarily decided 
that his principles apply to theistic experiences – why? If they apply to theistic 
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experiences, why refuse to apply them to non-theistic experiences? Simply 
because they are non-theistic?  
This is where religious pluralism comes into its own (see the next chapter), 
but Swinburne, seeking to establish that religious experiences count as evi-
dence for the existence of God, runs into a problem, certainly with the accounts 
of non-theistic experiences which clash with theistic accounts. Applicable 
though the two principles are – and have to be – to the ordinary goings-on of 
the world, they are clearly considerably less applicable to contested experi-
ences such as the testimony of a subject that she experienced an encounter 
with Jesus or with Krishna or received a glimpse of nirvana; or indeed with the 
claim that any such experience is of a non-subjective referent. 
It seems to boil down to this: to accept someone else’s experiential reports, 
their testimony, about tables is no great problem because we all know what 
tables are, despite their wide variation in size, construction, material, durability, 
aesthetic quality and so forth. For someone to claim to have seen a table they 
like in a store does not trouble us; tables belong to our assumptive world, tables 
are part of the (literal) furniture of the world. They are public objects; whereas 
the alleged referents of religious experiences are not public objects in anything 
like the same way. They could be purely subjective, and have no evidential 
force for there being something other to which they refer. 
 
David Hay 
David Hay, former director of the Religious Experience Research Unit, also 
argues that religious experiences (instances of spiritual awareness, “Roses”) 
are indicative of there being Something There (Hay 2006).  
Hay’s research builds on the work of Alister Hardy who had proposed that 
religion was a “feeling of contact with a Greater Power beyond the self” and was 
a natural faculty of H. sapiens which had evolved because of its adaptive 
function in enabling its possessors better to survive and reproduce (Hardy 1965: 
274). Hay concurs, arguing that his research indicates that we have an “inbuilt 
awareness that is involved in spirituality” (Hay 2006: 126), and he infers from 
his data that "whatever else it may be, spirituality is supremely related to 
ultimate meaning" (2006: 81), and involves, "[a]wareness of the here-and-
now… of mystery, and… of value” (2006: 130).  
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Having undertaken statistical surveys into the prevalence of religious or 
spiritual experiences (“Roses”), coupled with focus group discussions and 
personal interviews, particularly with participants who had self-reported as being 
non-religious (Hay 2006), as well as research into the experiences of children 
(Hay and Nye 2006), Hay reports that despite the many rational objections his 
adult interviewees raised against traditional interpretations of reality, “[u]nder-
neath the confusing variety of interpretation [by the interviewees], ranging from 
explanations couched in the language of mainstream religious orthodoxy 
through to bizarre personal speculation, there loomed an all-pervasive sense of 
‘something there’” (Hay 2006: 115). And despite the embarrassment and 
awkwardness many of the interviewees reported in talking about spirituality, 
“[t]here was one area where our interviewees were not reticent… [M]ore or less 
universally they insisted on explaining spirituality as another word for 
disinterested love” (2006: 119).  
Arguing that “spiritual awareness [is] logically distinct from religion”, and that 
rather than seeing spirituality as the factor at the centre or core of all religious 
traditions and world-views, spirituality is rather the “biological context” in which 
religious traditions arise, (Hay 2006: 44 – emphasis in original), Hay reverses 
the usual hierarchy of “spirituality” being a sub-section or characteristic of 
“religion”. The significance of this reversal is that it recognises the validity of 
experiences of meaning, value, purpose, transcendence and so forth which are 
construed using non-religious terminology, without the need to shoe-horn such 
experiences into the framework of one or other of the specific religions. Thus 
“religious spirituality” becomes a sub-section of “spirituality”, with “secular 
spirituality” another, equally valid, sub-set. 
Hay, a hands-on researcher, does not go in for deep epistemological 
musings but offers his suggestions and conclusions in the spirit – as it were – of 
the principles of credulity and testimony as espoused by Swinburne (see above) 
but without a predetermined bias towards theism. He and his co-workers listen 
attentively to their interviewees, both adult and children, and take seriously what 
they are told, emphasising that they are seeking neither to evangelise nor to 
criticise but to accept and if possible to understand. The nearest he gets to a 
theological statement is a reference to an immanent God; but secular spirituality 
is as possible and as valid as a spirituality linked with a religious tradition, for 
Hay infers from his research results (and those of his predecessor Hardy) that 
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the Something Other, the Something that is There, to which Roses point and of 
which Roses are signals (Berger 1969), consists of ultimate meaning, value, 
purpose and a communal ethic.  
Like James, Hardy’s position (and therefore by implication Hay’s as well) 
also comes under the Lash (1988) (see below). 
Those three witness for the defence, as it were, assert that there is 
Something Other which Roses are signposts to or direct experiences of. But 
many disagree: 
 
Steven Katz 
One counter-argument to the claim that religious experiences (Roses) involve 
contact with and knowledge of a Something Other that is not purely subjective 
arises from the claim that all experience is structured by, perhaps even created 
by, pre-existing concepts and categories of thought the individual has. The 
cognitive is constitutive of the experience itself, and not simply applied post-
experientially for the purposes of understanding the experience and 
communicating it.  
Katz, a strong proponent of this view, asserts that “mystical or more 
generally religious experience is irrelevant in establishing the truth or falsity of 
religion in general or any specific religion in particular" (Katz 1978: 22 – 
emphasis added); and this irrelevance, he contends, stems from the imposs-
ibility of demonstrating publicly “independent grounds for the claimed event/ 
experience” (1978: 22). That is to say, the testimony of an individual cannot be 
accepted in the absence of objective corroboration – directly contrary, of 
course, to Swinburne’s principles of credulity and testimony. 
However, the main issue Katz raises is that of interpretation and the degree 
to which it is separable from the experience itself. The distinction between a 
religious or mystical experience in itself and the conceptual interpretation of it 
has long been recognized (Stace 1987 [1960]), but Katz focuses on the extent 
to which an interpretation is actually part of the experience itself, not simply a 
process to which some purportedly pure, uninterpreted experience is subjected.  
Referring to mysticism, but applicable to all religious experiences, Katz’s 
claim is that such experiences are created by the pre-existing categories and 
concepts of thought and interpretation deriving from that mystic’s culture, and 
that “the forms of consciousness which the mystic brings to experience set 
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structured and limiting parameters on what the experience will be, i.e. on what 
will be experienced, and rule out in advance what is ‘inexperienceable’ in the 
particular, given, concrete, context” (Katz 1978: 26-7). Interpretation, in other 
words, is not confined solely to the report of an experience but is part of the 
experience itself; for an experience to be an experience in the first place, 
interpretation is already incorporated as an unavoidable factor; there is no pure, 
uninterpreted or pre-interpreted core to the mystical (religious, spiritual) 
experience. Thus a Hindu mystic has a Hindu experience, he does not simply 
have an experience which he then describes using Hindu categories, but the 
experience is itself the “at least partially, pre-formed anticipated Hindu 
experience of Brahman” (1978: 26). Likewise, the Christian mystic “does not 
experience some unidentified reality, which he then conveniently labels God, 
but rather has the at least partially prefigured Christian experience of God, or 
Jesus, or the like. Moreover... the Hindu experience of Brahman and the 
Christian experience of God are not the same” (1978: 26). The experiences, not 
just the interpretation of the experiences, are different. 
This “hard constructivist” position holds that the kind of preinterpretative 
cultural concepts available to a mystic will actually constrain the types of 
experience possible for the individual, as typified by a Jewish mystic who is 
“permeated from childhood up by images, concepts, symbols, ideological 
values, and ritual behaviour which there is no reason to believe he leaves 
behind in his experience. Rather, these images, beliefs, symbols, and rituals 
define, in advance, what the experience he wants to have, and which he then 
does have, will be like" (1978: 33 – emphasis in original). Result? – the Jewish 
mystic, because of his preinterpretative concepts and categories, cannot have a 
mystical experience of union with the Godhead, only of an intimate relationship 
with God: “What the Jewish mystic experiences is, perhaps, the Divine Throne, 
or the angel Metatron, or… God's secret Names, but not loss of self in unity with 
God” (1978: 34). Certain types of experience (union with the Godhead) are 
ruled out by one’s manifold of pre-existing categories of thought. 
Since under Katz’s scheme mystical experiences are neither “pure” in the 
sense of being free from “social, cultural, theological, religious or other mediat-
ion” nor a “unity” in the sense of their being the same or similar across different 
cultures, for it could “well be the case that one mystic directly experiences a 
reality different from that of another” (Janz 1995: 79), any truth claims they 
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purportedly make are considerably vitiated. Katz, however, is not arguing that 
claims based on mystical experience are necessarily false, but that even if the 
claims of mystical experiences are true, "there can be no grounds for deciding 
this question" (Katz 1978: 22). Mystical experiences in particular, and Roses in 
general, cannot (according to the hard constructivist position of Katz) be taken 
as pointing to Something Other. 
There is much to commend in Katz’s position, for it provides a plausible 
explanation for the great variation in the accounts of mystical experiences (and 
even greater variety of Roses); it takes seriously the importance of context, an 
issue Jantzen has addressed in arguing that James, by not attending to context, 
seriously mis-represents what mystics themselves “consider to be the essence 
and goal [of the mystical pathway], either for themselves or for those whom they 
instruct” (Jantzen 1989: 300); and it is supported by the empirical findings of 
social psychologists that the interpretation which a subject puts on a state of 
physiological arousal depends on the context in which it occurs (Schachter 
1971). However, his position has been attacked by “a host of writers… on a 
variety of points” (Janz 1995: 78), only a few of which points I will rehearse 
here.  
First, if Katz’s arguments were to be applied to other areas of experience, 
such as pain, one would have to conclude that there is no transcultural 
“common core” of pain – pain pure and simple, so to speak. But this is highly 
implausible – people from all cultures feel pain (and other emotions) and can 
recognize it cross-culturally, a view with evidential backing (Ekman 1998). Pain 
experiences are clearly not the creation solely of pre-formed cultural concepts, 
and Katz advances no reason to suppose that religious experiences are any 
different in that regard.  
Moreover, the extent to which different languages borrow, and often assim-
ilate, words from other languages strongly suggests that people in different 
cultures share the same or similar experiences, and when one culture hasn’t 
quite the bon mot for a given experience it gratefully adopts a term from else-
where, such as schadenfreude and simpatico. This could not occur if Katz’s 
view obtained across the board. 
Second, doubt is also thrown on Katz’s claim that “the forms of conscious-
ness which the mystic brings to experience… rule out in advance what is 
‘inexperienceable’ in the particular, given, concrete, context” (Katz 1978: 26-7 – 
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emphasis added). If that were so, it would be difficult to account for so-called 
heretical mystics, those whose experiences (and teachings based on them) run 
counter to the prevailing culture, such as Meister Eckhart (1260-c.1327) and 
Jacob Boehme (1575-1624) in the Christian tradition. The hard constructivist 
“will struggle to explain transformations within mystical traditions, and cannot 
easily account for innovative geniuses within mystical traditions” (Gellman 
2010:16). And although Katz claims that because a Jew learns that “one does 
not have mystical experiences of God in which one loses one's identity in 
ecstatic moments of unity… the Jewish mystic rarely, if ever, has such experi-
ences” (Katz 1978: 34 – emphasis in original), one can ask “if Katz is correct – 
that the individual does not have that particular experience – or rather that it is 
simply the case that the individual does not recognise those kinds of 
experiences” (Goodey 1998: §4 – emphasis added).  
A third argument to be advanced against the hard constructivist position is 
that attributing to the concepts within a culture or tradition the power of actually 
creating the experiences the mystic undergoes leaves unanswered the question 
of how those traditions arose in the first place, if not through the reflected-upon 
experiences of the ancestors of that culture. Of all traditions, of all cultures, 
there will have been a time before which they did not exist, and what is known 
as a tradition is only so known in retrospect – the first time something occurs 
does not constitute a tradition: “Prior to Moses experiencing the burning bush, 
there… was no tradition of such an event in Judaism. If mystical experiences 
are confined to some predetermined criteria of presentation, as Katz asserts, 
then one cannot fail to ask where the origin of such criteria occurs” (Goodey 
1998: §7). This however is perhaps not entirely fair to Katz, for he argues that 
the relationship between experience and interpretation is mutual and 
symmetrical, such that “beliefs shape experience, just as experience shapes 
belief" (1978: 30), which suggests a symbiotic development over time, with 
neither tradition/culture nor experience being primary. This mention of devel-
opment over time, however, leads to another factor, key to the current enquiry. 
This fourth factor, which partly (but only partly) supports Katz’s thesis, is our 
evolutionary history. Since the second part of the current enquiry is focused on 
the contribution to be made by evolutionary theory to the understanding of 
spirituality, what briefly follows here is by way of anticipation. Evolutionary 
psychology (Barkow, Cosmides and Tooby 1992) contends that we have a suite 
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of evolved mental modules which result in our bringing a form of innate 
knowledge to the world – not propositional knowledge, but the knowledge of 
intuitive physics, intuitive biology and the like (Buss 2005). According to this 
account we bring to experience, or events before they count as experiences, 
pre-existing structures of the mind. Not culturally-derived concepts per se, but 
mental structures by the (automatic, unconscious, instinctive) application of 
which we order and interpret the world of which we are a part; the ordering not 
being deterministic but a shaping, a biasing, evolved because of the selective 
advantage of a plasticity of human behaviour enabling optimal responses to 
differing environmental situations. This understanding would vindicate Katz in 
his arguing that there is no such thing as raw experience, that it already comes 
with an interpretative aspect which is part of the experience itself. However, the 
preinterpretive input he posits is cultural, different from culture to culture, 
whereas the evolutionary psychological input is of a human universal, the same 
underlying similarity across cultures. Later, though, I argue that both inputs play 
a role, as will be seen when I draw upon the religious pluralism of Hick (1989) 
and his quasi-Kantian argument. 
 
Wayne Proudfoot  
Proudfoot challenges the claim that religious experiences point to the existence 
of Something Other by examining how certain words and concepts are actually 
used in the accounts of such experiences. He acknowledges that “religious 
experience” is “experience of something”, and that it is “intentional in that it 
cannot be described without reference to a grammatical object” (Proudfoot 
1985: 192); but the fact that a religious experience has a grammatical object 
does not entail the existence of an objective object. Someone is fearful of a 
bear, only the bear turns out to be a log mistaken by the subject for a bear; 
there is no objective bear present, but the experience of fear can only be 
explained in term of the bear: “If someone is afraid of a bear, his fear cannot be 
accurately described without mentioning the bear. This remains true regardless 
of whether or not the bear actually exists outside his mind” (1985: 192-3 – 
emphasis added).  
More than one interpretation of the experience is thus available, and it is 
legitimate to say that bear-log man experienced “seeing a bear”, that is a 
descriptive interpretation of the experience he underwent, because even though 
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it wasn’t actually a bear, that describes the experience as far as he is con-
cerned. And it is legitimate to say that he experienced seeing a log as though it 
were a bear – and that is an explanatory interpretation of his experience (see 
1985: 216ff). 
The descriptive interpretation, Proudfoot maintains, has to be in words which 
are plausibly ascribable to the individual concerned, with concepts that would 
be part of his cognitive equipment (otherwise it would not be an interpretation of 
his experience which was of a bear, even though no bear was there); whereas 
the explanatory form of interpretation is what the analyst can make of it using 
concepts which the individual would not necessarily recognise or agree to – this 
is the anthropological “emic/etic” distinction (Headland, Pike and Harris 1990).  
In the particular case of interpreting a religious experience, both an under-
standing of the description as supplied by the subject concerned, and an 
explanation are required; confusing them can result in the illegitimate form of 
reductionism known as “descriptive reductionism”. This refers to “the failure to 
identify an emotion, practice, or experience under the description by which the 
subject identifies it” (1985: 196) as when an experience is described in non-
religious terms such as alpha brain waves and altered heart rate even though 
the subject himself describes it in religious terms of, say, mystical union with 
God. Descriptive reductionism also obtains inter-religiously, and “[t]o character-
ize the experience of a Hindu mystic in terms drawn from the Christian tradition 
is to misidentify it” (1985: 196-7). 
Descriptive reductionism is contrasted with legitimate “explanatory reduct-
ionism” which “consists in offering an explanation of an experience in terms that 
are not those of the subject and that might not meet with his approval… The 
explanandum is set in a new context, whether that be one of covering laws and 
initial conditions, narrative structure, or some other explanatory model. The 
terms of the explanation need not be familiar or acceptable to the subject” 
(1985: 197). This occurs when, for example, historians employ terms such as 
socialization, ideology and feudal economy to explain past events. 
It is the failure to distinguish between these two types of reductionism 
(descriptive reductionism, bad; explanatory reductionism, good) when applied to 
religious experience which leads to claims that accounts of religious experi-
ences and the like should always be emically worded, a claim which “derives its 
plausibility from examples of descriptive reduction but is then extended to pre-
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clude explanatory reduction. When so extended, it becomes a protective 
strategy” (1985: 197 – emphasis added). That is to say, he argues that such 
linguistic ambiguity is being used illegitimately to protect religious claims from 
being scrutinized from a perspective other than the religious perspective itself.  
Proudfoot also discerns a form of protective strategy in the employment of 
the term “ineffable” which, along with synonymous expressions such as “beyond 
words” characterizes many accounts (e.g. CFD3, DH3, DH4), particularly of the 
mystical variety. He argues that “ineffability” is a grammatical rule rather than a 
descriptive adjective: the imputed ineffability of terms such as “God”, “Tao” 
“YHWH”, “Brahman” “Sunyata” and the like indicates that they are grammatical 
“placeholders”, words empty of content but serving a function in a sentence 
(such as the “it” in “it is raining”). Ineffable as a placeholder “preempts any 
ordinary connotations a term might have and gives it a special logical function. It 
serves to maintain, and perhaps even to create, a sense of mystery… The term 
is prescriptive and evocative rather than descriptive” (1985: 128 – emphasis 
added). That is to say, to describe an experience as “ineffable” isn’t actually 
describing it, but evoking it. Giving as examples the opening to the Tao Te 
Ching (“the Tao that can be told is not the eternal Tao. The name that can be 
named is not the eternal name” [Lao Tsu 1973: np]), and Eckhart’s remark that 
“God is ‘above names’ and ineffable” (Eckhart 1981: 205), he comments that 
these are “precise formulae that rule out in advance the appropriateness or 
adequacy of any description that might be proposed” (Proudfoot 1985: 129).  
But although placeholders do not represent, they are not always entirely 
opaque: “Tao connotes ‘way’ or path’, and… god connotes personal agency” 
(1985: 129-30); thus it seems to the individual as though there is an objectified 
something there, the reified placeholder, which is the object of religious experi-
ences; and the application to an experience of the term “mystical”, with its built-
in ineffability, functions to ensure that the experience remains outside natural-
istic explanations; it protects the experience from scrutiny. Thus the mystics’ 
experiences “are testimonies not to some direct perception but to the beliefs 
that enter into the identification of the experience” (1985: 154 – emphasis 
added).  
Proudfoot’s analysis of the linguistic and grammatical implications of the 
terminology used in describing or denoting or identifying religious experiences 
(and, by extension, “Roses” in general) is subtle and significant. Although he is 
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not – or does not appear to be – claiming that his analysis proves that there 
definitely is no Something Other that is the (objective) referent of religious 
experiences, his work challenges the easy use of the terminology available. 
Along with Katz’s analysis, which he draws on at times, his insights make 
problematic any claim that Roses definitively demonstrate the reality of God, 
Brahman, the Tao, the Transcendent.  
An important distinction that Proudfoot has elucidated is that between inter-
pretation as description and interpretation as explanation. This, in the current 
enquiry, translates into a distinction between the religious interpretation that the 
individual person concerned might put upon her experience, and the naturalistic 
interpretation that might be put on it by an observer. Proudfoot takes it that the 
naturalistic and the religious interpretations are mutually exclusive, saying of 
mystical experiences that it would be odd “if someone claimed to have had a 
religious experience and then argued that the experience could be exhaustively 
explained as the effect of a pill he had ingested. It would be strange for some-
one to report a religious experience and to subscribe to a psychoanalytic or 
sociological explanation as providing a complete account of that experience. 
The words exhaustive and complete are important here” (Proudfoot 1985: 187). 
And elsewhere he remarks that “[i]f the distinguishing mark of the religious is 
that it is assumed to elude natural explanation, then the labelling of the 
experience as religious by that subject includes the belief that it cannot be 
exhaustively explained in naturalistic terms” (1985: 217).  
A problem with this view is that it comes close to a God of the Gaps 
approach (Coulson 1958) whereby God is used to plug the gaps in an incomp-
lete scientific explanation, as with the claims of Intelligent Design proponents 
who accept that evolutionary mechanisms explain certain aspects of human 
anatomy, but that, because evolutionary theory allegedly can’t explain what is 
termed “irreducible complexity”, an Intelligent Designer – aka God – must have 
stepped in to do that bit (Behe 1996; and see Young and Edis 2004). Proudfoot 
is assuming that a religious explanation is offered to fill in the gap left by an 
inadequate naturalistic explanation. But it is not necessarily the case that a 
religious explanation entails something that is “assumed to elude natural 
explanation” for that presupposes that “religious” and “natural(istic)” 
explanations operate at the same logical level. Yet in principle something can 
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be exhaustively explained at one level (a chemical reaction, for example) yet 
still have a valid explanation at another level (that of quantum physics). 
There is a related problem in the distinction between “descriptive reduction-
ism” and “explanatory reductionism”. I have no quarrel with the distinction being 
made, nor with its signifying a genuine difference to be aware of. The problem 
comes in the implication that the “explanatory reductionism”, by entailing a set 
of concepts which “need not be familiar or acceptable to the subject” comes 
close to explaining away the phenomenon, of assuming that, though we must 
be respectful of the other person’s view, it is nevertheless, in the long run, 
wrong. Well, maybe it is wrong, but then again maybe the analyst, the explanat-
ory reductionist, is the one who is wrong because “the possibility cannot be 
excluded”, to borrow Bowker’s dry comment on the reductive explanations of 
Tylor, Durkheim and Freud, “that God is the origin of the sense of God” (Bowker 
1973: 16). 
Proudfoot’s opposing the religious with the naturalistic explanation for a 
given experience also runs foul of Lash’s criticism (below) of the tendency (by 
James and others) to regard “religious experience” as applying to a distinct 
“district” of human experience (Lash 1988); but if “religious” and “naturalistic” 
are different possible construings of one and the same experience, then it would 
not necessarily be odd “if someone claimed to have had a religious experience 
and then argued that the experience could be exhaustively explained as the 
effect of a pill he had ingested” (Proudfoot 1985: 187). Religious and naturalistic 
explanations are not necessarily mutually exclusive. 
 
Nicholas Lash 
A major problem with James’ position which Lash identifies is its dualistic 
dependence upon the assumption “that God is one of a number of possible 
‘objects’ of human experience, objects that may compete with each other for our 
attention”, such that the quality of one’s relationship with God increases “in 
proportion as other objects are ignored and other relationships allowed to wither 
away” (Lash 1988: 59). Swinburne’s approach, too, Lash locates within the 
“broad framework” of Cartesian dualism (1988: 99); and he charges Hardy (and 
hence by implication Hay also, whose research is a continuation of Hardy’s) 
with a lack of “hermeneutical curiosity” (1988: 98) about the accounts he 
studies. In what follows, I briefly outline two of his challenges. 
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Lash traces the Jamesian dualism with regard to our experience of God 
back to Friedrich Schleiermacher and his “notorious identification of the feeling 
of absolute dependence with ‘being in relation with God’” (1988: 120). Schleier-
macher takes God to be the origin (the “Whence”) of the experience of a feeling 
of absolute dependence (Schleiermacher 1928), but Lash contends that it is 
illegitimate to infer that there is something termed “God” which is the origin and 
explanation for those feelings, for “if we do attempt to name… the ‘whence’ of 
the feeling of absolute dependence, then the name that we give, the content of 
the account that we offer, must be derived from elsewhere: it is not, and it can 
never be, given in or furnished by the feeling itself” (Lash 1988: 127 – emphasis 
in original). That is, the feeling of absolute dependence cannot itself contain, or 
does not come with, its own identificatory tag like, say, Paddington Bear whose 
“whence” of Peru was written on a label round his neck. Rather, to speak of the 
“whence” of a religious experience such as that of absolute dependence is “a 
‘grammatical’ remark; it does not constitute an empirical claim of any kind” 
(1988: 127 – emphasis in original). The feeling of absolute dependence (and by 
extension other varieties of religious experience) cannot be considered proof of 
the existence of a God, because the “whence” of the experiences is simply how 
we use the word “God”.  
Lash, understandably as a Christian theologian, is concentrating on the use 
of the word God, arguing that it is a grammatical term, but the same argument is 
equally applicable to the more amorphous term Something There (Hay 2006), 
or Hardy’s “benevolent, non-physical power” (Hardy 1975: 1).  
A second contention of Lash’s is that what gets termed “religious experi-
ence” should not be seen as confined “to some one particular ‘district’ of human 
experience…” (Lash 1988: 105). Taking issue with James’ understanding of the 
term, he argues that “any general account of human experience is mistaken, 
bewitched by the form of our language, if it proceeds on the supposition that 
there is any such thing as experience” (1988: 13); and the problem with most 
discussions of religious experience is that they proceed on the assumptions that 
“firstly, the notion refers to some particular kind or category of ‘experience’ or 
psychological state which may be phenomenologically distinguished from other 
kinds of conscious experience and, secondly, that ‘God’... is the name of a 
particular object or thing which we encounter or come across in enjoying the 
kind of experience which is called ‘religious’” (1988: 128-9); and he quotes 
 85 
approvingly Karl Rahner who states that “experience of God must not be 
conceived as though it were one particular experience among others’” (quoted 
in Lash 1988: 251 – emphasis in original). 
What then is “religious experience”? It is, as Lash understands it, a way by 
which we make sense (or can make sense) of our experiences in general as 
human beings. Religious experience is not about God, but about us as human 
beings.  
I find Lash’s position very appealing, particularly in the argument that strictly 
speaking we cannot have an experience of God since God is not a thing, not an 
‘It’, and hence it is dubious to infer the existence of God from this particular 
subset of human experiences; and it does not follow that all so-called religious 
experiences (or Roses) are indeed experiences of the same “thing” i.e. they 
don’t necessarily have a common referent.  
But there are a couple of problems. Whilst Lash’s argument based on the 
grammar of God and the grammar of religious experience is a crucial corrective 
for the tendency to reify Schleiermacher’s Whence into a Something There, 
there is an opposite danger of over-grammarizing, and (as with Proudfoot) of 
privileging the etic dimension of the analyst or observer at the expense of the 
emic dimension of the individual whose experience is under scrutiny. In a 
different context but applicable here, Wilfred Cantwell Smith observes that there 
is “a certain school of modern philosophers [who] have come from their studious 
examination of language to deny that prose is inherently a possible instrument 
for reporting transcendence” (Smith 1991 [1962]: 182), forgetting that words and 
sentences in themselves mean nothing: “it is only persons who mean some-
thing; language is their instrument” (1991 [1962]: 182). And Hick remarks that 
religious statements such as “God is a very present help in time of trouble” or 
“In the beginning was the Word and the Word was with God” entail the exist-
ence of “God”, and that “normal or typical users of such language have intended 
this entailment or presupposition” (Hick 1973: 27). That is, the language as it is 
actually used by all but philosophers and theologians qua philosophers and 
theologians is taken to refer to something. Now, it may well be so that there is 
no “something” to which the terminology refers, but it is implausible that the 
existence or non-existence of the alleged something (“God”) can be determined 
by reconstruing what are generally used as substantive nouns to be grammat-
ical operators in disguise. Obviously the grammar of a statement can be 
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analysed, but such analysis cannot reveal the meaning intended by the person 
making the statement. If someone makes a statement intending to refer to what 
they believe to be an objectively existing state of affairs, it is not grammar that 
decides the validity or otherwise of their truth-claim, but ontology – does the 
alleged referent objectively exist or not? Grammar won’t tell you. 
A further point concerns the claim that “religious experience” does not refer 
to a distinct subset or “district” of human experience but is a way in which we 
“attempt to give an account of our human experience” (Lash 1988: 127): what, 
then, are we to make of the fact that human beings do cluster together a 
number of experiences under the heading “religious experience”, and disting-
uish them from experiences which are not religious? If the meaning of a word is 
how it is used (Wittgenstein 1972 [1958]), then “religious experience” does have 
a meaning which distinguishes one type of human experience from others, the 
reason being that that is how we use the expression: namely to construe a 
subset of experiences as being “religious”. 
Lash recognizes this problem, asking himself whether “in emphasizing the 
ordinariness of human experience of God, am I not in danger of underestim-
ating the theological significance of those events and occurrences, those 
special moments, upon which accounts of religious experience habitually con-
centrate?” (Lash 1988: 250). Some experiences are indeed more important than 
others as far as our relationship with God is concerned, and the experiences 
which matter most “whether they be episodic in character… or whether they be 
of more extended duration… are at least as likely to have the character of 
responsibility acknowledged, or suffering endured, as they are to have the 
character of aesthetic satisfaction or heightened feeling” (1988: 251 – emphasis 
added). Thus Lash is proposing that whilst there is no distinct “district” of 
experiences which are exclusively religious, or “of God”, nevertheless some 
experiences are more, as it were, transparent to or indicative of God – namely 
those (whether focal or background) with particular types of consequences or 
sequelae. This is consonant with Underhill’s comment quoted in chapter 1 that a 
focus purely on devotion may be just “a form of self-indulgence, unless it issues 
in some costly and self-giving action” (Underhill 1933: 19), and with the 
approach in the current enquiry where “spirituality” is understood to have both 
the vertical/diameter dimension and the horizontal/ circumference dimension. 
But it still sounds as though, in practice, there is a subset of human experiences 
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which are, at the very least, more likely to be understood as religious experi-
ences (or more generally as “Roses”) than are others. 
 
Conclusion  
This brief consideration of the epistemology of religious experiences (“Roses”) 
is predictably inconclusive, there being plausible arguments on both sides as to 
why such experiences should/shouldn’t be considered as coming from, pointing 
to, and giving some sort of knowledge of, something such as Schleiermacher’s 
“Whence” or Hay’s Something There. It does, however, seem safe to accept 
that no such experience can be taken naïvely to confirm or prove the existence 
of whatever appears to be presenting itself to someone who undergoes such an 
experience – whether that be a “focal” experience which could be, as it were, 
date-stamped, or a “background” experience of living in the ongoing ambience 
or awareness, as it were, of God, or Brahman, or the Tao or however the 
purported Whence presents itself.  
But in the absence of a knock-down argument either way, although one 
cannot make naïve inferences about the Whence from a batch of reported 
experiences, neither can one accord such experiences a naïve dismissal as all 
illusion, delusion, pathology or cognitive construction. The arguments against 
naïve acceptance of the experiences as being of an objective referent are 
themselves open to criticism, and either way the question still remains, how 
come we have these experiences? If there is indeed no distinct district of 
human experiences which are “religious experiences”, how come we 
nevertheless tend to construe certain experiences as religious? Or as “Roses”?  
The model I am presenting suggests that the insights of evolutionary 
psychology can, if not actually answer those questions definitively, at least 
enable us to view them from a different perspective, and thereby (possibly) tip 
the balance one way or the other. Before that, however, there are two very 
different theologians whose work will provide can offer considerable help to the 
current enquiry, John Hick and Alvin Plantinga. The next chapter will focus on 
religious pluralism, particularly as developed by Hick (1989); and the following 
chapter will draw upon the thinking of Plantinga (2000) and his development of 
the concept of the Sensus Divinitatis. 
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Chapter 4: Of religious pluralism 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter I argue for a version of religious pluralism, principally as devel-
oped by Hick (1989) though with modifications. The reason for advocating 
pluralism is that in my view it offers a good explanation for the large number and 
wide diversity of religious traditions found in contemporary, historical and (as far 
as can be told) pre-historical societies, and in doing so it provides the univers-
ality required if evolutionary psychology (which deals in human universals) is to 
make a contribution to our understanding of spirituality. That religion is a human 
cultural universal is generally accepted – understood broadly, it is and has been 
a feature of all human societies in every time and place (Rappaport 1999); but I 
will in due course argue that this cultural universality arises from an underlying 
human psychological universal, a mental module which I term the “sensus 
transcendentis”, responsible for our religious sense, our spiritual awareness, 
our “Roses”. 
But if a human psychological universal for a religious or spiritual sense 
exists, how come there is such a range and diversity of religions and of Roses? 
How come that our psychological universal doesn’t give rise to the same experi-
ences in all people and hence the same religion in all peoples? Enter religious 
pluralism, bearing an account of how the many diverse religious and spiritual 
traditions and experiences are all human responses to the one reality – “the 
Real” to use Hick’s (1989) designation; and from a pluralist standpoint I will be 
arguing that it is our capacity to respond to “the Real” which constitutes the 
human psychological universal for which evolutionary psychology can (at least 
in part) offer an account. 
 
The problem of religious diversity 
There have been and still are a huge range of religious traditions, though 
exactly how many is impossible to state, for, “[i]n addition to a myriad of lesser 
groups, there are… at least four or five major religious communities each pro-
claiming a faith with a long and impressive, even brilliant, past and with the 
continuing creative allegiance of mighty civilizations… [and there is] the further 
fact of diversity within each tradition. Each tradition appears in a variety of 
forms” (Smith 1991 [1962]: 2). Thus, as well as the array of primal religions, 
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there are the various Axial religions: the Semitic group of Judaism, Christianity 
and Islam; the Indian group of Hinduism, Buddhism and Jainism; the Sino-
Japanese group of Confucianism, Taoism and Shinto (Smart 1969); and so 
forth. Further divisions and sub-divisions result in a positive delta of religious 
traditions: in Christianity there are Orthodox, Catholic, Reformed, Protestant … 
further subdivisions yielding Amish, Anglicanism, Baptist, Brethren, Christian 
Science, Church of the Latter Day Saints, Methodist, Mennonite, Mormonism… 
Neither are other religions monolithic – as evidenced by the Sunni, Shiite and 
Sufi strands of Islam and the Orthodox and Reform schools in Judaism 
(Armstrong 2000), the multiple strands of religious tradition lumped together 
under the designation of “Hinduism” (Smith 1991 [1962]), and the different 
flowerings of Buddhism in India, Tibet, Japan, China and, more recently, in the 
West (Mishra 2004; Humphreys 1985 [1971]). 
In this diversity, a common feature of the Axial religious traditions, different-
iating them from their primal precursors, has been identified as their soteriol-
ogical function, a response to the unsatisfactoriness of human existence, and 
which entails “the bringing about of a transformation of human existence from 
self-centredness to Reality-centredness – a transformation which shows itself, 
within the conditions of this world, in compassion… or love” (Hick 1989: 164), a 
transformation variously termed salvation, enlightenment, liberation or fulfilment 
(hereinafter “s-e-l-f”) – and the immediate objection that the Christian under-
standing of “salvation”, for example, is not the same as the Buddhist concept of 
“enlightenment” receives consideration below.  
A second, connected, feature of the Axial religions is that each refers to 
“something… that stands transcendingly above or undergirdingly beneath and 
giving meaning or value to our existence. This is referred to in a wide range of 
ways as God, or the divine, or the absolute, or the Tao, or the Dharmakaya, or 
the Spirit…” (Hick 1989: 172), with orientation to that “something”, being in right 
relation with it, bringing about s-e-l-f. 
 
Exclusivism, inclusivism, pluralism  
From within the religious discourse, there are three main stances towards the 
diversity of traditions: exclusivism, inclusivism and pluralism (Byrne 1995; 
D’Costa 1986), though other possibilities are discussed in the literature 
(Anderson 2008; Bowker 1995; Byrne 1995). All three take a realist stance 
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towards religious phenomena in presupposing that “religion succeeds in relating 
human beings to religious reality in some mode or other” (Byrne 1995: 3). 
Exclusivism and inclusivism are further similar in that they are confessional, that 
is, they both take one particular religious tradition to be the one true path to s-e-
l-f; they both “view the theoretical and practical structures of all religions in the 
light of one religion’s claim to have the definitive, normative account of the 
nature of the sacred and of salvation” (Byrne 1995: 17). In this way both 
exclusivism and inclusivism can be contrasted with pluralism, which, in theory at 
least, does not privilege one faith tradition over the others but remains agnostic 
about all such claims.  
In the following accounts of exclusivism, inclusivism and pluralism I am 
principally drawing on examples from the Christian tradition as a matter of 
convenience, but the arguments apply, mutatis mutandis, to other religious 
traditions.  
 
Exclusivism 
“The God of ‘other religions’,” Emil Brunner is quoted as saying, “is always an 
idol” (Smith 1991 [1962]: 140), which neatly illustrates the exclusivist position; a 
more formal definition being that “[t]he exclusivist interpretation holds that the 
other religions are cognitive failures in the light of the dogmatic structures of the 
favoured religion” (Byrne 1995: 3). The exclusivist maintains that only one 
religious tradition is true and that s-e-l-f cannot be achieved unless the one 
favoured route is undeviatingly followed. Within Christianity one form of exclus-
ivism is doctrinally expressed by the Catholic teaching, “extra ecclesiam nulla 
salus” (there is no salvation outside the church), the Council of Florence (1438-
45) pronouncing that it “firmly believes, professes and proclaims that those not 
living within the Catholic Church, not only pagans but also Jews and heretics 
and schismatics, cannot participate in eternal life, but will depart ‘into ever-
lasting fire which was prepared for the devil and his angels’, unless before the 
end of life the same have been added to the flock” (quoted in Netland 1991: 13), 
a loophole-free stance to which loop-holes have subsequently been added (see 
below). 
Being exclusivist, though, is far from being solely a Catholic prerogative, the 
Protestant equivalent to extra ecclesiam being that no salvation is possible out-
side Christianity, “so that missionaries were sent out to save souls who must 
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otherwise have forfeited eternal life” (Hick 1987: 17), and Plantinga asserts that 
“[h]uman beings require salvation, and God has provided a unique way of 
salvation through the incarnation, life, sacrificial death, and resurrection of his 
divine son” (Plantinga 1995: 41 – emphasis added); whilst Karl Barth has been 
summarised as maintaining that “any religion, as a human construct, including 
Christianity itself, in its institutional forms and speculative explorations, can be 
no more than a barrier against God; and the more it thinks it attains to God, the 
less it is capable of doing so” (Ward 1994:17). It is, for Barth, the Christian 
revelation, not the Christian religion which counts, for “[r]eligion is unbelief” 
(Barth 1956: 299) – so we have what would appear to be the ultimate in 
exclusivism in that it entails Christianity excluding religion per se, even the 
institutional manifestations of itself. 
Exclusivism is not confined to Christianity. The Hebrew Bible is “trenchantly 
intolerant of any deviations from belief in the one true God. Other peoples do 
not have the right to choose to worship other gods and their ‘sin’ in doing so 
entitles the Hebrews to destroy them” (Young 2007: 49); and the exclusivist 
strand in Islam as manifested by the Wahabbi is well depicted in Ed Husain’s 
(2007) memoir The Islamist. Even Hinduism “widely hailed as the apotheosis of 
tolerance – is no exception. One finds in Shankara and Radhakrishnan vigorous 
argument against those who do not accept their particular perspectives on 
reality” (Netland 1991: 35), and Buddhism has its “judgments as to the salvific 
inefficacy of Hindu doctrine and practice – and by extension, of all non-Buddhist 
doctrine and practice” (Griffiths 1990: 158).  
The premise of exclusivism is that the favoured faith tradition transcends all 
thought patterns and cultural constraints, even though “all religions seem to be 
historically and culturally conditioned in their forms of understanding” (Byrne 
1995: 19 – emphasis in original), and for many within Christianity the exclusivist 
position has become increasingly untenable as the traditions of many other 
cultures have become better known, with a concomitant implausibility that the 
“immense spiritual riches of Judaism and Islam, of Hinduism, Buddhism, and 
Sikhism, of Confucianism and Taoism and African primal religion” (Hick 1987: 
17) should be rejected as invalid and soteriologically ineffective.  
Such interfaith awareness challenges the claimed exclusivism of any 
religious tradition, Christian or otherwise, but there are other problems with 
exclusivism particularly when applied to Christianity. There is a grave 
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inconsistency in maintaining that God is a God of love yet one who confines his 
revelation to only a segment of humankind, thereby condemning the rest to 
perdition. Any claim that everyone has a chance to hear and respond to the 
gospel falls foul of the empirical fact that for 2,000 years people have lived and 
died who have literally never heard the Christian message, living as they have 
in, say, pre-missionary Papua New Guinea; and what of those who have 
“heard” the gospel but in an incomprehensible or ludicrous form, or from people 
who have simultaneously abused them, which somewhat vitiates the plausibility 
of the Christian message? Or how about the entire human race up until the 
middle of the first century CE, before when there was no such thing as 
Christianity? “Can we really accept that the God revealed in Christ, a loving 
father of ‘generous, unlimited Divine love,’ has denied so many millions the 
means to salvation – through no fault of their own?” (D’Costa 1986: 67)4. 
Attempts to square this situation with the demands of exclusivism are “painfully 
inadequate” (D’Costa 1986: 68).  
Inaccurately characterising other religions in order to maintain an exclusivist 
position exacerbates the problem – Brunner’s dismissal of other religions as 
being “essentially eudaemonistic and anthropocentric... religions of self-
redemption” completely misrepresents Islam, “which enjoins complete 
submission to the will of God, total acceptance of the Koranic revelation, and 
forbids all anthropocentric representations of God to a much greater degree 
than Christianity has done” (Ward 1994: 18, 19). Judaism, too, presents a major 
challenge to Christian exclusivism, given that the Hebrew Scriptures are part of 
Christian scripture and depict salvation as operative through the covenant 
between God and Israel: “such a testimony clearly indicates that God’s activity 
cannot be confined to the historical event of Jesus’ life, death and resurrection” 
(D’Costa 1986: 66). This seriously (I would say fatally) challenges the exclusiv-
ist view, for “[h]ow can it be maintained that the only way to salvation is explicit 
confession and surrender to God in Christ, if God has truly revealed Himself in 
Israel’s history before the coming of Jesus Christ?” (1986: 67). 
The array of arguments to counter exclusivist claims for Christianity is 
developed at greater length elsewhere (e.g. D’Costa 1986; Hick and Knitter 
1988; Ward 1994); and the difficulties with exclusivism urgently necessitates 
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 Although, as he subsequently changes his views (D’Costa 2000), in my view D’Costa’s 
arguments against exclusivism in this earlier book remain valid. 
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alternative paradigms to depict the relationship among different religious 
traditions.5  
 
Inclusivism 
Bob Ferris’s prospective mother-in-law in the TV sitcom The Likely Lads 
unwittingly expresses a type of Christian inclusivism when, discussing the 
forthcoming wedding, she pronounces that “[t]here are many roads to God, but 
I’ve always thought of the C of E as the M1” (Clement and La Frenais 1974: 
184). Inclusivism is the contention that although one particular religious tradition 
holds the only fully true account of God, nevertheless other faiths could possess 
partial truths and their teachings can therefore be accepted to the extent that 
those teachings agree with the teachings of the one true faith. Christian inclus-
ivism, for example, “affirms the salvific presence of God in non-Christian 
religions while still maintaining that Christ is the definitive and authoritative 
revelation of God” (D’Costa 1986: 80). 
Inclusivism thus responds positively to the contention that no single tradition 
is the sole repository of wisdom and profundity, and that there are “many 
liberating ways to supreme value as a final goal, enshrined in different 
cumulative traditions and looking back to different supremely authoritative 
teachers” (Ward 1994: 310). However, it does not follow that God – to remain 
with theistic language – has inspired all religious traditions to the same extent, 
or that all recipients of the inspiration were equally receptive; and so it is 
possible that one tradition is normatively correct, and “[o]ther faiths... achieve 
cognitive success because they at some level approach the success of the 
favoured faith” (Byrne 1995: 3).  
The changes over the centuries to the interpretations of the Catholic “extra 
ecclesiam nulla salus” doctrine illustrate inclusivism. Although the central tenets 
of the uniqueness of the Christian revelation and the Church’s sole authority are 
maintained, the constituency identified as belonging to the Church has 
expanded. The Council of Trent (1545-1563) pronounced that baptism into the 
church could be received “not only… with water... but also by desire. Such 
‘baptism by desire’… could admit into the Church anyone who lived a morally 
good life but could not, for whatever reason, receive the sacrament of water 
                                            
5
 For a comedian’s take on religious exclusivism, see appendix 2. 
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baptism” (Netland 1991: 21). The doctrine had acquired an “epicycle” (Hick 
1989). 
A further change, the addition of a further epicycle, occurred with Vatican II 
(1962-65) which extended the possibility of “eternal salvation” to those who, 
“through no fault of their own, do not know the Gospel of Christ or his Church6, 
but who nevertheless seek God with a sincere heart, and, moved by grace, try 
in their actions to do his will as they know it through the dictates of their 
conscience” (Netland 1991: 23-4, quoting from Lumen Gentium 16). Karl 
Rahner was a key figure in the Vatican II developments, and D’Costa (1986) 
gives a fine summary from which I draw the following points.  
Rahner maintains that human nature includes an inbuilt “pre-reflective, pre-
apprehension of God… which [he] calls ‘transcendental revelation’” (1986: 81); 
that is, God has implanted in us, or we have otherwise acquired, a faculty by 
which we are oriented to God prior to our actually apprehending God. This God 
to which we are oriented has acted and spoken through the life, death and 
resurrection of Christ; hence “[a]ll questions about God and human beings can 
only be answered with reference to Jesus” (1986: 82). This can only be med-
iated by the Catholic Church, but other religions can contain “supernatural 
elements arising out of the grace which is given to men as a gratuitous gift on 
account of Christ. For this reason, a non-Christian religion can be recognized as 
a lawful religion… without thereby denying the error and depravity contained in 
it” (Rahner, quoted in D’Costa 1986: 85). The idea then is that God is offering 
grace to all by implanting fragments of the truth in other religions, but we can 
only know which are the truthful fragments by whether or not they accord with 
the full-blown Christian revelation. But if a non-Christian can encounter frag-
ments of the truth in another religion, it is possible for them to have accepted 
God’s grace even prior to hearing the Christian gospel – and hence Rahner’s 
famous formulation of “the anonymous Christian”, someone who is on the way 
to becoming a Christian and is already living “in the state of Christ’s grace 
through faith, hope and love, yet who has no explicit knowledge of the fact that 
his life is orientated in grace-given salvation to Jesus Christ” (Rahner 1976: 
283). Other religions are seen as vehicles by which the individual may event-
ually come to Christ, who remains the sole and ultimate means of salvation. 
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 See appendix 3 for Peter Cook and Dudley Moore’s particular view of the matter. 
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As with exclusivism, inclusivism is not a phenomenon confined to Christian-
ity. The Vietnamese Zen master Thich Nhat Hanh writes of having shared the 
Eucharist with a Catholic priest, and continues: “People kill and are killed 
because they cling too tightly to their own beliefs and ideologies. When we 
believe that ours is the only faith that contains the truth, violence and suffering 
will surely be the result” (Hanh 1996: 2), and the devotions of the Hindu 
Mohandas (“Mahatma”) Gandhi to Christ’s teachings are well-known (Ellsberg 
1991).  
Inclusivism is an attractive proposition to many, combining as it does a 
commitment to one faith tradition with openness to the insights and wisdom of 
others, and it addresses the implausibility that “the Real inspires prophets in 
only one tradition” (Ward 1994: 318). However, there are also problems with 
inclusivism, sharing as it does with exclusivism the premise that one particular 
tradition or revelation is normative – for can any religious system be the 
outcome of pure, unadulterated revelation, untouched by fallible human hand? – 
it being “abundantly evident today that each tradition has been deeply 
influenced by cultural forces which rest in turn upon a complex of geographical, 
climatic, economic and political factors” (Hick 1989: 7); and it has moreover 
been argued that concepts of the Deity tend to reflect aspects of the society in 
question: the relationship between Yahweh and Israel as portrayed in the 
Hebrew Scriptures parallels that between husbands and wives in Israel’s 
patriarchal society, suggesting that the biblical portrayal of God “is a result of 
the projection onto God of characteristics that actually belong to the biblical 
authors or their communities” (Young 2007: 35). 
A further problem with Rahner-style inclusivism lies with its actual appli-
cation: how can a Buddhist, say, be called an anonymous Christian, requiring 
only knowledge of Christ to complete his salvific quest, since “the quest 
associated with following the path toward nirvana is set in a unique pattern of 
belief and behaviour, [so] it cannot prepare Buddhists for the goods of the 
Christian eschaton” (Byrne 1995: 94, citing Jantzen 1984).  
A further objection is that, as a matter of observation, if someone is 
committed to a faith tradition it is almost always that in which they were raised; 
one’s religious commitments “depends upon the accidents of birth” (Hick 1989: 
2) rather than (by and large) on an unbiased choice, weighing up the pros and 
cons of various religious traditions before committing to one (or none). Some-
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one being born into a religious tradition does not confer any special status to 
that tradition, any more than their being born into an English speaking society 
renders English the normative language for people born in other linguistic 
communities.  
Inclusivism is an attractive possibility, particularly as a confessional position: 
be committed to your tradition, but open to the possibility/probability that truth is 
widely distributed. But in the absence of a knock-down argument with which 
everyone would agree as to why this tradition should be normative rather than 
that tradition or any one of these traditions, a third approach to religious 
diversity is called for.  
 
Pluralism 
Pluralism has its problems, as will be seen (below), but it does offer a way of 
understanding religious diversity which, unlike exclusivism and inclusivism, 
stands outside (or attempts to stand outside) any specific confessional position 
which privileges one tradition over all the others, though pluralists themselves 
are from within particular traditions: D’Costa (2000) identifies as pluralists Hick 
(1989) and Knitter (1985) from the Presbyterian and Catholic traditions 
respectively of Christianity, Radhakrishnan (1939) from the Advaitin school of 
(neo-)Hinduism, the Dalai Lama (1996) from Tibetan Buddhism, and Cohn-
Sherbok (1994) from Reform Judaism. In what follows I concentrate on the 
pluralism as espoused by Hick, for the joint reasons that he is the closest of 
these to my own Protestant non-conformist tradition and, more pertinently, that 
the philosophical underpinnings of his position are of particular interest and use 
in the model I am seeking to develop. I do not follow him in all respects, though, 
and also draw upon Byrne (1995). 
Pluralism contends that no single religious tradition can be or should be 
privileged above the others, and that all traditions offer contact with the Real 
and valid paths to s-e-l-f. Three propositions encapsulate the pluralist view: “(1) 
All major religious traditions are equal in respect of making common reference 
to a single transcendent, sacred reality. (2) All major traditions are likewise 
equal in respect of offering some means or other to human salvation. (3) All 
traditions are to be seen as containing revisable, limited accounts of the nature 
of the sacred: none is certain enough in its particular dogmatic formulations to 
provide the norms for interpreting the others” (Byrne 1995: 12); though the 
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references to equality in (1) and (2) should not be taken to imply equally 
efficacious, it being self-evident “that not all religious persons, practices and 
beliefs are of equal value. Indeed the great founders and reformers were all 
acutely dissatisfied with the state of religion around them” (Hick 1989: 299). 
However, although pluralism entails agnosticism regarding any particular form 
of religion being knowable “with sufficient certainty to enable such a faith to be 
the means of interpreting human religion”, it also entails that the religions 
“provide cognitive contact with transcendent reality and enough relational and 
practical knowledge about it to offer overlapping, connecting ways of living 
rightly toward it” (Byrne 1995: 6,13). 
Following Hick, the term “the Real” names the sacred referent (or referents, 
or alleged referent[s]) to which the different Axial traditions seek to point or offer 
a route, though the various traditions have different conceptions of the Real 
which are to varying degrees incompatible, a striking incompatibility being 
between theistic traditions with their belief in a personal God (Yahweh, Allah, 
the Father, Shiva, Vishnu…) and non-theistic traditions positing among them a 
range of non-personal Absolutes (Brahman, the Dharmakaya, Nirvana, 
Sunyata, the Tao…). Using Hick’s (1989) distinction of personae to refer collect-
ively to the theistic depictions and impersonae to refer collectively to non-
theistic depictions, the situation is simply stated: the pluralist paradigm appears 
to require the Real to be simultaneously both persona and impersona, but how 
can the Real be construed in terms of both? How can “God the Father” be 
equated with “Nirvana”? If they can’t be equated, then either Christianity is 
false, or Buddhism is false, or both are false, but both can’t be equally valid/ 
true/salvific – can they?  
Pluralism resolves the problem by developing a Kant-inspired distinction 
between “the Real-in-itself” and “the Real-as-thought-and-experienced” (Hick 
1989). Although we are embedded in and part of a real universe, we do not 
actually perceive anything as it is “in itself” but only as it appears to us, the input 
from the universe being filtered through and shaped by our physical senses and 
our cognitive apparatus, the innate “categories of the understanding” such as 
those of substance, causality, extension, time, space and so forth (Kant 1973 
[1781]). The constructive activity of the mind/brain, which has been “massively 
confirmed” (Hick 1989: 240; citing, inter alia, Anderson 1975; Berger and 
Luckman 1967), gives rise to the distinction, in Kant’s epistemology, between 
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the “noumenon”, or the thing-in-itself, and the “phenomenon”, or the thing-as-it-
is-perceived. This does not result in there being two worlds: there is just the one 
world, but “the noumenal world exists independently of our perception of it and 
the phenomenal world is that same world as it appears to our human conscious-
ness” (Hick 1989: 241 – emphasis added). The noumenal world, the world-as-it-
is-in-itself, is forever inaccessible to us7; it is only the outcome of the construct-
ive activity of our mind/brain of which we have cognisance.  
A straight-forward application of Kantian epistemology to the question of 
religious diversity solves nothing since the categories are, according to Kant, a 
priori and, as such, human universals, so the Real as mediated purely through 
Kantian categories would appear the same to everyone. But the pluralist 
position is that the Real is refracted not only through the prism of the Kantian 
categories (or Kantian-type categories), but also through the prism of the 
thought patterns, mind-sets and particular conceptual categories characterising 
whichever culture one belongs to; hence “we always perceive [the Real] through 
the lens of a particular religious culture with its distinctive set of concepts, 
myths, historical exemplars and devotional or meditational techniques” (Hick 
1989: 8).  
Hence “the Real-in-itself” is postulated both as a necessary precondition for 
religious experience, ritual, practice and the like, and also as the focus to which 
all the religious traditions ultimately point, despite the contradictions between 
them at experiential level; and that the most we can say about the noumenal 
realm “is that it is the reality whose influence produces, in collaboration with the 
human mind, the phenomenal world of our experience” (Hick 1989: 243). 
But we are left with the puzzle that it is all very well to claim that the Real, 
when refracted through the prism of different cultures, is experienced in a 
multitude of different ways as personae and impersonae, but what about the 
Real as it is in itself? Although we don’t experience it directly, can we 
nevertheless claim that the Real-in-itself is a persona, thus supporting the 
claims of those traditions for which the Real-as-experienced is a persona 
(Yahweh, Allah etc.); or is the Real-in-itself an impersona (Brahman, the 
Dharmakaya etc.), thus supporting the claims of those traditions for which “the 
Real-as-experienced is an impersona? The Real has to be one or the other – 
                                            
7
 Somewhat like the view attributed to Jane Austen that all-male conversation is inaccessible to 
a female novelist – though one such conversation does occur in Mansfield Park. 
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doesn’t it? The law of non-contradiction surely obliges us to admit that it is “a 
necessary truth… that whatever is real is either personal or non-personal. So, 
by my lights there can be no such thing as Hick’s Real in itself” (Rowe 1999: 
149). 
Well, up to a point, Lord Copper. Rowe’s argument relies on an invalid 
application of the law of non-contradiction, because he is offering a forced 
choice between two options which do not cover all the possibilities. He is 
assuming that “is it personal or non-personal?” can validly be asked of the Real. 
Though the persona/impersona dichotomy is applicable to the Real-as-
experienced, it does not follow that it is applicable to the Real-in-itself which, 
counter-intuitively, does not have to be either. One attempt to explain the 
contention that the Real is validly experienced in the guise both of various 
personae and of various impersonae without itself being an instance of either is 
to draw upon the “Complementarity Principle” from the world of quantum 
physics. This states, in effect, that both particle and wave theories are required 
to explain fully all the properties of light (Gribben 1984), but Hick’s (1989) 
application of this principle to the personae/impersonae duality, such that they 
are taken to be complementary descriptions of a single referent, is unsatisfact-
ory. “Particle” and “wave” both refer to light at the phenomenal level; whereas 
“the Real-in-itself” and “the Real-as-experienced” refer to the Real at, respect-
ively, the noumenal and the phenomenal level. The analogy doesn’t work.  
To rectify these limitations (though probably introducing others), a different 
analogy draws upon the fantasy of Flatland (Abbot 1992 [1884]) in which two 
dimensional creatures, who are in effect geometrical designs (circles, ellipses, 
triangles, polygons…), inhabit a two-dimensional world such as the surface of a 
sheet of paper. Imagine that some Flatlanders have certain experiences which 
lead them to claim that Ultimate Reality is a vast circle; but other Flatlanders 
claim, on the basis of their experiences, that Ultimate Reality is a vast rectangle; 
in consequence one religious tradition of Flatlanders develops which claims that 
geometric salvation is to be gained by adhering to Circulism, and another that 
enlightenment depends on the revealed truths of Rectangulism. Which is the 
true religion? Which is the true depiction of the Real? Circle or rectangle?  
In this two-dimensional world, it would seem that Ultimate Reality – “the 
Real” – cannot be both circle and rectangle. It must be one or the other (or 
neither – perhaps both sects are deluded). But if we three-dimensional super-
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beings envisage a three-dimensional cylindrical object, such as a length of 
dowelling rod, we will discover that when looked at end-on it will present as a 
circle (that is, one of its cross-sections is circular), but when looked at side-on it 
presents as a rectangle (that is, another of its cross-sections is rectangular). 
Although for a Flatlander an object (which only possesses two dimensions) 
cannot be both a circle and a rectangle, we inhabitants of three-dimensional 
space discover that it can be both – depending, quite literally, on how we look at 
it. In mathematical terms, one projection onto a 2D screen such as Flatland of a 
length of dowelling rod is circular, and another projection from a different angle 
is rectangular, although the dowelling rod itself is neither exclusively circular nor 
rectangular, since “circular” and “rectangular” are adjectives that are not 
applicable to 3D objects. Did the Flatlanders but know it, the Real exists in a 
higher physical dimension, and their experiences of it are projections into their 
dimensionally-impoverished world of a circle and a rectangle. Flatlanders are 
right in believing that “the Real-as-experienced” cannot be both a circle and a 
rectangle simultaneously, but they are mistaken in inferring that therefore “the 
Real-in-itself” (the dowelling rod) must be either a circle or a rectangle but not 
both. Strictly speaking, it can’t be either; a three-dimensional object cannot be 
properly described using two-dimensional terms – it falls outside their “range of 
convenience” (Kelly 1955). 
This analogy serves to show that descriptions which are mutually exclusive 
at one level of understanding can be conjoined at a higher (or meta-) level. And 
if the circle and rectangle are taken to represent the personae and impersonae 
respectively, and the dowelling rod represents “the Real-in-itself”, the analogy 
suggests that the personae and impersonae of different religious traditions are 
different projections of the Real from a (non-spatio-temporal) “fifth dimension” 
(Hick 1999); and that just as “circular” and “rectangular” cannot, strictly 
speaking, be applied to the dowelling rod, so neither persona nor impersona 
can, strictly speaking, be applied to the Real. The Real gives rise to the 
personae and impersonae of religious traditions, but in itself it is neither. Rowe’s 
objection that the Real has to be either personal or impersonal is analogous to 
claiming that the Flatlander’s Real has to be either circular or rectangular – well, 
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it doesn’t have to be. It can’t be. The Real-in-itself falls outside the range of 
convenience of the persona----impersona construct8. 
Like all analogies, the above is inadequate in many respects. One could ask 
how the supposed Kantian categories and supposed cultural concepts play their 
part in the above scheme? The answer is simply that this analogy doesn’t 
address those matters, its function is simply to make one point, namely that it is 
valid to claim that the different conceptions of “the Real-as-experienced” (and in 
particular the distinction between the theistic personae and the non-theistic 
impersonae) cannot be applied to “the Real-in-itself”, and hence there being 
contradictory claims across religious traditions concerning the nature of “the 
Real-as-experienced” does not sink Pluralism.  
There are however several other possible objections to the pluralism 
paradigm, consideration of which will clarify the position adopted in the current 
enquiry.  
 
1: Don’t truth claims conflict? 
As well as the different claims they make concerning the nature of the Real, the 
different traditions also make a range of other, conflicting, truth claims. Thus the 
Hindu belief that “temporal existence is beginningless and endless” conflicts 
with the Jewish/Christian/ Islamic belief that “the universe began through the 
creative fiat of God and will end in divine judgment” (Hick 1989: 362); and the 
Islamic belief that Jesus did not die on the cross conflicts with the Christian 
belief that he did. There are also conflicts within the traditions, such as the 
Catholic/Protestant disagreement on whether or not the bread and wine of the 
Eucharist literally transubstantiates into the body and blood of Jesus. Given 
these and many other conflicting claims, how can pluralism be sustainable? 
To tackle this, Hick identifies three categories of conflicting claims: i) those 
that concern a matter of (alleged) historical fact such as whether or not Buddha 
literally flew through the air from India to Sri Lanka and back, ii) those that are a 
matter of “trans-historical” fact such as whether or not reincarnation occurs, and 
iii) those that concern the nature of the Real and “the source and destiny of 
humanity and of the universe of which we are a part” (Hick 1989: 363), such as 
the persona/impersona dichotomy. As regards the first two categories, 
                                            
8
 See appendix 1 for more detailed explanation of these terms. 
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interesting and puzzling though they are, pluralism does not insist – how could 
it? – that conflicting claims in those categories must somehow all be true simply 
because they are promulgated by religious traditions; the acceptance or 
rejection of such claims, irrespective of their alleged significance or otherwise to 
a religious tradition, depends upon interpretation of the evidence and inference 
to the best explanation, and pluralism takes an agnostic position towards such 
matters (though individual pluralists, like everyone else, will have differing views 
as to what, in any one instance, counts as the “best” explanation to which 
inference is made).  
The undecidability of specific claims falling in the first two categories does 
not undermine pluralism’s principle argument about the differences between 
traditions concerning claims in the third category about the nature of the Real. 
The focus of pluralism is precisely those category (iii) differences; it is to explain 
how those differences have come about that the pluralist paradigm has been 
developed, and it is only to the extent that any category (i) and category (ii) 
conflicting claims impinge upon claims concerning the nature of the Real that 
they too are subsumed by the pluralist critique. As Hick suggests regarding 
category ii) claims: 
“It does not seem to make any soteriological difference whether one 
believes that the world is or is not eternal and its history cyclical or linear, 
that we do or do not reincarnate, that there are or are not angels and 
devils and a hierarchy of heavens and hells… 
     “Such beliefs concerning matters of trans-historical fact vary in 
importance within the belief-system to which they belong; and at the top 
end of the scale they may be indispensible to a given doctrinal structure. 
It does not however follow that that structure is itself indispensible for 
salvation/liberation. On the contrary it suggests otherwise: for it seems 
implausible that our final destiny should depend upon our professing 
beliefs about matter of trans-historical fact concerning which we have no 
definitive information. It seems more likely that both correct and incorrect 
trans-historical beliefs, like correct and incorrect historical and scientific 
beliefs, can form part of a religious totality that mediates the Real to 
human beings, constituting an effective context within which the salvific 
process occurs” (Hick 1989: 369-70 – emphasis added). 
 
It has however been argued that this dismisses too easily claims concerning 
trans-historical matters that different traditions do take “to be highly salvifically 
significant, and actually are. [Hick’s] assumption is that any disagreements that 
appear to be of this kind… must be based on a misapprehension of their own 
traditions by those who profess them” (Griffiths 1990: 161 – emphasis added). 
But the claim that certain beliefs about certain issues (trans-historical or 
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otherwise) actually are salvifically significant belongs precisely to a confessional 
perspective that pluralism challenges, for there is no way outside the confess-
ional stance to substantiate the “actually are” claim. Nor does pluralism necess-
arily entail that the beliefs held by the followers of a given tradition “must be 
based on a misapprehension of their own traditions”; since it is possible for 
someone to apprehend their own traditions accurately even though the tradition 
itself might well be labouring under a misapprehension of the soteriological 
(in)efficacy of other traditions. Given that both exclusivist and inclusivist stances 
from within any tradition entail the belief that many (most? all?) of the beliefs of 
other traditions are wrong, false, salvifically nugatory, it’s difficult to see as 
contentious the pluralist view querying the propositional statements and beliefs 
of all religious traditions.  
 
2: Why postulate an unknowable “Real-in-itself”? 
The pluralist position, based on a distinction between “the Real-in-itself” and 
“the Real-as-experienced”, holds that we can know nothing about the former, 
only about the latter. But if nothing can be predicated of “the Real-in-itself”, then 
“[w]hy not omit the concept of the Real altogether, especially since we should 
not really say that it is real or unreal, in any case?… the expression ‘the Real’ 
seems almost vacuous” (Ward 1994: 311); and D’Costa argues that “the Real's 
invulnerability leads... to its redundancy” (2000: 28). A related concern is that 
pluralism yields far too much to the role of culture, reducing religion to a cultural 
construct, since the distinction between the noumenal and the phenomenal 
overcomes the incompatibilities among different experiences of the (alleged) 
Real, but “only at a cost of suggesting a barrier to reference to the sacred as it 
is in itself which we cannot get across… Genuine cognitive contact with an 
object surely entails that something of how that object is perceived is down to its 
character”; and if the noumenal/phenomenal distinction is total, then any true 
beliefs we might have about “the sacred as it appears and as it is defined by my 
culture do not carry over into true beliefs about the sacred itself” (Byrne 1995: 
37,39,38 – emphasis in original).  
These are pertinent points, and here I diverge from Hick’s line that we can 
infer nothing about “the Real-in-itself”. The inaccessibility of a referent does not 
automatically entail our being able to know nothing about it, even though all 
such knowledge is, as critical realism recognizes, provisional and corrigible 
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(McGrath 2002). In the Flatland analogy, the three-dimensional nature of the 
dowelling rod does partially determine what particular geometric shapes are 
perceived by Flatlanders, since only a limited set of projections onto the 2D 
world are possible; and although Flatlanders cannot apprehend the dowelling 
rod directly, their pluralist theologians (dowellogians?) could at least infer that 
the postulated Real Dowelling possesses the characteristics of being able to 
project (or be projected) into their world as a circle or rectangle, but not as, say, 
a pentagon or an outline of the Mona Lisa. No matter how we 3D super-beings 
manipulate a piece of ordinary dowelling, we can’t get it to project a pentagon or 
an outline of the Mona Lisa onto a 2D surface. Analogously, the nature of “the-
Real-in-itself” constrains the types of ways in which “the Real-as-experienced” 
manifests in different traditions. Pluralism does not necessitate the impossibility 
of saying anything about “the Real-in-itself”. 
Byrne, in his discussion of what we can know about the Real, comes at the 
matter from a different direction involving an exploration of the use of metaphor, 
such that what Hick takes to be different phenomena arising from the same 
transcendent noumenon can be seen as so many different metaphors for the 
Real. The fact that religious traditions offer conflicting accounts of the trans-
cendent (the Real) can be accommodated in metaphor theory which allows that 
“conflicting metaphors used of the same thing can still have referential and 
cognitive worth with regard to it” (Byrne 1995: 153) though not all metaphors are 
successful – an example (not Byrne’s) is that the apparently conflicting des-
criptions of atoms as being miniature billiard balls and miniature solar systems 
are each useful in different contexts for conveying different atomic properties, 
whereas the plum pudding metaphor of atomic structure proposed by J. J. 
Thompson proved a cognitive and descriptive failure (Sukys 1999). Applying the 
possibility of successful and unsuccessful metaphors to the current enquiry, “[i]f 
we admit… successful metaphorical statements have cognitive consequences, 
then surely we can admit that a limited number of positive descriptions of the 
transcendent can be built up through reflection on human religious experience” 
(Byrne 1995: 150).  
I am taking it, therefore, that “the Real” is not necessarily as unknowable as 
pluralism sometimes appears to require, though any knowledge we might have 
of it would probably be, to use Christian terminology, like seeing something 
“through a glass darkly” (1 Cor 13:12). 
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3: isn’t a soteriological criterion inappropriate? 
Since the Axial religious traditions are concerned with the unsatisfactoriness of 
human existence, and offer a path to a “limitlessly better possibility” (Hick 1989, 
passim), pluralism offers a soteriological criterion to judge among them; but as 
far as our limited, fallible human judgement can determine all religious traditions 
would appear to offer potentially equally valid ways to enable “the transform-
ation of human existence from self-centredness to Reality-centredness” (Hick 
1989: 36). Arguments have been advanced that the soteriological criterion is 
inappropriate, since it entails lumping together concepts from the different 
religions such as “salvation”, “liberation”, “enlightenment” and “fulfillment”. 
Whereas in Christian terminology, “salvation” involves “repentance” and “belief 
in Christ” and so forth, for Buddhism “enlightenment” entails grasping the four 
noble truths and following the eightfold way: the two concepts (salvation and 
enlightenment) do not map onto each other, and to refer to both as a turning 
from self-centredness to Reality-centredness “is in danger of removing any 
substantial content to the notion of salvation and the different religious truth-
claims, by collapsing and assimilating them together as ‘Reality-centred’” 
(D’Costa 1986: 43).  
Agreed, Christian “salvation” does not map directly and coterminously onto 
Buddhist “enlightenment”, and it would do a disservice to both traditions to claim 
it does – Jantzen’s criticism, referred to above, of Rahner’s “anonymous 
Christian” concept is also relevant here. But at a more general level, all the trad-
itions offer in some way or another an explanation for the unsatisfactoriness of 
the human condition and a path away from it towards s-e-l-f. Pluralism is not 
claiming that all the religions are in fact offering the same account of s-e-l-f, 
“merely that all religions must be alike in offering some means of relating 
salvifically to the sacred” (Byrne 1995: 85 – emphasis in original).  
A related issue is that pluralism is often understood to claim that because 
(from a non-confessional standpoint) we cannot know for certain which (if any) 
religious tradition offers the most efficacious route to s-e-l-f, all routes must be 
equally valid, a stance termed “hard pluralism” (Ward 1990: 28), compared to 
“soft pluralism” which simply maintains that “the Real can manifest in many 
traditions, and humans can respond to it appropriately in them” (1990: 37), 
without claiming equally validity for them all. Hard pluralism, Ward contends, is 
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incoherent because it claims that “all (or at least all ‘great’) traditions are equally 
valid paths to salvation and equally authentic modes of experience of a Real; 
which is a completely unknowable postulate of the religious life” (1990: 37).  
This is pertinent and, as Hick himself acknowledges, it is self-evident that 
“not all religious persons, practices and beliefs are of equal value” (Hick 1989: 
299). His stance, and that of the current enquiry, is that it is certainly possible 
for one tradition to be more effective and more valid than the others, but we 
can’t tell for sure which it is, hence the pluralist is someone “who... doubts 
whether the detailed dogmatics of any particular religion can be known with 
sufficient certainty to enable such a faith to be the means of interpreting human 
religion" (Byrne 1995: 6). 
As far as the current enquiry is concerned, however, the salvific efficacy of 
different religious traditions is not a critical factor. What is necessary for the 
sensus transcendentis model which is being developed is that the various 
religious traditions, both pre-Axial and Axial, represent differing ways of being 
open to and of responding to the Real, to Ultimate Reality. The model does not 
require all the different manifestations of openness to the Real being equally 
effective at aligning the individual – or the community – to the Real. 
 
4: Not all religions necessarily have the same referent. 
Unlike the soteriological issue, this objection is of particular relevance to the 
current enquiry. As pointed out earlier, evolutionary psychology concerns itself 
with human psychological universals; and the model being developed involves 
our being endowed with, as a universal possession, a mental module that is 
open to and responds to the Real or the Transcendent. But how does the 
pluralist know that the various referents which different religious traditions speak 
of (the Tao, God the Father, Allah, Nirvana and so forth) are ultimately 
manifestations (“as experienced”) of the same referent? There is one physical 
reality of which “intuitive physics” (Pinker 2002) is the mental correlate (see 
chapter 7), but is there just the one “Real”, the reality of which the proposed 
sensus transcendentis could be a mental module correlate? Pluralism maintains 
that the many personae and impersonae of religious traditions are different 
manifestations of the same “Real-in-itself”, but how do we know that they do 
have the same ultimate referent, rather than there being a manifold of refer-
ents? When a Hindu or a Sikh prays to God, “how can we [i.e. Christians] know 
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that in his intention it is the same God we worship?” (Pannenberg 1990: 103), 
and of course in turn the Hindu and the Sikh can, mutatis mutandis, enquire the 
same of the Christian. And, also of course, the (say) fundamentalist Christian 
and the (say) liberal Christian could ask the same of each other – is Calvin’s 
God, with his doctrine of double-predestination (Calvin 1962 [1536]), the same 
as that of former Bishop of Durham David Jenkins whose views on the virgin 
birth and the resurrection outraged traditionalists (Jenkins 2002)?  
Pannenberg’s question is, in the light of these examples, easily answered by 
acknowledging that we can’t know. Logically it may indeed be possible that, 
instead of one single ultimate reality which we can term the Real, there is a 
whole manifold of noumenal Reals – but there is no way (at least currently) of 
distinguishing between the two cases. The notion of a unique “Real-in-itself” is 
simply a necessary postulate “if from a religious point of view we are trying to 
think... of the simplest hypothesis to account for the plurality of forms of rel-
igious experience and thought” (Hick 1989: 248). There is indeed no guarantee 
that all religions have the same referent, but again, that is what is being 
postulated to account for the undeniable fact of there being a plurality of 
religious traditions. The principle of parsimony, aka Occam’s razor, that “entities 
are not be multiplied beyond necessity” (Flew 1979: 236), is being wielded.  
Byrne, exploring the question of reference at some length, considers that 
although the differences between religions are actual, not illusory, the pluralist 
thesis is that such divergences “do not count decisively when reference is 
judged” (Byrne 1995: 33 – emphasis in original), there being problems with the 
descriptive theory of reference since differing descriptions, even contradictory 
descriptions, do not necessarily mean that different referents are involved. 
Reference can still be valid even if a particular description is actually incorrect 
(his example is of referring to someone as the person holding a glass of whisky 
when in fact it’s a glass of coke – the incorrect description still refers to the 
person in question). So although the possibility of there being multiple referents 
cannot be logically or empirically disproved, the fact that different traditions offer 
differing descriptions of their referent does not entail there being a multiplicity of 
referents. Such a multiplicity is an unnecessary postulate, and for the purposes 
of this enquiry will receive no more attention. 
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5. Isn’t pluralism just another form of exclusivism?  
A former proponent of the “exclusivism, inclusivism, pluralism” typology has 
subsequently sought to deconstruct it, claiming in particular that pluralism is in 
effect “yet another party which invites the disputants actually to leave their 
parties and join the pluralist one... [of] liberal modernity” (D’Costa 2000: 20), 
and that whichever religious tradition they come from “all pluralists are 
exclusivists” (2000: 83). That is, he maintains pluralists of every stripe have set 
up a belief system which belies its name in being as exclusive as any other 
belief system, its proponents maintaining that they are right and non-pluralists 
are wrong. This possibility of a self-undermining incoherence could of course be 
problematic for the version of pluralism this enquiry has adopted, were it not for 
the fact that, although D’Costa puts all three stances on a spectrum with 
pluralism and exclusivism at the two extremes and inclusivism in the middle 
(2000: 21), the three positions are of logically different types. Exclusivism and 
inclusivism are confessional stances, whereas pluralism is non-confessional, it 
is a philosophical hypothesis offering “the best available explanation… of the 
data of the history of religions. Pluralism is… a meta-theory” (Hick 1997: 163). 
D’Costa finds this distinction between pluralism and the other two stances 
“highly questionable” on the grounds that pluralism itself is “a philosophical faith 
with many epistemological, ontological and ethical presuppositions undergirding 
it” (2000: 46), that is, it is another form of confessionalism. It confesses “liberal 
modernity”.  
Clearly D’Costa is right in that every philosophical, ethical, religious, 
theological, scientific, metaphysical, mathematical (etc. etc.) system has its 
assumptions and axioms, its “many epistemological, ontological and ethical 
presuppositions undergirding it”, but the fact that pluralism cannot escape the 
necessity for these does not invalidate its being meta- to other stances. Where 
exclusivism says that “path P is the only way to reach destination Z, and there 
are no other paths to Z”; and inclusivism says that “path P is the only way to 
reach destination Z, but there are other paths (Q, R, S & T) heading towards Z 
which get there provided at some stage they meet up with P”; pluralism asks 
“how come there are so many paths all seemingly heading towards Z? Maybe 
P, Q, R, S & T all reach Z eventually, independently of each other”, and offers 
an explanation for the multiplicity of paths. Pluralism, in other words, differs from 
exclusivism and inclusivism by not offering yet another path to Z, but points out 
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that, as far as one can tell, all, or most, of the available paths appear to lead to 
Z. It is a meta-theory because it is commenting on the theories that only P leads 
to Z (exclusivism) or that Q, R, S & T head towards Z provided they join up with 
P (inclusivism), but it does not offer another theory about how to get to Z. Since 
pluralism makes no claim that you have to be a pluralist to get to Z, it is not the 
exclusive stance that D’Costa claims it to be, and rather than pluralism inviting 
the disputants “to leave their parties and join the pluralist one” (D’Costa 2000: 
20), it is content for “the disputants” to remain on their respective paths, whilst 
asking them to recognize the validity of other paths. To claim, as D’Costa does, 
that pluralism collapses into exclusivism, fails to do justice to the particular 
insights that pluralism offers. 
 
Conclusion 
Religious pluralism provides a particular understanding of the wide religious 
diversity we see in the world and throughout human history (and, as far as can 
be told, pre-history too) by maintaining that Ultimate Reality – “the Real” – is not 
experienced directly “in itself” but as mediated through constructs and 
categories of thought that differ from culture to culture, such that in some 
traditions “the Real-as-experienced” is theistic in form, and in other traditions it 
is non-theistic. Both theistic and non-theistic experiences, and (within these two 
sub-divisions) different forms of theism and non-theism are therefore all valid 
apprehensions of the Real.9 
This provides the human universal to the understanding of which 
evolutionary psychology can make a contribution, for although neither theism 
nor non-theism can be claimed as denoting a cultural human universal, the 
capacity to be open to the Real, however it is actually manifested in experience, 
can be posited as a human psychological universal. Such a human 
psychological universal transcending culture would underlie the specific, 
culturally shaped experiences known as religious experience or, in my 
terminology, Roses. 
The possibility of there being a human universal of being open to “the Real-
in-itself” is not a new idea. Christian theologians in particular (but not exclusive-
ly) have over the centuries referred to an innate human capacity for being 
                                            
9
 See appendix 4 for a more light-hearted view of religious pluralism. 
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aware of, and responding to, God. The best known term for this, coined by John 
Calvin, is the Sensus Divinitatis, and is the topic of the next chapter.  
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Chapter 5: Of the sensus divinitatisIntroduction 
The focus of this chapter is Reformed theologian Alvin Plantinga’s version of 
the sensus divinitatis (Plantinga 2000), purportedly an innate human faculty 
whereby we gain knowledge of God. Plantinga has developed his model based 
on comments made by Thomas Aquinas and John Calvin, and given that he not 
only is a Christian exclusivist (Plantinga 1995), but also argues against natural-
ism in general and evolutionary theory in particular as offering a coherent 
account of our rational faculties and why we may depend on them (Plantinga 
1993b), it might seem perverse for the current enquiry to draw upon his 
thinking. However, I will be arguing in due course that a modified version of his 
model of the sensus divinitatis can provide a crucial link between spirituality 
(particularly the “vertical” component) and evolutionary theory. The modific-
ations I propose to make take into account not only the pluralist contention that 
non-theistic construals of the transcendent Real are as valid as theistic 
construals, but also the insights offered by evolutionary theory into human 
nature and our cognitive architecture. 
There are numerous historical sources for the idea that we have an inbuilt 
capacity or faculty for an awareness of God (Holland 2007: 765 n2). Cicero 
praised Epicurus for perceiving “the existence of the gods on the impression 
which nature herself hath made on the minds of all men”, and he infers that, 
“since it is the constant and universal opinion of mankind, independent of 
education, custom, or law, that there are gods, it must necessarily follow that 
this knowledge is implanted in our minds, or rather is innate in us. That to which 
there is a general agreement through nature must infallibly be true; therefore it 
must be allowed that there are gods” (Cicero 1829: 26, 27). 
Cicero’s logic can certainly be challenged, since a universal belief in some-
thing is not evidence for its truth (it could be a universal false belief); neverthe-
less, his argument that nature has “implanted” in humankind an idea of the 
gods is an early counter to “blank slate” models of human nature whereby the 
human mind is believed to be empty or blank until experience, and experience 
alone, gives it content (Pinker 2002). 
Zoroaster used a term which “in effect postulates and designates a religious 
faculty in man” (Smith 1991 [1962]: 99); and Augustine of Hippo’s plaint that 
“Thou awakest us to delight in Thy praise; for Thou madest us for Thyself, and 
our heart is restless, until it repose in Thee” (Augustine 1907 [397]: 1) implies 
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the existence of an inbuilt ability or faculty of responding to God which needs 
activating or “awakening”.  
Aquinas suggests in Summa Theologiae that “[t]o know in a general and 
confused way that God exists is implanted in us by nature” (quoted in Plantinga 
2000: 170), and Calvin (1931 [1536]) uses the concept of innate knowledge of 
God derived from the operation of the sensus divinitatis as part of his argument 
that we humans cannot plead ignorance of God and his commandments as an 
excuse for our wrong-doing. We pick up on Aquinas and Calvin below.  
Writing roughly a century after Calvin, Lord Herbert of Cherbury (regarded 
as the “father of deism”) argued that human beings are endowed with a relig-
ious sense that accounts for religion’s very existence (Preus 1987), and the 18th 
century New England divine Jonathan Edwards proposed a supra-physical 
“sense of the heart” which entails the perception not only of the fact of the 
“infinite excellency of God”, but also “a perception of meaning and value” (Hay 
1987: 80). In the 20th and 21st centuries, Ernst Troeltsch refers to “the religious 
apriori within the human spirit – the innate orientation toward and the experi-
ence of the divine built into human nature” (Knitter 1985: 25); Rahner (as dis-
cussed in the previous chapter) referred to a “pre-reflective, pre-apprehension 
of God… which [he] calls ‘transcendental revelation’” (D’Costa 1986: 81); 
William Alston (1991) has developed the idea of “Mystical Perception” providing 
information about God which is on a par with knowledge of the external world 
provided by our sense perceptions; and Ian Markham in his critique of the “new 
atheists” refers throughout to the “spiritual sense” (Markham 2010: 4 and 
passim). But the name currently most associated with developing the idea of 
the sensus divinitatis is Alvin Plantinga, and to his ideas we now turn. 
 
Alvin Plantinga and the sensus divinitatis  
The sensus divinitatis purportedly delivers not simply belief in but knowledge of 
God, so one of Plantinga’s necessary tasks is first to demonstrate how a belief 
can constitute knowledge. I believe many things, and I know many things (I 
believe), but although what I believe and what I know are (probably) over-
lapping, they are not automatically coterminous sets. I know I am Richard 
Skinner. I know I like eating bananas. I know Mount Everest is about 29,000 
feet high… or do I? I certainly believe Mount Everest to be about 29,000 feet 
high, but do I know it? Well, I remember reading years ago that it had been 
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measured at exactly 29,000 feet but because that sounded too neat they had 
added on a couple of feet (heavy snowfall?), and I have checked Everest’s 
reported height in an atlas, on-line in Wikipedia, and in my copy of Curious 
Facts for Curious Boys which all pretty much concur, give or take a blizzard. So 
I am relying on memory and the testimony of others. But still, despite consulting 
these sources, can I truly claim to know the height of Everest? Is it knowledge 
that I have, or just a firm belief? Suppose tomorrow a reputable geographer 
announces that new measurements and calculations have revealed Everest to 
have been over 31,000 feet high for many centuries? Suppose over the 
following weeks all other reputable earth scientists, having examined the 
evidence, announce their support for this revised information – then my belief 
that Everest is 29,000 feet high vanishes, so it can’t have been knowledge in 
the first place. What I had had knowledge of, maybe, was that the official 
consensus had been that Everest was 29,000 feet high, but that consensus 
was (it now appears) wrong. Their belief was wrong, and therefore so was 
mine. I (and they) had had a belief, but it wasn’t knowledge. 
This might seem an arcane point, typical of philosophers who would starve if 
they had to decide before eating a meal that they know rather than simply 
believe (or hope) that the (alleged) eggs and (putative) bacon in front of them 
are nutritious not poisonous, but it is important when it comes to the contentious 
area of belief and knowledge concerning God or, more broadly, the Real. 
When, if ever, does theistic belief count as knowledge of God? When, if ever, 
does belief in, or about, the Real, count as knowledge of a transcendent 
domain (realm, dimension, aspect of our total environment)? 
In tackling this, two key terms in Plantinga’s epistemology need addressing, 
namely “proper function” and “warrant” (Plantinga 1993b), both necessary for 
an understanding of whether a particular a belief arising through the operation 
of a cognitive faculty or module (including the sensus divinitatis) can constitute 
actual knowledge. Although Plantinga (1993a, 1993b, 2000) writes at length 
about them, here only a brief outline is possible in which much of Plantinga’s 
subtlety is lost, but it will be sufficient for the purposes of the current enquiry.  
 
Proper function 
For the formation and deliverance of beliefs, we need to have “epistemic 
faculties that function properly… A belief has warrant for you only if your 
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cognitive apparatus is functioning properly, working the way it ought to work, in 
producing and sustaining it” (Plantinga 1993b: 4). “Proper function” refers to the 
operation of a mechanism (or indeed a biological organ) which is carrying out 
the function for which it is designed. The proper function of car brakes is to slow 
the car when the brake-pedal is depressed; the proper function of a clock is to 
depict accurately the passage of time; and so on – and it seems pretty well self-
evident that the proper function of an artefact is simply that which the artefact is 
designed to do, and similarly it is easy to specify, at least roughly, when it is 
malfunctioning, namely when it is not performing the function for which it is 
designed.  
We also speak quite happily of the function of biological organs: the function 
of the heart is to pump blood round the body, the (or a) function of the kidneys 
is to keep the blood clean and chemically balanced; and “the fact that these 
organs are supposed to do these things, the fact that they have their functions, 
is quite independent of what we think they are supposed to do. Biologists 
discovered these functions; they didn’t invent or assign them” (Dretske, quoted 
in Plantinga 1993b: 5). 
However, the notion of proper function applied to a biological organism is 
more problematic. It is hard to argue, for example, that an oak tree in itself has 
a proper function. It just is. Yes, it might function within the entire ecosystem to, 
say, help maintain the oxygen in the atmosphere, but it is pushing it to claim 
that helping maintain the oxygen balance is its proper function, that for which it 
was designed. As Plantinga puts it: “What is it… for a natural organism – a tree, 
for example, or a horse – to be in good working order, to be functioning 
properly, to be functioning the way it ought to, to be functioning in accord with 
its design plan? Isn’t a trout decomposing in a hill of corn functioning just as 
properly, as far as nature herself goes, as one happily swimming around 
chasing minnows?” (Plantinga 1993b: 195 – emphasis in original).  
Plantinga is making the counter-intuitive point that in the absence of what he 
calls a “design plan” one cannot talk about something having a “proper 
function”, for a proper function of something is the function specified for it 
according to the design plan. And although we might consider that a decomp-
osing trout is not functioning properly as a trout, it is, as it were, “functioning” 
perfectly well in its capacity as a dead trout – it is decomposing according to the 
natural laws that govern the fate of dead organisms in general. Decompose is 
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what – it could be argued – dead organisms are supposed to do. This argument 
cannot plausibly be applied to artefacts. It doesn’t work to say that a broken car 
brake is functioning perfectly well as a broken brake, for that is to miss the point 
that the brake was designed to slow the car, and failing-to-slow-the-car is not 
part of the design specification of car brakes, there is no design plan for a 
“broken brake” (cynical built-in obsolescence aside).  
Although artefacts such as car brakes do have a design plan, it is contenti-
ous to claim that a biological organism has a design plan – this is the area of 
“special creation” of the species; and indeed the so-called “argument from 
design” supporting belief in the existence of a God received a severe blow from 
Darwinism, with God as the designer of organisms being ousted by the “blind 
watchmaker” of natural selection (Dawkins 1986) which works to no design plan 
by which the functioning of the organism can be judged. Hence, Plantinga’s 
argument goes, there is no “proper function” of organisms if one takes a 
naturalistic stance, whereas a theistic stance which entails a creator God who 
has divine purposes in mind for his creatures – and hence, as it were “design 
plans” for them – supports the concept of “proper function” being applicable to 
natural entities as well as artefacts. From a theistic perspective, the proper 
functioning of (say) a human being would be (in general terms) that human 
being functioning as God intended.  
This argument that “proper function” cannot be applied to biological 
organisms if one adopts a naturalistic stance is part of Plantinga’s argument 
against naturalism and in favour of theism; but for the purposes of the current 
enquiry it is not necessary to expand on this here. All we need for now is the 
concept of the “proper function” of some entity being its functioning according to 
its design. The question of whether or not an organism can be said to have a 
proper function when it is viewed through the naturalistic lens of evolutionary 
theory is important, and will be further considered later (p 222), but the 
relevance now is that the “proper function” of our cognitive faculties is an 
essential element in deciding whether or not our beliefs have warrant. 
 
Warrant  
“Warrant” is Plantinga’s answer to the epistemological questions: “what is it that 
distinguishes knowledge from mere true belief? What further quality or quantity 
must a true belief have, if it is to constitute knowledge?” (Plantinga 2000: 153).  
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On the face of it, these are odd questions, but it is fairly easy to dream up 
scenarios in which someone can have a belief that happens to be true, but 
which cannot really be deemed knowledge because the grounds for that belief 
are suspect or downright illegitimate. Plantinga gives the example of an 
optimistic mountaineer who believes the weather tomorrow will be good for 
climbing despite terrible forecasts. As it turns out, the forecasters are wrong 
and the weather is ideal, but although the mountaineer’s belief that the weather 
would be good was true “it didn’t constitute knowledge” (Plantinga 2000: 153) – 
it was simply optimism that struck lucky. However, this example might be 
considered unconvincing since someone “believing” the weather will be good 
tomorrow is not claiming that belief to be definite knowledge – it is an 
expression of hope or expectation. A clearer example would be my belief that 
the summit of Ben Nevis is roughly 4409 feet above sea level, a belief based on 
your say-so (without my referring to other sources of information, not even 
Curious Facts for Curious Boys), and which is a justified belief because I know 
you are extremely knowledgeable, you have never lied to me, and I am not 
aware of any reason why you should suddenly start lying, so I am justified in 
accepting your statement. But unknown to me mountain heights is your one 
area of ignorance, and not wishing to admit your ignorance you pluck a figure 
out of a book of random numbers, alighting on the right answer by sheer luck; 
so my consequent belief about the height of Ben Nevis happens to be a true 
belief, but was acquired by means that denies it the status of knowledge. 
Gettier (1963) famously proposed other equally (or even more) implausible 
but logically possible scenarios, but their implausibility does not invalidate the 
conclusion that it is possible for someone to hold a true belief, and be justified 
in holding that belief, but under circumstances that deny that belief the status of 
knowledge.  
What is needed to convert justified true belief into actual knowledge is, 
according to Plantinga, warrant, namely “that further quality or quantity 
(perhaps it comes in degrees), whatever precisely it may be, enough of which 
distinguishes knowledge from mere true belief” (Plantinga 2000: 153), and for a 
true belief to have warrant, and thus to count as knowledge, Plantinga argues 
that a number of conditions have to be satisfied.  
First, one’s cognitive faculty, through the operation of which one has come 
to have this belief, needs to be “functioning properly, subject to no disorder or 
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dysfunction” (Plantinga 2000: 153 – emphasis added), not impaired by, say, too 
much alcohol or organic brain disease. Hence the belief of the man who 
mistook his wife for a hat (Sacks 1985) was unwarranted because his cognitive 
faculties, disturbed by a neurological disorder, were not carrying out their 
proper function.  
Second, there has to be a design plan for the cognitive faculty – that is, a 
way in which it is supposed to work so that, by comparison with which, it is 
possible to determine whether or not the faculty is indeed functioning properly: 
“[h]uman beings and their organs are so constructed that there is a way they 
should work, a way they are supposed to work, a way they work when they 
work right; this is the way they work when there is no malfunction” (Plantinga 
2000: 154 – emphasis in original). Briefly, then, the cognitive “organ” or faculty 
by which a particular belief comes into existence needs to be working as it was 
designed (“by God or evolution” [2000: 155]) to work.  
Third, the design plan for the cognitive faculty has to be “a good one, one 
that is successfully aimed at truth” (2000: 156 – emphasis in original) – which 
may seem self-evident, but it is logically possible for the cognitive faculty to be 
aimed not at truth but at usefulness. There are cases “where the design plan is 
not aimed at the production of true… beliefs but at the production of beliefs with 
some other virtue” (1993b: 16), such as someone whose belief that they will 
recover from a disease is not justified by the statistics, but which actually 
functions to improve their survival chances, hence the purpose of the cognitive 
faculty under those circumstances “is not to produce true beliefs. [It is] instead 
aimed at something else: survival” (1993b: 13). Thus our cognitive faculties 
may be functioning perfectly well according to their design plan, yet deceive us. 
This distinction between a truth-directed faculty and a usefulness-directed 
faculty will arise again later on in connection with evolution, in which the 
processes of natural selection, it can be cogently argued, operate on what 
works rather than what is true (Ruse 2006), a distinction Plantinga uses to 
argue against naturalism – “natural selection isn’t interested in true belief, but in 
adaptive behavior” (Plantinga 2000: 231).  
Fourth, the environment needs to be appropriate for the functioning of the 
cognitive faculty in question, i.e. that in which it has been designed to operate – 
if, for instance, one is subjected to extremes of temperature, as on a long trek 
across the Arctic, one’s cognitive faculties will be deleteriously affected (Geiger 
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2009), and beliefs we acquire under such circumstances (such that there is a 
mysterious extra person in the party) lack warrant because the cognitive 
faculties are trying to work outside their designed-for range. 
In summary, according to Plantinga a belief has warrant for someone “only if 
that belief is produced in [them] by cognitive faculties functioning properly 
(subject to no dysfunction) in a cognitive environment that is appropriate for 
[their] kind of cognitive faculties, according to a design plan that is successfully 
aimed at truth” (Plantinga 2000: 156). It should be noted that, curiously, even a 
false belief can have warrant if it “is produced… by cognitive faculties success-
fully aimed at truth and functioning properly in an appropriate environment” 
(1993b: 55); but if it is a true belief that has warrant, then it constitutes 
knowledge. 
 
The sensus divinitatis: Aquinas/Calvin model 
Both proper function and warrant are necessary factors in the model of the 
sensus divinitatis faculty as Plantinga develops it. This faculty, according to 
him, is part of our “epistemic establishment” (1993b: 48), that set of cognitive 
modules we have which produces beliefs on a wide range of topics such as 
“[o]ur everyday external environment, the thoughts of others, our own internal 
lives… the past, mathematics and logic, what is probable and improbable, what 
is necessary and possible, beauty, right and wrong, our relationship to God, 
and a host of other topics” (1993b: 42). The modules involved include those 
pertaining to “self-knowledge, memory, perception, knowledge of other persons, 
testimony, a priori knowledge, induction, and probability” (1993b: 48), each of 
which is responsible for delivering beliefs – my belief, for instance, that the 
Battle of Hastings was in 1066 comes through the testimony of others (I cannot 
know or have beliefs about such an historical event through direct participation) 
and memory (of school history lessons and subsequent reading); whereas my 
beliefs concerning my own current state of being (thirsty but alert) are based on 
direct self-awareness; and so forth. Plantinga is proposing that the sensus 
divinitatis is another cognitive faculty which is responsible for delivering beliefs 
concerning God.  
Plantinga’s proposal is that the sensus divinitatis has a proper function 
which is indeed the apprehension of God and the deliverance of warranted 
beliefs about God; it delivers not simply an awareness of God, but what 
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Plantinga considers to be basic beliefs about God – true beliefs which are 
justified and warranted, and hence constitute knowledge of God. However, this 
faculty is prone to malfunction – does not fulfil its proper function – because of 
the consequences of sin. 
Since he is suggesting a model involving the sensus divinitatis as a human 
cognitive faculty which delivers theistic beliefs, it is important for him to determ-
ine the criteria which obtain for those beliefs to count as knowledge; and since 
the current enquiry will be developing an alternative to the sensus divinitatis, 
these criteria are significant in that context too. For current purposes I am 
accepting Plantinga’s starting position; later, I will offer modifications based on 
a pluralist, not theist, presupposition. 
Plantinga begins with comments found in the writings both of Thomas 
Aquinas and John Calvin who, though otherwise unlikely bed-fellows, “concur 
on the claim that there is a kind of natural knowledge of God” (Plantinga 2000: 
170). Taking Aquinas’ comment that “[t]o know in a general and confused way 
that God exists is implanted in us by nature” (2000: 170), Calvin “expands this 
theme into a suggestion as to the way in which beliefs about God can have 
warrant; he has a suggestion as to the nature of the faculty or mechanism 
whereby we acquire true beliefs about God” (2000: 170). It is this “faculty or 
mechanism” that is the focus of my attention. 
Plantinga identifies Calvin’s basic claim as being that “there is a sort of 
instinct, a natural human tendency, a disposition, a nisus to form beliefs about 
God under a variety of conditions and in a variety of situations” (2000: 171). 
This claim is made explicit in Calvin’s commentary on a biblical passage from 
Paul’s letter to the Romans. Paul writes: 
“For the wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness 
and wickedness of men who by their wickedness suppress the truth. For 
what can be known about God is plain to them, because God has shown 
it to them. Ever since the creation of the world his invisible nature, 
namely his eternal power and deity, has been clearly perceived in the 
things that have been made. So they are without excuse…” (Romans 1: 
18-20). 
 
And in his commentary, Calvin writes: 
“By saying, that God has made it manifest, he means, that man was 
created to be a spectator of this formed world, and that eyes were given 
him, that he might, by looking on so beautiful a picture, be led up to the 
Author himself” (quoted Plantinga 2000: 171). 
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This view Calvin later developed: 
“There is within the human mind, and indeed by natural instinct, an 
awareness of divinity [sensus divinitatis]. This we take to be beyond 
controversy. To prevent anyone from taking refuge in the pretense of 
ignorance, God himself has implanted in all men a certain understanding 
of his divine majesty… Since, therefore, men one and all perceive that 
there is a God and that he is their maker, they are condemned by their 
own testimony because they have failed to honor him and to consecrate 
their lives to his will… there is, as the eminent pagan [i.e. Cicero] says, 
no nation so barbarous, no people so savage, that they have not a deep 
seated conviction that there is a God… Therefore, since from the 
beginning of the world there has been no region, no city, in short, no 
household, that could do without religion, there lies in this a tacit 
confession of a sense of deity inscribed in the hearts of all” (quoted in 
Plantinga 2000: 171). 
 
“The basic idea,” Plantinga sums up,  
 
“is that there is a kind of faculty or cognitive mechanism, what Calvin 
calls a sensus divinitatis or sense of divinity, which in a wide variety of 
circumstances produces in us beliefs about God. These circum-
stances… trigger the disposition to form the beliefs in question; they 
form the occasion on which those beliefs arise. Under these circum-
stances, we develop or form theistic beliefs – or, rather, these beliefs are 
formed in us; in the typical case we don’t consciously choose to have 
those beliefs. Instead, we find ourselves with them, just as we find 
ourselves with perceptual and memory beliefs. (You don’t and can’t 
simply decide to have this belief, thereby acquiring it.)” (2000: 172-3 – 
emphasis in original).  
 
Plantinga’s last point is particularly important; he is asserting (correctly, I 
believe) that perceptual and memory beliefs are not the result of deliberate 
choice; they arise spontaneously. I cannot choose to believe that I am looking 
at a tree when my visual sense tells me it’s a house; I cannot choose to believe 
that I had cornflakes for breakfast when my memory tells me I had toast. 
Similarly, Plantinga is contending, under the right circumstances the operation 
of the sensus divinitatis results in our having a belief about God that we do not 
actively choose but which is presented to us (this is much the same point 
James is arguing in his Will to Believe [1917])  
The awareness of God “is natural, widespread, and not easy to forget, 
ignore or destroy” (2000: 173), a suggestion Plantinga illustrates by remarking 
that “[s]eventy years of determined but unsuccessful Marxist efforts to uproot 
Christianity in the former Soviet Union tend to confirm this claim” (2000: 173); 
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though I note, in keeping with my pluralist advocacy, that much the same can 
be claimed for Buddhism in occupied Tibet. 
Although the model that Plantinga is developing entails the sensus divinitatis 
as an innate faculty, it is not being suggested that actual knowledge of God per 
se is innate, more that “[t]he capacity for such knowledge is indeed innate, like 
the capacity for arithmetical knowledge” (2000: 173), and just as it requires a 
degree of maturity for the capacity for arithmetical knowledge to acquire actual 
content of arithmetical knowledge, so too “the development of the sensus 
divinitatis requires a certain maturity (although it is often manifested by very 
young children)” (2000: 173). The manifestation by “very young children”, which 
has some empirical evidence (Kelemen 2004), will be addressed later. 
Thus Plantinga is suggesting a model whereby there is a faculty for know-
ledge of God, the sensus divinitatis, which: a) is innate; b) is hard to eradicate; 
c) is a capacity for knowledge of God rather than propositional knowledge itself; 
d) does not emerge fully formed but requires maturation; and e) when it is 
functioning properly it forms theistic beliefs “in response to the sorts of 
conditions or stimuli that trigger the working of this sense of divinity” (Plantinga 
2000: 173). 
What though are these circumstances which trigger beliefs about God? It 
would appear that Calvin drew upon the argument from design, contending as 
he does that God “revealed himself and daily discloses himself in the whole 
workmanship of the universe” (2000: 174), which Plantinga glosses as “the 
marvellous, impressive beauty of the night sky; the timeless crash and roar of 
the surf that resonates deep within us; the majestic grandeur of the 
mountains… the ancient, brooding presence of the Australian outback; the 
thunder of a great waterfall” (2000: 174). And lest we are so carried away by 
the beauties of nature we take them to be the lone revelation of the existence of 
God, Plantinga adds other circumstances which (he contends) also trigger the 
sensus divinitatis, such as “an awareness of divine disapproval upon having 
done something wrong, or cheap, and something like a perception of divine 
forgiveness upon confession and repentance” (2000: 174). The sensus 
divinitatis, then, is a belief-making mechanism which “resembles other belief-
producing faculties or mechanisms” (2000: 174), and operates in a range of 
circumstances to bring knowledge of God (though I note that no mention is 
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made of the cruel side of creation, “evolutionary evil” and the like [Southgate 
2008], which takes some of the gloss off the beauties-of-nature rhapsodising). 
There are further features of Plantinga’s model to note. First, there is 
basicality. A basic belief is one that is not derived from other more basic 
propositions but which itself can become the basis for further inferences. Such 
beliefs can be those derived from sense perceptions (such as knowing that I am 
looking at a tree – this knowledge is not the outcome of a process of inference 
from some even more basic perception such as it seeming to me that I am 
being appeared to by a tree-like entity, requiring me to infer that I indeed am 
being so appeared to); or memory (I remember having cornflakes for breakfast, 
I don’t infer it from other perceptions such as seeing cornflakey crumbs on my 
jacket); and so forth. According to Plantinga’s model, the sensus divinitatis also 
delivers basic beliefs about God – they are not arrived at by a process of 
inference from other perceptions (this is similar to Alston’s argument concerning 
“mystical perception” [Alston 1991] as a analogue of sense perception). He 
gives several examples, such as seeing the night sky or being in the Australian 
outback, and becoming aware of belief that there is a God, but that belief is not 
inferred from perceiving the sky or the outback, “it is rather that, upon the 
perception of the night sky or the mountain vista or the tiny flower these beliefs 
just arise within us. They are occasioned by the circumstances; they are not 
conclusions from them” (Plantinga 2000: 175). Likewise, he considers that the 
experience of guilt also gives rise to a belief concerning God, a belief that is not 
the end result of, say, syllogistic reasoning, but a belief which rises up naturally: 
“I don’t take my guilt as evidence for the existence of God, or for the proposition 
that he is displeased with me. It is rather that in the circumstances – the 
circumstances of my clearly seeing my guilt – I simply find myself with the belief 
that God is disapproving or disappointed” (2000: 175 – emphasis in original). 
A second feature of the model is that of what he terms “proper basicality 
with respect to justification” (2000: 177), by which he means that theistic belief 
arising from the operation of the sensus divinitatis not only is basic but also is 
justified in that the individual “is within his epistemic rights, is not irresponsible, 
is violating no epistemic or other duties in holding that belief in that way [i.e. by 
means of the sensus divinitatis]” (2000: 178). A belief is justified, in Plantinga’s 
understanding, if the individual holding it has considered contrary evidence and 
arguments to the best of his ability rather than just blindly accepting the belief, 
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and concludes that on balance it is true. Even if it turns out that a given belief 
(such that the sun circles the earth) is actually wrong, the falsity of the belief 
does not, in itself, render the belief unjustified if the individual concerned is not 
aware of the contrary evidence, is not refusing to consider contrary evidence, 
has no means of knowing that there is contrary evidence, or if they know and 
have considered the contrary evidence but it seems to them insufficient to 
counter the evidence they have in favour of their belief. It is Plantinga’s 
contention that the theistic belief delivered through the operation of the sensus 
divinitatis is justified in this understanding of the term. 
Third, Plantinga contends that the model offers “proper basicality with 
respect to warrant” – theistic belief arising from the operation of the sensus 
divinitatis “can… be properly basic with respect to warrant” (2000: 178-9 – 
emphasis in original). That is to say, ”[i]t isn’t just that the believer in God is 
within her epistemic rights in accepting theistic belief in the basic way… this 
belief can [also] have warrant for the person in question, warrant that is often 
sufficient for knowledge. The sensus divinitatis is a belief-producing faculty… 
that under the right conditions produces belief that isn’t evidentially based on 
other beliefs” (2000: 179). Since, in Plantinga’s scheme, the sensus divinitatis 
has been designed and created by God with the express purpose of delivering 
true theistic beliefs, then when it is carrying out its proper function, “it ordinarily 
does produce true beliefs about God” which constitute knowledge (2000: 179). 
A fourth feature of the model concerns “natural knowledge of God”. The 
sensus divinitatis is posited as being part of our original cognitive equipment, 
our “fundamental epistemic establishment with which we have been created by 
God” (2000: 180), and hence the theistic beliefs it delivers constitutes natural 
knowledge of God. The sensus divinitatis is part of our original human nature. 
This is to contrast it with a process that Plantinga posits in an extended version 
of the model, one which is not part of our original human nature but (Plantinga 
contends) is God’s way of dealing with the sin-induced malfunctioning of the 
sensus divinitatis.  
This latter process depends on Calvin’s notion of the “internal instigation of 
the Holy Spirit (IIHS)” which, the contention is, comes into play as part of “the 
divine response to human sin and the human predicament… [namely] the fallen 
condition into which humankind has precipitated itself” (2000: 180). God has 
had to instigate a process to rectify matters, and part of that process is the 
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working of the Holy Spirit within the individual. This IIHS would not have come 
about had it not been for sin, whereas the sensus divinitatis, Plantinga 
maintains, “would no doubt have been a part of our epistemic establishment 
even if humanity had not fallen into sin” (2000, 180).  
Although this added extra falls outside the current enquiry, it helps highlight 
another aspect of Plantinga’s basic model. His description of the alleged IIHS, 
requiring it to be added at a later stage by God, rules it out as being a product 
of evolution; whereas the origin of the sensus divinitatis is not so clear cut. 
Following Aquinas and Calvin, Plantinga writes of the sensus divinitatis as 
being part of human nature (2000: 170 and passim); for his two mentors, living 
long before Darwin, evolutionary theory was not an option for explaining the 
existence of the sensus divinitatis. Plantinga’s own position on evolution how-
ever is captured in a remark on how, in his view, God brought about creation: 
“Perhaps it was by broadly evolutionary means, but then again perhaps not. At 
the moment, ‘perhaps not’ seems the better option” (quoted in Ruse 2006: 25), 
and part of the perhaps-not-ness is that, in his view, evolutionary theory is self-
undermining: because “natural selection isn’t interested in true belief but in 
adaptive behavior” (Plantinga 2000: 221) our cognitive faculties are inherently 
unreliable, and so any arguments we come up with in support of evolutionary 
theory itself cannot be relied on. Plantinga believes that organisms “are created 
by a conscious agent (God) according to a design plan” (2000: 154), implying 
that God underwrites the truthfulness of the deliverances of the cognitive 
faculties (including the sensus divinitatis) when they are functioning properly 
according to their design plan. 
Fifth, Plantinga discusses whether the operation of the sensus divinitatis 
and the knowledge of God to which it gives rise constitutes actual perception of 
God. Though acknowledging the case made by Alston (1991) that there can be 
and is perception of God, and that there are many instances of “indirect per-
ception” of God whereby “the perception of God is mediated by the perception 
of something else” such as the night sky, Plantinga contends that there are 
nevertheless cases in which “God doesn’t seem actually present, or presented, 
even though various beliefs about him – that he is powerful, glorious, to be 
worshiped, obeyed, thanked – arise” (2000: 182 – emphasis in original). From 
this observation he concludes that the operation of the sensus divinitatis 
“doesn’t necessarily involve perception of God” (2000: 182 – emphasis added). 
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Nor, it would seem, does the knowledge of God obtained through the operation 
of the sensus divinitatis necessarily constitute religious experience. Certainly, 
“the operation of the sensus divinitatis will always involve the presence of 
experience of some kind or other... [a] common component is a sort of awe, a 
sense of the numinous; a sense of being in the presence of a being of over-
whelming majesty and greatness…” (2000: 183). But whether the sensus 
divinitatis knowledge of God comes by way of religious experience (rather than 
being accompanied by, or actually constituting, what he terms a “doxastic 
experience” – that is, the experience of gaining a belief) he is agnostic, deciding 
that “we can be satisfied with an account of how (on the model) the sensus 
divinitatis does in fact work; given that account, the answer to the question 
whether this is by way of experience is unimportant and optional” (2000: 183-4). 
If I have understood him correctly, Plantinga claims that although the acqui-
sition of a belief (or knowledge) is an experience in its own right, the operation 
of the sensus divinitatis is not (or not necessarily) by means of experience. The 
situation is unclear, and I propose to leave it at that. 
In summary then, we have a model in which God has endowed us with a 
cognitive faculty, the sensus divinitatis, which delivers theistic beliefs that, when 
the faculty is functioning properly (as God designed it to do) are warranted 
beliefs and constitute knowledge. This knowledge is “basic” knowledge, not 
derived, deduced, inferred or abducted from other beliefs. It is knowledge of 
God. 
 
Challenges and modifications 
Plantinga’s epistemological position can be and has been challenged. 
Swinburne, for example, argues that the proper functioning of an organ or 
faculty doesn’t require reference to what God or evolution purportedly designed 
the organ or faculty to do, but is simply “its functioning in ways (normal to the 
species) conducive to the survival, health, or flourishing of the organism in 
various respects including holding true beliefs” (Swinburne 2001: 204). Fales 
questions whether Plantinga has satisfactorily circumvented those epistemol-
ogical problems involving implausible but logically possible scenarios in which 
we have unwittingly come to “know” something by ingeniously illegitimate 
means, claiming that “the Gettier bulldog still has a firm grip upon his ankle” 
(Fales 2003: 354); and in his discussion of Reformed epistemology Sudduth 
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draws out implications of Plantinga’s model that since the task of the sensus 
divinitatis is purportedly to deliver theistic beliefs, there is therefore “something 
incorrect, improper, or defective in holding theistic belief on the basis of theistic 
arguments”, which moreover suggests “that both theistic unbelief and non-basic 
theistic belief are indications of cognitive malfunction” – implications that 
Sudduth argues are too restrictive, for “surely it is plausible to suppose that 
people often do hold some of their theistic beliefs at least on the partial basis of 
evidential considerations” (Sudduth 2003: 312, 313). 
It is, however, not necessary for present purposes to address such 
challenges to Plantinga’s general epistemological position, for this reason: the 
sensus divinitatis is offered by Plantinga as the description of a module or 
faculty that delivers beliefs, and as such it is (if it exists) part of our cognitive 
equipment along with other belief-delivering faculties such as perception and 
memory. The knowledge-status of any belief delivered by any of these other 
faculties is open to the same kinds of challenge (is it justified? warranted? 
true?) to which the deliverances of the sensus divinitatis can be subjected, and 
the sensus divinitatis does not have to be better at meeting those challenges 
than the other cognitive faculties for it still to count as a (plausible) cognitive 
faculty itself. Other belief-delivering faculties are known to be fallible, as with 
the problem in law courts where both perception and memory errors render 
eyewitness statements less than wholly reliable (Engelhardt 1999) – but this 
does not prevent our still considering them to be faculties that deliver beliefs 
upon which much of our putative knowledge is based. Gettier-type problems 
should perhaps encourage us to be cautious in according knowledge-status to 
our beliefs, because of the possibility that we have unwittingly acquired a given 
true belief by epistemically illegitimate means involving outrageous coincidence 
and luck – but that in itself does not invalidate the sensus divinitatis any more 
than it invalidates memory, perception or any of the other cognitive faculties.  
Admittedly the challenges to Plantinga’s position do pose a problem for 
Plantinga himself, as he is seeking to use an extended version of the sensus 
divinitatis model to argue that specifically Christian beliefs (“trinity, incarnation, 
Christ’s resurrection, atonement, forgiveness of sins, salvation, regeneration, 
eternal life” [Plantinga 2000: 241] are warranted; but the aim of the current 
enquiry is far more modest – namely to argue that there exists a cognitive 
faculty by the operation of which H. sapiens has contact with, intimations of, 
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openness to, the Real – picking up, as it were, “signals of transcendence” 
(Berger 1971) – and that this faculty has evolutionary roots. This does not 
require such a faculty being any less fallible than memory, perception and the 
rest, so what I am taking from Plantinga is that such a cognitive faculty could 
plausibly exist and, as with other cognitive faculties, deliver beliefs that have 
warrant.  
There are however two significant modifications to make to Plantinga’s 
model, precisely because he is arguing from a theistic (more specifically, 
Christian; even more specifically, Reformed) position, whereas I am advocating 
a pluralist position and offering a naturalistic account for the existence of the 
module or faculty in question. Since in the pluralist paradigm the term “God” 
simply refers to one of a range of possible manifestations of the Real as 
experienced (the personae), and that the Real is experienced non-theistically in 
some traditions (the impersonae), the term sensus divinitatis is not entirely 
appropriate. Admittedly, strictly speaking the term sensus divinitatis does not 
refer to God but to the divine, but nevertheless it is strongly associated with 
delivering theistic belief and hence is unsuitable to cover the experiences of the 
transcendent Real which fall in the impersonae category. Therefore I propose 
henceforth to use a term which will cover the range of personae and 
impersonae by which the transcendent Real is experienced, and have settled 
on the term “sensus transcendentis”.  
I am also, it must be noted, not taking on board Plantinga’s suggestions 
concerning the additional “faculty” of the “Internal Instigation of the Holy Spirit” 
(IIHS) whereby the alleged malfunctioning of the sensus divinitatis allegedly 
brought on by alleged human sin are counteracted by the actions of the Holy 
Spirit. I am interested in, broadly speaking, the evolutionary roots of human 
nature, and by Plantinga’s own admission the IIHS (if indeed it, or something 
like it, actually exists) is not part of the original package of human nature; and 
what he considers to be the “noetic effects of sin” (that is, blindness to theistic 
truth) can be alternatively construed under the model I am developing as the 
consequences of the transcendent Real being mediated through different 
cultural categories of thought, as suggested by the pluralist paradigm. I am, 
therefore, sticking with the sensus transcendentis alone – which is pan-cultural, 
and not incorporating something (the IIHS) which is applicable to a single 
tradition. I am clearly, though, advocating a fully evolutionary view, not 
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requiring, as it were, God or some conscious agent to ensure that evolved 
cognitive faculties deliver the truth. 
 
Conclusion 
The sensus divinitatis as proposed by Plantinga offers a template for the 
sensus transcendentis model which I am developing, with its possessing a 
“proper function” in the delivering of beliefs which have warrant, but which is 
susceptible to some form of malfunction.  
Whereas the sensus divinitatis is said to be designed to deliver awareness  
or knowledge of God, the sensus transcendentis has been shaped (I will con-
tend) by evolutionary processes to deliver awareness of the Real, analogous to 
the way by which our other cognitive faculties (perception, memory and so 
forth) have contact with other aspects of our total environment and deliver 
beliefs about those aspects.  
The previous discussion highlighting the universality of religious traditions 
and the wide range of “Roses” identified by James (1902) and others are highly 
suggestive, such that something along the lines of a sensus transcendentis is a 
plausible hypothesis for explaining – or at least contributing to an explanation of 
– these phenomena. But if the sensus transcendentis is a part of human nature, 
how did it come into being? As frequently adumbrated, I will be drawing upon 
evolutionary theory to answer this question; and that is the subject of Section II. 
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Chapter 6: Of evolutionary theory 
 
Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide the context for an explication of 
evolutionary psychology which will, in due course, be a lens through which to 
look at spirituality. Biological evolution, gene-culture coevolution and the 
evolution of language are all briefly addressed, in preparation for focusing 
specifically on evolutionary psychology in the following chapter. 
 
Evolutionary Theory 
There are many fine accounts of the theory of evolution and its history (e.g. 
Dawkins 2009; Pallen 2009; Ridley 1993; Ruse 2006), and as there is neither 
space nor necessity to give a whole mass of details here, I will restrict myself to 
a very abbreviated account before focusing on human evolution.  
In 1859 Charles Darwin published On the Origin of Species by Means of 
Natural Selection. He had been working on his theory for many years following 
his five year voyage (1831-36) as intellectual companion to Captain FitzRoy of 
the HMS Beagle, which was charting the coast of South America. Able to 
pursue his primary interest in natural history, Darwin made detailed observ-
ations of the birds and reptiles on the Galapagos islands, noting that despite 
clear similarities they differed not only from those on the mainland, but also from 
island to island (Rogers 2011). Becoming convinced on his return to England 
that the island forms were genuine species, he concluded that the idea of the 
fixity of species was untenable and that a process of “descent with modification” 
takes place, such that in this instance ancestors of the islands’ birds and 
reptiles, having come from the mainland, had spread and diversified on the 
islands. But although he well knew how animal and plant breeders improve their 
stock over the generations by selecting which organisms to breed from, the 
means by which nature could similarly select for change remained mysterious to 
him until famously he read Malthus’s (1973 [1798]) tract which argued that 
“state support of the poor only exacerbates problems, for population numbers 
always outstrip potential food supplies” (Ruse 2006: 15) – and this “struggle for 
existence”, Darwin realised, resulted in the mechanism of natural selection 
when allied with the vast reaches of time that geology increasingly disclosed 
(Lyell 1830-33).  
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The logic of natural selection is easy: in any population of organisms there is 
variation in phenotypic characteristics. Those individuals whose characteristics 
confer an advantage, however small, over other members of the population will, 
“owing to [their] particularly well-adapted combination of inheritable characters, 
give rise to the next generation” (Mayr 1993: 37), and those advantageous 
characteristics will spread throughout the population. Thus when it comes to 
fleeing from a predator, faster gazelles are at an advantage compared with 
slower gazelles, so (other things being equal) fleetness of foot will be selected 
for, and any genetic predisposition for such fleetness will spread through the 
ensuing generations. On the other hand, as Darwin observed, “we may feel 
sure that any variation in the least degree injurious would be rigidly destroyed. 
This preservation of favourable variations and the rejection of injurious 
variations, I call Natural Selection” (quoted in Ruse 2006: 16).  
For the birds and reptiles that Darwin observed on the Galapagos islands, 
the ancestral founder populations will have faced environmental challenges 
(such as climate, potential sources of food, possible predators) different from 
the challenges faced by the mainland population, hence what constituted 
favourable variations being selected for in the island populations would have 
been different from what constituted favourable variations being selected for in 
the mainland populations; and as the generations passed, the island populat-
ions and the mainland populations diverged until, as Darwin recognised, they 
were species distinct from each other.  
Tracing the above process forwards in time shows how one species can split 
into two or more daughter species, particularly if the populations in question 
become geographically separated (“allopatric speciation”) as with an island 
population and a mainland population; but tracing the process backwards in 
time illuminates the theory of common descent, namely that “every group of 
organisms [is] descended from a common ancestor, and… all groups of organ-
isms, including animals, plants, and micro-organisms, ultimately go back to a 
single origin of life” (Mayr 1993: 36). The further back in time we go, the more 
that ancestral species converge with each other such that, for example, the 
chimpanzee lineage and the hominid lineage (which gave rise eventually to H. 
sapiens) are found to have split about six million years ago (Mithen 2003), and 
“the common ancestor of people and budgerigars lived about 310 million years 
ago” (Dawkins 2009: 254). 
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Darwin’s “descent with modification” depends upon variation of character-
istics within a population, and on heritability – the passing on of a characteristic 
from one generation to the next; but in the early years a major problem for 
Darwin’s theory was the lack of a suitable mechanism of inheritance, the belief 
at the time being that characteristics of parents are “blended” in the offspring, a 
process which would have resulted in favourable variations being diluted to 
insignificance within a few generations. The actual “particulate” (i.e. genetic) 
mechanism of inheritance was established in the early 1860s by the Moravian 
monk Gregor Mendel, but though he had presented a paper on his work in 1865 
and published in 1866, Darwin remained unaware of this work which would 
have resolved the diluting problem, since the “particles” (read “genes”) in being 
passed from generation to generation would not be blended. Mendel, on the 
other hand, had read the Origin before publishing his paper, but regrettably and 
extraordinarily he failed to make the connection (Pallen 2009).  
Mendel’s work remained effectively unknown for several decades, before his 
discoveries were independently rediscovered at the start of the 20th century 
(Pallen 2009), giving rise in time first to population genetics (Fisher 1930) and 
eventually neo-Darwinism (Dobzhansky 1937) in which classical Darwinian 
theory is integrated with genetic theory, and of which mainstream evolutionary 
theory consists today. Today, the further developments of gene-culture co-
evolution (Durham 1991), developmental systems theory (Oyama et al 2001), 
niche construction theory (Odling-Smee et al 2003), evolutionary developmental 
biology (Carroll 2005) and epigenetics (Carey 2011) are enriching the field 
immeasurably. 
 
Evidence 
Although it is not the aim of this enquiry to establish the truth of evolutionary 
theory, but to develop a model to demonstrate how a particular aspect of it 
plausibly can mesh with an understanding of spirituality on the presupposition 
that evolutionary theory is at least in the neighbourhood of truth, it will be helpful 
to give a brief indication of the empirical evidence in favour of such a 
presupposition. 
Although direct evidence for speciation, in the sense of seeing it happen in 
front of our eyes, tends to hard to come by since the mills of natural selection 
generally grind agonisingly slowly, evidence for the operation of natural 
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selection itself is found in a number of phenomena such as the development of 
bacterial resistance reducing the efficacy of antibiotics, the development of 
insect resistance to insecticides such as DDT, and (to give some more specific 
examples) the divergence both biochemically and in their breeding times of two 
populations of apple maggot fly parasitizing apples and hawthorns respectively 
(Ruse 2006); alterations in the characteristics of finches’ beaks on the Galapa-
gos islands over several consecutive years of drought (Weiner 1994); and 
genetically-based differences in phenotypic traits in guppies subjected to 
different predators (Reznick et al 1997). Rogers (2011) argues that polyploid 
hybrids in plants (whereby the number of chromosomes in the offspring is 
doubled) constitute new species; Callaghan (1987) contends that there have 
been a number of examples of observed speciation; and Endler (1986) lists 
over 100 research projects in the literature demonstrating the operation of 
natural selection on a wide range of organisms.  
Indirect evidence for common descent of species is, by contrast, consider-
able, and comes not only from many different sources but from many different 
types of sources as outlined by Ruse (2006). From biogeography we have the 
observation that “the inhabitants of islands resemble the organisms on their 
closest mainland, rather than on mainlands far away” (2006: 39), yet similar 
places often have dissimilar inhabitants: “there is a considerable degree of 
resemblance in the volcanic nature of the soil, in climate, height, and size of 
islands, between the Galapagos and Cape Verde Archipelagoes: but what an 
entire and absolute difference in their inhabitants! The inhabitants of Cape 
Verde Islands are related to those of Africa, like those of the Galapagos to 
America” (Darwin, quoted in Ruse 2006: 40) – an observation more plausibly 
explained by evolution than by special creation. 
With palaeontology, Ruse notes that the fossil record is “roughly progress-
ive, which is what we would expect were evolution true, but it also shows the 
kinds of sequences we would expect from evolution” – a notable example being 
the series of fossils leading to the modern horse (2006: 40, 41), each member 
of the sequence highly plausibly being derived from the previous member by 
“descent with modification”.  
Morphology gives numerous instances of homology – similarity between the 
parts of organisms of very different species, such as the front limbs of verte-
brates which have different functions: “the hand of a man, formed for grasping, 
 137 
that of a mole for digging, the leg of the horse, the paddle of the porpoise, and 
the wing of the bat [are] all… constructed on the same pattern, and… include 
the same bones, in the same relative positions” (Darwin, quoted in 2006: 42). 
This and other homologies are “powerful evidence of common ancestry, with 
one initial form having been moulded to various ends” (2006: 11). 
Embryology shows that organisms which are very different as adults 
(humans and chickens, for instance – or the aforementioned budgerigars) have 
embryos that are very similar “because they are descended from common 
ancestors. There is no other good reason” (2006: 42). Likewise, the existence of 
vestigial organs such as “the wings of flightless birds, the limb remnants of 
‘limbless’ vertebrates like snakes and whales, the eye sockets of eyeless fish, 
and in humans such things as the appendix and the coccyx” are best explained 
in evolutionary terms as “relicts and evidence of the past – of past ancestors, 
that is, shared with organisms that still (as did the ancestors) use these features 
for their own adaptive ends” (2006: 42,43).  
The field of molecular genetics is concerned with the comparison of 
equivalent genes across different species, and the variations in proteins that 
different genes code for such as cytochrome-C which is part of the “electron 
transport chain” in cells of plants, animals, and many unicellular organisms. The 
extent to which cytochrome-C and other proteins differ among various species 
enables “family trees” of the species to be constructed, which converge “rapidly 
and decisively, on a single great tree of life” (Dawkins 2009: 325) as the theory 
of evolution predicts.  
It is the cumulative and mutually supporting evidence from such an array of 
sources that “points strongly to the truth of the fact of evolution” (Ruse 2006: 
43), though it is important to acknowledge that the mechanism of natural 
selection, which remains central to the theory of evolution as we know it, 
continues to be challenged. The core understanding is that random changes – 
mutations – in the genome occur from time to time during reproduction, and 
though the vast majority of mutations are lethal, some confer a slight adaptive 
advantage to the organism such that it is statistically more likely to survive and 
reproduce than conspecific organisms without that mutation. The strong version 
of this account assumes that all traits of a given species have arisen as benefic-
ial adaptations, but Gould and Lewontin (1979) argue that although many traits 
of a given organism are adaptive, many are better understood as non-adaptive 
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side-effects arising from other changes in the organism, and that evolutionists 
are too fond of dreaming up unwarranted “just-so” stories to impute an adaptive 
role to such traits; others argue against the concept of “atomistic (one trait at a 
time) mechanisms of natural selection”, drawing upon the insight of evolutionary 
development (“evo-devo”) to argue inter alia that “the whole process of develop-
ment, from the fertilized egg to the adult” is significant in constraining what vari-
ations in phenotypes become available for “ecological variables” to operate 
selectively on (Fodor and Piattelli-Palmarini 2010: 26, 27); and with epigenetic 
effects (how genes are switched on and off in cells, and their transgenerational 
influence) also being increasingly understood (Carey 2011) the picture grows 
ever more complex.  
Nevertheless, it remains the case “the main engine of evolution is seen as 
natural selection – the preferential survival and reproduction of some genetic 
forms rather than others” (Lea 1999: 17), and the current enquiry works on that 
assumption, along with the assumption (which is more of a truism) that even if 
not each and every trait of a given species is an adaptation in the sense of 
separately conferring survival/reproductive advantage to its possessors, never-
theless the entire suite of traits of a species is, on balance, adaptive rather than 
maladaptive.  
 
Human evolution 
Around eight million years ago, Africa and Eurasia collided creating the high-
lands of Kenya and Ethiopia, and the earth’s crust cracked to form the Great 
Rift Valley, and the eastern side the forest and woodland largely gave way to 
savannah, or open terrain (Corballis 1999). This is the area, it is now generally 
reckoned, where human evolution began, and although the dates ascribed to 
various stages in human evolution change as new fossils are discovered, radio-
metric techniques for dating them are refined, and molecular evidence (from 
e.g. mitochondrial DNA and Y-chromosome studies) comes to the fore, the 
human lineage appears to have separated from that of our closest relatives, the 
great apes, around six to eight mya (Renfrew 2007), though some put it as 
recently as five mya (Ruse 2006). A proliferation of ancestral and collateral 
species has been identified, including Homo habilis (c. 2.5 mya) who is also 
regarded as the first member of the genus Homo with which began “the evolu-
tion of distinctively human characteristics… Brain size began its spectacular 
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increase [and] stone tools were developed” (Corballis 1999: 60), with “our ever-
changing battle with climate and food resources” (Oppenheimer 2007: 94) 
driving that evolution. 
According to a recent interpretation of the evidence (Renfrew 2007), the 
first of several waves of dispersal out of Africa took place at the start of the 
Pleistocene period about 1.7 mya. Anatomically modern humans (AMH) 
evolved in East Africa perhaps as long ago as 150,000 years ago, with their 
particular “out-of-Africa” dispersal put at around 60,000 years ago, Australia 
being colonized by at least 45,000 years ago, and Europe 40,000 years ago, in 
due course displacing their various cousin species. Ceramic technology had 
been established by 26,000 years ago, the domestication of plants and animals 
by about 10,000 years ago, and writing was invented by 5,000 years ago, by 
when “the foundations of the modern world had been laid” (Mithen 2003: 3). H. 
sapiens had arrived both anatomically and culturally. 
 
Culture  
There is a “remarkable… lack of internal genetic variation” of the human 
species of today (Ruse 2006: 185), suggesting that there can have been only 
very limited genetic changes in H. sapiens since the dispersal; for had the 
different populations of AMH on the various continents each evolved consid-
erably away from the ancestral population in Africa they would today vary even 
more widely from each other, having to all intents and purposes been genetic-
ally isolated from each other from the time of the African dispersal up until the 
possibility of rapid global travel in very recent centuries. This implies that the 
changes in human behaviour that have occurred and the human diversity that 
we see are cultural rather than biological in origin, and hence any real under-
standing of H. sapiens requires cultural processes to be taken into account, 
along with how genes and culture might interact in a form of co-evolution 
(Durham 1991, Boyd and Richerson 2005, Richerson and Boyd 2005).  
Culture refers to information that an individual acquires through teaching, 
imitation and other forms of social transmission; it is “not inherited through 
genes, it is acquired by learning from other human beings...” (Dobzhansky, 
quoted in Wilson 2000 [1975]: 550). Claims that culture is unique to human 
beings (White 1959) are sometimes countered by claims of cultural trans-
mission in other species such as chimpanzees who learn by imitation to use 
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twigs to extract termites from termite mounds (Goodall 1971), but the vast 
difference in degree between the culture of H. sapiens and the alleged culture 
of any other species arguably amounts to a difference in kind. A longstanding 
view of culture is that it concerns socially transmissible behaviour including the 
making of artefacts, such that “[s]pecifically and concretely, culture consists of 
tools, implements, utensils, clothing, ornaments, customs, institutions, beliefs, 
rituals, games, works of art, language, etc. ” (White 1959: 3), though culture 
can also be understood as “ideational”, that is, concerned with ideas, values 
and beliefs, of which observable behaviour is the manifestation (Durham 1991).  
Cultures change (our tools now include the internet and Exocet missiles 
instead of – or as well as – smoke signals and clubs), and prior to the rise of 
sociobiology and evolutionary psychology, theories of cultural evolution had 
gone in and out of anthropological fashion. White (1959) takes the term 
“evolution” to be synonymous with “change and development” rather than in a 
narrower, Darwinian sense involving variation, inheritance and natural selection 
(or an analogue), and understands cultural evolution and biological evolution to 
be independent processes; the latter not shaping the former, nor vice versa. 
A clear example of how White’s scheme of culture is divorced from genetics 
concerns the incest taboo, worth mentioning because of the contrasting view of 
incest-avoidance offered by evolutionary psychology, as discussed in the next 
chapter. The incest taboo in White’s view is an “invention” (1951: 86 – his 
inverted commas) to ensure exogamy, which in turn enables alliances between 
families to be formed, which in turn increases cooperation, which in turn 
increases security against enemies and predators, and increases efficiency in 
acquiring the necessities for life. Thus the incest taboo is seen as ultimately 
increasing the security and hence survivability of the group. “Prohibitions 
against incest and customs of exogamy were the products of sociocultural sys-
tems...” and no-one “would want to argue that any cultural form is determined 
by genes and chromosomes” (1959: 89, 21-22). 
 
Culture and evolution  
White’s contention in that last sentence is no longer true unless “determined by” 
is taken utterly literally, for modern evolutionary theory has permeated main-
stream social and psychological anthropology giving rise to “models of culture 
that are based on evolutionary processes” (Flinn et al 1994: 327), and concepts 
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of cultural evolution which “have almost nothing in common” with the “progress-
ive evolutionary theories debated by generations of anthropologists” (Richerson 
and Boyd 2005: 59). These include the notion of cultural evolution analogous to 
Darwinian genetic evolution (Dawkins 1989 [1976], Durham 1991, Richerson 
and Boyd 2005); claims that genes keep culture “on a leash” (Wilson 1978: 167); 
the possibility that culture itself feeds back to influence genes – or, more accur-
ately, to influence the differential inheritance of genes leading eventually to 
changes in the gene pool (Boyd and Richerson 1985; Durham 1991; Richerson 
and Boyd 2005); and arguments that culture (aka civilization) has accelerated 
genetic evolution up to a hundred-fold (Cochran and Harpending 2009), as well 
as the complete opposite that little if any genetic evolution has taken place in H. 
sapiens over the last 50,000 years or so (Diamond 1992).  
According to Darwinian theory genetic variations which improve the survival 
and reproductive chances of their possessors will spread through the population 
in succeeding generations, and likewise, it is argued, cultural variations also 
have an impact on the survival and reproductive chances of their practitioners, 
with the result that “some cultural variants spread and others diminish, leading to 
evolutionary processes that are every bit as real and important as those that 
shape genetic variation” (Richerson and Boyd 2005: 4). Cultural evolution, how-
ever, is potentially a far faster process than genetic evolution, and human cult-
ures can change “even more quickly than the most rapid example of genetic 
evolution by natural selection” (2005: 43), such as the shift from sedentary 
farming to buffalo hunting by Plains Indians, and the “complex artifacts, instit-
utions, and behaviors we associate with [them]” which arose after the introduct-
ion of horses around 1650 (2005: 43). 
The advantage that cultural evolution has over genetic evolution is not only 
its rapidity, but also its allowing a cumulative assembly of adaptations over many 
generations, “adaptations that no single individual could evoke on his or her 
own” (Richerson and Boyd 2005: 45). Moreover, cultural transmission entails 
imitation of and learning from not only parents but also others in the social 
environment whether of a different or the same generation, which breaks the 
genetic link between what the individual acquires and his genetic forebears. 
Imitation is crucial since to imitate is less costly than to find out something for 
oneself (such as which foods are safe to eat – the first taste of a potential new 
foodstuff could be the last taste of anything), so “imitate the successful” is a 
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good heuristic or rule-of-thumb in a stable environment. However, such a 
procedure is less than perfect in a changing environment such as climate 
fluctuation during the Pleistocene. For if everyone simply imitated the behaviour 
of everyone else, however successful that behaviour had been in previous 
conditions, no adaptation could occur to respond to changed circumstances and 
the old behaviour would become maladaptive. Hence the necessity of “inform-
ation producers” as well as “information scroungers” (Richerson and Boyd 2005: 
112), that is to say, individuals who are innovators (taking the risk of trying 
previously avoided potential foodstuffs when the usual resources have all failed) 
as well as those who are imitators. Cultural evolution requires both, with the 
innovators being the equivalent of the genetic mutations; the difference being 
that cultural evolution can track a changing environment far faster than can 
genetic evolution. 
We thus have a “dual inheritance” model (Boyd and Richerson 1978), which 
entails human beings possessing “two major information systems, one genetic, 
and one cultural… both of these systems have the potential for transmission or 
‘inheritance’ across space and time… both have profound effects on the 
behavior of the organism, and… both are simultaneously co-resident in each 
and every living human being” (Durham 1991: 9 – emphasis in original). This 
then raises the question of how genes and culture interact and co-evolve. 
 
Gene-culture coevolution 
Durham identifies five distinct ways that genetic and cultural change interact in 
human populations (Durham 1991); here, for the purposes of this enquiry, I will 
briefly consider the two interactive modes.  
The first of these modes entails genes mediating culture, an example being 
that of colour discrimination. It used to be thought that each language chops up 
human experience uniquely, such that there were no semantic universals and 
that, for example, ”the cultural labels for color [were] viewed as arbitrary” (1991: 
215). An attempt in 1969 to confirm this “hypothesis of extreme linguistic 
relativity” (1991: 216), however, demonstrated the opposite: when native 
speakers of twenty different languages were given the task of naming the basic 
colours of a large array of chromatic chips and identifying on a grid of colours 
the “focal points” or most typical example of each basic colour, the researchers 
found “a very high degree of concordance or correlation among the boundaries 
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of the basic color terms… [and] a tight clustering of the focal points rather than 
a culturally arbitrary scatter” (1991: 216-7). A very basic set of eleven focal 
categories emerged, and languages with fewer than the eleven manifested a 
sequence of which colours were linguistically discriminated: all languages had 
terms for black and white; if a language has a third colour term it was for red; if 
a fourth term, it was for green or yellow; a fifth term would be for the other of 
yellow or green; then blue, then brown, then (though now in no particular order) 
purple, pink, orange and grey (1991: 217-8). That is to say, all the tested 
cultures divided up the colour spectrum in a non-arbitrary fashion, a finding 
supported by evidence from the neurophysiology of colour vision that “the 
nervous system codes spectral radiation according to its wavelength in a way 
that creates a kind of biological categorization of the spectrum” (1991: 218). 
Genes, it can be inferred, create a visual system that divides up the spectrum in 
the same way for all of H. sapiens, and the linguistic terms follow those cleav-
age lines. Culture, in this instance, would appear to be constrained by genes 
(though see Roberson et al [2005] for a contrary view). 
A second interactive mode Durham identified entails culture mediating 
genes – that is, a cultural innovation leads, eventually, to genetic change in the 
relevant human population. This has occurred in tropical West Africa where 
slash-and-burn practices, clearing land for agriculture, create places where 
warm, sunlit pools form. These pools are the ideal habitat for malaria-bearing 
mosquitoes, which have a knock-on effect on pools of the human gene variety. 
Malaria is, obviously, bad news for humans. However, the “S” allele (gene 
variant), which gives rise to the lethal condition of sickle-cell anaemia when an 
individual inherits two sickle-cell alleles (one from each parent), actually gives 
protection against malaria to an individual who has inherited only one sickle-cell 
allele (“S”) from one parent and an unmutated allele (“A”) from the other parent. 
Moreover, such an individual, despite the S allele, does not develop sickle-cell 
anaemia – the presence of the unmutated “A” allele provides protection. Hence 
in malarial areas, there is selection pressure in favour of “SA” individuals, 
protecting them against malaria. In consequence, there is a much higher 
prevalence of the “S” allele in the local population than is the case in non-
malarial areas, despite its lethality for individuals who inherit a double dose 
(Durham 1991). 
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Other examples of gene-culture interaction which have been proposed 
include the change in humans to a less robust physique with the development 
of effective projectile hunting weapons, the development of lactose-tolerance 
among pastoralist communities, the evolution of language along with the 
necessary vocal apparatus, and the development of human cooperation (Boyd 
and Richerson 2005); and even (though more speculatively and provocatively) 
the development of higher-than-average intelligence of Ashkenazi Jews has 
been attributed to cultural pressures, including endogamy and anti-Semitism, 
purportedly favouring the selection of genes underpinning intelligence (Cochran 
and Harpending 2009).  
 
Language 
Integral to all known human societies is language (Pinker 1994), the coming of 
which marked the eighth and last of what some have identified as a series of 
major transitions in the evolution of life, namely the transition from primate 
societies to human societies (Smith and Szathmáry 1997). With language, our 
forebears became “what might loosely be called ‘fully human’”, constituting as it 
does a unique characteristic, for although all animals communicate, “only 
humans, so far as we know, are possessed of languages composed, first, of 
lexicons made up of symbols… and second, of grammars, sets of rules for 
combining symbols into semantically unbounded discourse" (Rappaport 1999: 
4). Language enables reference to that which is not present “even when that 
referent is thousands of miles away or thousands of years back in history” 
(Bickerton 2009: 47), markedly differing in this respect from animal 
communication systems which deal only with the immediately present, such as 
a vervet’s suite of alarm calls responding to the presence of eagle, leopard or 
snake – it is the immediate danger that is signalled; the vervet cannot make 
reference to an eagle that was circling above yesterday, or a leopard that might 
appear a week tomorrow (Bickerton 2009). The symbolic nature of language 
releases us from the purely literal, enabling us to re-create the world rather than 
simply “reading-off from what is already there” (O’Hear 1997: 39), and so 
permits the development of the consciousness of one’s belief as “something 
separate from the world it is representing, and hence as [the believer’s] 
representation of his world" (1997: 37). And although this current enquiry does 
not fully endorse Katz’s (1978) strong constructivist position, nevertheless it is 
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hard to disagree with his general assertion that language is necessarily involved 
in the construction and interpretation of religious experience, and that “the 
mystical experience must be mediated by the kind of beings we are. And the 
kind of beings we are require that experience… involve memory, apprehension, 
expectation, language, accumulation of prior experience, concepts and expect-
ations” (1978: 59). It is not simply that language allows us to communicate our 
experiences to others, it also permits us to represent those experiences to 
ourselves, and without the symbolic, representational character of language, 
without the tropes of “metaphor, symbol, analogy, parable, paradox” that 
characterize religious language (Honderich 1995: 768), religion, religious 
experiences and spirituality could not exist.  
But for all that, the origins of language – the when, how and why it evolved – 
are greatly disputed. Dating the emergence of language is problematic because 
of the obvious fact that language leaves no fossils, and attempts to infer the 
linguistic abilities of ancestors from the nature of their surviving artefacts could 
well “seriously underestimate the antiquity of language” since many sophistic-
ated artefacts such as baskets, clothing and tents “rot into nothing quickly after 
[the] departure [of those who made them], obscuring their linguistic compet-
ence” (Pinker 1994: 352). The anatomy of skulls might seem a proxy for langu-
age skills, with their imprints of wrinkle patterns of their former brain contents 
revealing, for example, in Homo habilis the presence of Broca’s area, which in 
humans is implicated in language use. But there is no guarantee that H. habilis 
used Broca’s area for language, since “even monkeys have a small homologue 
to Broca’s area” (Pinker 1994: 353), and monkeys are not credited with poss-
essing language. Moreover, language use also involves sub-cortical areas of 
the brain (Lieberman 1998) which could not leave imprints on their host skulls.  
This leaves the field open to a range of views for when language evolved. 
Bickerton (1990) locates “protolanguage”, a postulated precursor to language 
proper resembling pidgin languages and the grammarless language of two-year 
old children, as far back as two mya; whereas Donald on the other hand, puts 
the evolution of protolanguage much later, at around 130-100 kya. Either way, 
all agree that the evolutionary advantages of language are considerable: it 
permits the acquisition of information from others, avoiding the time-consuming 
and possibly dangerous trial-and-error procedure of gaining that knowledge 
directly by experience (Pinker and Bloom 1992); it enhances social inter-action 
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by reducing the time and effort needed to build social ties otherwise mediated 
by the physical grooming of others (Mithen 1996); it allows the tribal retention of 
crucial information on which their survival could well depend, such as how to 
survive a potentially catastrophic depletion of resources; and it contributes to 
the faculty of “mental time travel”, which gives the possessor the advantage of 
being able to relive past events and imagine, and hence plan, the future in 
episodic detail (Corballis and Suddendorf 2007). These factors and others 
enhance the genetic fitness of the individual either directly, or through being a 
member of the language-using tribe. 
The evolution of language can also be understood as one example of gene-
culture interaction, since the learning of a given language is a cultural process, 
distinct from any predisposition or instinct to acquire language, but its 
enhancing the fitness of the individual will “ultimately impact on the [biological] 
evolutionary trajectory of the learning mechanisms for language” (Kirby 2007: 
677) – that is, over evolutionary time those individuals whose fitness was 
enhanced by their language-acquisition statistically left, by definition of “fitness”, 
more descendants, thus spreading through the population whatever might be 
the genetic underpinning for language acquisition. Thus language as a cultural 
artefact feeds back into language acquisition as a biological mechanism.  
 
Conclusion 
The main aim of this scamper through evolutionary theory in general and the 
evolution of H. sapiens in particular has been to clear the ground for the intro-
duction of evolutionary psychology. I am accepting that the evidence which can 
be adduced in favour of evolutionary theory is extremely strong and that 
“descent with modification” and “natural selection” together provide a compelling 
account (albeit incomplete, as all scientific theories are incomplete and corr-
igible) of how all non-human species, both extant and extinct, have come into 
being. I am also accepting that those self-same processes have given rise to 
the human species as well – a point well expressed by the description of our 
being the “third chimpanzee” (Diamond 1992) – but that our biological evolution 
has given rise to the capacity for culture, resulting in cultural attainments out-
stripping those of any other species by so many orders of magnitude as to be 
qualitatively virtually incomparable. These attainments – including language and 
the concomitant capacity for symbolic representation, art, music, technology 
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and religion – are so considerable, though, that the temptation can be over-
whelming to regard ourselves as a special species: our bodies, yes, are the 
result of evolutionary processes, but surely not our minds? They must have 
come about by some non-material processes, surely? Well, it is the contention 
of evolutionary psychology that the human mind as well as the human body is a 
product of evolutionary processes, and that an understanding of our capacity for 
various cultural flowerings – including religion, which is of particular significance 
for the current enquiry – is enhanced by adopting an evolutionary perspective; 
and this is the subject matter of the next chapter.  
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Chapter 7: Of evolutionary psychology 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter I present some of the principles of evolutionary psychology and 
the evidence in its support. The purpose is to establish that the evolutionary 
psychological perspective both is valid and can offer an insight into the origins 
of our capacity, our faculty, to experience what I have termed “Roses”, the 
vertical/diameter dimension of the target phenomenon of spirituality. 
 
The origins of evolutionary psychology 
The discipline of evolutionary psychology has its roots in Darwin’s The Origin of 
Species (1968 [1859]) in which he hints that his theory of descent with modifi-
cation powered by the mechanism of natural selection could be applicable to 
humankind, a hint which he develops in his subsequent books The Descent of 
Man (1871) and The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals (1998 
[1872]). However, it was not until over a hundred years after the Origin that 
advances in the theoretical understanding of evolutionary biology with 
Hamilton’s (1963, 1964) work on social behaviour, inclusive fitness and kin 
selection, Williams’ (1966) dismantling of simplistic group-selectionist models, 
and Trivers’ (1971, 1972) work on reciprocal altruism and parental investment 
allowed these hints to lead first to the development of sociobiology which seeks 
to draw the social behaviour of animals into the fold of biological explanation 
(Wilson 1975), and then to evolutionary psychology itself which applies 
evolutionary thinking to human behaviour in general and to the human mind in 
particular (Barkow, Tooby and Cosmides 1992).  
Two currents of thought come together in evolutionary psychology: first, the 
adaptationist approach in evolutionary biology whereby natural selection is 
understood to work on the variations within a given population such that those 
organisms which are better adapted to their environment are more likely to 
survive, reproduce, and have their genes preferentially represented in subse-
quent generations (Williams 1966); and, second, the “modularity of mind” 
approach in cognitive psychology, whereby the human mind/brain is under-
stood to consist of a set of “mental modules” with specialised functions, rather 
than it being simply a general purpose information processor with just two or 
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three properties such as memory and reason (Fodor 1983; Tooby and 
Cosmides 1992, 2005).10  
The claims of evolutionary psychology are contentious, and a distinction can 
usefully be drawn between the general field of enquiry which adopts an evolut-
ionary perspective on human behaviour and psychology, and the particular 
articulation of it by writers such as Pinker (1998; 2002), Buss (1994; 2005) and 
Tooby and Cosmides (1992; 2005). Buller (2005) refers to these latter as 
developing a new paradigm (Kuhn 1962), and, following him, I refer to their 
views as “strong”, and the contrary position, which accepts that the human 
mind is a product of evolutionary processes whilst not adopting the new para-
digm, as “weak”. These terms are not intended to carry moral evaluation of the 
positions thus labelled; and as will become apparent, I favour a watered-down 
version of the strong position – call it “strongish”. 
 
The Environment of Evolutionary Adaptedness 
A key concept in evolutionary psychology, borrowed from John Bowlby (1969) 
of “attachment theory” fame, is that of the Environment of Evolutionary 
Adaptedness (EEA). Our mental modules, it is argued, evolved in response to 
the challenges of the physical, social and biotic environment in which our 
hunting/gathering ancestors lived, the environment, in effect, of the Pleistocene 
age (c. 1.8 mya to 10 kya). However, this does not imply that the EEA was 
invariant for a couple of million years, but that there were recurrent aspects of it 
to which the evolving human organism had to adapt, and the problems our 
ancestors faced and had to overcome in order to survive and reproduce 
successfully included the needs to “recognize objects, avoid predators, avoid 
incest, avoid teratogens when pregnant, repair nutritional deficiencies by dietary 
modification, judge distance, identify plant foods, capture animals, acquire 
grammar, attend to alarm cries, detect when their children needed assistance, 
be motivated to make that assistance, avoid contagious disease, acquire a 
lexicon, be motivated to nurse, select conspecifics as mates, select mates of 
the opposite sex, select mates of high reproductive value... interpret social 
situations correctly, help relatives… along with a host of other tasks” (Tooby and 
Cosmides 1992: 110). Of course, many of the challenges that faced our 
                                            
10
 The modular approach to understanding human nature was prefigured in the “Theory of 
Archetypes” developed by the psychologist Carl Jung. See especially Stevens (1982). 
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ancestors still face us today, yet there are some circumstances that have 
changed, not only (in the “developed” world) regarding resources with ready 
access to food, water and shelter, but also in our social environment with the 
immense rise over the past two or three centuries in global travel, not to 
mention the contemporary blossoming of virtual societies on internet social 
network sites, by means of which we are able to interact with hundreds, maybe 
thousands, of other people; yet (the evolutionary psychology argument goes) 
because of the conditions encountered in the EEA, our mental modules dealing 
with social relationships still “expect” Stone Age numbers in the region of 150 
(Dunbar 1992; 2010).  
With cultural evolution being many orders of magnitude faster than genetic 
evolution (Richerson and Boyd 2005), some modules have become maladapt-
ive: when our ancestors lived in an environment where obtaining food was 
uncertain and erratic, it was adaptive to stoke up on high octane food when 
obtainable in order to survive the periods of scarcity, but this continuing 
penchant for sweets and fats is “maladaptive in [environments] with fast-food 
restaurants” (Bjorklund and Blasi 2005: 829). Human nature is therefore “a 
hodgepodge of special genetic adaptations to an environment largely vanished, 
the world of the Ice-Age hunter-gatherer” (Wilson 1978: 196), and psychiatric 
problems have been attributed to the fact that there is a mismatch between our 
actual environment and that for which our evolved nature is prepared to 
encounter (Adriaens and de Block 2011; Stevens and Price 1996).  
The concept of the EEA has been criticized as being “little more than a 
figment of our nostalgia for an idealized past” because “the notion of a 
specifiable environment of evolutionary adaptedness doesn’t correspond to any 
identifiable reality” (Tattersall 2002: 170-1). But this is to misunderstand the 
concept. The EEA does not refer to a comprehensive set of unchanging 
characteristics (climatic, physical, social, biotic) which persisted for millennia but 
no longer obtain; it refers, for any specific organism, to “the set of reproductive 
problems faced by members of that species over evolutionary time” (Hagen 
2004: §2). Physical evolution occurred over evolutionary time to meet the 
relevant challenges of the environment; strong evolutionary psychology simply 
maintains that the evolution of the mind also occurred to meet relevant 
challenges. 
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Massive Modularity 
Although the “modularity of the mind” idea is particularly associated with Fodor 
(1983), evolutionary psychology has developed his insight with a hypothesis of 
“massive modularity”, positing the existence of “hundreds or thousands of 
functionally dedicated computers (often called modules)” (Tooby and Cosmides 
1995: xiii). The basic logic of the modules is specified by our genetic program 
(Pinker 1998), and each is said to be “domain-specific”, that is, each has 
evolved to deal with a particular challenge posed by the environment and 
exigencies of life. This is in contrast to the view that the mind is “domain-
general”, capable of employing the same approach to all the multiple challenges 
we face and our ancestors faced. 
Solving the huge array of challenges, strong evolutionary psychology claims, 
could not be performed by the kind of mind envisaged by the “Standard Social 
Science Model”, characterised – or caricatured – as the “blank slate” model 
(Pinker 2002; Tooby and Cosmides 1992, 2005), an image derived from the 
empiricist John Locke’s (1964 [1690]) notion of the mind being like a white 
paper without any writing on it. Tooby and Cosmides argue that: 
“[T]he traditional conceptual framework for the social and behavioral 
sciences… was built from defective assumptions about the nature of the 
human psychological architecture… The most consequential assumption 
is that the human psychological architecture consists predominantly of 
learning and reasoning mechanisms that are general-purpose, content-
independent, and equipotential… That is, the mind is blank-slate like, 
and lacks specialized circuits that were designed by natural selection to 
respond differentially to inputs by virtue of their evolved significance” 
(Tooby and Cosmides 2005: 6). 
 
Or as Pinker puts it more straightforwardly: “The mind cannot be a blank slate, 
because blank slates don’t do anything” (Pinker 2002: 34).  
The metaphor often used to convey the idea of massive modularity is that of 
the Swiss Army knife (Tooby and Cosmides 1992), with its array of tools 
designed each to cope with one of the many cutting, screwing, stabbing, 
sawing, bottle-opening, horses’ hooves de-stoning, teeth-picking, sharpening, 
tweezering tasks that confront the average rambler. This metaphor conveys well 
the concept of “domain specificity”, the claim that “adaptations evolve to solve 
problems in particular domains, and therefore are less well suited to solve 
problems in other domains” (Hagen 2004 §10), but has its limitations (see 
below).  
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Proposed modules are said to be encapsulated, or informationally isolated; 
that is, a given module cannot take into account information available to the rest 
of the organism’s brain. An example of encapsulation is the functioning of the 
visual system, such as its response to stereoscopic images as used in the 
current fashion for 3D films. Put on the special spectacles and the images leap 
out of the screen, and the conscious knowledge we have that they are 
projections on a 2D screen makes no difference to how our visual system 
processes the information it is receiving. The visual system is informationally 
isolated from other knowledge we might have, and this characteristic of being 
informationally isolated contributes to the speed with which modules work. It is 
contentious, however, whether the mental modules of evolutionary psychology 
should be regarded as always rigidly encapsulated (Cundall 2006 – see below).  
 
Mental modules 
A range of potential mental modules have been suggested and described in the 
literature, including those for language acquisition (Pinker 1994), face recog-
nition (Boyer and Barrett 2005), facial expression of the emotions (Ekman 
1998), colour discrimination (Shepard 1992), cheater detection (Cosmides and 
Tooby 1992), mate selection (Buss 1994), morality (Hauser 2006), intuitive 
psychology (Baron-Cohen 1995), intuitive physics and intuitive biology (Pinker 
1998) among many others.  
I propose to offer a brief account of intuitive physics, and longer accounts of 
intuitive psychology and language acquisition. I also give an account of the 
evolutionary account of incest aversion which, though not a single module in its 
own right, illustrates the need for a module for kin recognition, also necessary in 
an evolutionary psychological account of intuitive morality (Hauser 2006). This 
last has a chapter to itself, being the basis for the horizontal dimension or 
circumference of our spirituality. 
 
Intuitive physics 
Intuitive physics refers to an innate sense that the physical world operates in a 
particular way, its core intuition being the concept of the object “which occupies 
one place, exists for a continuous span of time, and follows laws of motion and 
force” (Pinker 2002: 220).  
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The presence of an intuitive physics faculty has been demonstrated by a 
range of experiments with babies and young children, relying on their boredom 
threshold. Familiarity breeds boredom, and when a baby sees the same old 
thing occurring their attention wanders, but if something unexpected occurs 
“they perk up and stare” (Pinker 1998: 317). By manipulating various items 
behind a screen and then removing the screen to reveal different outcomes, 
researchers gain an insight into what expectations their baby subjects have by 
monitoring their resultant stares: “if the baby’s eyes are only momentarily 
attracted and then wander off, we can infer that the scene was in the baby’s 
mind’s eye all along. If the baby stares longer, we can infer that the scene came 
as a surprise” (Pinker 1998: 317). Babies are surprised if the set-up is manip-
ulated so that it appears that one solid object has passed through another, or so 
that what appears to be two parts of a single item poking out of different edges 
of a screen and moving in unison are then revealed to be two separate items, or 
so that one object apparently causes another object to move without physical 
contact: three- to four-month-old infants “see objects, remember them, and 
expect them to obey the laws of continuity, cohesion and contact as they move” 
(Pinker 1998: 319). 
Other elements of intuitive physics include the expectation that large objects 
don’t go into smaller objects and that unsupported objects fall (Baron-Cohen et 
al 2001), but we don’t need infants to see intuitive physics at work. It manifests 
itself in the general (but erroneous) expectation that if something falls from a 
moving object it falls vertically (it doesn’t – the forward inertia it possesses 
results in its following a parabolic path to the ground), and in the expectation 
that if an object is whirled horizontally about on a piece of string and the string 
breaks, the subsequent trajectory of the object is curved (it isn’t, at least not in 
the horizontal plane – it travels along the tangent from where the object was 
when the string broke; the only curving is as it simultaneously falls under 
gravity). This is what we intuitively expect, even if we have a physics degree 
and know the equations that say otherwise.  
Intuitive physics, these last examples demonstrate, is not the same as 
Newtonian physics; motion in the former is “something closer to the mediaeval 
conception of impetus, an ‘oomph’ that keeps an object in motion and gradually 
dissipates” (Pinker 2002: 220). This makes evolutionary sense: as every school-
boy used to know, Newton’s first law of motion states that an object will remain 
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in its state of rest or of uniform motion unless acted upon by a force (Feather 
1959). However, we rarely if ever come across objects not acted upon by a 
force; objects moving through the air encounter air resistance, objects moving 
on the ground encounter friction. This, obviously, was as true in the EEA as it is 
today, and our intuitive physics did not evolve in order to parse what happens to 
moving objects into inertia (the tendency to maintain constant motion) and these 
opposing forces, but to provide a useful, pragmatic expectation of what happens 
in the real physical world. Hence it is “natural to conceive of objects as having 
an inherent tendency toward rest” (Pinker 1998: 321). Intuitive physics is an 
adaptation to the physical world as experienced, not to a mathematical 
abstraction. 
 
Intuitive psychology: the Theory of Mind  
Our species could be designated Homo psychologicus (Humphrey 1984), for we 
are natural psychologists, capable of inferring11 other people’s states of mind 
(beliefs, hopes, intentions) with a fair degree of accuracy. This capacity for 
intuitive psychology was dubbed “Theory of Mind” (hereafter “ToM”) by 
psychologists Premack and Woodruff who describe it as the faculty by which 
“[an] individual imputes mental states to himself and to others (either to 
conspecifics or to other species as well)” (1978: 515). It is in operation when I 
know that the car-keys are in the sitting-room, but I realise my wife believes 
they are in my coat pocket, or when John thinks that Jane believes that Gill is in 
love with him: John and I are attributing states of mind to others which differ 
from our own, and we are able to make reasonable predictions about, and give 
reasonable explanations for, the behaviours of those other people.  
ToM is not a culturally transmitted ability, and the inferences about other 
individuals to which its operation gives rise “are not taught, as are reading or 
arithmetic; their acquisition is more reminiscent of that of walking or speech” 
(1978: 525 – emphasis added). Its status as a human universal in adults is well 
attested (Bjorklund and Blasi 2005), though it functions poorly in individuals on 
the autism spectrum (Baron-Cohen 1995); but it would seem that ToM is not 
totally confined to H. sapiens, shared as it is by some other species, at least in 
a rudimentary fashion, if observations on some other primates are anything to 
                                            
11
 See “a note on inference” below (p. 159) 
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go by. ToM can be seen at work in (or, more accurately, inferred from) the 
behaviour of two chimpanzees Belle and Rock, in which they seek to deceive 
each other, and detect the deception of each other, over the location of a 
banana cache. A series of observations of their interactions saw Belle leading 
Rock and the rest of the chimp group “in the wrong direction and as Rock 
foraged for nonexistent tidbits, running back to the food cache. Occasionally an 
extra piece of food was hidden away from the main cache. Belle took to leading 
the group to this, then rushing over to the main food pile while Rock was 
engaged in eating the single piece. Eventually Rock caught on to this, too, and 
began to ignore single food pieces. At this point, the frustrated Belle could only 
respond with temper tantrums” (Tattersall 1998: 45-6, summarised from de 
Waal 1983). 
Belle and Rock were each clearly imputing certain intentions to the other 
and adjusting their behaviour accordingly, in what turned into an escalating 
“arms race” of manoeuvre and counter-manoeuvre (though see Penn and 
Povinelli [2007] who argue that no animals other than humans possess a ToM). 
In the human animal, ToM can be seen – or inferred – to develop in the first 
few years of life, notably with results of the “false-belief” test. In this, a child is 
shown, say, a cornflakes box and asked what they think is inside it. The answer 
they give is, unsurprisingly, Cornflakes! The child is then shown that the box 
actually contains something else, such as ribbons, and is then asked what 
someone else (their Daddy, say), who hasn’t seen inside, would think is in the 
box. The responses differ according to the age (or, more accurately, the 
developmental stage) of the child. Whereas young children answer that Daddy 
would think there are ribbons in the box (that is, attributing to Daddy the 
knowledge that they, the child, now has), older children correctly answer that 
Daddy would think there are cornflakes in the box even though the child knows 
the true answer is ribbons (Bjorklund and Blasi 2005). That is to say, younger 
children attribute to someone else the same belief that they now have; whereas 
the older children can distinguish what they know to be the case and what 
someone else would think to be the case. They can attribute a false belief to 
someone on the basis of their current knowledge and what they (falsely) 
believed earlier regarding the contents of the cereal box.  
We are clearly not born with a fully functioning ToM, but it emerges as part 
of our developmental sequence, with most three-year-olds failing the false-belief 
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test, and most five-year-olds passing it, and there is evidence that ToM 
develops “at about the same time and in the same sequence in most children 
around the world,” (Bjorklund and Blasi 2005: 840 – citing Avis and Harris 1991, 
Baron-Cohen 1995, Leslie 1994). 
Baron-Cohen has developed a model involving four mechanisms, of which 
ToM is just one, which "might underlie the universal human capacity to 
mindread” (Baron-Cohen 1995: 31), the other three mechanisms being an 
Intentionality Detector (ID), an Eye-Direction Detector (EDD), and a Shared-
Attention Mechanism (SAM).  
The ID is concerned with detecting volition in the environment, responding to 
activity which could be that of an agent, such as “the universal movements of all 
animals: approach and avoidance” (Baron-Cohen: 1995: 33). This system 
develops in early infancy (Bjorklund and Blasi 2005).  
The EDD is concerned with interpreting eye gaze, with three functions: it 
“detects the presence of eyes or eye-like stimuli, it computes whether eyes are 
directed toward it or toward something else, and it infers from its own case that 
if another organism's eyes are directed at something then that organism sees 
that thing” (Baron-Cohen 1995: 38-9). This develops at around nine months 
(Bjorklund and Blasi 2005).  
And the SAM is concerned with the relations among an Agent, the Self, and 
a (third) Object and for detecting what another person’s attention is fixed on, for 
example “[Mummy-sees-(I-see-the-bus)] or [John-sees-(I-see-the-girl)]” (Baron-
Cohen 1995: 45). This mechanism develops over the first 18 months of life 
(Bjorklund and Blasi 2005). 
Then there is the Theory of Mind itself which “is a system for inferring the full 
range of mental states from behavior… It has the dual function of representing 
the set of epistemic mental states and turning all this mentalistic knowledge into 
a useful theory” (Baron-Cohen 1995: 51).  
The operation of an Intentionality Detector is well illustrated by Heider and 
Simmel’s (1944) findings. They played a short silent film to three groups of 
subjects showing geometrical shapes moving about, then asked them to write 
an account of what they had seen. With only three exceptions (out of 114), the 
subjects “interpreted the picture in terms of actions of animated beings, chiefly 
of persons” (1944: 259). They were ascribing intentions and agency to things 
which they consciously knew full well did not have intentions and agency: the ID 
158 
automatically kicks in to ascribe such agency. Dittrich and Lea (1994), using 
moving letters on a display screen, have demonstrated that only relatively 
simple stimuli are required to produce “a convincing illusion of animate, 
purposeful movement” (1994: 265); and preschool children viewing scenes of 
coloured balls moving about and apparently interacting with each other, 
“differentiated between intentional movement patterns of [the] balls and the 
nonintentional control events where the movements were desynchronized” 
(Dasser et al 1989: 365), suggesting that “infants are predisposed to see the 
world as inhabited by intentional agents and artifacts” (Cundall 2006: 383 – 
citing Johnson 2003).  
The Eye-Direction Detector has been demonstrated in a number of studies 
showing that two-month old infants “looked almost as long at the eyes as at a 
whole face but looked significantly less at other parts of the face”, and that six-
month old infants “look 2 to 3 times longer at a face looking at them than at a 
face looking away” (Baron-Cohen 1995: 39, 40 – citing Hainline 1978; Haith, 
Bergman and Moore 1977; Papousek and Papousek 1979). 
The Shared-Attention Mechanism similarly has experimental backup. In the 
phenomenon of “gaze monitoring” which is seen in infants from about nine 
months onwards, “the infant turns in the same direction that another person is 
looking at and then shows gaze alternation, checking back and forth a few times 
to make sure (as it appears) that it and the other person are both looking at the 
same thing, thus establishing shared visual attention on the same object” 
(Baron-Cohen 1995: 48 – citing Butterworth 1991; Scaife and Bruner 1975). 
The proposed modularity for these mechanisms receives support from 
Baron-Cohen’s work on autism, a condition he dubs “mindblindness” (1995) as 
it describes the inability to read, or see into, other people’s minds – autistics are 
unable to infer another’s state of mind, and perform poorly on the “false belief” 
tasks, as with the ribbons in a cornflakes pack. Yet this inability to “mind read” 
can occur in conjunction with high levels of intellectual functioning in non-social 
spheres of life, as evidenced by the life of the autistic biologist Temple Grandin 
(Grandin and Scariano 1986; see also Sacks 1995), which, coupled with 
evidence that how one performs on ToM tasks is independent of general verbal 
performance, supports the contention that “theory of mind is not simply a 
function of general intellectual functioning” (Bjorklund and Blasi 2005: 841). 
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Finally there is also evidence that ToM and its confederates in mindreading 
require appropriate environmental input during a critical period of development if 
they are to function properly, significant factors including “the social skills of 
children’s teachers, the number of adults and older children that a preschool 
child interacts with daily, and family size, especially the number of older siblings 
a child has” (Bjorklund and Blasi, 2005: 841-2 – citing Lewis et al 1996; 
Ruffman et al 1998; Watson et al 1999).  
There are claims that ToM is not a module. Buller objects that “possessing a 
theory of mind involves more than the ability to pass the false-belief test” (Buller 
2005: 195), since even children under two (i.e. who wouldn’t pass the false-
belief test) begin to show signs of understanding other minds, and he instances 
their ability to imitate the intended actions of others, and to attribute goals to 
others. However, Baron-Cohen’s postulated suite of modules addresses consid-
erably more than false-belief tests, with the ID, EDD and SAM being in evidence 
before the age of two (Bjorklund and Blasi 2005), and in reviewing all the evi-
dence, another commentator concludes that “there is ample evidence to support 
the contention that ToM knowledge is modular… There is physiological and 
cognitive evidence that there are specific areas and computational resources 
devoted to ToM processing. ToM processing is, in many ways, uncontrolled and 
impervious to other relevant knowledge we might have” (2006: 383), though 
warning that ToM processing cannot be completely modular because 
“[i]nformational encapsulation is violated” (2006: 380) when our having a belief 
about someone else’s state of mind is affected by other knowledge we have 
about that person. This suggests that some cognitive systems are not fully 
encapsulated and hence not fully modular in the Fodor sense, a position which 
accords with that of a modified “strong-ish” evolutionary psychology adopted in 
the current enquiry.  
 
A note on “inference” 
“Inference” and its cognates has been used to describe the action of ToM, and 
will be used again when the sensus transcendentis model is presented. 
However, “inference” is an ambiguous term, and a note of clarification may help. 
“Infer” in ordinary speech and in logic refers to a conscious process: the 
detective sees footprints in the mud, measures them, and is able to infer that a 
man with size ten feet passed this way after it had rained. It is done consciously 
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– we see one thing (footprints) and by application of reason we infer from it 
something else that we can’t see (a man with size ten feet). If, on the other 
hand, we actually see a man with size ten feet, we don’t say that from the fact 
that we can see a man with size ten feet, we infer that a man with size ten feet 
is present. Seeing the man means we don’t have to enter into a process of 
inference. Perception renders inference unnecessary. When used by 
evolutionary psychologists, though, to describe the operation of ToM, “infer” is 
not intended to convey such a conscious process, and it approaches the 
meaning of “perceive” (or “apprehend” or “be aware of”). “Infer” here is intended 
to have the same immediacy (in the sense of being unmediated as well as the 
sense of rapidity) as “perceive”. There is a similarity here with Plantinga’s notion 
of the sensus divinitatis delivering basic beliefs about God, ones not arrived at 
by a process of inference from other perceptions (Plantinga 2000; and see 
discussion in chapter 5 above) 
The term “construe” as used in Personal Construct Psychology (Kelly 1955; 
Procter 2008) is particularly helpful here, as it refers to how the whole person 
(not just the intellect) responds and makes sense of things. When we construe 
a situation as being, say, “dangerous” or a person as “friendly” we are not 
carrying out a conscious, logical sequence of processes but responding as a 
whole person – construing is “just as emotional as it is semantic or cognitive” 
(Procter 2008: 2). Our ToM would be better understood as a construing 
mechanism or faculty, rather than an inference mechanism; but the evolutionary 
psychological literature uses the term “infer” and I will continue to follow suit, 
though regularly coupling it with “construe”. 
 
The Language Acquisition Device  
The evidence for a genetic basis for language acquisition is considerable, 
entailing a specialized module or suite of modules evolved through the process 
of natural selection (Pinker and Bloom 1992), and which requires appropriate 
linguistic stimuli during a critical period of development for it to be activated 
(Lenneberg 1967). The range of evidence for a language acquisition device 
(LAD) is summarised by Pinker and Bloom: 
“… individual humans are proficient language users regardless of 
intelligence, social status, or level of education. Children are fluent 
speakers of complex grammatical sentences by the age of three, without 
benefit of formal instruction. They are capable of inventing languages 
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that are more systematic than those they hear, showing resemblances to 
languages that they have never heard, and they obey subtle grammatical 
principles for which there is no evidence in their environments. Disease 
or injury can make people linguistic savants while severely retarded or 
linguistically impaired with normal intelligence. Some language disorders 
are genetically transmitted. Aspects of language skill can be linked to 
characteristic regions of the human brain. The human vocal tract is 
tailored to the demands of speech, compromising other functions such 
as breathing and swallowing. Human auditory perception shows 
complementary specializations toward the demands of decoding speech 
sounds into linguistic segments” (Pinker and Bloom 1992: 451). 
 
To explain briefly just some of these lines of evidence (for a comprehensive 
coverage see Laurence and Margolis 2001): first, language acquisition occurs 
despite the fact that “the knowledge acquired in language acquisition far out-
strips the information that is available in the environment (i.e. the ‘primary 
linguistic data’)” (Laurence and Margulis, 2001: 221), a phenomenon known as 
the “Poverty of the Stimulus” (Chomsky 1966). What children hear spoken 
around them and to them does not contain sufficient grammatical information to 
explain their/our ability to master it. In their linguistic environment children are 
not subject solely to well-formed, grammatical sentences; what they hear are 
often “ungrammatical utterances due to speech errors, false starts, run on 
sentences, foreign words and phrases, and so on… this means that children 
have to settle on a grammar that actually rejects a good number of the utter-
ances they hear” (Laurence and Margulis 2001: 230 – emphasis in original), 
suggesting an innate capacity to infer the correct grammar despite the mis-
leading empirical data of ungrammatical utterances. Children, of course, do 
make errors, yet the nature of their errors, and of the errors they don’t make, 
adds a further line of evidence in support of the innateness (also known as the 
“nativist”) argument. They will say things like “goes” instead of “went”, and 
“holded” rather than “held”, but they “never say ‘He didn’t a few things’ on 
analogy with ‘He didn’t eat’, or ‘Ate he something?’ on analogy with ‘Is he 
happy?’ The nativist explanation is that children have a highly circumscribed 
hypothesis space that’s fixed by a rich set of language-specific biases” (2001: 
236). 
A third, related line of evidence arises from a study of pidgin and creole 
languages. A pidgin is a makeshift language, such as those which developed in 
colonial times when slaves and labourers from different language backgrounds 
worked together on the plantations, and consists of “choppy strings of words 
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borrowed from the language of the colonizers or plantation owners, highly 
variable in order and with little in the way of grammar” (Pinker 1994: 33). 
However a pidgin can transmute into a full complex language when a group of 
children is “exposed to the pidgin at the age when they acquire their mother 
tongue. That happened, [the linguist Derek] Bickerton has argued, when 
children were isolated from their parents and were tended collectively by a 
worker who spoke to them in the pidgin… [T]he children injected grammatical 
complexity where none existed before, resulting in a brand-new, richly 
expressive language… called a creole” (1994: 33). That is to say, in creolizing 
their pidgin language, the children managed to bring to it the grammar that a 
pidgin lacks, again leading to the inference of there being an innate factor. It 
could be contested that the resulting grammar actually derived from the mother-
tongues which the children had heard, if not yet spoken (Lea, personal comm-
unication); but even if this were the case it would not invalidate the inference of 
there being an innate factor, for the “poverty of the stimulus” argument can still 
be set against the possibility of the children inferring a grammar from the 
mother-tongues then having to use it on the “choppy strings of words” of the 
pidgin. It is implausible that such a two-stage task would be easier than a one-
stage task of inferring a grammar from a mother-tongue and simultaneously 
using it with that same mother-tongue; hence at the very least the pidgin-to-
creole transmutation supports, and plausibly strengthens, the original Poverty of 
the Stimulus argument. 
The phenomenon of feral children (NcNeil et al 1984; Newton 2002) 
provides a supportive line of evidence to complement the pidgin-to-creole data, 
for these are children such as Victor, the so-called “Wild Boy of Aveyon” (Itard 
1962) who, growing up in a non-linguistic environment, fail to acquire language 
even when returned to a human community. Information on such feral children, 
however, is mainly anecdotal and can only be considered as suggestive; but 
better documented are instances of non-feral children who, having been 
deprived of linguistic stimulus during their critical years, fail subsequently to 
acquire language. One such is Chelsea who, hearing-impaired but misdiag-
nosed as mentally-retarded, was never exposed to a natural sign language, and 
when as an adult, following a proper diagnosis, she was fitted with a hearing-
aid, attempts to teach her a language have failed despite her relatively normal 
intelligence. With typical utterances such as “The small a the hat” and 
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“Breakfast eating girl”, her use of language is “often so ungrammatical that it is 
unintelligible” (Laurence and Margolis 2001: 237; citing Curtiss 1988). Work with 
other deaf children exposed to sign language at different ages has also prov-
ided extensive data demonstrating a critical period for language acquisition, 
whereby “native signers do better than early signers, and early signers do better 
than late signers” in tests on morphology and syntax (2001: 237). As with the 
“incest aversion” module (see below), if a child does not have the relevant input 
during the critical period, which for language acquisition “ends abruptly at 
puberty” (Ridley 2003: 168), the LAD shuts down and ceases to be available 
even when linguistic stimuli are subsequently present.  
A fourth line of evidence for a genetic basis to language acquisition derives 
from the argument that if language is an instinct rather than one among many 
learned behaviours, then specific genetic malfunction should selectively disrupt 
language: “Disrupt these genes or neurons, and language should suffer while 
the other parts of intelligence carry on; spare them in an otherwise damaged 
brain, and you should have a retarded individual with intact language, a 
linguistic idiot savant” (Pinker 1994: 45). There are indeed a number of neuro-
logical or genetic impairments that selectively affect language, such as “Broca’s 
aphasia” which involves damage in the frontal lobe of the brain’s left hemi-
sphere. This can lead to an inability to speak, or to speak with peculiarities like 
omitting grammatical endings, such as the “–ed” of a past participle, or the “–s” 
of a plural; or being unable to analyse the grammar of a sentence to answer 
correctly the question, “The lion was killed by the tiger; which one is dead?”, 
whilst remaining unimpaired in other faculties (Pinker 1994: 47-8).  
The genetic component of some language impairments is indicated by 
statistical studies, a striking example offered by Pinker being a family in which 
the grandmother is language-impaired as are four of her five children. The 
offspring of the linguistically normal daughter are also linguistically normal; but 
of the offspring of the four linguistically-impaired siblings, eleven are language-
impaired and twelve are linguistically-normal; a pattern suggestive of genetic 
rather than environmental causality. Moreover, most of the afflicted family 
members “score in the normal range in the nonverbal parts of IQ tests” (Pinker 
1994: 49), the selective damaging of a faculty implying that there is a specific 
something there to be damaged – namely, the putative LAD. 
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Objections are raised about the plausibility of there being a LAD. It has been 
argued that language cannot be one of the mental modules because, being 
specialized, they would not have access to the workings of each other, whereas 
“language has general access and cuts across all our sensory modalities. We 
certainly are free to talk about whatever we see, hear, or feel” (Donald 2001: 
37). Donald is clearly correct in saying that we are free to talk about whatever 
we see, hear, or feel, but that is not at issue. It is the acquisition of language 
which, evolutionary psychology proposes, occurs by the operation of a mental 
module. How we consciously use language is another matter. I acquired the 
ability to speak English through the interaction of the innate LAD with the 
linguistic stimuli in the social environment in which I was raised – I didn’t have a 
choice about acquiring English, it just happened. Having acquired English I 
choose when, if and how to use it, but this in itself does not invalidate claims for 
the LAD being a module as postulated by evolutionary psychology.  
 
Kin detection (Incest avoidance)  
To consider incest in an enquiry concerned with spirituality may seem odd, but 
to do so fulfills two functions. One is the general one of illustrating evolutionary 
psychological claims and the evidence in its favour, the other is the more 
specific function of highlighting the importance of “kin detection”. Being intuit-
ively aware who is one’s kin would have been immensely important in the EEA 
to ensure certain behaviours were instinctively avoided (such as sex with near 
kin) and certain other behaviours were instinctively enacted (such as altruism 
towards near kin). The best way to ensure that incest avoidance occurs is for 
there to be incest aversion – that is, avoidance achieved not by requiring a 
conscious decision-making process (“better not – after all, she is my sister”), but 
an unconscious, reflex feeling (“not with my sister!!”). Research into incest 
aversion strongly suggests the existence of an intuitive kin-detection faculty, 
which also plays its part in the evolution of altruism, considered in the next 
chapter.  
Incest taboo is commonly recognised as constituting a human universal 
(Brown 1991), and one possible explanation for its ubiquity is that “human 
beings, being observant and intelligent, spot the consequences of matings 
between close relatives and make safety laws about them” (Bateson 1983: 
491), a problematic explanation given that “nobody… has claimed that such 
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knowledge is universal” (1983: 491); indeed, it is an “implausible idea that 
prehistoric peoples intentionally established the incest taboo as a form of 
genetic hygiene” (Smith 2007: 202). 
An alternative explanation is that the taboo is a collective expression of 
individual aversive feelings (Smith 2007), for Darwinian logic predicts that 
because procreative sex with very near relatives carries an increased likelihood 
of genetic defects in any offspring and hence lowered “fitness” (Ruse 1982), 
natural selection will favour those who mate exogamously. Since an inbuilt 
aversion to sex with near relatives would be advantageous, the question arises 
as to the mechanism by which the individual instinctively recognises those to 
avoid having sex with. An answer was offered by the anthropologist Edvard 
Westermarck (1925), who argued that the key factor was extended childhood 
co-residence, for which there are several strands of evidence. 
 
Kibbutz children 
Children raised on Israeli kibbutz were separated from their parents soon after 
birth and brought up in age-related groups of six to eight children, even sleeping 
together in dormitories. As adults, “sexual relationships or marriage between 
peer-group members are virtually nonexistent” (Smith 2007: 205), implying that 
co-residency at a young age rather than the actual genetic relatedness to be the 
key factor; and the discovery that there were after all a few kibbutz marriages 
(Leavitt 1990) only serves to sharpen understanding of the parameters under 
which the proposed mechanism of prolonged co-residency works. These 
marriages had occurred between kibbutzniks who were either i) from different 
peer groups (in which case the marriages fall outside the hypothesis, since the 
partners weren’t raised together; or ii) from the same peer group but had joined 
it after the age of six (suggesting there to be a critical age by when such an 
avoidance mechanism needs to be primed if it is to operate in later life); or iii) 
from the same peer group before the age of six but for under two years 
(suggesting that there is a minimum time length of childhood intimacy for such a 
mechanism to become primed).  
This last point is further supported by “genetic sexual attraction”, the phen-
omenon of relatives, separated at an early age, experiencing a strong sexual 
attraction on being reunited, found in one study to occur “in over 50% of relat-
ives reunited after early separation” (Smith 2007: 206, citing Greenberg and 
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Littlewood 1995); and whereas most incestuous sibling relationships are short-
lived, those few which do involve lasting attachments are between siblings who 
“had been separated from each other when they were babies” (Bateson 1983: 
493, citing Weinberg 1956).  
 
Simpua marriages  
Further evidence comes from simpua (“little bride”) arranged marriages in 
Taiwan, in which an infant girl was adopted into the family of the husband-to-be, 
and the two children raised together, the marriage being consummated when 
the partners were adolescent. These marriages were less successful in terms of 
passing on genes to subsequent generations than marriages in which the 
partners met for the first time as adolescents (Bateson 1983; citing Wolf and 
Huang 1980).  
Leavitt (1990) claims that the apparently similar custom of the Arapesh 
(Mead 1935) constitutes a counter-example, but there the betrothal, generally 
leading to successful marriages, occurs when the girl is seven or eight, and the 
boy several years older, outside the time-frame identified in the kibbutz and 
simpua examples. The alleged “failure” of the Arapesh to demonstrate incest-
avoidance behaviour simply underscores the idea that evolved incest-aversion 
is primed before the age of seven or eight.  
 
Cousins 
Cousin-cousin relationships provide an interesting corroboration to the co-
residency hypothesis, based on a distinction drawn between cross and parallel-
cousins. Cross cousins are related by virtue of their being the respective off-
spring of a brother and sister, whereas parallel cousins are related by being the 
respective offspring of two brothers or two sisters. In a monogamous society, 
cousins (whether cross or parallel) generally share 12.5% of the same genes by 
common descent; but in cultures which practice sororal polygyny (a man’s 
several wives are sisters), parallel cousins are often half-siblings in having 
different mothers but the same father; whereas cross cousins are not half-
siblings. Therefore in these societies parallel cousins are likely to be genetically 
related twice as strongly as are cross cousins (25% compared with 12.5%), 
which leads to the prediction that sexual relationships between parallel cousins 
are far more likely to be considered incestuous, and hence taboo, than such 
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relationships between cross cousins; and indeed anthropological data reveal 
that “where sororal polygyny is practised, there is far more probability that 
parallel cousin marriage will be banned” (Ruse 1982: 263). Moreover, in these 
societies parallel cousins who might well be half-siblings are likely to have been 
brought up in the same household, that of their joint father, whereas cross 
cousins will have been brought up in separate households, those of their 
respective fathers (Bateson 1983), resulting in the co-residency factor priming 
the kin-recognition/incest-avoidance mechanism for parallel cousins but not 
cross cousins. All this boils down to the fact that the cultural norm in these 
societies regarding cousin marriages is consonant with, and may be explained 
by, genetic logic. 
 
Other mechanisms 
The evidence so far given supports the contention of there being an intuitive 
heuristic of “avoid sex with someone you were brought up” which, in the EEA, 
would have roughly coincided with avoiding sex with one’s siblings. But the 
evidence which supports the Westermarck Hypothesis for incest avoidance with 
siblings or quasi-siblings can’t explain other forms of incest aversion (Smith 
2007). One suggestion addressing incest aversion beyond the sibling-sibling 
relationship is the “Shared Mother Hypothesis” which involves the individual 
intuitively inferring the relatedness (or otherwise) of others as they interact with 
the individual’s mother (Smith 2007), which would explain daughters generally 
not being sexually interested in their fathers. Aversion to mother-son sex can be 
explained by Westermarck-type hypothesis, the selection pressure again being 
the susceptibility to inbreeding depression of any offspring of a mother-son 
union.  
 
But incest occurs 
These various strands point clearly to an evolutionary biological basis for incest 
aversion and its accompanying taboo, but one problem is that incest still occurs. 
Full brother-sister marriages occurred in Roman Egypt (Bateson 1983); and 
royal incest has been practised in a number of societies (Wilson 1998). In all 
these cases, though, there is good evidence of other factors at work. The sibling 
marriages of Egypt concerned the preservation of property (Bateson 1983, 
citing Hopkins 1980), while the deleterious effects of royal inbreeding were 
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counterbalanced by “the monopolistic retention of extraordinary resources, 
especially when those resources gave one access to innumerable lesser wives 
and concubines who, although they could not bear future kings, could certainly 
bear children” (van den Berghe, quoted in Ruse 1982: 263). The incest-
avoidance mechanism, that is, contends with cultural and environmental factors 
concerning preservation or enhancement of power and status, property 
arrangements, and the need to maintain the family in existence. Other things 
being equal, inbreeding is not ideal, but if the alternative to it is either impossible 
or has unacceptable consequences regarding dispersal of property, endogamy 
may become the preferred option to deal with exceptional circumstances. 
What, though, of incest which cannot plausibly be explained by the above 
power and status arguments, for incest does occur from time to time within the 
monogamous nuclear family (Smith 2007). The theory allows for this: incest will 
not be aversive if the mechanism fails to be potentiated or primed by relevant 
early experiences (such as childhood co-residency). It is also worth noting that 
there is often insufficient distinction made in the literature between non-
procreative sexual behaviour and sexual behaviour that is (potentially) pro-
creative: Leavitt regards the kibbutz evidence to be undermined by Shepher’s 
admission that sexual play does take place among the children. Yet Leavitt 
himself quotes Shepher that “[t]his sexual play begins in infancy, is intensive 
during early childhood, and is somewhat less intensive in the first school years” 
(Leavitt 1990: 981). Given that another few years would have to pass before a 
six-year old girl becomes fertile, such sexual play is non-procreative and hence 
incest-aversion at that age would be unnecessary. It is potentially procreative 
incestual sexual activity that risks inbreeding depression and hence requires an 
incest-avoidance mechanism to evolve which operates at the relevant age. 
 
Objections to Evolutionary Psychology   
The strong evolutionary psychology position with its claims to “massive 
modularity” is been under attack since its inception (Buller 2005; Dupré 2001, 
2003; Fodor 2001; Rose and Rose 2000). Some objections have been comm-
ented on regarding specific candidate modules; here I wish to acknowledge 
briefly some of the more general objections to the whole enterprise and 
proposals of strong evolutionary psychology. A more extended discussion can 
be found in Hagen (2005). 
 169 
Some argue that H. sapiens has many mental abilities that are difficult to 
explain by a strong modularity concept; for example the ability to do higher 
mathematics. Referring to the abstruse proof by Andrew Wiles of Fermat’s Last 
Theorem (Singh 1997), Mithen asks “if minds are just adapted for solving the 
problems of hunting and gathering how could this proof have been devised? 
How indeed could Fermat have thought of a last theorem, or even a first 
theorem?” (Mithen 1996: 47). A module for higher mathematics seems highly 
implausible. 
But no-one is proposing that a module for solving problems of higher 
mathematics evolved in hunting-and-gathering times. Whereas an intuitive 
capacity for elementary arithmetic would have adaptive significance (“three lions 
have gone into the cave and two have come out, three minus two equals one, 
so there must still be a lion in there”), and there is evidence for our possessing 
“intuitive mathematics” at that level (Bjorklund and Blasi 2005), no evolutionary 
psychologist claims there is a module for solving quadratic equations or differ-
entiating ‘x’ with respect to ‘y’. Mathematical thinking in adults builds on modular 
“core knowledge systems” (Spelke 2000), so the absence of any specialised 
modules for arcane mathematical procedures cannot vitiate the evidence for the 
existence of the core modules.  
A group of researchers “who see great value in applying evolutionary 
thinking to psychology and behavior” (Henrich et al 2010: 62) offer a WEIRD 
critique, that being an acronym for “Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, 
Democratic” societies, their point being that much of the data of the behavioural 
sciences in general, including evolutionary psychology, have been garnered 
from members of these societies, and from a certain subset in particular, such 
that “a randomly selected American undergraduate is more than 4,000 times 
more likely to be a research participant than is a randomly selected person from 
outside of the West” (2010: 63). This extreme bias raises the question of 
whether the researchers are justified “in assuming a species-level generality for 
their findings?” (2010: 61) since WEIRD people constitute “a certainly narrow 
and potentially peculiar subpopulation” (2010: 63). As applied to evolutionary 
psychology, this translates as asking whether (say) the purported theory of mind 
module or the incest-avoidance mechanism can be claimed as human 
universals. 
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Their impressive empirical review of “studies involving large-scale compar-
ative experimentation on important psychological or behavioral variables” (2010: 
61) focuses on “those domains which have largely been assumed… to be de 
facto psychological universals” (2010: 62). They noted that the data on several 
faculties concerned with colour perception, emotional expression and false 
belief tasks showed “universal patterns” (2010: 69), and that they could identify 
“many domains in which there are striking similarities across populations [i.e. 
not just within WEIRD populations]” including theory of mind (2010: 78), yet 
there were many “basic psychological processes” that “vary dramatically across 
populations”, such as “aspects of visual perception, memory, attention, fairness 
motivations, categorization, induction…” (2010: 78-9). 
These findings should lead to caution in claims for the universality of various 
postulated modules where the evidence is derived mainly from WEIRD popul-
ations; yet although these authors do not specifically refer to language acqui-
sition or incest-avoidance, it is hard to see that these, along with theory of mind, 
could be accused of being overly WEIRD-biased, given that they are based on 
considerable trans-cultural data (Shepard 1992). The critique, however, 
justifiably warns of the danger of seeing universal modules where what is 
observed may be culturally specific ways of responding to environmental 
challenges, and it is only sensible to heed their warning that there are “no 
strong grounds to make a priori claims to the ‘fundamentalness’ or the likely 
universality of a given psychological process” (Henrich et al 2010: 79).  
Buller (2005) offers a considered and well-nuanced critique of evolutionary 
psychology, eschewing the “vitriol” found in many published criticisms of 
evolutionary psychology, and dismissing those who crudely depict evolutionary 
psychologists as “biological determinists” and/or the discipline as “culturally 
pernicious” (2005: 4). (He does not name them, so I will: Dupré 2001; Rose and 
Rose 2000; Tattersall 1998). 
There is not the space here to do Buller’s own views full justice, so I will pick 
up on just a few points. He argues that there is no such thing as a universal 
human nature, but rather that “human populations are characterized by evolved 
psychological variation, multiple minds, rather than a single ‘mind’ that is uni-
versal within human populations” (2005: 14 – emphasis in original). This point is 
similar to a contention of the above-mentioned WEIRD authors. He also gives a 
clear and detailed account of the growth of the human brain, how it involves the 
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proliferation of neuronal pathways that are then pruned back under the influ-
ence of environmental input, hence “although an adult human brain can be 
characterized by ‘modular’ information-processing structures, these are environ-
mentally shaped, not ‘genetically specified’, outcomes of development” (2005: 
134 – emphasis in original). That is, he maintains that even though strong 
evolutionary psychology acknowledges the importance of the environment in 
triggering the activation of the development of a module, it fails to take suffic-
iently into account the environmental input into the development of any such 
modules in a given organism.  
This is a fair point, along with the added objection that according to the 
current state of knowledge there are totally insufficient genes in the human 
genome to underpin all the “hundreds or thousands” of proposed modules, 
since it appears “that [the brain’s] higher cognitive structures are vastly under-
specified genetically compared to its more peripheral sensory structures [such 
as olfaction]” (2005: 130). But a distinction needs to be made between whether 
the mind is massively modular, and, if it is, how it comes to be so in the 
individual (ontogeny) and how it came to be so in the species (phylogeny). 
Logically, strong evolutionary psychology could be right in its answer to whether 
and wrong in its answer to one or both hows, and Buller’s points concern the 
hows. His arguments do not impinge on the evidence that the human mind is 
modular. 
Another possible problem concerns the original claim that mental modules 
are informationally encapsulated. Buller, adducing evidence for cross-modal 
connections, for example between auditory and visual areas of the cortex 
regarding speech perception, argues that the “degree of informational overlap in 
our brains shows that brain circuits are not ‘domain specific… [but are] domain 
dominant” (2005: 139 – emphasis in original), that is, modules have a dominant 
but not exclusive function. Information encapsulation, however, is not a pre-
requisite for strong evolutionary psychology despite the Swiss Army knife 
metaphor (Tooby and Cosmides 1992) which implies there is a set of indepen-
dent modules which do not interact. The theory-of-mind-related modules 
proposed by Baron-Cohen (1995) have to interact with each other for their 
proper functioning, and a distinction can be drawn between the original proposal 
by Fodor (1983) of informationally encapsulated modules, and that of evolut-
ionary psychology which “takes all mechanisms, with or without information 
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encapsulation, to be modules” (Hagen 2005: 163). Psychological adaptations 
often share components “and interact with each other to produce adaptive 
behavior” (Confer et al 2010: 111). 
 
Conclusion 
Evidence has been presented for the existence of a number of the modules that 
the version strong evolutionary psychology posits; with references to some of 
the others. Much of the evidence is comprehensive and appears strong, but in 
the light of the arguments of Buller (2005) and Cundall (2006) in particular, it 
seems wise to adopt a nuanced position such as Cundall’s, referred to above. 
He argues that “there might be cognitive systems that are not fully encapsulated 
and thereby not fully modular” (2006: 385), a position located between the 
strong and weak versions of evolutionary psychology, allowing for there to be 
strictly domain-specific modules, a general central-processing system, and 
variants in between.  
A strict “massive modularity” model does not have to be adopted for the 
purposes of the current enquiry, since it is my aim to argue that another module 
(or, possibly, suite of modules) with which we have been endowed by evolution 
is one whose domain (whether domain-specific or domain-dominant) is that of 
spirituality. That argument will not depend on whether or not the mind is 
massively modular, only on whether modularity per se is a valid approach to 
construing the human mind, and the evidence and discussion in this chapter 
presents my case that that is so. 
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Chapter 8: Of intuitive morality and altruism  
 
Introduction 
A contention of evolutionary psychology is that nature has designed our uni-
versal sense of right and wrong (Hauser 2008), giving H. sapiens an evolved 
faculty of “intuitive morality” to go with our other intuitive faculties such as those 
of intuitive physics and intuitive psychology. This is of particular relevance to the 
current enquiry, since later I am taking the essence of the “horizontal” dimen-
sion of spirituality to be altruism, particularly two varieties which I term “weak 
Good Samaritan Altruism” (referring to general altruistic behaviour, particularly 
when directed at a stranger) and “strong Good Samaritan Altruism” (referring to 
altruistic behaviour directed at someone who belongs to a group, tribe or nation 
which is actually hostile to one’s own). Of course, it can be argued that altruism 
is not the same as morality, and it is not even a simple subset of morality, since 
it is possible to behave in a way that is altruistic but generally agreed to be 
immoral – as in taking the rap for your spouse’s drink-driving offence. Neverthe-
less, because altruism is about a particular way of behaving towards others 
(putting their interests above self-interest [Flew 1979]), it acts as a useful proxy 
for the more complex phenomenon of morality in general (Haidt [2009] identifies 
five foundations and four principles of morality). 
I intend therefore first to make a few comments about intuitive morality in 
general, then to concentrate more specifically on the evolutionary basis for 
altruism and how that links with spirituality. 
 
Evolution and ethics 
There are at least two types of possible relationship between evolution and 
ethics (or morality – I will be using the terms virtually synonymously): one is to 
view evolutionary theory as prescriptive, capable of determining or at the very 
least shaping ethical theory; the other is to view evolutionary theory as 
descriptive, explaining how the moral capacity of human beings arose. The 
former is known as “evolutionary ethics”; the latter as “the evolution of ethics” 
(Woolcock 1999). It is this second, descriptive account which is the proper 
concern of the current chapter since it addresses the evolutionary under-
pinnings of what has been identified for the current enquiry as the horizontal/ 
circumference dimension of spirituality. 
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Nevertheless, a few words are in order about the prescriptive approach in 
order to emphasise that this is not the route taken by evolutionary psychology. 
This is necessary because some critics of evolutionary psychology erroneously 
charge it with condoning unethical behaviour such as rape (Tattersall 1998) on 
the grounds that it offers a (possible) adaptiveness-based explanation, as 
though ethical principles could be based on evolutionary processes, and that an 
evolutionary explanation were the equivalent of an ethical exculpation.  
Evolutionary ethics, which refers to the attempt to derive normative ethical 
principles from the facts and processes of evolution (Schloss 2004), can be 
traced back to Herbert Spencer (1820-1903) who sought to construct a “strictly 
scientific morality” derived from evolution which he saw as inevitably entailing 
progress (Farber 1998: 40). He opposed social policies which mitigated the 
effects of natural selection, writing of those who defended the Poor Law that, 
“[b]lind to the fact that under the natural order of things, society is constantly 
excreting its unhealthy, imbecile, slow, vacillating, faithless members, these 
unthinking, though well-meaning, men [i.e. defenders of the Poor Law] advocate 
an interference which not only stops the purifying process but even increases 
the vitiation” (quoted in Ruse 2004: 29).  
Such thinking was opposed by many, with the principle philosophical 
argument against evolutionary ethics being, and remaining, the “Naturalistic 
Fallacy”, advanced by G. E. Moore (1903) but with its origins going back to 
David Hume’s (2000 [1739]) is/ought distinction, referring to the illegitimacy of 
deriving “ought” statements from “is” statements. Moore’s target was all ethical 
systems which did not take “the good” to be a simple notion which cannot be 
defined or analysed; and hence cannot be derived from other things such as 
natural objects. But to claim, as evolutionary ethics does, that “we ought to 
move in the direction of evolution simply because it is the direction of evolution”, 
is to identify “the good” with another notion (alleged evolutionary progress), and 
hence is fallacious (Farber 1994: 110).  
To illustrate that what ought to be the case cannot be derived from what is 
the case, Ruse offers the eradication of small-pox, a product of evolution, by the 
World Health Organization. Unsurprisingly accepting this as a good thing 
(though perhaps Spencer would disagree – unless he contracted it, of course), 
he argues, rightly in my opinion, this to demonstrate that there is “nothing 
sacrosanct about evolution. What is good, or what one ought to preserve or 
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encourage, is not necessarily what has evolved or is evolving, even if this 
evolution is along Darwinian lines” (Ruse 1982: 269).  
Whether the philosophical objection to evolutionary ethics had much impact 
outside philosophical circles is debatable, but what certainly brought the 
traditional form of evolutionary ethics into wide disrepute was its association 
with particular social doctrines (“social Darwinism”), notably eugenics with its 
premise that if evolution requires “the fit” to flourish at the expense of “the less 
fit”, then killing off those perceived to be less fit was aiding evolution and 
therefore a good thing; whereas striving to keep alive the less fit was contrary to 
evolution and therefore a bad thing. Then, having started with eugenic 
proposals “to weed out the lower classes, as well as non-European races, by 
selective breeding, oppressors repeatedly invoked the name and prestige of 
biology, along with Social Darwinist distortions of evolutionary theory, to justify 
exploitation. The notion on fitness was twisted to preserve white dominance in 
the United States through so-called intelligence testing, bolstered by false, but 
seductive, biological theories. It also figured in the ravings of the Nazis” 
(Midgley 2002: 9).  
As Midgley asserts, eugenic proposals were a distortion of evolutionary 
theory, and the evolutionary ethics which allegedly legitimised eugenics fell out 
of favour. There have been revivals of different forms of evolutionary ethics, no 
longer crudely trying to derive ethical principles from evolutionary theory but in 
arguments that an evolutionary understanding of human beings can help 
identify what constitutes the human good (Farber 1994), but there is a tendency 
among opponents of evolutionary psychology to claim that its advocates are 
attempting to derive ethical norms from evolutionary principles. Tattersall claims 
that “some of the more literally minded of the evolutionary psychologists have 
taken to defending rape as an ‘adaptive’ behavior, since it is one more way for 
males to spread their genes around” (Tattersall 2002: 178). This presumably 
refers to the two contending hypotheses concerning rape, namely i) that human 
rape behavior is a by-product of men’s adaptation for pursuit of casual sex with 
multiple partners, or ii) that rape is an adaptation in and of itself because it 
promotes success in competition for mates (Thornhill and Palmer 2000). 
Whether or not either theory is correct, the authors are explicit that they are not 
defending rape on the grounds that it may be an evolved behaviour and that to 
do so would be to commit the naturalistic fallacy (2000: 5 and passim). They are 
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seeking to explain the possibility of rape in evolutionary terms, but “[n]o one 
knows, nor is there currently enough evidence to decide the question either 
way. A better question is whether or not a rape adaptation in humans is 
conceivable. Here, I think the answer is clearly yes. That rape might be an 
adaptation is a reasonable hypothesis to pursue, and the proper framework is 
intersexual conflict” (Hagen 2004: np). The wrongness of rape is not mitigated 
by its origins. 
This diversion into evolutionary ethics has been to emphasise that the claim 
of evolutionary psychology that we have an evolved intuitive morality should not 
be taken as a pronouncement on the content of any ethical system. Indeed, our 
intuitive morality would seem to favour kin over non-kin, and the in-group, or 
“us”, over the out-group, or “them” (Hauser 2008), which are biases the ethical 
legitimacy of which could be consciously challenged by invoking the Golden 
Rule (Singer 1991).  
Hauser (2006) bases his account of intuitive morality on an analogy with 
language acquisition, though he misses a trick in failing to note that if the 
language acquisition device is LAD, then a morality acquisition device would 
surely be…  
However, his account is comprehensive, and I propose simply to pick out 
two or three of his arguments before homing in on the phenomenon of altruism 
which is, to repeat, the horizontal dimension or circumference of spirituality. 
 
Intuitive morality 
Arguing that we have a moral faculty “equipped with a ‘universal moral 
grammar’” (2006: xv), Hauser makes use of a number of experiments to 
demonstrate that our moral intuitions are “fast, automatic, involuntary, require 
little attention, appear early in development, are delivered in the absence of 
principled reasoning, and often appear immune to counter-reasoning”, in 
contrast to conscious reasoning which is “slow, deliberate, thoughtful, requires 
deliberate attention, appears late in development, [is] justifiable, and open to 
carefully defended and principled counterclaims” (2006: 36). In particular, he 
presents a series of “trolley problems” in which the basic scenario is that 
someone, call him Jim, is on an out-of-control trolley on a railway line. Jim 
cannot stop the trolley – the brakes have failed – but he knows he can flip a 
switch which will divert the trolley onto a branch line. Suppose there are five 
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hikers ahead on the line oblivious to their danger, and no-one on the branch line 
– is it morally permissible for Jim to flip the switch? Research shows that as well 
as the obvious answer of yes, the instinctive response of most people is also to 
say that Jim would be morally culpable if he didn’t flip the switch. But suppose 
as well as the five hikers on the main line there is one hiker, also oblivious to 
danger, on the branch line: now is it morally permissible for Jim to flip the 
switch, given that if he does so, that lone hiker will die though the other five will 
live? If you say yes, it is morally permissible to flip the switch with the result of 
the lone death instead of five deaths, Hauser reports that “you are like thous-
ands of subjects [he has] tested in experiments” (2006: 37). Now suppose that 
Jim isn’t on the trolley but on a bridge, and this time there isn’t a branch line 
option, but standing beside Jim is a very large man. Jim realises that a heavy 
weight – of, coincidentally, the mass of the large man – dropped in front of the 
trolley will halt it and save the five hikers. Is it morally permissible for him to 
shove the large man off the bridge onto the track below? It would result in the 
death of one man and saving the lives of five, but although this is exactly the 
same arithmetic outcome as in the previous scenario, most people, according to 
Hauser (and as I, for another, would expect), respond instinctively that such an 
action is not morally permissible. But what of those few who do claim that it is 
morally permissible to sacrifice the large man in this way for the sake of the five 
(and there are some)? Hauser refers to another thought experiment, though one 
not involving a trolley (except of the hospital variety): there are five critically ill 
people in a hospital, each needing an immediate organ transplant if they are to 
live. Enter a healthy man. Is it morally permissible to kill him and use his organs 
to save the lives of the other five? 98% of those asked “judged this act as 
impermissible” (2006: 142 – regrettably, Hauser says nothing further about the 
remaining 2% and how they would respond if they were the healthy man in 
question). Yet on a utilitarian calculus the outcome of killing the healthy man is 
identical to the second of the trolley problems – divert the trolley, killing one and 
saving five. The major difference between the scenarios, though, is that in the 
first one the death of the lone hiker is a regrettable by-product, as it were, of the 
action required to save five (an action, the diverting of the trolley, which would 
take place even if the lone hiker weren’t there), whereas in the large-man-over-
the-bridge scenario and the organ-transplant scenario, the single individuals 
concerned are being used as the means of saving the lives of others – saving 
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the others wouldn’t be an option in their respective absences. That the general 
intuition is that, regrettable though it may be, it is morally permissible to bring 
about the death of the lone hiker as a foreseen but unintended by-product of 
acting to save the lives of the others is the philosophical “principle of double 
effect”. But this principle was articulated “after years and years of debate and 
scrutiny” by philosophers, whereas “[e]veryone listening to these dilemmas… 
judges them immediately, without any sense of thinking through the problems 
and extracting the underlying principles” (2006: 38). There is an immediate gut 
response, even if later, conscious, reasoning then takes place. 
Similar thought-experiments, undertaken using American and Taiwanese 
students but with further information given about the fictional dramatis 
personae, showed that subjects preferred to save “kin over non-kin, friends over 
strangers, humans over nonhumans, and politically safe or neutral individuals 
over politically abhorrent monsters. In both cultures, subjects judged that it was 
permissible to save an unknown person over an endangered gorilla, and to 
sacrifice several people with politically abhorrent views (e.g., Nazis) over one 
person with politically and emotionally neutral beliefs. These results held across 
both groups, even though the Taiwanese students tended to follow Eastern 
religions that favor inaction over action” (2006: 133-4). All that might sound like, 
as Basil Fawlty would say, a statement of the bleedin’ obvious – but that is 
precisely the point; these responses chime so well with the intuitions of most of 
us that they are obvious. They are what sociologist Peter Berger refers to as “‘of 
course’ statements” (Berger 1966). But how come we have those intuitive 
responses? How come on hearing them we shrug and say “of course”? If our 
conscious, reasoning self acknowledges that actually people are of equal value, 
or rather that there is no logical reason to say that kin are on the whole 
intrinsically better people than non-kin, or that friends are on the whole better 
than strangers, then is it right to favour kin over non-kin? Friends over 
strangers? Why do we instinctively do it? It is, Hauser argues, that individual 
moral judgments “reflect evolved, universal decision-making processes that 
increase genetic fitness” (2006: 134).  
There is a lot more than could be said but not the space to say it all. I 
propose therefore in the rest of this chapter to elaborate the proposal that moral 
judgments “increase genetic fitness” by considering the phenomenon of 
altruism. 
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The evolution of altruism  
In evolutionary theory, altruism has been dubbed “the central problem” (Wilson 
1998: 165) since altruistic behaviour in any species appears to be contrary to 
natural selection, entailing as it does one organism behaving in such a way as 
to benefit another organism to its own possible detriment. A simplistic under-
standing of Darwinian mechanisms suggests that since (statistically speaking) 
altruists are less likely to survive and reproduce than are non-altruists, there 
should be a preferential propagation down the generation of the genes of non-
altruists compared with genes of altruists. And by this calculus, altruism should 
in the long run be selected out; selfishness should reign triumphant. Yet that 
manifestly is not the case, with chimps helping each other in a fight, vampire 
bats feeding blood to hungry conspecifics, ground squirrel’s alarm call, and the 
phenomenon of social insects (Cosmides and Tooby 1992), not to mention, in 
the human sphere, the sharing of blood through blood donor schemes (Titmuss 
1970), and the actions of people such as Andrew Parker who, when a ferry 
capsized in Zeebrugge harbour, turned himself into a human bridge, allowing 
the others to crawl to safety over him whilst endangering his own life (BBC 
1987). 
 
Moral and Evolutionary Altruism  
To account for the widespread occurrence of such apparently perverse (in 
evolutionary terms) behaviour, a number of evolutionary mechanisms have 
been posited. First, though, it is necessary to distinguish between two different 
but related uses of the term “altruism”, for which, following Ruse (1986b), I use 
the terms “moral altruism” and “evolutionary altruism”.  
Moral altruism refers to behaviour which is performed by a moral agent 
acting in his or her capacity as a moral agent, with the intention of benefiting 
another organism (whether of the same species or not) although it carries, or 
may carry, a cost to that agent. Only organisms which have some capacity for 
reflective thought and decision-making, and can make a conscious choice 
between different courses of action, are capable of moral altruism. Andrew 
Parker, in turning himself into a human bridge, chose take that course of action. 
He could well have done differently – getting himself to safety as quickly as 
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possible, and hang everyone else – but no, he chose to remain for the sake of 
strangers. His action, deliberately chosen, is an instance of moral altruism.  
But a lapwing which lures a predator away from a chick-filled ground nest by 
feigning a broken wing is also risking her life to protect her others – her young 
(Smith, J.M. 1993) – but this is an instinctive response triggered by the circum-
stances. No-one seriously suggests that the lapwing ponders what course of 
action to take – feigning a broken wing is what lapwings do in those circumstan-
ces. Her behaviour looks altruistic, and is altruistic in the sense that she is 
endangering herself for the sake of her chicks, but it is not the outcome of 
conscious, deliberate choice. It is not moral altruism but evolutionary altruism, 
altruism that has an pay-off in evolutionary terms. 
Evolutionary altruism, then, refers to behaviour by an organism which, like 
moral altruism, benefits another organism at the agent’s own individual cost, but 
which actually results in an increase in the agent’s “inclusive fitness” – that is to 
say, although the behaviour is detrimental to the agent as an individual 
organism by decreasing its survival chances, it benefits the agent’s genes by 
increasing their chances of being represented in future generations. The 
behaviour of the lapwing in enticing the predator away from the chick-filled nest 
improves the chances of survival (and hence, in due course, of reproduction) of 
the chicks, and so the genes of the “altruistic” lapwing have a greater chance of 
being represented in future generations than of a “selfish” lapwing who flies 
away and allows her chicks to be predated. This illustrates the principle that in 
evolution, “it is not the survival of the individual that matters but of the offspring 
of that individual” (Smith 1993: 193). 
Moral altruism and evolutionary altruism involve identical types of behaviour 
but they differ in the presence and absence respectively of motivation (Singer 
1981), and “there is no implication that evolutionary ‘altruism’… is inevitably 
associated with moral altruism (where this is the original literal sense, implying a 
conscious being helping others because it is right and proper to do so)” (Ruse 
1986b: 98). Evolutionary altruism involves “expectation (not necessarily 
conscious expectation) of return from an evolutionary perspective. This kind of 
altruism is metaphorical” (2001: 192). 
Although the focus here is on altruism, the same distinction arises in the 
evolutionary use of its antonym “selfish”, particularly as applied to the activity 
and function of genes, about which “definitions of altruism and selfishness are 
 181 
behavioural, not subjective. I am not concerned here with the psychology of 
motives” (Dawkins 1989: 4 – italics in original). 
 
A Taxonomy of Altruisms 
There is a range of different behaviours which can all be classed as “altruistic” 
of either the evolutionary or moral kind, and it is part of my argument that, of this 
family of altruisms, the evolutionary members are the precursors of what, in H. 
sapiens, are the moral members. That is, the claim that altruism is based on the 
functioning of an intuitive, evolved faculty is supported by the widespread 
occurrence of altruistic behaviour throughout the animal kingdom which, in the 
absence of a culture, can only have arisen through evolutionary processes. 
Evolutionary altruism in its various guises constitutes an intuitive faculty, upon 
which human moral altruism is subsequently built – much as the ability to do 
higher mathematics builds on the far more elementary functioning of our 
intuitive mathematics – and without that grounding of evolutionary altruism, 
moral altruism could not come to be.  
There follows a rough typology of altruism, evolutionary and moral, ordered 
according to the increasingly indirect relationship, either genetic or social, 
between the agent and the beneficiary of the behaviour being considered. For 
simplicity’s sake I have excluded some behaviours which could conceivably 
come within the altruism family, such as the parasitism (or rather, the conse-
quence of the parasitism) of cuckoos: by laying their eggs in their nests they 
induce the “foster” mother to hatch and rear the cuckoo chick to the detriment of 
her own chicks – and hence to the detriment of her genetic fitness (Dawkins 
1989 [1976]), which could be reconstrued as, say, “unintended altruism”.  
 
1. Parental altruism  
Parental altruism is better known as parental care, and refers to the investment 
of time and energy in raising young, time and energy which could otherwise be 
spent on the well-being of the parent. It is altruistic behaviour because it bene-
fits the offspring to the cost of the parent, but in most species this cannot count 
as “moral altruism” since it is clearly a consequence of evolved, instinctive 
behaviour, such as that of the lapwing faking a broken wing, rather than the free 
choice of a moral agent. Wilson comments that parental care is not altruism “in 
the strict genetic sense” (1980: 55), by which he means that such behaviour by 
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the organism is a consequence of genetic selfishness, since the chances of the 
genes being represented in future generations are enhanced by the parent’s 
altruism. Parental care therefore counts as “evolutionary altruism” because the 
evolutionary benefit of enhanced genetic fitness, accruing from the behaviour, 
has driven the evolution of parental altruism. 
From this account it would seem obvious that from an evolutionary pers-
pective parental care is inevitably advantageous, but things are not that straight-
forward. Consider the case of the pelican “insurance” chick. Holmes Rolston 
(2006 [1987]) reports that the white pelican typically lays two eggs and so 
begins to rear two young; but in time the stronger of the two ousts the other 
from the nest, and this weaker chick is henceforth ignored by the parent peli-
cans. The second “insurance” chick functions to increase the chances of one 
viable chick surviving – if anything untoward happens to the favoured chick in 
the early days, its not-yet-abandoned back-up sibling takes over the role of 
gene-carrier-in-chief; but if the favoured chick survives, the back-up chick is not 
needed and, becoming a drain on resources, its ejection from the nest is advan-
tageous. No parental care there, for it is the genetic calculus that shapes the 
outcome, not an absolute directive that pelican (or other) parents must care for 
their young come what may. 
It would be a waste of time to look through the moral lens at the behaviour of 
pelican parents towards the insurance chick and construe the pelican parents’ 
behaviour as immoral, the very antithesis of “moral altruism”. We might not like 
this aspect of the natural world, we might consider it cruel, wasteful, unpleasant, 
we might consider it to be an example of “evolutionary evil” (Southgate 2008), 
but the pelicans themselves are hardly blameworthy moral agents consciously 
choosing chickicide. The evolutionary lens alone is sufficient to examine their 
behaviour and how it has come into existence; the moral lens is not required.  
All this might seem a long way from the actions of human parents where the 
parent-child attachment, and in particular the mother- (or mother-substitute-) 
child attachment, is so strong (Bowlby 1969). It is easy to believe that parental 
altruism is also natural to – that is, an evolved characteristic of – H. sapiens, but 
without “insurance chick” complications… But not so fast; there are 
complications. 
First, a general point, is that there is good evidence for infanticide being 
significant in many human societies both past and present (Williamson 1978), 
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indicating that parental altruism is not so hard-wired into the human psyche that 
it always prevails, whatever the environmental or cultural circumstances. 
Secondly, there are regrettably regular instances of parental neglect 
reported and investigated (Packman 1975), about which the evolutionary 
psychologists Martin Daly and Margo Wilson (Daly and Wilson 1988; 1994; 
1998; Wilson and Daly 1992) predicted that children would be more at risk from 
step-parents than from genetic parents, the evolutionary logic being that unlike 
one’s biological children, stepchildren do not carry one’s genetic endowment to 
subsequent generations:  
“Parental investment is a valuable resource that can be parasitized by 
nonrelatives, and animals manifest a wide range of complex adaptations 
for countering such parasitism… It would thus be surprising if the relat-
ively ‘selfless’ motivational and emotional states of parental solicitude 
were readily and fully engaged by a new mate’s offspring from a prior 
union… By this reasoning, a differential risk of violent lapses of parental 
solicitude is just one, relatively extreme, consequence of the fact that 
genetic parents’ solicitude generally exceeds that of stepparents” (1994: 
208).  
 
Research spectacularly confirmed the prediction, with U.S. data indicating “that 
the youngest children (0-2) incurred about 100 times greater risk at the hands 
of stepparents than of genetic parents” (1994: 207), and Canadian data 
showing a 70-fold factor. The argument is not that stepparents are predisposed 
to harm their stepchildren, but that stepparent solicitude is (statistically) weaker 
than that of genetic parents, backed up by “ample evidence of men’s reluctance 
to assume child support obligations to the offspring of other men” (Wilson and 
Daly 1992: 307 – citing a range of studies). 
Although there is (quite rightly) moral condemnation of child abuse whether 
by genetic or step-parent, this evidence supports the view that parental altruism 
is an evolutionary phenomenon, for the differential between abuse by step-
parents and abuse by genetic parents is inexplicable from a purely moral 
perspective. Of course, this does not remove the moral (or rather, immoral) 
dimension from child abuse by step-parents, nor does it reduce parental 
altruism to a form of disguised selfishness just because the parent’s genes (or, 
more strictly, copies of their genes) benefit, for “selfish genes sometimes use 
selfless individuals to achieve their ends” (Ridley 1996: 20). The altruism that 
parents display towards their children has evolutionary roots without that 
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detracting from the behaviour fulfilling the condition of benefitting another 
organism at the parent’s own individual cost. 
Since a parent and a child are, by definition, kin, parental altruism is strictly 
speaking a subset of the next category, kin altruism. 
 
2. Kin altruism  
Behaving altruistically towards kin (not just one’s offspring) is common in the 
animal kingdom. For example, with many species of birds an individual that 
sees a predator will give an alarm call which alerts the other birds to the danger 
but simultaneously puts itself at greater risk (Smith 1993 [1958]). This appar-
ently maladaptive behaviour is explained by the concept of kin selection 
(Hamilton 1964) whereby the increased risk to the continued survival of the bird 
making the alarm call is more than outweighed by the decreased risk to its 
relatives in the flock, and “the more closely are the members of the flock 
related, the greater the risk an individual will run to confer a given advantage to 
the other members of a flock. If the flock is merely a random sample of the 
whole population, selection will not favour the running of any risk at all” (Smith 
1993 [1958]: 195). The so-called “social insects” such as ants and bees are 
often cited as a striking example of kin selection in action. A worker bee is a 
sterile female who “spends her life looking after her children”, the explanation 
offered being that because the curious genetics of the hymenoptera order of 
insects makes a female genetically closer to her sisters than to her own 
daughters, “a female [bee] does more to preserve her own genes if she stays at 
home and looks after her sisters than if she goes out and starts a family of her 
own” (1993 [1958]: 196). Altruistic behaviour is reported in many other species 
such as monkeys and whales, a phenomenon explicable by the kin-based 
nature of many such groups, such that when, for example, whales go to the 
help of an injured individual, “it may be that the overall probability that a random 
member of the school is a relation is so high that the altruism is worth the cost” 
(Dawkins 1989: 100).  
Looking through the evolutionary lens, it makes genetic sense for an organ-
ism to be altruistic towards relatives since they carry a share of the same 
genes. This is the concept of “inclusive fitness”, defined as “the sum of an 
individual’s own fitness plus all its influence on fitness in its relatives other than 
direct descendants” (Mayr 1993: 181). That is to say, if an organism behaves in 
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such a way that it lowers its own genetic fitness (i.e. less likely to survive and 
pass on its genes directly), but in doing so raises the genetic fitness of its 
relatives (i.e. increases their chances of surviving and passing on their genes, 
which includes copies of the genes the relatives have in common with the 
altruist) to a degree that more than compensates for its own lowered fitness, 
then the altruist will have raised its own inclusive fitness, and its behaviour will 
(statistically) be selected for and tend to spread through the population in 
subsequent generations. 
Applying the concept of kin altruism to human behaviour gave rise to J.B.S. 
Haldane’s mordant quip that “greater love hath no man than this, that he lay 
down his life for two brothers, four half-brothers or eight first cousins (Bowker  
1995: 33), his point being that since we share 50% of our genes by common 
descent with a sibling, 25% with a half-sibling, and 12.5% with a cousin, our 
loss by death of our own reproductive potential would be balanced by our 
preventing the death of 2, 4 or 8 of those relatives respectively. Of course, no-
one is suggesting that such mathematical calculations take place consciously; 
the argument is simply that altruistic behaviour towards kin is also beneficial to 
our genes (or, more accurately, towards the copies of our genes that our kin 
share), hence that behaviour will be selected for along with any genetic 
predisposition to act altruistically towards kin.  
Empirical research supports the expectation derived from the inclusive fit-
ness argument that kin are preferentially the beneficiaries of altruistic behaviour. 
Stewart-Williams (2007) observed in his research with undergraduates “[a] 
general (albeit imperfect) trend… such that, as the cost of helping increased, 
the share of help given to kin increased, whereas that given to nonkin 
decreased”, and that “even though young adults report that they are emotionally 
closer to friends than to siblings… participants were more willing to provide 
high-cost help (i.e., evolutionarily significant help) to siblings” (2007: 196). Other 
research focused on cousins, and was based on evolutionary considerations 
concerning the probabilities of paternity uncertainty and hence uncertainty 
about what percentage of genes by common descent were shared: the 
prediction was verified that individuals would exhibit higher levels of altruism 
towards cousins who were their mother’s sister’s children (where one could be 
certain of shared genes by common descent) than towards cousins who were 
their father’s brother’s children (where there is less certainty of shared genes by 
186 
common descent (Jeon and Buss 2007). Rachlin and Jones (2008) verified that 
financial generosity varies according to perceived closeness of genetic relation-
ship – the nearer the relationship, the greater the financial altruism. 
These and similar findings support the view that kin selection is an important 
factor in the evolution of altruism (though see Nowak, Tarnita and Wilson [2010] 
for a dissenting view). 
 
3. Reciprocal Altruism  
Altruism, however, is not confined to helping kin, and the mechanism of kin-
selection cannot alone explain instances of altruism such as the intra-specific 
example of vampire bats and the inter-specific example of cleaner fish. Here the 
mechanism of “reciprocal altruism” (Trivers 1971) is operating. Though it 
sounds like an oxymoron, it refers to the phenomenon whereby, although 
certain behaviour by each of two individuals are altruistic when considered 
independently, there is in effect an (unconscious) reciprocity occurring whereby 
both individuals benefit.  
Vampire bats feed at night on the blood of large animals, but hunting is not 
always successful and the bats have evolved their own blood-sharing scheme 
(Wilkinson 1984). When a bat is successful, it can drink more than it immed-
iately requires, and subsequently regurgitate the surplus to another bat who has 
failed on that occasion. The favour is repaid on another night, and the bats 
operate on a tit-for-tat basis: “A bat that has donated in the past will receive 
blood from the previous donee; a bat that has refused blood will be refused 
blood in turn” (Ridley 1996: 63). This reciprocity increases the fitness of both 
donor and donee bats: a bat who donates blood is, at the moment of donation, 
apparently lowering its fitness and increasing the fitness of the (possibly 
unrelated) recipient; but if a night or two later when its own hunting has been 
unsuccessful it receives blood from a fellow bat, then its fitness is enhanced: 
and the fact that reciprocal altruism has evolved suggests that the degree to 
which its fitness is enhanced as a recipient more than compensates for the 
amount its fitness is lowered when a donor. This makes sense, since for young 
bats “one night in three is unsuccessful, and two abortive nights in a row are not 
therefore uncommon. After as little as sixty hours without a blood meal, the bat 
is in danger of starving to death” (1996: 62); hence reciprocal altruism can 
mean literally the difference between life and death. 
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The reciprocity could, of course, be open to abuse, in that bats which accept 
blood meals but fail to reciprocate later would be gaining the benefits and not 
paying the cost, giving them a selective advantage over reciprocating bats. This 
explains, at least in part, why vampire bats have evolved very big brains for 
their size, namely to monitor the complex social relationships entailed by 
reciprocal altruism: “To play the reciprocity game, they need to recognize each 
other, remember who repaid a favour and who did not, and bear the debt or 
grudge accordingly” (1996: 69). Cheats, in other words, will soon find them-
selves being refused blood meals by fellow bats; cheating behaviour will be 
selected against.  
An inter-specific example of reciprocal altruism is found at “cleaning 
stations” among coral reefs where large fish can go to be cleaned of parasites 
by a range of smaller fish and shrimps (Ridley 1996). The client fish benefit by 
having potentially harmful parasites removed, whilst the cleaners benefit from 
having their meals (namely, the parasites) ready provided. Significantly, 
although the cleaners often resemble the usual prey of the client fish, they are 
not harmed, so the puzzle is “why the clients do not... accept the cleaning 
services, but round off the session by eating the cleaner” (1996: 64).  
The behaviour of the client fish in not eating the cleaner fish fits with the 
definition of altruism, since it is to the advantage of the cleaner fish (“not being 
eaten” is a definite improvement on “being eaten”), but it is to the disadvantage 
of the client fish which now has to expend extra energy in going off to find prey 
fish elsewhere rather than eating the cleaners. The reciprocal altruistic explan-
ation for this behaviour is “roughly [that]… good cleaners are hard to find. The 
client fish do not spare their cleaners out of a general sense of duty to future 
clients, but because a good cleaner is more valuable to them as a future 
cleaner than as a present meal” (1996: 64). Client fish with a predisposition to 
eat their cleaners would be selected against compared with client fish who had 
a predisposition not to eat their cleaners. This isn’t to suggest that the client fish 
has developed a conscience, nor that the fish consciously calculate that “a good 
cleaner is more valuable to them as a future cleaners than as a present meal”: 
natural selection has built that calculation into their instinctive patterns of be-
haviour. And in their turn, those cleaner fish with the greater cleaning efficiency 
eat better, and so will on average be selected by natural selection in preference 
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to the less efficient cleaners. The genetic fitness of both client and cleaner are 
enhanced by their reciprocity. 
Reciprocal altruism has been observed in rhesus macaques and baboons, 
and the anthropoid apes, where members of troops “are known to form 
coalitions or cliques and to aid one another reciprocally in disputes… [and] 
chimpanzees, gibbons, African wild dogs, and wolves also beg food from one 
another in a reciprocal manner” (Wilson 1980 [1975]: 58-9), but it is human 
behaviour which “abounds with reciprocal altruism”(1980 [1975]: 58).  
 
4. Strong Reciprocity  
Whereas the forms of altruism so far referred to are found in the non-human as 
well as the human world, in strong reciprocity (Fehr and Fischbacher 2003; Fehr 
and Henrich 2003; Gintis 2000; Gintis et al 2003) we find a phenomenon which, 
the evidence suggests, is “a uniquely human cognitive adaptation” (Hauser 
2006: 89). It refers to a predisposition not only to cooperate with others, but also 
to punish non-cooperators – those considered to be behaving unfairly by 
violating the norms of the group – and, significantly, to be willing to punish at 
personal cost “even when this behavior cannot be justified in terms of extended 
kinship or reciprocal altruism” (Gintis 2000: 169). The argument is that such 
strong reciprocity helps guarantee “stable, co-operative societies” (Hauser 
2006: 89), contributing to a form of group selection in that a group of co-
operating altruists is more likely to survive periods of adversity than is a group 
of selfish cheaters (Wilson 2002). 
The existence of strong reciprocity has been repeatedly demonstrated in 
industrialized societies in many experiments involving the “Ultimatum Game” 
and its variants. In the standard version the investigator hands a sum of money 
(say £10) to one participant (“the proposer”) whose task is to offer some of that 
money to a second participant (“the respondent”). If the respondent agrees to 
the proposer’s offer, the money is split as agreed and they each keep their 
share. If, however, the respondent rejects the offer, then neither of them get to 
keep any of the money. There is no further bargaining, and the proposer loses 
out as does the respondent. Now, if the respondent were acting totally ration-
ally, then in a one-shot encounter (where there will be no future behaviour of the 
proposer that the respondent’s response can influence) he would not reject 
whatever the proposer offered, even if it were only 50p – since something is 
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better than nothing and he would still be 50p up, even though he considers the 
proposer a louse for not offering more. But that is not what happens – typically if 
the proposer offers only a small percentage, the respondent rejects the offer, 
thus punishing the proposer for his perceived unfairness by causing him to lose 
all the money involved, even though he (the respondent) also loses out on 
getting some free money. He has punished unfairness at the cost to himself, 
and this punishment is usually inflicted if the offer from the proposer is less than 
20% of what the investigator has handed to the proposer; that is, respondents 
“do not behave in a self-interest maximising manner” (Fehr and Henrich 2003: 
5). But it also turns out that proposers often offer in the region of half the 
money, so in effect both players are behaving irrationally (the respondent in 
rejecting an offer, however small; the proposer in making an offer higher than 
necessary).  
There are variants to the game, some involving anonymity, some involving 
repeated interactions with the same partner, some involving the respondent 
having no option but to accept whatever the proposer offers (the so-called 
“Dictator Game”), with differing outcomes dependent on reputations that players 
acquire and their experiences with one or another partner. Mathematical models 
reveal that “fairness evolves as a stable solution to the ultimatum game if 
proposers have access to information about a [respondent’s] past behavior... 
reputation fuels cooperation and provides a shield against defection” (Hauser 
2006: 87).  
Similar bargaining games with a range of small scale societies, reveal 
“significant cross-cultural variation that maps onto social norms within each 
culture” (2006: 91), but Hauser further notes that none of the ultimatum game 
players in the 15 societies reported on by Henrich et al (2001) “made offers of 
less than 15% or more than 50%”, variations which, he argues, suggest that 
there is a universal principle of fairness, which cultures individually “tweak… in 
order to constrain what counts as permissible exchange” (Hauser 2006: 93).  
There is an argument that strong reciprocity is not an adaptation in its own 
right but simply a maladaptive by-product of the other forms of evolutionary 
altruism such as ordinary reciprocal altruism not being “sufficiently finely-tuned 
to the modern human condition where lots of one-shot interactions occur” (Fehr 
and Henrich 2003: 7), unlike the situation in the EEA where one-shot inter-
actions would have been rare. But these authors cite “ample evidence that 
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humans cooperate much more if they expect frequent future interactions than if 
future interactions are rare or absent” (2003: 7), that is, we aren’t fooled into 
behaving as though a one-shot interaction is merely one of a series of repeated 
interactions (being fooled that that were the case would indicate strong recipro-
city to be a maladaptive by-product); we do distinguish between a one-shot 
interaction and the possibility of repeated interactions, and strong reciprocity 
persists. 
Strong reciprocity, then, appears to be a product of human evolution 
involving a willingness to subordinate one’s own interests in order to punish 
cheaters (“strong negative reciprocity”) or reward those who have bestowed 
benefits (“strong positive reciprocity”) (2003: 3). It has not been found in any 
other species so far studied, including our nearest relatives the chimpanzees, 
among which “no behaviors that come close to strong reciprocity have been 
observed” (2003: 6), and entails an intuitive understanding of “fairness”, though 
what is understood to be fair appears to have a large cultural component. 
That cultural component becomes even more significant in the two final 
categories of altruism, where explicit moral agency rather than simply the 
biologically intuitive responses comes into its own.  
 
5a Weak Good Samaritan altruism  
The mechanisms and examples so far given of altruism clearly do not cover the 
whole range. Earlier, the distinction was made between evolutionary altruism 
and moral altruism, the latter being the province only of moral agents. Although 
a case can be put for the existence of a proto-moral agency in some other 
primates (de Waal 1996), there is currently only one species, H. sapiens, that 
we can be confident possesses moral agency if any species does. The following 
therefore is solely about types of altruistic behaviour that H. sapiens is capable 
of as a moral agent, not simply as the possessor of an intuitive (and hence non-
moral) faculty.  
I identify two types of moral altruism, weak Good Samaritan altruism 
(WGSA) and strong Good Samaritan altruism (SGSA). These terms arise from 
the well-known parable of the Good Samaritan: Jesus, in conversation with a 
lawyer, asks for his understanding of “the Law”, to which the man replies by 
quoting Leviticus 19:18: “You must love the Lord your God with all your heart, 
with all your soul, with all your strength, and with all your mind, and your 
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neighbour as yourself”. Jesus commends this summary of the Law and urges 
the man to obey it. The man then asks, “And who is my neighbour?” (Luke 
10:27, 29), whereupon Jesus recounts the parable (Luke 10: 30-37). This tells 
of a man being beaten up and left for dead by robbers, and as he’s lying there 
unconscious he is ignored first by a priest, then by a Levite, before finally being 
rescued by a Samaritan traveller who tends to his wounds, takes him to an inn 
and pays for his care. It is the Samaritan, who showed pity and helped another 
in distress, who “proved himself a neighbour” (Luke 10:36). 
In common parlance “being a Good Samaritan” means helping a stranger in 
distress – as in the charitable organisation “The Samaritans” with its origins in a 
desire to respond helpfully and pastorally to would-be suicides (Varah 1965). It 
means putting yourself out for another with no thought or possibility of reward, 
even when that other is not a member of your family, group, tribe or nation.  
No value judgement is meant to be implied by referring to this as “weak” 
Good Samaritan Altruism, but this common perception of being a good 
Samaritan, of being helpful and co-operative, of inconveniencing yourself for the 
sake of someone else (and usually with the expectation of reciprocity if the 
opportunity arises) is actually a dilute or weak version of what is implied in the 
biblical narrative, where the behaviour exhibited is what I refer to as: 
 
5b Strong Good Samaritan Altruism (SGSA). 
Rolston refers to the Samaritan’s behaviour as “helping non-genetically related 
others” and as that of one who “values life outside his own self-sector, outside 
his cultural sector” (2004: 238, 239), which in effect describes what I have 
termed weak Good Samaritan Altruism. Rolston’s depiction is correct as far as it 
goes, but the Samaritan is doing more than Rolston gives him credit for. A 
telling factor in the parable is that the recipient of the altruistic behaviour is a 
Jew and “there was no love lost between Samaria and Judea” (Van Harn 2001: 
369). The Samaritan is actually depicted as helping someone who belonged to 
a nation for whom Samaritans were “despised” (2001: 372), a hostile other 
group. This is different from helping just any old stranger, and that Jesus chose 
a despised-by-Jews Samaritan to manifest his radical ethic provided the “shock 
of the parable” (2001: 371).  
The behaviour of the fictional Good Samaritan deserves a category of its 
own, namely “strong Good Samaritan altruism” (SGSA), to distinguish it from 
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the weaker (though still laudable, of course) version of behaving altruistically 
towards an unknown “other”. And it into this category that I would place the 
actions of the non-fictional Kushdeva Singh. 
Kushdeva was a Sikh doctor living in the Punjab in 1947, just after the 
partition of India (Hick 1999). He assisted numerous Muslims to escape from 
the area following the murder of a Muslim by another Sikh and a Hindu, that 
outrage itself being in response to reports of the killing of Hindus fleeing from 
Pakistan. Kushdeva arranged for two trucks to take the refugees to a transit 
camp, then on learning of plans to ambush the trucks he contrived a diversion 
which saved the lives of the refugees, though the mob looted the now-empty 
Muslim houses. He escorted some Muslim women to Delhi and “worked 
successfully in many ways to enable the local Muslim community to escape 
safely to Pakistan, in spite of constant danger to himself from people blinded by 
hatred” (1999: 207). In 1973, the Indian government rightly awarded him the 
Order of Merit (Civil) in recognition of his actions.  
A remarkable aspect of this man’s altruism is that he was risking his life to 
help members of the Muslim community, traditionally hostile to Kushdeva’s own 
Sikh community. His behaviour mirrors that of the Good Samaritan.  
The fictional good Samaritan and the real-life good Sikh, along with all the 
other examples of non-reciprocated, non-kin-based altruism and cooperative 
behaviour that one could adduce (Kramer 2007; Oord 2008), make it clear that 
the evolutionary account of morality in general and altruism in particular can 
only go so far. It is difficult to stretch the plausibility of the accounts of how 
parental care, kin altruism and reciprocal altruism evolve within a Darwinian 
paradigm to cover examples of WGSA and SGSA, particularly as the latter are 
not species-typical. The good Samaritan parable worked precisely because 
Jesus’ Jewish audience did not expect to hear of such behaviour; Kushdeva 
received the Order of Merit precisely because his behaviour went way above 
what could have been expected. Such behaviour is not a human universal, it is 
exceptional, and hence falls outside the remit of evolutionary psychology, which 
can account for the universality of the “evolutionary” forms of altruism. 
There are a number of points to make. First, as a species we are clearly not 
genetically hard-wired for SGSA. It goes against the grain to put ourselves out 
to help those we construe as being actively hostile towards us, and even the 
expression of compassion towards “the enemy” is often unacceptable. Witness 
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Margaret Thatcher’s “reported fury” when Robert Runcie, then Archbishop of 
Canterbury, had the temerity to offer prayers for Argentinean soldiers and their 
families at the service to mark the ending of the Falklands war in 1982 (Williams 
2011). Active compassion towards, or indeed from, a putatively hostile other 
does not, in common parlance, come naturally to us, hence the shock to Jesus’ 
listeners when he attributed such an action to a despised foreigner. 
Second, the non-hard-wired nature of SGSA is consistent with the view that 
in biological/genetic terms it is maladaptive as is, say, the use of contraception. 
Good Samaritan altruists are not promoting their own genes through the 
reproductive success of themselves or of their kin, or through the flourishing of 
their tribe or society. In evolutionary terms, they are putting the continuation of 
their genes at risk. Maladaptive altruism does occasionally occur in the non-
human animal world, such as a lioness nursing a baby oryx (Guardian 
Unlimited, April 3rd 2002), without, however, moral agency being attributed to 
that lioness as it is for human behaviour. And although we may not be hard-
wired for GSA, the fact that it can and does sometimes occur demonstrates that 
it is within the range of human possibility – i.e. we are also not hard-wired not to 
manifest GSA. There are many things our genetic endowment simply does not 
permit us to do – unaided flight (like birds), the digestion of grass (like cows), 
and the direct perception of electric fields (like electric eels) or ultraviolet light 
(like butterflies) – but GSA is not one of the behaviours closed to us. It may be 
difficult to do – like learning a second language as an adult – but nevertheless it 
falls within our genetically allowed possibilities. 
Third, such behaviour won’t spread by biological evolutionary processes 
because of the “free-rider” problem (Ridley 1996); it can only spread, if it is 
spread at all, by cultural transmission through imitation and teaching/learning. 
Significantly, it has been documented that all the major religions have some 
close variant of the Golden Rule (“Do unto others as you would have them do 
unto you”) at the core of their ethical teaching (Hick 1999). There appears to be 
widespread consent – in that it is found in many cultures – that by and large it 
would be a good rule to live by. This yields weak GSA, but when the “other” 
refers to one’s enemy (potential or actual), it becomes “strong GSA”.  
We can invoke the metaphor of an “expanding circle” of morality whereby 
over the centuries we are widening our circle of who or what can make an 
ethical call upon us such that “altruistic impulses once limited to one’s kin and 
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one’s own group might be extended to a wider circle by reasoning creatures 
who can see that they and their kin are one group among others, and from an 
impartial point of view no more important than others” (Singer 1981: 134). It 
requires a deliberate choice by a reasoning, moral agent for it to come about, 
which in turn requires the capacity for self-awareness and reflection, and hence 
the evolution of consciousness is a pre-condition for the evolution of GSA. But 
the evolution of consciousness is recognised as being “the hard problem” about 
which there is much disagreement (Dennett 1993; Freeman 2001; Humphrey 
1983; Jaynes 1990 [1976]; McGinn 1993). For the purposes of the current 
enquiry it needs to be accepted as a given that H. sapiens is a conscious, self-
aware species; and given that that is so, the capacity for altruism derived from 
evolutionary processes is a pre-requisite for the possibility of “moral altruism” – 
a necessary but (it would appear) not a sufficient condition. It is the existence of 
this necessary condition for which evolutionary psychology offers an 
explanation. 
 
Altruism and spirituality  
I am identifying altruism or, more accurately, moral altruism, as being the horiz-
ontal dimension of spirituality. It constitutes the circumference of spirituality, 
and entails the capacity to move from being self-centred to being other-centred, 
and choosing to behave in a way that promotes the interests of another. What 
has not been explored in the above account is the affective dimension of 
altruism, probably best known as empathy, one definition of which is “our ability 
to identify what someone else is thinking or feeling, and to respond to their 
thoughts and feelings with an appropriate emotion” (Baron-Cohen 2011: 11). 
This is more than knowing what you yourself would think and feel in someone 
else’s situation, it is awareness of what they think and feel in that situation, 
which might be quite different. This ability, of course, involves our “Theory of 
Mind” module as discussed in the previous chapter, for it is the inferences 
delivered by our ToM module which give us insight into another’s state of mind, 
and the intuitive awareness that it is not necessarily the same as our own.  
If what has gone before has any validity, it is clear that there is an evolution-
ary basis to our capacity for altruism – both in the capacity to intuit another 
person’s state of mind as well as the capacity to respond altruistically – but not 
deterministically so. The instances of “evolutionary altruism” outlined above 
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suggest that such behaviours would have been selected for over evolutionary 
time because of their contribution to the inclusive fitness of the individual, but 
“moral altruism”, although it is based on evolutionary altruism and builds on it, 
cannot be reduced to the outcome of a genetic calculus. Nor can a genetic 
calculus prescribe what one individual ought to do with regard to another: that 
would be to return to the crude form of evolutionary ethics and the committing 
of the naturalistic fallacy (see above). But without the evolutionary processes 
operating over the millennia, altruism – moral altruism – would not have come 
into being. 
This constitutes part of the contribution that an evolutionary perspective can 
make to an understanding of spirituality. Our responding to another is not like 
the lapwing who cannot help but put on the broken-wing performance when the 
appropriate environmental cues are there to trigger the sequence of moves, it is 
a choice which our evolved nature enables us, but does not constrain us, to 
take. To the extent that one dimension of spirituality (the horizontal, the circum-
ference of spirituality) can be identified as a move away from self-centredness 
to an other-centredness or even, to use Hick’s (1989) term, Reality-centred-
ness, it is, the above strongly suggests, rooted in the evolutionary soil of human 
nature.  
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Chapter 9: Of evolution, spirituality and religion 
 
Introduction 
Lack of space prevents discussion of many of the naturalistic explanations 
which have been advanced for the existence of religion by such as Feuerbach 
(1989[1841]), Freud (1973 [1930]), and Durkheim (1915), and the task here is to 
consider several accounts which, taking an evolutionary approach, have a direct 
bearing on the current enquiry. 
Evolutionary explanations of religion fall broadly into two camps, those that 
see religion as being an adaptation in its own right, and those which see it not 
as an adaptation but as the by-product of the functioning of some other adapt-
ation(s) (Sanderson 2008). The model I develop in the next chapter belongs to 
the adaptationist camp, but theories on both sides make varying contributions to 
the argument.  
Although the current enquiry focuses on spirituality, not on religion, the two 
not being equivalent although closely allied (Heelas and Woodhead 2005), I am 
following (among others) Otto (1958 [1923]) and Hay and Socha (2005) in 
taking religion to be more of a subset or consequence of spirituality rather than 
vice versa: that is, the various religious traditions, whatever else they may be, 
constitute so many different manifestations or vehicles of spirituality, rather than 
spirituality simply being one of several dimensions of religion.  
This poses a slight problem in what follows, especially in the next chapter 
where the adaptiveness of spirituality is discussed largely in the context of 
evidence relating to religion, which is where the bulk of the evidence lies. To 
what extent, though, is it valid to transfer to spirituality arguments related to 
religion? To address this, the course I am adopting involves a short chain of 
inference which I spell out at the relevant point in the next chapter – but briefly it 
results in accepting that religion is by and large a useful proxy for spirituality, at 
least to a first approximation, when seeking to understand spirituality’s evolut-
ionary roots; the justification being that were it not for the human capacity to 
have some form of spiritual awareness and experiences of the kind which “are 
of central importance to every religious tradition” (Rue 2005: 133), religion 
would never have arisen. Where there is religion, one might say, there spirit-
uality has been. Therefore at times I use the expression “religion/spirituality” as 
a shorthand way of acknowledging that evidence and arguments relating to 
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religion require the further chain of inference to make the evidence and 
arguments applicable to spirituality itself. 
 
Religion as an evolutionary by-product: Barrett and Boyer 
Justin Barrett (2004) and Pascal Boyer (2001), adopting the modularity thesis of 
evolutionary psychology, offer accounts for the evolution of religion based on 
Barrett’s conception of the “hypersensitive agency detection device”, a version 
of which Guthrie (1995) had developed in his discussion of the human 
propensity to anthropomorphise inanimate objects, such as seeing faces in 
clouds. 
Barrett posits that there are two types of belief: reflective beliefs which are 
those we arrive at “through conscious deliberation, contemplation or explicit 
instruction”, and nonreflective beliefs which are those that “come automatically, 
require no careful rumination, and seem to arise instantaneously and some-
times even ‘against better judgment’” (2004: 2). These latter are the deliver-
ances of our evolved intuitive faculties which enabled our ancestors to negotiate 
the EEA, and they underpin our reflective beliefs. Examples of non-reflective 
beliefs are that “[p]eople act in ways to satisfy desires… Animals have parents 
of the same species as themselves… Unsupported objects fall” (Barrett 2009: 
78), beliefs which are delivered by the operation of the intuitive psychology 
(ToM), intuitive biology and intuitive physics faculties respectively. 
Many religious beliefs, Barrett maintains, such as “God has desires” and 
“God perceives human actions” are nonreflective because our ToM module is 
attributing to God properties it attributes to all persons, namely the capacity to 
have desires and the capacity to perceive things. These nonreflective beliefs 
underpin reflective religious beliefs, such that when people “reflectively talk 
about or engage in prayer, they nonreflectively believe that God can both 
perceive and understand human language (particularly our own language)” 
(2004: 10).  
The crucial part of Barrett’s thesis is that nonreflective beliefs concerning 
God, or the gods, are not aberrant but arise because of the normal, proper 
functioning of our evolved mental modules “working in common natural and 
social contexts” (2004: 21). Of particular significance is the operation of the 
mental module which he dubs the “Agency Detection Device” or “ADD” (2004: 
31), by which he refers to the evolved capacity to detect agency, an “agent” 
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being that which has its own powers of doing things (see the previous 
discussion about the modules posited by Baron-Cohen [1995]). It is more 
beneficial, the argument goes, if the ADD errs on the side of giving false 
positives rather than false negatives: to fail to interpret some movement as a 
bear heading in your direction could be fatal if there is a bear approaching; 
whereas to interpret a bush swaying in the wind as a stalking predator will not 
be fatal. Thus, Barrett argues, because false positives are better than false 
negatives, the Agency Detection Device is in fact a “Hypersensitive Agency 
Detection Device” or “HADD” (2004: 32 – alternatively referred to as the 
“Hyperactive Agency Detection Device”), and it is that hypersensitivity which 
make it “prone to find agents around us, including supernatural ones, given 
fairly modest evidence of their presence. This tendency encourages the 
generation and spread of god concepts and other religious concepts” (2004: 
31).  
Agency is detected by the HADD, Barrett argues, when it perceives an 
object violating, or apparently violating, “the intuitive assumptions for the 
movement of ordinary physical objects (such as moving on non-inertial paths, 
changing direction inexplicably, or launching itself from a standstill) and the 
object seems to be moving in a goal-directed manner” (2004: 33). The formation 
of religious concepts occurs when that attributed agency is coupled with a 
counter-intuitive property (such as invisibility), which also makes the purported 
agent memorable and the concept more likely to be passed on by cultural 
transmission.  
Barrett then maintains that the counterintuitive properties of supernatural 
agents makes them suitable for upholding morality, since they may be any-
where at any given time, and consequently “even if they have not been specific-
ally attributed super-vision, superhearing, or superknowledge, they may be 
witnesses to any human actions. Assuming that gods do know what you or 
anyone else has done is much easier than trying to determine just what this 
invisible agent might and might not know. Hence, we often credit gods with 
superknowledge” (2004: 48-9). The gods, in other words, can monitor our affairs 
and provide good reason for adhering to the community’s ethical norms . 
 
Boyer (2001) also accepts a modular scheme, describing belief in God, or the 
gods, as being not a conscious invention but arising from the operation of 
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evolved systems in the brain which “specialise in particular aspects of objects 
around us and produce specific kinds of inferences about them” (2001: 184). He 
contends that there are a limited number of “ontological categories” (that is to 
say, fundamental types of things that exist) which the operation of our evolved 
mental modules allows us intuitively to distinguish among: animal, person, tool, 
natural object and plant (2001: 90). Echoing Barrett’s proposal, Boyer maintains 
that a supernatural concept is one in which something that is assigned to one of 
these ontological categories possesses a characteristic that violates one of the 
standard inferences of what constitutes that category: “[p]ersons can be 
represented as having counter-intuitive physical properties (like ghosts or gods), 
counter-intuitive biology (like many gods who neither grow old nor die) or 
counter-intuitive psychological properties (such as unblocked perception or 
prescience)… Tools and other artefacts can be represented as having biological 
properties (some statues bleed) or psychological ones (they hear what you 
say)” (2001: 90). Religious concepts, therefore, arise as a result of the operation 
of our innate inferential mechanisms coupling an item in one ontological 
category with a property that does not fit that category.  
Further, but unlike Barrett’s proposal, religion and religious concepts in 
Boyer’s scheme do not underpin morality; it is rather that the belief in a super-
natural agent (or agents) is itself underpinned or strengthened by the ethical 
system of a community: “once you have concepts of supernatural agents with 
strategic information [i.e. knowledge about who has done what, and how and 
with which and to whom], these are made more salient by the fact that you can 
easily insert them in moral reasoning that would be there in any case” (2001: 
218). The notion that the ethical system of the community provides validation for 
belief in an omniscient, invisible agent (God or the gods) leads Boyer to con-
clude that to some extent “religious concepts are parasitic upon moral intuitions” 
(2001: 218 – emphasis added).  
 
Comments 
From an evolutionary psychology perspective, the proposed HADD is a 
plausible mechanism to explain the development of a belief in supernatural 
agents – though there is the unanswered puzzle of how come, over the 
millennia, the HADD hasn’t evolved to become less hypersensitive and more 
capable of distinguishing actual agency from false agency. Although a false 
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positive is preferable to a false negative, the fewer the false positives the better, 
provided that the number of false negatives doesn’t rise proportionately. And 
given the universality of religion, many false positives will have occurred which, 
however tiny the cost in energy and time each incurs individually, would collect-
ively entail a vast quantity of wasted effort, and consequently any individual with 
a more discriminating ADD would be at a fitness advantage. 
There is also the unsatisfactory manner in which counter-intuitive properties 
are said to come to be associated with entities, whether alleged or real. No 
really plausible explanation is offered as to how, say, the counter-intuitive 
property of being able to hear what you say is imputed to a statue in the first 
place. Moreover, the assumption that supernatural agency was inferred by the 
HADD implies that our ancestors were incapable of revising the outputs of the 
inferential mechanisms in the light of more information – but on what independ-
ent grounds can that be substantiated? Mental modules are not necessarily fully 
“informationally encapsulated” (Cundall 2006), and since we are capable of 
revising inferences in the light of further information, there is no obvious reason 
to deny that ability to our ancestors. Moreover again, there is no explanation of 
how it is that gods, when gods were inferred, were local gods confined to the 
tribe, as is typical of primal religions (Ward 1994). 
From the religious perspective there are a couple of points. The first is that 
(along with so many other models) the focus is on construing religion purely in 
terms of supernatural agents; and saying little about the other dimensions 
(Smart 1996), which is an impoverished view of religion (and to be fair, Barrett 
and Boyer both acknowledge that a simple explanation of religion is unlikely). 
From the viewpoint of the current enquiry, the account that all this could render 
of the experiential side of religion – the Roses – would be limited to experiences 
construed as the presence of an agent, which is only one of many different 
categories of religious experiences, with little or nothing explanatory to contrib-
ute to experiences in which an agent fails to feature. 
Secondly, the understanding of even this attenuated version of religion in 
these schemes smacks of the God-of-the Gaps approach (Coulson 1958), with 
the posited HADD filling in the gaps in the explanation of otherwise inexplicable 
events by inferring the existence of supernatural agents; agents which are in 
effect mere “place-holders” to be replaced in due course by non-supernatural 
explanations. For although Barrett acknowledges that there are good grounds 
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for believing that we are born with an innate sense of God or the gods (Barrett 
and Richert 2003), priority is given to the evolved faculties of “intuitive physics”, 
“intuitive biology” and so forth, the violation of whose expectations leads to the 
inference that the agents detected by HADD are of a supernatural variety; with 
the sense of God, or the gods, being relegated to the status of an epiphenom-
enon, something which arises from the (hypersensitive) functioning of these 
intuitive faculties, rather than its being the output of an independent module as 
primary and as fundamental as the other intuitive faculties. In contrast, I will be 
arguing that we do have such a dedicated module, the sensus transcendentis.  
A third problem is that although they invoke the same mechanism of a 
hypersensitive agency detector device, the two authors come to diametrically 
opposite conclusions on the relationship it entails between religion and ethics. 
Barrett views religion as strengthening or underpinning ethics (and hence has 
acquired an adaptive role), whereas for Boyer religion is parasitic with no 
adaptive function. 
However, despite these drawbacks, these schemes, which are elaborated at 
some length, importantly identify the roots of religion as lying in the evolution of 
instinctive responses to certain experiences, and that the functioning of mental 
modules is implicated in some religious inferences. This insight is consonant 
with the aim of the current enquiry to develop a model of how evolutionary 
psychology and spirituality can complement each other.  
 
Religion as a suite of evolutionary by-products: Kirkpatrick 
Whereas Barrett and Boyer explain one (common but not universal) aspect of 
religion (supernatural beings) as a by-product, Kirkpatrick (1999) goes for an 
entire suite of by-products to explain “the diverse range of beliefs, behavior, and 
experience that we collectively refer to as religion” (1999: 921). 
Religion, in his view, resembles other human activities for which there are no 
specific adaptation but which have arisen as by-products of adaptations, such 
as “playing tennis, driving automobiles, or solving calculus problems [each of 
which] is motivated and enabled (as well as constrained) by adaptations that 
were designed by natural selection for other functions” (1999: 926). He argues 
that belief in gods and ancestral spirits, with the anthropomorphizing of “the 
unseen forces of nature” (1999: 933), is a set of by-products of several 
modules: of theory of mind relating to persons; of kinship mechanisms as when 
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the living “attempt to help the dead by burying helpful artifacts… and seek (and 
expect) help with their own worldly affairs” (1999: 933); of attachment mechan-
isms (Bowlby 1999 [1969]), as suggested by a variety of beliefs about deities 
“ranging from maternal deities of ancient religions to the Virgin Mary of 
Catholicism” (1999: 934); and of social exchange and reciprocal altruism mech-
anisms, which involve pleasing the gods with sacrifices in exchange for “military 
victory, good harvest or a ticket to heaven” (1999: 935 – quoting Ridley 1996). 
Our social exchange and cheater detection modules are involved in beliefs 
about evil and sin, since “certain patterns of behaving… are prescribed by the 
deity as part of a tacit or explicit social-exchange agreement” (1999: 938-9), and 
our breaching the contract activates our cheater detection and social exchange 
modules, the idea being that what gives rise to our awareness of evil and sin is 
our intuitive realisation that God’s cheater detection module, as it were, will 
have been activated when we breach the contract (or, in Judeao-Christian 
terms, the covenant) we believe we have with God. And religion co-opts kinship 
mechanisms to promote pro-social behaviour, treating each other in the 
community “as if kin” (1999: 937) with the resultant benefits. 
A problem arises, however, when it comes to the area of particular interest 
to the current enquiry, for Kirkpatrick admits to having no explanation for the 
origin of “numinous, mystical, or religious experience” (1999: 940). In keeping 
with his general thesis, however, he picks upon parallels which have been 
discerned in the phenomenology of anxiety attacks and in mystical experiences, 
including “the sense of being overwhelmed or engulfed by the feeling, ineff-
ability, and ‘an actual or impending dissolution of the self-as-object’” (1999: 
941). This leads to a suggestion that since anxiety attacks are presumably not 
an adaptation “but rather reflect a misfiring or inappropriate activation of 
emotion mechanisms that ordinarily are adaptive, [then perhaps] mystical 
experiences eventually will be understood in a similar manner” (1999: 941) – 
that is, “Roses” are to be understood as the result of the misfiring of evolved 
mechanisms concerned with emotion. This is hardly satisfactory – first because 
of the assumption that anxiety attacks are not an adaptation, and although I 
agree that it doesn’t seem likely that they are an adaptation in themselves, he 
adduces no evidence one way or the other; and, second, using anxiety attacks 
as an analogue for mystical experiences seems about as helpful as using a 
raging toothache as an analogue for a deep, sensuous massage.  
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Kirkpatrick gives fair warning that he has “barely sketched the outline of a 
modern evolutionary psychological approach to religion” (1999: 947), but there 
are some useful insights here, in particular his stressing that since religion is a 
diverse phenomenon, the involvement of several psychological modules will be 
required. Moreover, as with the other by-product theorists, such an approach 
ensures that religion is (almost literally) earthed, it is understood very much as 
being a product of the interaction of human beings with their physical, social 
and biotic environment. 
 
Comments 
There are a couple of problems with this approach. Whereas Barrett’s 
contention is that the HADD is functioning properly even when it misidentifies 
something as an agent (that is, it has been “designed” by evolution to be 
hypersensitive, just to be on the safe side), Kirkpatrick refers to “errors of 
interpretation” (1999: 932) which give rise to animism, anthropomorphism and 
the like; that is, the modules in his view are not functioning as they have been 
“designed” to do. As he revealingly says regarding the speculation about 
religious experiences, it involves a “misfiring or inappropriate activation” (2999: 
941) of a module. In the many by-products approach he is advocating, many 
misfiring and inappropriately activated modules are being implicated. This is 
problematic. One reason he gives for rejecting any adaptationist claim for 
religion is that his approach is the “more theoretically conservative position” 
(1999: 926), that is, it does not require the postulation of yet another module. 
Occam is not explicitly invoked, but the sound of razor-stropping is loud: clearly 
he considers that a module for religion would be an unnecessary multiplication 
of entities. Yet his explanation requires a whole suite of “misfiring” modules, 
whose by-products miraculously combine to create something (religion) which, 
as the evidence adduced in the next chapter strongly suggests, actually is 
adaptive, and which therefore looks remarkably like the output of a single 
module that is not misfiring rather than the combined output of many misfiring 
modules. Many assumptions (one per by-product) are required instead of one 
(that of an extra, domain-specific module), which renders Kirkpatrick’s account 
susceptible to Occam’s razor (Flew 1979: 236). 
The other problem is his tentative suggestion, in the absence of an altern-
ative explanation consistent with his model, that religious experiences are a 
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result of the misfiring of a module relating to emotion. In context, he is referring 
to the dramatic examples of religious experiences, “focal” rather than “back-
ground” in Alston’s (1991) terminology, and there is no doubt, as shown by the 
range of examples in chapter 3, that affect is often a considerable component of 
these. But it is a curious kind of misfiring that can bring about such beneficial 
outcomes as is often reported (Hay 2006), the conferring of meaning, value and 
“a completely new and exquisitely integrated perspective” (Rue 2005: 212). 
These considerations render the by-product theories, though intriguing and 
not without significant insights, ultimately unsatisfactory, and I move on to 
theories which construe religion as being an adaptation. 
 
Religion as an adaptation: Wilson and Wilson 
Both E.O. Wilson and D.S. Wilson have put forward explanations which see 
religion evolving because it helped to bring internal coherence and conformity to 
a tribe, thus making the tribe more likely to survive in adverse times.  
E.O. Wilson refers to religion in terms of “belief”, “practice”, the “super-
natural”, “behavior”, “ritual” and “myth” (1978: 169, 169, 174, 175, 179, 189), 
and the grounding of ethics (1998: chap 11); and in this he reflects the widely 
accepted multi-dimensional nature of religion (Smart 1996). But the whole 
complex is, in Wilson’s view, a Darwinian adaptation, which (similar to Barrett’s 
view, above) functions to provide what is experienced as and believed to be an 
objective validation of the tribe’s ethical system, adherence to which ensures 
that the tribe is a cohesive group. This is to the benefit of the individual 
members of the tribe, for a cohesive group is better placed to survive and 
flourish, benefitting the individual members themselves; or as Wilson puts it, 
“[w]hen the gods are served, the Darwinian fitness of the members of the tribe 
is the ultimate if unrecognized beneficiary” (1978: 184).  
Wilson, therefore, is yoking together ethics and religion such that the latter 
provides (or provided, during the long stretches of human evolutionary pre-
history) the grounding for an ethical system to be accepted as objectively real. It 
does this by offering an explanation of “the origin of a people, their destiny, and 
why they are obliged to subscribe to particular rituals and moral codes” (1998: 
275 – emphasis added).  
A weak or non-existent religious belief system would result in a less 
cohesive, less co-operative group which would be less likely to survive adverse 
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conditions, and so would be selected against; religion therefore “is above all the 
process by which individuals are persuaded to subordinate their immediate self-
interest to the interests of the group” (1978: 176 – emphasis added). There is 
however an adaptive advantage to the individual in his/her own right of a 
religious belief system, since it provides membership of a group, and “gives him 
a driving purpose in life compatible with his self-interest. His strength is the 
strength of the group, his guide the sacred covenant” (1978: 188). 
D.S. Wilson offers a group selection explanation similar to E.O. Wilson’s, but 
there are a few extra comments to make. He takes religion to be in part “a 
collection of beliefs and practices that honor spirituality", that last term referring 
(again “in part”) to “a feeling of being connected to something larger than 
oneself” (Wilson [D.S.] 2002: 3), although he is not asserting that one can infer 
that the “something larger than oneself” necessarily exists. Moreover, what he is 
offering can only be a partial explanation because religion is not a single trait 
but a “heterogeneous set of traits that might require different explanations” 
(2002: 45 – emphasis added).  
D.S. Wilson’s argument is based on what he terms the “organismic concept 
of religious groups” (2002: 1), which refers to the capacity of social groups in 
general, and religious groups in particular, to be considered under some circum-
stances as being organisms in their own right. The organismic concept is in turn 
based on adopting a multilevel approach to natural selection, whereby the unit 
of selection upon which natural selection operates is not confined to one level of 
the biological hierarchy such as the gene (Dawkins 1989 [1976]) or the individ-
ual organism (Darwin 1859), but also at higher levels such as the group (Sober 
and Wilson 1998). The term multilevel selection “expresses the possibility that 
natural selection can operate at more than one level of the biological hierarchy” 
(Wilson 2002: 10). 
Religion, D.S. Wilson argues, enables a group to become an adaptive unit 
by strengthening the ties of commitment among group members, giving that 
group a selective advantage over other groups whose religion evokes less 
commitment. In doing so, religion is therefore motivating behaviours which are 
adaptive in the real world, and although “many religious beliefs are false as 
literal descriptions of the real world… this merely forces us to recognize two 
forms of realism; a factual realism based on literal correspondence and a 
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practical realism based on behavioral adaptedness” (2002: 228 –see also 
Bulbulia and Frean [2009]).  
 
Comments 
Both Wilsons have developed their arguments from a group selection perspect-
ive, the status of which is equivocal (Dennett 2006). Group selection theory, 
which involves individuals behaving in a manner for the benefit of the group, 
even if it is against their immediate own best interests, is vulnerable to the 
cheat, or “free-rider” problem (Ridley 1996), whereby an individual who, though 
a member of a co-operating group, fails to co-operate but still accepting the 
benefits of others’ co-operative behaviour, will be at an advantage which 
enhances his individual fitness. This problem with group selection theory 
resulted in its being cast into outer darkness following Williams’ (1966) robust 
response to Wynne-Edwards’ (1962) invoking it to explain various aspects of 
animal behaviour. Though a modified version of group selection theory had 
already been making a comeback (Sober and Wilson 1998), it is still not widely 
accepted (Dennett 2006); but see Wilson and Wilson (2007) and Jaffe and 
Zaballa (2009) for further arguments in favour. The evolution of “strong recipro-
city”, discussed in the previous chapter, constitutes a mechanism that operates 
at group selection level, in that the individual strong reciprocator decreases his 
own fitness whilst increasing the fitness of the group. 
A further problem as far as the current enquiry is concerned is that religious 
experience does not seem to fit well into the scheme. True, E.O. Wilson does 
write of the spiritual journey, of the mind reflecting “in certain ways in order to 
reach ever higher levels of enlightenment until finally, when no further progress 
is possible, it enters a mystical union with the whole”, which sounds promising, 
but he believes “it can all eventually be explained as brain circuitry and deep, 
genetic history”, even though he does not wish to trivialize the idea of “the 
mystical union [which] is an authentic part of the human spirit” (1998: 290). 
Despite this reference to the human spirit, the role which our capacity for 
religious experience plays in E.O. Wilson’s scheme is to confirm for us the 
objective reality of the gods, even if they don’t exist. 
Although the reliance on group selection arguments has attracted criticism 
from other evolutionary thinkers (Dennett 2006) these explanatory schemes are 
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important in being predicated on religion as a collective phenomenon, in con-
trast to the individualistic bias noted in chapter 2 of many accounts of Roses.  
 
Religion as an adaptation: Hardy and Hay  
Hardy (1965, 1966, 1979) proposed that religion, a “feeling of contact with a 
Greater Power beyond the self” (1965: 274), evolved because of its adaptive 
function. Part of the mechanism of its evolution, in his view, involved the 
conscious choice by certain forerunners of H. sapiens to attend to, and indeed 
seek out, experiences of religious awareness because of their beneficial effects. 
This is a particular example of his more general argument that evolution is not a 
passive process but that the “ever inquisitive, exploratory nature of animal 
behaviour, leading to new habits and ways of life” (1965: 262) is an important 
factor, and with animal choice leading to new habits and ways of life, any 
genetic variants in subsequent generations which favour these new habits 
would be selected for. This phenomenon, known as the “Baldwin effect” 
(Bateson 1988; Weber and Depew 2003), is significant in the current “niche 
construction theory” (Odling-Smee et al 2003) which echoes some of Hardy’s 
views. 
It was in pursuit of this theory that Hardy collected and collated numerous 
accounts of “religious experience”, previously referred to, for which Hay, 
building on Hardy’s work, uses the wider term of “spiritual experiences” (Hay 
2006; Hay and Nye 2006; Hay and Socha 2005) and which this enquiry has 
dubbed “Roses”. Hay, whose work has already been mentioned in chapter 2, 
understands spirituality to be “a human universal appearing in many secular as 
well as religious forms, although its most typical manifestations have been in 
religious experience” (Hay and Socha 2005: 589), hence “religious experiences” 
constitute a subdivision consisting of those spiritual experiences which are 
interpreted using religious terminology and constructs. So both religious and 
nonreligious spirituality can be understood as “alternative cultural constructions 
giving expression to the natural predisposition” (2005: 598), and Hay, following 
Hardy, further proposes that all human beings “including secular atheists and 
others hostile to religion” possess some form of spirituality (2005: 607). 
Spirituality, prior to religion(s), is rather the “biological context in which religion 
can arise” (Hay 2006: 44 – emphasis in original). 
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Hay’s point that spirituality is the human universal of which religion is one 
manifestation, rather than spirituality being a subdivision, or component, of 
religion, enables a description of spirituality to be undertaken without recourse 
to invoking supernatural agents, relating it instead to “ultimate meaning" (Hay 
2006: 81) and involving "Awareness of the Here-and-Now, Awareness of 
Mystery and Awareness of Value” (2006: 130 – capitalisation in original).  
As referred to in chapter 2, a co-worker of Hay’s identified in her work on the 
spirituality of children the core category of “relational consciousness” (Hay and 
Nye 2006), which encompasses how the child relates to things, other people, 
him/herself, and God. This relational consciousness, Hay believes, evolved 
because it enables cooperation through a direct recognition of the “holistic 
dimension of human experience. Hence, it also allows the possibility of a 
communal ethic and, for the religious believer, a sense of relationship with a 
God who is experienced as immanent” (Hay and Socha 2005: 598). So again 
we have a model in which the ethical system of the group or community plays 
an important role – although Hay does not explain how cooperation can 
enhance survival and reproductive fitness. 
As well as the communal, co-operative aspect of existence, experiences of 
religious or spiritual awareness function by enabling the individual to cope with 
“existential issues” (2005: 603) and “random mutations that enhanced this kind 
of awareness would be selected for because they gave an advantage in the 
process of natural section” (Hay and Socha 2005: 592).  
 
Comments 
Unsurprisingly, I find this approach has a lot to offer to the current enquiry since 
its approach takes seriously the importance of “spirituality” rather than seeking 
to explain it (away) in evolutionary terms as simply an epiphenomenon of over-
eager mental modules that evolved for other functions, or as a parasite, or as 
simply a support for ethics which do the real work of binding a community 
together and enhancing the evolutionary fitness of the group and its members.  
Moreover, construing spirituality as superordinate to religion is consonant 
with a broad version of religious pluralism in that it entails not only specific 
religions as being different outworkings of a prior spirituality; but also the 
possibility of non-religious traditions and world-views being acknowledged as 
potentially valid vehicles or manifestations of spiritual awareness (van Ness 
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1996). It also encompasses both the collective, ethical aspect of spirituality (as 
does the group selection approach of the two Wilsons) and the individualistic 
aspect (as do the hypersensitive module approaches of Barrett and Boyer).  
Where it is most vulnerable, though, is in the extremely broad understanding 
it has of “spirituality”. In Hay’s work, it sometimes seems that virtually anything 
can count as “spiritual” including belief in UFO’s (Hay 2006); in this, it is similar 
to presuppositions of Boyer (2001), among others, who includes magic and 
aliens in his understanding of what constitutes “religion”. But too broad a 
spectrum invites the Stringfellow lampoon quoted in chapter 1. 
From an evolutionary perspective, there is also a problem in the lack of a 
clear mechanism by which religious or spiritual experiences are mediated. To 
propose that religious awareness is a natural faculty of H. sapiens which has 
evolved because of its adaptive function (Hardy 1965), or that random mutat-
ions that enhanced spiritual awareness would be selected for (Hay and Socha 
2005) is a tantalizing explanatory start, but the manner in which religious or 
spiritual experience is delivered to the human organism is unspecified. The 
interface, as it were, between the human organism and the wider environment 
which results in a “Rose” remains mysterious. How do we come to have those 
experiences that we do have? The model I propose attempts to address that. 
 
Conclusion 
The above constitutes just a sample of the theories that have been developed 
to account for the evolutionary origins of religion, with Atran 2002, Dawkins 
2003, Guthrie 1995 and Lewis-Williams 2010 among others in the by-product 
camp, and Bering 2011, Bulbulia 2004, Sanderson 2008 and Rue 2005 among 
others in the adaptationist camp; but the above will suffice; and from them, a 
number of points will be carried forward to the model which I am proposing. 
Of course, given the range of theories already on offer, the sensible thing 
might well be to find ways of trimming down the possibilities, not contributing to 
them; but my rationale in developing another explanation is that there are 
theological resources which can be drawn upon which are generally neglected 
by evolutionary thinkers, resources which can bring a fresh perspective. 
There are of course well-known views that religious beliefs and evolutionary 
theory are antithetical, with science (Dawkins 2006, Dennett 2006) or religion 
(Dembski 1998, Johnson 1991) being the final authority on any disputed issue, 
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as well as views that they are not necessarily opposed provided each keeps to 
its own domain (Gould 1999) – these represent the conflict and the independent 
models respectively for the science/religion relationship (Barbour 2000). 
Examples of the dialogue model also abound, occasionally offered by someone 
who is an avowed atheist (Ruse 2001) but mainly by theists (the great majority 
being Christian theists) accepting the challenge of exploring how religion and 
theology can respond positively to the continuing discoveries of science (Collins 
2007; McGrath 2005, 2011; Miller 1999; Southgate 2008; Southgate and Poole 
2005; Ward 2006), with integration models also on offer (Haught 2000, 
Peacocke 1993). What follows in the next chapter belongs towards the 
integration end of the spectrum as I draw upon those theological concepts 
which have been discussed earlier to re-order and re-pattern the possibilities for 
religion/ spirituality and evolution. 
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Chapter 10: Of the sensus transcendentis  
 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter I discussed several models that have already been 
advanced which seek to give an evolutionary account for the existence of 
religion, religion here standing proxy for spirituality – or, more accurately, the 
vertical dimension or diameter of spirituality. Now it is time to put forward the 
model towards which the current enquiry has been heading. It is a model which, 
like the explanations proposed by the two Wilsons, Sanderson and Hay takes 
religion/spirituality to be adaptive, but like the explanations advanced by Barrett, 
Boyer and Kirkpatrick it draws on the modular approach of strong evolutionary 
psychology. 
 
Preliminaries  
The concept of religious pluralism will be used to move the debate away from 
pure theism and towards a more universal phenomenon of spirituality – which is 
somewhat ironic, given that the focus of evolutionary psychology is meant to be 
on human universals, yet much of the evolutionary writings about religion 
confines itself to the issues of agency and theism in religion, which are not 
universals. Thus the introduction of religious pluralism will allow evolutionary 
psychology to be somewhat truer to its calling. 
In keeping with this universalizing necessity, the sensus divinitatis will be 
transmuted into the sensus transcendentis; and although the notion of our 
possessing an innate religious faculty is new neither in religious discourse nor in 
evolutionary discourse, its role is destined to be a unifying concept, a cupola 
joining the two discourses. Evolutionary-speak and spirituality-speak will both 
be able to incorporate the sensus transcendentis – thus providing at least a 
measure of integration.  
 
The sensus transcendentis  
The proposal of this current enquiry is that through the processes of evolution, 
human beings have been endowed with a faculty whose proper function is to 
detect, infer or construe12 intimations of transcendence in our total environment 
                                            
12
 See “a note on inference” above (p. 159) 
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and deliver to the human organism those experiences of transcendence which I 
have dubbed “Roses”. This faculty, which I term the sensus transcendentis, is a 
mental module, a part of our psychological make-up, which in keeping with 
other mental modules is an adaptation which evolved in ancestral times, con-
ferring enhanced fitness to our proto-human forebears in the Environment of 
Evolutionary Adaptedness, and which continues to function today in response to 
the intimations of transcendence of our total environment. Although the sensus 
transcendentis is a human psychological universal, its deliverances of trans-
cendence, being mediated through the concepts and categories of thought 
pertaining to specific cultures, have historically been experienced and embodied 
variously in both theistic and non-theistic forms of religion, and increasingly in 
the modern era in secular forms.  
The operation of the sensus transcendentis constitutes the metaphorical 
“vertical” dimension (or diameter) of spirituality, the “horizontal” dimension (or 
circumference) of spirituality being the evolved capacities for moral awareness 
and altruism.  
The rest of this chapter is devoted first to amplifying and clarifying the 
various elements of this statement, drawing upon both the theological and the 
evolutionary arguments presented in the previous chapters; and then to 
discussing empirical evidence which supports the proposal that there is such an 
innate mental module; and that it confers “fitness”, necessary for it to qualify as 
an adaptive product of evolution. 
 
Transcendence 
The proposal entails that as part of our evolutionary heritage we are endowed 
with a mental module which detects, infers or construes intimations of trans-
cendence, hence before attempting to spell out the nature of the module itself it 
is necessary to consider what transcendence refers to as far as the current 
enquiry is concerned.  
A starting point is the contention that “many human beings experience life in 
relation to a limitlessly greater transcendent Reality – whether the direction of 
transcendence be beyond our present existence or within its hidden depths" 
(Hick 1985: 37). This dual possibility – beyond or within – helps step away from 
the notion of “transcendence” and “transcendent Reality” referring to some kind 
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of parallel universe, up above the bright blue sky, where the laws of nature to 
which we are subject in this universe are somehow suspended.  
“Transcendence” here is intended to suggest or entail or refer to an aspect 
or quality or characteristic of the world as we know it. It is intended to suggest or 
entail or refer to intrinsic meaning, purpose, value, sacredness, awe; it is 
intended to suggest or entail or refer to that which, to speak metaphorically (as I 
think we must), both takes us out of ourselves and brings us to ourselves; the 
“relational consciousness” that Hay and Nye (2006) uncovered in the conversat-
ion of children, the “Reality-centredness” not self-centredness that Hick (1989) 
identifies, the “ultimate concern” to which Tillich (1957) brings our attention. 
This involves the paradoxical relationship between transcendence and 
immanence which Meister Eckhart develops in his exposition of the nature of 
God. As summarised by two of his editors, Eckhart wrote of a “way of speaking 
about God as simultaneously totally immanent to creatures as their real exist-
ence and by that very fact absolutely transcendent to them as esse simpliciter 
or esse absolutum” (Eckhart 1981: 34 – emphasis in original). This idea of the 
possibility of transcendence being immanent, or of the immanent as being 
transcendent, may be logically and linguistically paradoxical, yet it expresses 
the sense, important to this current enquiry, of transcendence embedded and 
embodied – immanent – in the world of which we, as biological organisms, are a 
part. Transcendent transcendence and immanent transcendence, the “beyond” 
and the “within” to which Hick refers, are two sides of the same coin or, better, 
are the same single side of the coin seen from two different directions.  
The expression I use of “intimations of transcendence” is a deliberate echo 
of the term “signals of transcendence” coined by the sociologist Peter Berger to 
refer to those phenomena “that are to be found within the domain of our ‘natural’ 
reality but that appear to point beyond that reality” (1970: 70). I have chosen 
“intimations” in preference to “signals”, because of the former’s hint of 
“intimacy”, and without quite the connotation of deliberate communication that 
“signals” suggests, with the bonus of an allusion to Wordsworth’s Intimations of 
Immortality. But the general idea is the same – the everydayness and natural-
ness of transcendence, with its connotations of meaning, purpose, value, 
sacredness and awe (which, at the risk of my justifiably being accused of an 
addiction to word-play, could with rearrangement be acronymed as vamps). 
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Well, “that was a way of putting it – not very satisfactory” (Eliot 1974 [1936]: 
198), but it will suffice; and the way that “transcendence” is being understood 
and used will (or should) become clearer as the model is developed. There are 
though a couple of further comments to make before moving on. The first is to 
acknowledge that evolutionary theory does not normally deal in “purpose” 
except to dismiss it as illusory (Dawkins 1986), and hence its inclusion above in 
what “transcendence” is intended to connote will raise hackles; with the 
inclusion of “meaning”, “value” and “sacred” in all probability maximally raising 
the hackle quotient. However, I am not proposing that “purpose” and its allies 
should be considered a mechanism that drives evolution or a goal towards 
which the evolutionary process is lured; rather I am seeing purpose et al as part 
of the human experience – and as such we are entitled to ask how, in 
evolutionary terms, that has come to be so. What is the evolutionary 
explanation for our capacity to experience “purpose”? Our capacity to 
experience “meaning”, “value”, “sacredness”?  
A final comment concerns what it is that the proposed sensus transcend-
entis actually “tracks” in the environment. What is this, the critic could demand, 
in the total environment that the module is meant to be responding to and 
engaging with when it is allegedly detecting, inferring or construing intimations 
of transcendence? What is the module actually doing? Here I draw an analogy 
with the way in which the “Theory of Mind” module operates by means of 
inference (Baron-Cohen 1995). Another mind is not directly accessible; the ToM 
infers or construes its existence from behavioural cues and stimuli arising from 
that part of the environment which is another (usually but not necessarily 
human) organism. Analogously, I am proposing that transcendence, as I am 
using the term, is inferred or construed by the sensus transcendentis from 
relevant cues and stimuli in the total environment. It occurs intuitively or, to use 
Barrett’s (2004) term, non-reflectively. 
 
The sensus transcendentis is a mental module 
As discussed in chapters 7 and 8, the strong version of evolutionary psychology 
postulates that the mind is composed of a large array of mental modules which 
evolved in response to environmental pressures, each module being a domain-
specific adaptation such as the language acquisition device (LAD), theory of 
mind (ToM), and kin-recognition which underlies both incest-avoidance and 
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altruism. A module provides the organism with a form of non-propositional 
knowledge in that, having evolved in response to a recurrent aspect of the 
environment, it prepares the organism to encounter an environment with that 
recurrent aspect.  
In postulating that the sensus transcendentis is a mental module, I am 
maintaining that the total environment to encounter which our evolutionary 
faculties have prepared us includes not only the physical, social and biotic 
aspects, but also a transcendent aspect of which the sensus transcendentis is 
the evolved correlate in the psychological make-up of H. sapiens; or, to put this 
part of the proposal in its minimal form, a certain aspect or aspects of the total 
environment has the sensus transcendentis as an evolved correlate in the 
human mind, whose proper function is to infer (detect, construe) transcendence 
in or from those aspects, and in consequence to deliver certain experiences 
(“Roses”) to the human organism. 
However, to say that the sensus transcendentis evolved in response to a 
particular aspect of the total environment could be taken to mean that the 
environment is separable into different, non-overlapping factors – physical, 
social, biotic and transcendent – such that the adjective “transcendent” labels a 
definable area, different from the others. This is not what is meant. Recalling 
Lash’s argument that “religious experience” should not be seen as confined “to 
some one particular ‘district’ of human experience” (1988: 105), so too the 
current proposal is that the sensus transcendentis detects, infers, construes 
intimations of transcendence arising from all or any aspect of the total environ-
ment. A given part of the environment is not necessarily describable solely in 
terms of being either physical, or biotic, or social; it can sometimes be con-
strued as belonging to any or all of these aspects simultaneously. For instance, 
from the point of view of a human being, any other human being simultaneously 
belongs to the physical, biotic and social aspects of his/her environment as, 
respectively, an object of a certain size and certain weight, an organic entity that 
is part of the local eco-system, and as a potential co-operator or rival or mate. 
Thus the evolved faculties of intuitive physics, intuitive biology and intuitive 
psychology will all be in play in response to a single element in the environment, 
namely the other human being. In the model being proposed, then, the sensus 
transcendentis is also in play, not simply confined to a distinct area of the total 
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environment. Its domain is that of transcendence which is (potentially or 
actually) ubiquitous. 
 
The sensus “transcendentis”, not the sensus “divinitatis”  
As has been regularly flagged up, the concept of the proposed sensus 
transcendentis takes its inspiration from that of the sensus divinitatis developed 
by Plantinga (2000), but with a number of differences or developments as well 
as similarities. In what follows, I am not proposing that there are two faculties to 
be compared, but that there is one faculty of which there are two descriptions 
which are being compared. 
The similarities of the two descriptions lie in the claims being made by 
Plantinga and myself that the sensus divinitatis/transcendentis is a fundamental 
part of universal human nature, a faculty possessed by all members of H. 
sapiens and not just a select few, and one which operates outside the con-
scious control of the individual. It is purportedly capable of malfunctioning 
through the effects of sin (sensus divinitatis) or genetic abnormality and/or 
insufficient environmental stimulus during the critical developmental years 
(sensus transcendentis); and the focus and function of each pertains to a 
“dimension” of all that is the case (Wittgenstein 1922) which lies beyond the 
ranges of the five physical senses, a dimension which is in some sense 
“transcendent” and can be characterized as “God” (sensus divinitatis) or “the 
Real” (sensus transcendentis).  
The key differences lie in the respective claims made for the nature of the 
transcendent dimension and the epistemic status of the deliverances of the two 
faculties (or, rather, two competing models for the single faculty) under consid-
eration. Examining these differences will clarify more the details of the proposed 
sensus transcendentis, and in discussing these, I am for the sake of clarity 
dropping qualifiers such as “alleged”, “purported”, “supposed”, “said to be” and 
their derivatives, taking it as read that the terms sensus divinitatis and sensus 
transcendentis refer to concepts or models whose truth, accuracy, validity or 
utility still need to be justified or established (or, indeed, discounted).  
To begin with, whereas the function of the sensus divinitatis is to deliver 
knowledge of God, the omniscient, omnipotent Creator, Sustainer and Re-
deemer of the cosmos and so forth, the function of the sensus transcendentis is 
to detect, infer, construe in the total environment of the human organism 
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intimations of transcendence and deliver experiences of transcendence 
(“Roses”) to the human organism. In consequence, the sensus transcendentis 
is in some ways more comprehensive and in some ways less comprehensive 
than the sensus divinitatis.  
The sensus transcendentis is a more comprehensive model than the sensus 
divinitatis in that, drawing upon the philosophical underpinning of religious 
pluralism, it takes the concept of “God” to be just one possible interpretation or 
construal of Roses, “transcendence” being superordinate to a specific 
construing such as “God” (and even more superordinate to a construing such as 
“the ‘Christian’ God” or, more specific still, “the ‘Reformed Baptist Church of 
God, reformation of 1915’ God”13). Alternative construings involve different 
theistic possibilities as well as non-theistic possibilities: the personae and 
impersonae which Hick (1989) suggests.  
On the other hand, the sensus transcendentis model is less comprehensive 
than the sensus divinitatis model in that although construing Roses as being 
intimations of transcendence not only involves a level of interpretation above 
that of “raw” uninterpreted experience (if such a thing exists), but also invokes 
such concepts as meaning, purpose, value and sacredness, nevertheless 
construing those experiences as definitely being of the Christian conception of 
“God” involves a higher level of ramification, a more detailed interpretation, with 
more complex concepts such as creator, omnipotence, omniscience, forgive-
ness and so forth. The sensus divinitatis model, particularly when allied with the 
“Internal Instigation of the Holy Spirit” which Plantinga proposes in his 
“extended” model as God’s response to counter the effects of human sin, 
makes more specific claims and gives more specific explanations than does the 
sensus transcendentis model. However, the corollary is that in making less 
ramified claims for its output, the sensus transcendentis model allows for (and 
requires) greater cultural input into the experiences as they are construed by 
the individual than does the sensus divinitatis.  
A second difference lies in the epistemic status of their respective deliver-
ances, arising in consequence of their differing provenances, for the sensus 
divinitatis, although part of the natural endowment of humans, is guaranteed by 
God to be reliable in delivering truth when it is functioning properly (and not 
                                            
13
 See appendix 2. 
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marred by sin), whereas the sensus transcendentis, having evolved through the 
processes of natural selection, cannot be completely relied on to deliver truth (in 
the correspondence sense) even when it is functioning properly. This is an 
important factor, a consequence of which is that the existence of a sensus 
transcendentis cannot be used as a knock-down argument for the objective 
existence of transcendence: highly suggestive, yes; proof, no. 
The reason for this note of caution is that the supposed detection, inference 
or construal of transcendence could be erroneous, a misbelief, and there are 
two possible routes by which misbeliefs could be delivered. This requires a 
consideration of the proper function of the sensus transcendentis, and the issue 
of warrant. 
 
Proper function 
Plantinga (2000) maintains that the sensus divinitatis of his model has the 
“proper function” of delivering true knowledge of God – that is, its function in 
delivering such knowledge is specified by its designer (God) and hence qualifies 
as a proper (rather than, say, a contingent or accidental) function. However, 
Plantinga further maintains, a purely naturalistic, non-theistic, approach does 
not allow there to be a proper function of organic entities (or organs or faculties 
of entities) since, according to naturalism, they have not been designed by a 
designer with a particular intended function. On this score, my proposed sensus 
transcendentis could not have a “proper function” because of its naturalistic 
origins. 
Clever though this argument is, it fails to take context into account, for an 
organism as a viable entity entails the integrated working together of multiple 
organs and faculties, each contributing to that viability. A proper function in this 
context, and from an evolutionary perspective, is easily understood as the 
functioning of an organ or faculty which contributes optimally to the continued 
viability of the organism (or, if the multi-level approach of D.S. Wilson [2002] is 
taken into account, then the viability of the group or community constitutes a 
further criterion). The proper functioning of an organ or faculty, including the 
sensus transcendentis, can therefore be understood in an evolutionary 
perspective to entail functioning to optimise the survival and reproduction 
(directly or indirectly) of the organism (see also Swinburne 2001, as discussed 
in chapter 5 above); and though there is no designer to ask what the intended 
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proper function of an organ or faculty might be, that can be ascertained (more 
or less readily) by inspection: the proper function of the heart? To pump blood 
round the body. The proper function of the kidneys? To filter toxins from the 
blood. The fact that sometimes the proper function is obscure (what is the point 
of the appendix?) or wrong guesses are made (no, Aristotle, the proper function 
of the brain is not to cool the blood) does not detract from the notion that we 
can, at least in theory, determine what the proper function of an organ or faculty 
is, even from within a naturalistic perspective, by taking into account both its 
context and how it relates to emergent levels of complexity and order (see 
McKay and Dennett [2009] for further discussion on “function” as understood in 
an evolutionary context). 
Plantinga’s conception of “proper function”, which he applies to the sensus 
divinitatis, is therefore still valid in an evolutionary context to the sensus 
transcendentis, where it can be described as the detection, inference, construal 
of intimations of transcendence and the deliverance of Roses to the human 
organism. The existence of the sensus transcendentis and its proper function is 
inferred from the evidence, some of which is presented in chapter 2 with a few 
further examples below, that such Roses are widespread in human history and 
geography.  
 
Warrant 
In his discussion of the sensus divinitatis, Plantinga (2000) makes great play of 
the concept of warrant which, to rehearse material from chapter 5 (above), is 
“what… distinguishes knowledge from mere true belief” (Plantinga 2000: 153), 
and he concludes that a belief has warrant for someone “only if that belief is 
produced in [them] by cognitive faculties functioning properly (subject to no 
dysfunction) in a cognitive environment that is appropriate for [their] kind of 
cognitive faculties, according to a design plan that is successfully aimed at 
truth” (Plantinga 2000: 156).  
According to this specification, the beliefs delivered by the sensus trans-
cendentis (that meaning, purpose, value have been experienced, detected, 
inferred, construed) do not necessarily have the 100% warrant that would 
convert those beliefs into true and certain knowledge, for misbeliefs could come 
about through the sensus transcendentis functioning hypersensitively along the 
lines of the “Hypersensitive Agency Detection Device” described in the previous 
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chapter. As described there, the proper function of HADD is to detect agent-like 
activity in the environment and hence infer agency, but being hypersensitive it 
will purportedly attribute agency to non-agential occurrences when these latter 
have some agency-like characteristics such as apparently goal-directed move-
ment, the hypersensitivity being functional in that a false positive is better than a 
false negative: better to infer that something apparently behaving in an agent-
like manner is an agent (a tiger, say), and take sensible precautions, than to fail 
to infer the agency of an agent and become that agent’s lunch.  
Although as discussed in the previous chapter this leaves a lot to be desired 
as an explanation for the existence of religion (let alone spirituality), neverthe-
less the purported hypersensitivity of the agency detection device still remains a 
possible candidate for how the agency dimension of religion could be inferred 
from non-agential occurrences. So perhaps the sensus transcendentis is 
equally prone to such error? Perhaps it is hypersensitive and detects transcend-
ence where there is no such thing? In fact, I would rate it as highly likely that 
there are occasions where transcendence is allegedly but erroneously detected, 
as in the ascription of meaning, purpose and significance to occurrences which 
are pure coincidence: “Wow! We have the same birthday! God has obviously 
brought us together!” Some of the accounts offered in chapter 2 would leave 
many readers, myself included, uneasy at claims of there being more than 
coincidence involved (eg the photograph of someone’s father falling off the wall 
being interpreted as an answer from God – account DH1) – the problem with 
this judgement, though, being that one person’s coincidence is another person’s 
meaningfulness.  
This possible source of error, however, does not invalidate all of the 
deliverances of the sensus transcendentis, anymore than the hypersensitivity of 
the agency detection device invalidates its deliverances. Arguably the fact that 
sometimes the HADD infers an agent when there is no actual agent present 
depends on the fact that normally it infers an agent when there is an agent 
present – the HADD possesses a proper function, namely the detection of 
agency, and its hypersensitive function is parasitic (to use Boyer’s term) upon 
that proper function. The proper function of the sensus transcendentis is 
detecting intimations of transcendence and delivering the appropriate 
experiences to the human organism; the possibility that it sometimes gets it 
wrong doesn’t invalidate its proper function. Neither, as far as this model is 
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concerned, is this function attributable to the errors of some module whose 
proper function is something other than transcendence detection/ inference/ 
deliverance; it is the proper function of a dedicated module in its own right. 
There is however a second possible source of error, a second reason why 
the sensus transcendentis might be fooling us in its deliverances of Rose 
experiences. This source of error is neither malfunction nor hypersensitivity, but 
what if the proper function of the sensus transcendentis actually is to deliver 
false information, to give rise to misbeliefs? That is, if it is not “successfully 
aimed at truth” as Plantinga (2000) requires for warrant to apply? 
This potential unreliability of a sensus transcendentis arises because the 
evolutionary process of natural selection operates on usefulness, not truth, and 
a belief that is false (in a correspondence understanding of truth) can still have 
utility, still work to the organism’s advantage. Success in the evolutionary 
struggle “does not guarantee the truth or adequacy of a creature’s beliefs or 
perceptual representations” (O’Hear 1997: 60), and there is nothing in 
Darwinism “about getting our thinking into right order with reality, nothing about 
gaining (in the language of Karl Popper) ‘objective knowledge’. What works, 
what succeeds, is what wins” (Ruse 2006: 245). Hence the existence and 
operation of a sensus transcendentis, picking up cues from the total environ-
ment, inferring transcendence and delivering Roses to the human organism 
such that the individual concerned believes there is transcendent aspect of 
dimension to existence, does not guarantee the objective existence of such an 
aspect or dimension. The proposed sensus transcendentis, along with all other 
mental modules does not deliver correspondence truth, but pragmatic truth – 
what works.  
This is a point which Plantinga (1993b) makes use of in his criticism of a 
naturalistic approach which he maintains undermines itself – the idea being that 
if our cognitive faculties in general have evolved through the utility-directed 
rather than truth-directed processes of natural selection, then the deliverances 
of those cognitive faculties employed in arguments in support of evolutionary 
theory itself cannot be relied upon – evolutionary theory cannot be known to be 
true (Plantinga maintains) because it relies on faculties which by its own 
admission are unreliable.  
Agreed, scenarios can be created – and Plantinga is adept at this – in which 
a falsehood is more useful and hence more adaptive than truth: Plantinga’s 
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favourite example (referred to earlier in chapter 6) is of falsely believing your 
chances of surviving a particular disease are better than statistics warrant, an 
optimism which can result in improving your survival chances better than would 
believing the statistical truth; i.e. in this example false belief (that you will beat 
the odds) is more adaptive than true belief (that your chances are no better than 
what the statistics show) because the optimism that goes with the false belief 
actually improves your chances14.  
However, despite these little scenarios in which utility and correspondence 
truth are seemingly at odds, the pragmatic and the correspondence concepts of 
truth are not as far apart as implied – they are not mutually exclusive, nor are 
they independent variables. It is clearly perfectly possible for something which is 
true in the pragmatic or utility sense also to be true in the correspondence 
sense; indeed, for natural selection not to track reality with a good degree of 
fidelity most of the time would be to invite fitness disaster, and it is along these 
lines that Ruse (2006) robustly rebuts Plantinga’s argument, pointing out (in 
relation to a particularly off-the-wall scenario of Plantinga’s [1993b]) that falsely 
believing you are eating at the High Table in an Oxford College when in fact you 
are slogging through a primeval swamp full of crocodiles doesn’t do much for 
your reproductive chances, since “finding out what is really the case and dealing 
with it is the best way to reproduce” (2006: 246). So although natural selection 
does indeed operate on utility rather than on correspondence-truth, by and large 
the truth is useful to the organism, even if the deliverances of the evolved 
faculties and organs are not always of the whole truth (how could they be?). 
Along these lines Dennett and McKay (2009) conclude their exploration of the 
evolution of misbelief with two answers to the puzzle that if, as is commonly 
assumed, true beliefs are adaptive and misbeliefs maladaptive, how come 
misbeliefs arise? First, they point out that evolution “is not a perfect design 
process, but is subject to economic, historical and topographical constraints” 
(2009: 509); and a second explanation is that “in certain rarefied contexts, 
misbelief itself can actually be adaptive” (2009: 509 – emphasis in original); but, 
significantly, their concluding comment is that the assumption that “misinform-
ation leads in general to costly missteps has not been seriously undermined: 
although survival is the only hard currency of natural selection, the exchange 
                                            
14
 Though it could be argued that the optimism converts the false belief into a true belief, thus 
undermining Plantinga’s argument. 
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rate with truth is likely to be fair in most circumstances” (2009: 509). That is, in 
general our evolved mechanisms can be expected to deliver beliefs that are in 
the neighbourhood of correspondence truth. Applying this to the model under 
consideration leads to the conclusion that it is highly plausible, even though not 
provable, that the function of the sensus transcendentis is to track a real aspect 
or characteristic of the total environment, not simply a useful but fictional 
characteristic, and to deliver to the human organism intimations of 
transcendence in the guise of Roses. 
 
The sensus transcendentis is a human psychological universal  
In postulating the existence of the sensus transcendentis as a mental module, I 
am close to the position adopted by Hay and Socha (2005) who argue that it is 
spirituality, not religion, for which we have a natural disposition, and that “[b]oth 
religious and nonreligious spirituality… can be construed as alternative cultural 
constructions giving expression to the natural predisposition”, leading to the 
conclusion that all human beings, “including secular atheists and others hostile 
to religion, must on our definition possess spirituality in some form” (Hay and 
Socha 2005: 598, 607). The logic of the model I am proposing similarly entails 
that all human beings possess the sensus transcendentis mental module. 
Well, not necessarily all without exception, but “all” as in the statement “all 
human beings have two legs” rather than in the statement “all human beings 
have a mother”. It is not literally true that all humans have two legs, given that 
some have one or none because of accident or a genetic abnormality; but this 
does not invalidate the general universality claim. Likewise, if it were estab-
lished that some members of H. sapiens do not have a (fully) functioning 
sensus transcendentis, that would not in itself invalidate the claimed universal-
ity, any more than the ToM module is denied the status of universality by the 
existence of individuals on the autism spectrum who would appear either to 
have a faulty ToM or not to have it at all (Baron-Cohen 1995). As has been said 
of baboons, they “‘naturally’ have fur, and finding a few going bald does not 
disprove it” (Midgley 1978: 59). 
The point is this: the model being proposed entails the sensus transcend-
entis being part of the mental make-up of human beings, but its absence or 
malfunction in some individuals – were that the case – would not of itself debar 
it from being a universal mental module; and, to point out what shouldn’t need 
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pointing out, but to minimise the possibility of being misconstrued, any absence 
or faultiness of the proposed sensus transcendentis in the make-up of an 
individual would not thereby rob them of human status any more than would 
being bald, having a faulty ToM or, indeed, having one leg too few.  
Evidence to support the contention of universality will be discussed in a later 
section. 
 
The cultural input  
According to the model being proposed, the sensus transcendentis detects, 
infers, construes transcendence from cues in the total environment and delivers 
Roses as its output to the human organism. These experiences are not raw and 
unmediated, but are filtered through, shaped by, embodied in particular 
concepts, categories and images peculiar to the culture of which the individual 
is a member. The sensus transcendentis itself is a human psychological 
universal and hence pan-cultural, but the form of its deliverances in any given 
instance, being conditioned by the prevailing culture of the individual, is not 
universal.  
The rationale and justification for this part of the model lies in the previously 
discussed arguments for religious pluralism, whereby all religious traditions, 
theistic and non-theistic alike, are understood to be manifestations of “the Real-
as-experienced”, brought about by “the Real-in-itself” mediated to us through 
our various and varying cultural concepts and categories. Thus the revelations 
experienced by Julian of Norwich were of Christ, God the Father and Mary the 
mother of Jesus, for these were salient elements of the cultural system – the 
Catholic Church – in which she was embedded. Had she been a Hindu, the 
argument goes, her experiences would have been equally profound but 
probably mediated through Hindu concepts such as those of Krishna, Vishnu 
and Shiva (Hick 1989).  
According to Hick’s version of religious pluralism, the Real-in-itself is 
completely inaccessible to us – we cannot know anything directly about the 
supreme reality. All Roses are of Reality-in-itself as it is filtered through, shaped 
by, embodied in the cultural concepts of the individual concerned (God, Christ, 
sin, salvation, Buddha, nirvana, samsara, Krishna…). Religious pluralism does 
not hold that the experiences are thereby inauthentic – quite the opposite: it is 
simply that the experiences cannot occur except by the mediation of cultural 
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constructs, which are not passive conduits but active shapers of that which they 
mediate. I dissented from the view that nothing can be known or inferred about 
the Real-in-itself, arguing (using the metaphor of a three-dimensional object 
being projected onto a two-dimensional surface) that since “the Real-in-itself” 
contributes to “the Real-as-experienced”, then the latter can give us some hints 
and ideas as to the nature of “the Real-in-itself” even though it cannot be fully 
known. However, I accept the argument that “the Real-as-experienced” is 
shaped and expressed by the cultural constructs of the individual concerned.  
The application of this to the operation and deliverances of the sensus 
transcendentis is straightforward. Recalling that the mental module known as 
Theory of Mind does not detect a state of mind directly, but infers it from the 
behavioural cues of one particular aspect of the environment (namely the other 
person), it is plausible that transcendence, although not directly detectable, is 
also inferred or construed from cues in the total environment, and what is 
experienced by the individual is the outcome of those cues, those inferences, 
being filtered through, shaped by, embodied in the cognitive concepts and 
categories by which the individual habitually orients him/herself – many of which 
concepts and categories being cultural in origin.  
It is possible – but this does not significantly affect the model – that too 
much is still being attributed to the influence of culture, for a distinction can be 
made between the experiences as experienced and the experiences as 
reported. Clearly the experiences as reported are culturally shaped, obviously at 
the level of language used (English, Hindi, Japanese…) and also (this model 
accepts) at the level of many of the interpretative categories employed 
(Christian, Hindu, Buddhist, secular…); but it is possible that at a very general 
level of low ramification there is a non-cultural element to the experiences as 
experienced: this is suggested by the nature of reports from children when still 
children, as well as retrospective reports by adults about their childhood experi-
ences, with their struggle to find adequate words, and the frequent divergence 
from the cultural input it would appear that they had received (Robinson 1977). 
That the categories and concepts which shape the experiences may not be all 
cultural in origin but also, like the sensus transcendentis itself, be of biological 
origin is suggested by the identification of “basic, or primary emotions” which 
are “feeling states that might be experienced by core selves” (Rue 2005: 96, 
95), those which are pan-cultural in expression. Six, namely “fear, disgust, 
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anger, desire, happiness, and sadness” have been nominated on the grounds 
that they all have adaptive benefits which would “favor the selection of neural 
modules to mediate them” (2005: 96 97).It could be then that the deliverances 
of the biologically-based sensus transcendentis are shaped or interpreted by 
biologically-based primary emotions before, or as well as, culturally-derived 
categories and concepts. 
The model being advanced here, however, does not depend on the 
categories and concepts by which the Roses are shaped being purely cultural in 
origin, and would not be affected by further biological input. It is sufficient to 
assert, along with religious pluralism, that culture is one input in producing the 
Roses, thus contributing to an explanation for the wide divergence in the range 
of highly ramified structures known as religions despite their all being to some 
extent manifestations of the deliverances of the human universal sensus 
transcendentis.  
 
The adaptiveness of the sensus transcendentis in the EEA 
An important part of the model is that the sensus transcendentis is an adaptat-
ion in its own right, and its functions of detecting intimations of transcendence 
and the deliverance of Roses are not attributable to the workings of another 
module which has evolved with a different proper function but which fortuitously 
(or otherwise) also gives rise to a curious by-product which ends up as being 
religion. As an adaptation it needs, by definition, to have been adaptive in the 
EEA (and possibly, but not necessarily, now as well), which raises the question 
of what adaptive advantages could the sensus transcendentis have conferred to 
its possessors? 
There are several possibilities which are not necessarily mutually exclusive. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, it could be that religion underpinned the 
ethical system of a group or community, giving it greater stability and coherence 
which better adapted the group to survive periods of adversity, in turn improving 
the fitness of the groups members (E.O. Wilson 1998); and/or it could be that 
the religious system of a group was itself adaptive by strengthening commit-
ment, again enhancing both group and therefore individual fitness (Wilson D.S. 
2002). For the proposals of these writers, then, the function of the sensus 
transcendentis in delivering experiences of transcendence to the individual 
would, or could, have been to influence the individual’s beliefs and behaviour in 
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the light of those experiences to be more Reality-centred rather than self-
centred (Hick 1989), hence benefitting the group as both Wilsons’ proposals 
require.  
Another possibility, from Hay and Socha (2005), is that experiences of 
religious or spiritual awareness which the sensus transcendentis delivers 
functioned by enabling individuals to cope better with “existential issues” (death, 
guilt, freedom, isolation, anxiety, responsibility, meaninglessness and such like 
[Yalom 1980] – the cheery stuff of life, in other words). This though raises the 
question of the mechanism by which experiencing a sense of meaning, 
purpose, value and sacredness confers greater fitness, the answer to which 
increasing appears to lie, at least partly, in the realm of psychoneuroimmunol-
ogy (Koenig and Cohen 2002), with its claim that religion/spirituality decreases 
stress to the benefit of the immune system, leading to better health. The relat-
ionship between health and religious/spirituality is addressed in the next 
section.  
Further arguments that religion was adaptive in the EEA advanced by 
Sanderson (2008) include the near-universality of the shaman figure in the 
ancestral environment, with his ability to induce altered states of consciousness 
with concomitant healing effects in susceptible subjects; the pro-natalist 
tendency of most religions resulting in religious people having more offspring 
than non-religious; and the fact that the major Axial traditions emerged in a time 
of major social upheaval, suggesting they possessed an adaptive function 
(Sanderson 2008). 
These lines of evidence and arguments cannot clinch an adaptationist 
argument, but they do present “a very strong case… Even some of the by-
product theorists acknowledge that… religions all over the world are often linked 
to matters of existential anxiety” (2008: 154). Although direct empirical evidence 
for the adaptiveness of religion/spirituality in the distant past can only be circum-
stantial, the matter is different when it comes to the present. Evidence in 
support of the contention that religion/spirituality is adaptive in the present is 
piling up, and to that I now turn. 
 
The present adaptiveness of the sensus transcendentis 
Whether or not the sensus transcendentis is adaptive in the present does not 
really affect the model being proposed, intended as it is to give an account of 
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how our capacity for the experiential dimension of spirituality can be understood 
as a product of evolution. Nevertheless, to show that religion/spirituality is 
adaptive today strengthens the argument that it was adaptive in the EEA and 
hence enhances the status of the sensus transcendentis as an adaptation.  
If the sensus transcendentis was adaptive in the EEA, there are three poss-
ibilities concerning its present status: i) it is now positively maladaptive as is our 
once-adaptive penchant for sweets and fats; ii) it continues to be adaptive today 
as does the Theory of Mind module; iii) it is neither adaptive nor maladaptive 
today, analogous to a vestigial physical organ such as the appendix, once 
presumably adaptive (possibly to do with immune system), but now is believed 
by many to sit around all day doing not very much either adaptively or maladap-
tively. 
According to those who adopt the conflict model to describe the relationship 
between science and religion (Barbour 2000) and who advocate the former as 
against the latter, religious beliefs and religious practices are wrong and hence 
should be discarded; for “if a human being were to rely too heavily on 
supernatural beliefs, the result would be maladaptive because they would get in 
the way of that person’s relationship with the real world” (Lewis-Williams 2010: 
155). But that begs the question. Whether or not religion/spirituality is adaptive 
or maladaptive is an empirical matter, not something about which an a priori 
assumption can be made. Rue (2005) advocates the more nuanced position 
that religion is an adaptation but which, because it is now failing in its function of 
serving the goals of personal satisfaction and societal integration, has evidently 
become maladaptive. Again, though, the claim of religion’s maladaptiveness 
needs to be assessed – is religion maladaptive? 
The model I am proposing does not assume that religion/spirituality has to 
be adaptive now; the model entails the sensus transcendentis, and hence the 
resulting religion/spirituality, having been adaptive, and if it still is, so much the 
better for the model since its adaptiveness in the present would support the 
contention that it was adaptive in the past. But it cannot be assumed. 
The evidence that religion/spirituality is currently adaptive focuses mainly on 
the impact of religion/spirituality on physical and mental health. A summary of 
Koenig et al’s (2001) survey of hundreds of studies into the relationship 
between religion/spirituality and health includes the statistics that “75 percent of 
16 studies found lower heart disease and cardiovascular mortality among 
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people assessed as more religious… 88 percent [of 16 studies] found lower 
blood pressure (especially diastolic blood pressure) among the more religious… 
75 percent [of 52 studies] reported that more religious people lived longer, and 
only 1 study reported a shorter lifespan… 65 percent [of 93 studies] reported 
significant correlations between religiosity and lower levels of depression, with 
only 5 percent reporting higher levels of depression among the more religious” 
(Sanderson 2008: 150). These and other consistent findings of lower suicide 
rates, lower levels of anxiety; and lower alcohol and drug abuse correlated with 
being more religious lead to the conclusion that “[t]he role of religion in 
promoting physical health seems to be that it alleviates ‘existential stress’; it 
decreases anxiety and uncertainty and gives people a greater sense of control 
in a difficult world” (2008: 150).  
The above data are supplemented by research into adolescent mental 
health, significant since adolescents are just entering the reproductive market, 
and again the evidence is that religious involvement correlates positively with 
health. There are numerous studies showing a positive correlation between 
religion/ spirituality and a child or adolescent’s ability to cope with illness 
(Hackney and Sanders 2003; Miller and Gur, 2002; Resnick, Harris and Blum, 
1993; Resnick et al., 1997; Wallace and Forman, 1998; Wegener et al, 2003), 
and a review of 115 articles examining the relationship between 
religion/spirituality and adolescent psychiatric symptoms (20 of which focused 
on death by suicide, suicide attempts and suicide ideation) noted that 92% 
found “at least one significant… relationship between religiousness and better 
mental health” (Drew et al., 2008: 381). The studies reviewed included 
Christian, Jewish, Muslim and Druze adolescents.  
Of course, a correlation does not necessarily entail a causal relationship, 
and even if there is a relationship the causal arrow might not be in the direction 
required by the proposed model (it could be that those who are healthy are 
more likely to be religious, rather than vice versa). However, there is also 
evidence that the process of becoming involved in a religious group confers a 
beneficial health effect, strengthening the view that the causal arrow is from 
religion/spirituality to health. Psychological testing was carried out by an 
independent observer on 109 potential new recruits to the Unification Church 
(“Moonies”) who attended a weekend-long retreat with a further three week 
enlightenment course to follow. Of the 15 who lasted the entire three weeks, 
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nine became members, and tests of psychological well-being at the outset of 
the induction process “were highly predictive of who would actually stay on 
through each of the stages. Those who felt most comfortable with their lives left 
first, and those who scored lower on well-being stayed on through the first week 
and the following weekend. The nine who actually remained for three weeks 
and agreed to join were highly distressed in comparison to all the others who 
had left before them and to a matched sample from the population overall. The 
need for relief from emotional distress clearly provided pressure for affiliating” 
(Galanter 2005: 23). Moreover, well-being scores, which continued to rise as 
membership was established, were “highly correlated with the degree of their 
religious belief and their cohesiveness toward church members” (2005: 25). 
It would seem that the proximate cause of the improvement in psychological 
health of membership of the Unification Church was becoming involved and 
identified with a cohesive group, but the ultimate cause is arguably the fitness-
enhancing detection and response to the order, purpose, sense of meaning, 
identity and a “plausibility structure” (Berger 1970) which group membership 
provides – those same intimations of transcendence which are responded to by 
the adherents of the mainline religious traditions.  
The health advantages of belonging to the Church of Latter Day Saints 
(“Mormons”) is also well documented, with their showing, for example, lower 
cancer rates compared to non-Mormons, and a life-expectancy 6-10 years 
longer. The proximate causes for these differences are believed to be their 
substance-free lifestyle, routine health behaviors, early marriage, and regular 
church attendance (Rule et al 2010).  
One highly promising line of research in unravelling the link between 
religion/spirituality and health is that of psychoneuroimmunology, which is “the 
study of how social and psychological factors affect neuroendocrine and 
immune functioning” (Koenig 2002: 11). Religion/spirituality may provide a way 
which lessens the deleterious effects of stress on the body’s physiological 
equilibrium that is necessary for survival. In his introduction to a volume of 
papers on the relationship between religion and health, Koenig summarises the 
situation thus: 
“From the field of psychoneuroimmunology we are learning that what 
people believe, think, and feel may have a direct impact on neuroendo-
crine and immune function – systems that play a vital role in warding off 
disease and speeding recovery from illness. If religious beliefs and 
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practices improve coping with stress, reduce the likelihood of depression 
or other emotional disorders, and increase social support, then it is 
possible that such involvement will reduce the physiological consequen-
ces of stress and thereby improve our defenses against diseases. So, at 
least, the theory goes” (2002: 27). 
 
The theory and research continues (Koenig 2008), offering an insight as to how 
religion/spirituality could confer health benefits. Of course, better physical and 
mental health in themselves do not constitute better genetic fitness, but the 
relationship between health and genetic fitness is universally accepted in 
evolutionary thought, for “it is almost inconceivable that people in better health 
would not also have higher reproductive success. People in good health would 
be more likely to find mates, and to find good mates, than people in poor health, 
and thus to reproduce at higher rates… And even if the reproductive difference 
is marginal… even tiny differences in reproductive success can have major 
evolutionary consequences over many generations” (Sanderson: 2008: 151 – 
emphasis added).  
Given that religion/spirituality is indeed helpful and adaptive as the evidence 
increasingly shows (Blackmore 2010), acceptance that the sensus transcend-
entis itself is adaptive requires only a short chain of inference: according to the 
model, the sensus transcendentis detects, infers, construes intimations of 
transcendence and delivers experiences of transcendence to the human 
organism; these experiences constitute the “vertical” dimension of spirituality; 
spirituality is manifested (inter alia) in various traditions generally known as 
religions which also involve beliefs, rituals and other dimensions (Smart 1996); 
hence if religion/spirituality is adaptive then it can reasonably be inferred that 
the sensus transcendentis, which gave rise to it, is an adaptation.  
Admittedly this chain of inference is not infallible, since it could be argued 
that the health benefits deriving from religious involvement are, for example, a 
consequence of particular practices which do not require any form of commit-
ment to the rest of the religion/spirituality package and so are not linked to any 
originating deliverances of the sensus transcendentis. There is, however, 
evidence that “for a religious practice to result in a health benefit, there may 
need to be an element of ‘true belief’” (Griffiths 2002: 259), and that what is 
known as “extrinsic religiousness” – when one is involved in religion because it 
is the conventional thing to do, but with no intrinsic belief or commitment – 
correlates with poorer health outcomes than does intrinsic religiousness 
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(Griffiths 2002, citing Batson and Ventis 1982). This finding further tilts the 
weight of evidence in favour of the adaptiveness of religion/spirituality ultimately 
deriving from the operation of the sensus transcendentis, confirming – or at 
least upholding – its status as an adaptation. 
The above discussion, while primarily about the adaptiveness of the sensus 
transcendentis, also constitutes indirect evidence for its actual existence – it 
could not be adaptive if it did not exist, and something is making religion/ 
spirituality have an adaptive function. But there is also a growing body of 
somewhat more direct evidence in support of the contention that the sensus 
transcendentis, or something like it, exists. 
 
The sensus transcendentis: arguments/evidence for its existence 
As well as research into spirituality in general, evidence in support of the 
postulated sensus transcendentis comes from specific research into the 
spirituality of children (Coles 1990), an area of interest that has burgeoned in 
recent years with its importance recognised and accepted in educational (Best 
1996) and pastoral (Mercer 2006) settings, and with a dedicated journal, 
International Journal of Children’s Spirituality (Ota et al 1996), to further its 
recognition.  
Although an absence of evidence for spirituality in children would not tell 
against the sensus transcendentis model, since it is perfectly possible for an 
innate organ or faculty not to be in evidence for years (innateness does not 
entail being present at birth, as a consideration the development of secondary 
sexual characteristics shows), the evidence nevertheless suggests that the 
sensus transcendentis, or something rather like it, is indeed in operation in the 
early years of life.  
In the accounts submitted in response to newspaper articles and advertise-
ments placed by Hardy, the subset which referred to childhood experiences 
(e.g. accounts DH2b and DH3 in chapter 2) became the focus of further 
research by another of the team, who noted a consistency in the responses 
implying that “religious experience is really something quite ordinary, 
commonplace” (Robinson 1977: 15).  
A number of Robinson’s respondents pointed out that their experiences of 
spiritual awareness differed from what they were being taught by parents about 
God and religion; whilst others reported that because their attempts to talk 
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about such experiences were ridiculed by adults they quickly learned to keep 
these matters to themselves. Along with frequent references in the accounts to 
the inadequacy of words to explain or encapsulate the experiences, these 
comments suggest that for these respondents at least their experiences, far 
from being simply a reflection or regurgitation of what they had been taught at 
home or Sunday school, possessed a distinct reality of their own mediated by a 
non-culturally-constructed innate mechanism, contra the Katz (1978) position 
regarding religious experiences (see chapter 3). 
A difficulty with these accounts though, as Robinson acknowledges, is that 
they are to a large extent retrospective, sometimes by decades, which throws 
up the question of the reliability of memory and the subsequent (unconscious) 
construction from an adult perspective and with adult concepts of the reported 
experiences, though the consistency of the reports strongly suggests to 
Robinson that they are far from being fabrications. They are perhaps best taken 
as being impressionistic and suggestive, but not conclusive. 
More rigorous treatment, albeit on the theistic side, is offered by Kelemen 
(2004) who gives a tentative “yes” in answer to her own question, “are children 
‘intuitive theists’?”, citing research which shows that children’s reasoning is 
highly teleological; that is, children attend to the function of things and their 
purpose. When asked about clouds, preschoolers answer that they are made 
for “raining”, rather than raining simply being what clouds do; and when asked 
to decide whether prehistoric rocks “were pointy because of a physical 
process… or because they performed a function” children prefer the latter, 
giving explanations for the pointiness of rocks such as “so that animals wouldn’t 
sit on them and smash them” or “so that animals could scratch on them when 
they got itchy” (2004: 296). That these teleological explanations had not simply 
been absorbed from adults is indicated by further research showing “parents 
generally favor causal rather than teleological explanations” (2004: 296) when 
their children ask them questions about nature.  
The “promiscuous teleology” of the children leads Kelemen to suggest that 
“[c]hildren view natural phenomena as intentionally designed by a god” (2004: 
296), or at least that they are “predisposed to develop a view of nature as an 
artifact of nonhuman design” (2004: 299). Moreover, as she points out, 
teleological explanations have in fact been a staple of human understanding 
until very recently, and that “reasoning about all aspects of nature in non-
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teleological physical-reductionist terms is a relatively recent development in the 
history of human thought” (2004: 299). Her point is that our default position 
seems to be that of teleological rather than causal explanations. Whilst this 
obviously does not entail teleological explanations being correct and causal 
explanations being incorrect, it does add to the evidence that we have a 
predisposition to see, or seek, purpose. 
I emphasise “purpose” since Kelemen’s thesis, and the evidence backing it, 
that children are intuitive theists appears to run counter to the model I am 
presenting in which the sensus transcendentis detects intimations of 
transcendence, not necessarily intimations of (a) god – theism (according to the 
model) being just one of the possible ways in which the deliverances of the 
sensus transcendentis are experienced by the human organism. But the 
examples which Kelemen gives of children’s teleological thinking – the purpose 
of clouds is to rain, the purpose of the pointiness of rocks is for the rocks’ 
survival or for animals to scratch themselves – do not explicitly include a 
designer (e.g. a god) who created the entities concerned for their purported 
purposes. The children, if I have understood her correctly, are claiming a 
purpose for the clouds and for the pointiness of rocks without necessarily 
inferring that some other purpose-endowing entity created them. In fact, to say 
that a god created clouds with the purpose of raining is to combine causal 
thinking (“a god created them”) and teleological thinking (“with the purpose of”). 
No harm in that, except that Kelemen would appear to be reading into the 
children’s statements something which is not there – the cultural concept of a 
god, or, at the very least, “nonhuman design” (2004: 299). It is enough for the 
sensus transcendentis model that the children can be understood to receiving, 
or imputing, intimations of purpose – which is an aspect of the “transcendence” 
which is immanent that the model espouses. 
Somewhat similar is Barrett and Richert’s (2003) “preparedness hypothesis”, 
an alternative to the anthropomorphism model for explaining the origin of god 
concepts. Drawing upon research into children’s conception of the creative 
power of God compared to that of human beings, and into their continuing to 
attribute true belief to God in false-belief tests, along with similarly attributing to 
God special powers such as seeing in the dark and hearing music played too 
softly to be heard by humans, the authors contend that this provides “strong 
evidence that four-year-old children are capable of representing God as having 
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non-anthropomorphic power, and the early age at which children have this 
capability suggests a degree of preparedness” (2003: 304 – emphasis in 
original). 
Since the current enquiry, as repeatedly asserted, contends that theism (and 
hence any preparedness for awareness of “God”) is just one possible way in 
which religious or spiritual experiences can present themselves, the evidence 
and arguments for preparedness adduced by Barrett and Richert supports the 
sensus transcendentis model through the theistic route. And as the authors 
acknowledge, a preparedness does not entail inevitability, for “relevant cultural 
inputs are undoubtedly necessary to acquire any particular god concept” (2003: 
310); or rather, I would amend, any particular transcendent concept. Equivalent 
research into a possible preparedness in non-theistic cultures would be very 
welcome, though currently (as far as I can tell) non-existent. 
An additional contribution from Tamminen (1991), who researched the 
religious development of Finnish schoolchildren, is that “religious experiences 
are relatively general, especially in childhood but also in adolescence, 
according to the children and adolescents themselves… [and] such experiences 
are especially abundant in late childhood” (1991: 62 – emphasis in original). 
Moreover, although this research was carried out in a country where the default 
religious language is Christian, it was also found that “the pupils do not consider 
Christian faith as something unique compared to other religions” (1991: 88).  
One researcher who recognizes that spirituality does not necessarily entail 
God-talk is Hay (Hay 2006; Hay and Nye 2006). His premise is that the spiritual 
awareness of children is not necessarily something extraordinary, and that 
researchers need to focus on “the perceptions, awareness and response of 
children to those ordinary activities which can act as… ‘signals of transcend-
ence’” (Hay and Nye 2006: 60). In investigating children’s spirituality, Hay and 
Nye had tentatively identified three interrelated themes: i) awareness-sensing 
(involving “here-and-now”, “tuning”, “flow” and “focusing”); ii) mystery-sensing 
(involving “wonder and awe” and “imagination”); and iii) value-sensing (involving 
“delight and despair”, “ultimate goodness” and “meaning”). These would be the 
markers of spirituality for their research. 
With this in mind, Nye explored the spirituality of 38 children, 6-7 and 10-11 
years old, with Catholic, Anglican and Muslim family affiliations represented, but 
mostly with no particular religious affiliation. From structured interviews (several 
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with each child) she obtained over 1000 pages of conversational data, from the 
analysis of which emerged the concept of “relational consciousness” referred to 
earlier. It is this relational consciousness which is claimed to lie at the 
“rudimentary core” of children’s spirituality, “out of which can arise meaningful 
aesthetic experience, religious experience, personal and traditional responses 
to mystery and being, and mystical and moral insight” (2006: 109).  
Hay and Nye give several summarized examples of how relational 
consciousness manifested itself in the conversation of the children, such as the 
following account of a six-year old girl’s description of heaven: 
“She referred to the key elements in her spiritual response as ‘waking 
up’ and ‘noticing’, both of which suggest that a different quality of 
consciousness was crucial to her experience. The relational component 
in this was a strong feeling of connection to the natural world as some-
thing that was full of gifts for her and deserved her respect and love in 
return. This sense of intimacy also had reverberations in her relationship 
with herself, as seen in her self-conscious perception of a symmetry 
between her own joy and the joyful leaping of the lambs” (2006: 110). 
 
And again, for a ten-year-old boy, who had rejected any religious affiliation 
along with his family, many of his comments… 
“…were about the different kind of consciousness the spiritual domain 
seemed to engender in him, for instance the uncomfortable awareness 
of his brains feeling ‘scrambled’. The relational component in his case 
was represented mainly in terms of struggling to achieve a comfortable 
relationship within himself. Many of the themes he pondered, such as the 
eternity and creation of the universe or the existence of a single true 
God, were directed back to questions about and feelings of his own 
sense of identity. The central relational issue that appeared to colour his 
rather anxious, struggling expression of spirituality was that of trust. 
Were the feelings and insights associated with these products of his own 
consciousness ‘trustworthy partners’, so to speak, with whom 
constructive relationships might be made, or were they merely ‘tricks of 
the mind’?” (2006: 110). 
 
And a ten-year old girl whose first two interviews with the researcher had 
contained little of interest, suddenly in the third and final interview… 
“… came alive with philosophical questions, though not of a traditionally 
spiritual kind. Her flow of questions covered the nature of thought as never 
ending, leading her to wonder about the relationship between mind and 
brain. This was immediately followed by queries about the nature of 
language and how things came to have their names. In turn, this flood of 
unanswerable questioning (largely uninterrupted by [the researcher]) led her 
to wonder about the origin of the universe and of human beings (stopping to 
mention her rejection of the biblical explanation along the way). Finally she 
suggested that, faced with such mystery yet yearning for meaning, ‘Perhaps 
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we’ve got to, like, ask the clouds. The clouds have been there millions and 
millions of years’” (2006: 106). 
 
“It seems important,” Nye comments about the last account, “for such kinds of 
deep pondering to find a place in an account of children’s spirituality” (2006: 
106). 
What I find impressive about this research project is that the children are not 
being tested so much as being listened to. Although “God-talk” made a consid-
erable appearance – inevitable, given that it is the principal default religious 
language of the UK – time and again the children, given their head, manifested 
what seems to be an instinctive awareness of the importance of meaning, 
purpose, value, connectedness.  
The concept of relational consciousness within children’s spirituality has 
been further elaborated with the tentative identification of four images to 
describe different types of children’s spirituality, with children as “mystics, 
activists, sages, and holy fools” (Mercer 2006: 498); and five elements of that 
spirituality being: i) “based in experience. It is not primarily words about a 
phenomenon that mark spirituality, but the experience itself”; ii) “heightened 
awareness [is] involved, a level of attention to the experience, a sense of ‘being 
in touch’ with something big or important or ultimate”; iii) “awareness of an 
encounter with transcendence or mystery, awe, and wonder. Descriptions in 
fact generally point to an experience of a horizon or a presence that cannot be 
reduced to rational cognition or even to the language attempting to express it”; 
iv) “it is about relationships. It concerns one’s… sense of relatedness to self, to 
others, to those ‘centers of value and power’ that shape meanings in the lives of 
persons”; v) “[it] involves reflective symbolization, or the ability to have a 
perspective upon and make meaning of the relationships and experiences 
featured in the child’s awareness” (Mercer 2006: 504-5). 
Mercer also, and importantly, refers to the shadow side of children’s 
spirituality, which concerns “chaos and struggle, resistance, fear, evil, and 
suffering... When we are attempting to learn about or understand the spiritual 
lives of children, then, we need to listen not only for angel’s footsteps but also 
for the ways children wrestle with demons (figurative and existentially 
encountered)” (Mercer 2006: 505). 
None of these lines of evidence alone is conclusive, but cumulatively they 
make an impact, and even more so when combined with the evidence in the 
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previous section of the adaptive nature of religion/spirituality. It becomes 
increasingly plausible that H. sapiens possess a faculty along the lines this 
enquiry proposes, and increasingly implausible that such experiences of 
purpose, meaning, value, sacredness, of intimations of transcendence, could 
arise as the by-product of other cognitive modules.  
There are however a couple of omissions and a caveat. The omissions are 
that I have not considered whether, for the sensus transcendentis, there is a 
timetable of development (as with the Theory of Mind module) rather than its 
being present at or virtually from birth (as seems to be the case with intuitive 
physics); nor have I considered whether there is a critical period during which 
time environmental input is required to trigger the development and functioning 
of it as a module, otherwise it closes down and is henceforth inoperative (as 
with the Language Acquisition Device). The caveat is that the evidence 
adduced for the existence and adaptiveness of the sensus transcendentis is 
principally from the WEIRD countries and hence the caution advocated by 
Henrich et al (2010) about sampling bias is in order. However, the intent has not 
been to prove the model true beyond all peradventure and to nail down every 
detail, but to advance it with some evidential and philosophical support as being 
a viable model. This I believe I have done, and the evidence so far garnered 
has enabled it to pass at least the first test of falsifiability (Popper 1959 [1934]).  
 
Spirituality as a unity 
At the conclusion of the discussion of spirituality in chapter 1, I stipulated that 
for the purposes of the current enquiry I would take it to comprise two aspects 
or dimensions. The first, in theistic terminology, refers to relating “vertically to 
God” (Underhill 1933: 19), or in the pluralist interpretation of religion which I 
have adopted, relating to “the Real” (Hick 1989); and the second refers to 
relating “horizontally to other souls” (Underhill 1933: 19), although the term 
“souls” could be more generally taken to encompass not only other humans but 
other animate beings, and indeed the entire natural world (Rolston III 1988). 
However, I expressed the concern that this vertical/horizontal metaphor 
could imply that the two dimensions or aspects of spirituality are independent 
variables – that one’s openness to transcendence could alter without having 
any effect on, or correlation with, one’s relationship with others; and, likewise, 
that one’s openness and response to others could vary without that having any 
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necessary consequence concerning one’s openness and relationship with 
transcendence. This separation felt unsatisfactory, especially in the light of 
many thoughtful commentators more definitely linking the two aspects (see 
chapter 1), hence the suggestion of a second metaphor involving the properties 
of a circle: with “openness to transcendence” called the diameter of spirituality, 
and “openness to others” the circumference of spirituality, whereby, as with the 
diameter and circumference of mathematical circles, they would be locked into 
an exact co-variance. As well as ensuring that spirituality is not perceived as 
being split into two independent factors, this metaphor, by attributing a “circum-
ference” to spirituality, echoes Singer’s (1981) image of the expanding circle to 
depict the widening of our ethical concern for other sentient beings and life 
forms. A disadvantage, however, is that a mathematical metaphor is even more 
suggestive of favouring quantity over quality than is a spatial metaphor, and 
with spirituality involving meaning, purpose and value this seems inappropriate. 
Taking the two metaphors together as complementary might help mitigate 
the failings of each, but it does not resolve another problem. I can reasonably 
claim to have achieved what I set out to achieve in having developed a model 
by which the vertical/diameter dimension of spirituality, mediated by the sensus 
transcendentis, can be understood as a faculty rooted in our evolutionary 
history, as can the horizontal/circumference dimension of spirituality, mediated 
by our moral awareness and capacity for altruism. Nevertheless, an unsatisfact-
oriness remains in that no reason has yet been given for how it is that these two 
dimensions belong together in the phenomenon of spirituality. Why should it be 
taken that the vertical/diameter and the horizontal/circumference do have a joint 
referent in “spirituality”? Why consider they are connected at all? 
In what follows I am going beyond what can be directly read out from the 
model that I have proposed, but for greater completeness the model does 
require a suggestion of how the two putative dimensions of spirituality are 
actually connected, if not their actually being one and the same thing looked at 
from two different angles. It is this latter, italicised suggestion that I briefly wish 
to advocate. 
That there is an intimate connection, if not actual identity, between the two 
dimensions is strongly suggested in the Judeao-Christian tradition, epitomised 
in the Hebrew scriptures by the requirement to “act justly and to love mercy and 
to walk humbly with your God” (Micah 6:8); where “‘walking with God’ is a 
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metaphor for one who is right with God. One who walks with God has been 
graced by God’s presence and partnership in life and death” (Resner 2001: 
495); and in the Christian scriptures where, in the parable of the sheep and 
goats (Matt. 25:31-46), Jesus is depicted as equating such actions as feeding 
the hungry, welcoming the stranger, and visiting the sick and the imprisoned, 
with responding to God himself, and that “by doing good for others, they were 
doing good to him” (Hultgren 2001: 151). As remarked in chapter 1, most, if not 
all, other religious traditions have at their core some version of the Golden Rule 
(Hick 1999), whereby one’s (“vertical”) openness to transcendence and one’s 
(“horizontal”) response to others are intimately connected. Hick (1989), in 
discussing the soteriological characteristic of Axial religion, refers to the shift 
from ego-centredness to Reality-centredness, that is, requiring or entailing self-
transcendence; and a number of the witnesses called in chapter 1 also identify 
the centrality to spirituality of self-transcendence or an equivalent such as self-
giving (Conn 2000; Schneiders 2000; Underhill 1933). Likewise, Hay (2006) 
remarks that in his research, the respondents’ accounts of spiritual awareness 
regularly involve a raised ethical awareness and desire for greater altruism.  
According to the model, the proper function of the sensus transcendentis is 
detecting, inferring or construing intimations of transcendence in the human 
organism’s total environment and responding by delivering experiences of 
transcendence (Roses) to that human organism, “transcendence” referring here 
to meaning, purpose, and value which, whilst immanent in the total environment 
rather than forming a separate, discrete, parallel realm, nevertheless transcend 
the individual entities and processes comprising the material and social 
environment. But how are meaning, purpose and value immanent in the total 
environment? I consider that the sensus transcendentis model allows us to 
maintain that when the sensus transcendentis purportedly infers, detects or 
construes intimations of transcendence, what it is actually inferring, detecting or 
construing is the meaning, value and purpose embodied in “the other” – taking 
“the other” in a widest possible sense to refer to anything which is not one’s self 
– such that the experience of transcendence (whether of the “focal” or 
“background variety” [Alston 1991]) precisely is the awareness of and capacity 
to respond to the meaning, value and purpose of “the other”. This would entail 
the capacity for the experiences of transcendence and the capacity for altruistic 
response to “the other” being at base the same capacity. It is not a matter of 
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cause and effect, it is not that the sensus transcendentis detects or infers or 
construes intimations of transcendence, and then as a result one is prompted 
(or one chooses) to develop a greater self-transcendence in our relationships 
with others, manifested by increased altruism; but that the deliverances of the 
sensus transcendentis are how one experiences the meaning, purpose and 
value of “the other”.  
A further point is this: experiencing the meaning, purpose and value of “the 
other” is not, or not confined to, a cognitive experience, but is, or is also, a 
behavioural experience. This is where the insights and terminology of Personal 
Construct Psychology (Kelly 1955) are particularly helpful15. Since in PCP the 
verb “to construe” does not refer simply to a conscious, intellectual action but to 
the response of the whole person, emotional and behavioural as well as 
cognitive (Procter 2008), then any altruistic behaviour towards “the other” is a 
particular instance of construing, and that act of construing occurs prior to any 
cognitive labelling of meaning, purpose and value of “the other”. Thanks to our 
evolutionary heritage, an intuitive construing of “the other” occurs both experi-
entially (Roses) and behaviourally (altruism).  
If this, or something like this, is the case, then the deliverances by the 
sensus transcendentis of “Roses” on the one hand and our altruistic engage-
ment or ethical praxis on the other hand are respectively the “inner” and the 
“outer”, the subjective and the objective, of one and the same occurrence. 
Spirituality can be said to have two dimensions for the purposes of trying to get 
to grips with what it is and how it comes to be intrinsic to human nature, but to 
talk of it in this way is best seen as a heuristic device rather than a description 
of (correspondence) truth.  
In speculating along these lines, I could be accused of reducing transcend-
ence to immanence. That is, suppose there is something “out there”, some 
“higher part of the universe” (to use James’s [1902] expression) that objectively 
transcends (or Transcends) us all, then the above speculation would seem to 
deny this possibility. However, the speculation is agnostic about, and is not 
commenting upon, an “external” or supernatural transcendence. The 
suggestion put forward is that our very experience of transcendence, as 
inferred (detected, construed) by the sensus transcendentis, is identical to our 
                                            
15
 See appendix 1.  
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self-transcendence in altruistic openness to others, but this says nothing about 
the metaphysics of any supernatural realm, if there is one.  
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Chapter 11: Of consequences and implications 
 
Introduction 
The proposal that human nature can be understood as deriving from, or under-
pinned by, a suite of mental modules which have evolved through the process 
of natural selection, and that one such module is the sensus transcendentis 
underlying and facilitating human spirituality, brings to theological consider-
ations an explicitly biological dimension. Neither the introduction of evolutionary 
theory into theological thinking (Haught 2000; Miller 1999; Southgate 2008), nor 
the exploration of the biological underpinnings of religion (Feierman 2009; 
Swanson 2008; du Toit 2009) are new ventures, but the manner of doing it in 
the present enquiry, and the particular biological insight which has been 
invoked, namely evolutionary psychology, is I believe novel; and although 
Hardy (1975) and Hay (2006) had already argued that our religious sense or 
sense of spiritual awareness is a naturally evolved faculty, they could not have 
(Hardy) or have not (Hay) drawn upon this particular discipline to explicate it. 
The theological constructs I have engaged with are principally those of 
religious pluralism, particularly as advocated by Hick (1989), and the sensus 
divinitatis as developed by Plantinga (2000); and, further, having incorporated 
the concept of religious experience into a broader category of the Rose, I have 
also referred to the ascribed/intrinsic dichotomy of what makes a Rose a Rose. 
In making use of these theological resources I have inevitably adapted them, 
and if the sensus transcendentis model has any validity it will feed back into 
them and affect any future understanding and use of them. In what follows, 
therefore, I briefly consider the implications the sensus transcendentis model 
might have for religious exclusivism, inclusivism and pluralism, and for the 
ascribed/intrinsic dichotomy. I also remark on two other issues: the implications 
for religious (un)belief, and a contribution to evolutionary psychology this 
enquiry may conceivably make. 
 
A: Theological implications 
1. exclusivism, inclusivism and pluralism  
The sensus transcendentis model, if accepted, would have implications to 
varying degrees for the exclusive, inclusive and pluralist paradigms, as can be 
illustrated by considering the different positions of four Christian theologians: 
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two exclusivists who maintain different stances on the issue of religious aware-
ness, namely Barth (briefly alluded to in chapter 4) and Plantinga (chapter 5); 
and Rahner and Hick, whose advocacy of inclusivism and pluralism respectively 
were discussed in chapter 4. Given the extent to which their thinking has 
contributed to the development of the sensus transcendentis model, Plantinga 
and Hick receive more attention in what follows than do the other two. 
 
1a. Barth  
It is difficult to see how the sensus transcendentis model could come into fruitful 
dialogue with Barth’s position as expressed in ‘The Revelation of God as the 
Abolition of Religion’ (Barth 1956), with its constant refrain that religion and 
revelation are in opposition to each other. Emphasising that the reality and the 
possibility of God revealing Himself to man can be found “in God, and only in 
God”, Barth continues that “[w]e could not fix the reality of revelation in God, 
and yet find in man a possibility for it. We could not ascribe the event to God, 
and yet attribute to man the instrument and point of contact for it. We could not 
regard divine grace as the particular feature and man’s suitability and capacity 
as the universal” (Barth 1956: 280 – emphasis added), this being a completely 
contrary position to the sensus transcendentis model with its contention that the 
“suitability and capacity” for detecting (inferring, construing) transcendence is a 
human universal. Acknowledging that man can know God, Barth asserts that 
this capacity rests on the fact of God’s self-manifestation, and not on the fact 
that man could know him, and “[b]etween ‘he could’ and ‘he can’ there lies the 
absolutely decisive ‘he cannot’, which can be removed and turned into its 
opposite only by revelation” (1956: 301). Clearly, I think it safe to say, any 
deliverances of the sensus transcendentis, entailing an operation of detecting/ 
inferring/construing, would fall outside the active self-revelation of God as 
understood by Barth, since according to the model the sensus transcendentis 
as a natural faculty is operative as a matter of course, not dependent on the self 
disclosure of God (or transcendence) for its operation.  
Suppose, though, there were a Christian exclusivist; call him Geoff, who 
accepts not only evolutionary theory but also evolutionary psychology as a 
coherent, acceptable scientific account of the processes through which he 
believes that God operates. Suppose further that there were strong independent 
evidence for the existence of the sensus transcendentis – would that increase 
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or decrease the likelihood of Geoff’s Christian exclusivism being justified? It 
would put Geoff in the awkward position of having to explain why, if there is a 
personal God, it is a sensus transcendentis which has evolved and not a 
sensus divinitatis? That is to say, if the personal God of Christianity is indeed 
the universal noumenon (and not just the phenomenal manifestation as 
experienced by Christians) then why would a mental module have evolved 
which delivers intimations of a theistic nature to one person and intimations of a 
non-theistic nature to another? Geoff cannot call upon cultural differences to 
explain it, as that would be heading for a pluralist position. Presumably Geoff 
would have to take the Calvin/Plantinga explanation that the module was 
malfunctioning because of human sin, requiring God to create another faculty 
(such as the “Internal Instigation of the Holy Spirit” suggested by Plantinga 
[2000]) to rectify the situation. But such an explanation knocks out the attempt 
to take seriously an input from evolutionary psychology into the phenomena of 
spirituality and religion, and Geoff’s acceptance of both the evolutionary psych-
ology paradigm and his Christian exclusivism would, at the least, trigger 
cognitive dissonance (Festinger 1957). It would seem, again, that the sensus 
transcendentis model and religious exclusivism are incompatible; and if a 
Christian exclusivist is not persuaded to abandon exclusivism by the theological 
arguments that have been advanced by others (D’Costa 1986; Hick and Knitter 
1988; Ward 1994), it is unlikely (I imagine) that he would be persuaded by the 
sensus transcendentis argument. 
 
1b. Plantinga 
Although also an exclusivist, Plantinga’s view on there being a religious faculty 
as part of human nature differs from Barth. Calvin, from whom Plantinga had 
inherited the idea of the sensus divinitatis, maintained that it has been 
implanted in humans by God such that we have no excuse for not being aware 
of God nor for our disobeying his commands, and that it is our sin which is 
responsible for the sensus divinitatis not functioning as it was designed by God 
to do: “There is within the human mind” wrote Calvin, “and indeed by natural 
instinct, an awareness of divinity [sensus divinitatis]… Since, therefore, men 
one and all perceive that there is a God and that he is their maker, they are 
condemned by their own testimony because they have failed to honor him and 
to consecrate their lives to his will” (quoted in Plantinga 2000: 171). 
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The sensus divinitatis does however malfunction. It does not deliver up 
unambiguous awareness of God, and the cause of this, Plantinga (following 
Calvin) maintains, is human sin, and in response to this God has had to 
instigate another process to rectify matters, namely the working of the Holy 
Spirit within the individual. Unlike the sensus divinitatis, this “Internal Instigation 
of the Holy Spirit” was not part of our original “epistemic establishment” (2000: 
180). 
The sensus transcendentis model radically changes this picture. Unlike the 
malfunction of the sensus divinitatis being attributed to human sin, there are two 
non-sinful reasons why the sensus transcendentis might fail to deliver an 
awareness of God: a “functioning perfectly well” reason, and a “malfunctioning 
through no fault of the individual” reason. 
The “functioning perfectly well” reason arises because the proper function of 
the sensus transcendentis is not to deliver awareness of God, but to detect or 
infer or construe intimations of transcendence in the total environment and to 
deliver experiences of transcendence (focal, background, or both) to the human 
organism. In keeping with the pluralist approach used to develop the current 
model, these intimations of transcendence may take the form of theistic 
experiences (of God the Father, Yahweh, Allah, Krishna…) or of non-theistic 
experiences (Brahman, Nirvana, Sunyata, the Tao…) depending upon the 
cultural categories and concepts which are part of the individual’s mental 
equipment. Hence any “failure” to be aware of the existence of God need not be 
construed as the malfunction of a sensus divinitatis but as a consequence of the 
proper functioning of the sensus transcendentis within a particular cultural 
context. 
There is, however, still the second possibility that the sensus transcendentis 
could malfunction, but through no fault of the individual. The evolutionary origin 
of the sensus transcendentis, and its being part of a suite of evolved mental 
modules, makes it plausible that the sensus transcendentis will share certain 
characteristics with these other modules. We have seen that a number of such 
modules, such as Theory of Mind and language acquisition, require particular 
environmental inputs, particular types of stimuli, at significant stages of an 
individual’s development for those modules to come into being and to function 
properly. Their proper function can be thwarted by those stimuli being absent or 
of insufficient strength or duration, or indeed for there to be a genetic defect 
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which prevents those environmental stimuli having the effect they would have 
with an individual without the genetic defect. The proper function of the 
language acquisition device can be thwarted by the developing child being 
deprived of a linguistically stimulating environment during the first few years of 
her life; it can also be damaged by a genetic defect as seems to be the case in 
the family referred to by Pinker (1994). The kin detection module(s) which are 
important for triggering incest aversion (and hence incest avoidance) are 
brought on-line by the co-residency factor; miss out on that and the “proper 
function” of the mechanism fails. Applying this to the sensus transcendentis, it is 
perfectly possible that a failure of the necessary environmental stimuli at the 
sensitive period of a developing life, or a genetic abnormality, could impair the 
sensus transcendentis. 
From this it follows that the sensus transcendentis model undercuts the 
Calvin/Plantinga claim concerning sin. Even if the model as presented in this 
enquiry were to be reconstrued simply as an evolutionary version of the sensus 
divinitatis and nothing more, the claim falls apart that its presence as part of the 
nature of human beings removes any excuse for ignorance of God. Such 
alleged ignorance could be a result, not of the effects of sin clouding the 
operation of the sensus divinitatis as Calvin/Plantinga would have it, but of the 
effects of an environmental failure to provide the necessary stimuli to trigger the 
development and operation of the sensus transcendentis in the first place. 
Of course, the riposte could well be that God guarantees the properly 
functioning presence in every human being of the sensus divinitatis/sensus 
transcendentis even given its evolutionary origins, but that will not do. Given 
that God clearly doesn’t guarantee that the other evolved epistemic modules will 
function properly in all human beings (otherwise there wouldn’t be the malfunct-
ions that we see) and that at least two sources of malfunction have been 
identified for those other modules (insufficient environmental stimuli at the 
appropriate developmental stage, and genetic abnormality), there is no reason 
to suppose, and no evidence, that God would privilege the sensus transcend-
entis in ensuring its always functioning properly. Being an evolved module, it 
would be susceptible to malfunctioning possibilities similar to those besetting 
the other modules. 
In summary, then, although the sensus transcendentis model took its orig-
inal inspiration from the sensus divinitatis model, they are in direct competition 
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with each other in providing an explanation for the wide range of faith traditions 
that have existed and still exist among humankind in response to Ultimate 
Reality, and the supposed failure of many humans to acknowledge awareness 
of and give allegiance to one particular possibility of “the Real-as-experienced”. 
 
1c. Rahner 
Rahner’s inclusivism would seem to offer more scope for dialogue. In his 
scheme, a human faculty of openness to God is the free gift of God, who has 
created humankind “in such a way that he can receive this Love which is God 
himself.” Man must have a “potency” for it, which he terms the “supernatural 
existential” in the human soul (Rahner 1975: 186, 187, 185); “existential” 
(adopted from Heidegger) designating a “fundamental structure” of man’s being, 
and “supernatural” because the capacity to be open to grace is supernaturally 
endowed by God.  
This supernatural existential is “a permanent modification of the human 
spirit… [It] is not grace itself but only God’s offer of grace which, by ontologically 
modifying the soul, enables it to freely accept or reject grace” (McCool in 
Rahner 1975: 185). Without trying to equate the sensus transcendentis with the 
supernatural existential (unlike the latter, the former not only is explicitly 
proposed as a natural faculty, but also, of course, is not necessarily theistic in 
its deliverances), there is potential here for dialogue, despite Rahner’s comment 
elsewhere that if a man is “disposed to think in terms of the evolutionary view of 
the world… [and who] is nevertheless a Christian for some other reasons, he 
would then be forced to think along two completely unrelated lines of thought” 
(Rahner 1966: 158). I suggest that this view of the two lines of thought being 
completely unrelated is, as evidenced by the current enquiry, unsustainable; 
and that the contribution to an understanding of human nature made by the 
sensus transcendentis model would productively inform Rahner’s theological 
anthropology. I have to leave it to another time, or more likely another person, 
to follow up this hint. 
 
1d. Hick 
Since I have drawn upon Hick’s pluralist paradigm to develop and support the 
sensus transcendentis model, it is hardly surprising that the model can be seen 
to give some support to pluralism over exclusivism and inclusivism, for the 
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following reason. The sensus transcendentis is a universal mental module 
which, ex hypothesi, is responding to, or is the mental correlate of, an aspect of 
our total environment. Since it is the pluralistic view itself which has helped give 
rise to the sensus transcendentis suggestion, using the sensus transcendentis 
to support pluralism is in danger of being a circular process. But if there were 
independent evidence that the sensus transcendentis exists, evidence over and 
above its simply being postulated as a necessary hypothesis to help explain the 
phenomenon of diverse religious traditions, then that would be evidence, of a 
kind, in favour of the pluralist paradigm. And, as seen in chapter 10, there is a 
certain amount of suggestive evidence that the sensus transcendentis, or 
something like it, is indeed part of our evolved psychological make-up, which 
does therefore provide a measure of support for pluralism.  
There are several qualifying expressions in the above paragraph (“of a kind”, 
“suggestive”, “a measure of support”) for good reason: The structure of the 
support that the sensus transcendentis could seemingly give to pluralism is this: 
“If pluralism is valid, then something like the sensus transcendentis should exist. 
Oh look, there is evidence that the sensus transcendentis exists, therefore 
pluralism is valid”. Unfortunately, this reasoning is fallacious, known as 
“affirming the consequent” (Honderich 1995: 17) easily seen in operation in the 
structurally identical set of statements: “If you cheat you will get your PhD. Oh 
look, you got your PhD, therefore you cheated”. The existence, if it does exist, 
of the sensus transcendentis would not prove the correctness of pluralism any 
more than achieving a PhD proves that cheating occurred, for it is logically 
possible that something other than pluralism/cheating underpins the sensus 
transcendentis model/the PhD. However, the more that evolutionary psychology 
in general becomes accepted as a valid scientific paradigm, the more the 
absence of evidence for a sensus transcendentis or similar would become a 
problem for pluralism. Given evolutionary psychology, religious pluralism would 
predict the existence of a sensus transcendentis or something like it, to provide 
a partial explanation for how the Real is able to interact with, or be manifested 
to, the individual person. 
 
Differentiating between the claims of pluralism and inclusivism on the basis of 
the sensus transcendentis model, however, would be difficult, since the model 
would not undermine an inclusivist view that, of the various ways of construing 
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the deliverances of the sensus transcendentis, one is superior to the others on 
theological grounds. That is, inclusivism could easily accommodate the view 
that the deliverances of sensus transcendentis are all, potentially, valid, 
although the belief systems built on them may (from an inclusivist viewpoint) be 
inadequate. 
But this argument is getting arcane, and personal bias is creeping in. To 
hope that the sensus transcendentis model can help differentiate among relig-
ious exclusivism, inclusivism and pluralism in terms of their validity presupposes 
that it is possible to distinguish empirically between a sensus transcendentis 
and a sensus divinitatis, which at the current state of play seems unlikely. A 
method of distinguishing between them – a prediction the verification or falsific-
ation of which would support the one against the other – is a subject to be 
pursued subsequent to the current enquiry. 
 
2. the ascribed/intrinsic dichotomy of religious experiences  
In chapter 3 when I considered the experiential dimension of spirituality, I took 
the line that religious experiences “are experiences which the subjects 
themselves describe in religious terms or which are intrinsically religious” (Davis 
1989: 31); that is, experiences (and, by extension, Roses) might be termed 
religious (or rosy) simply because of the terminology used to describe them 
(that is, through ascription), or because they possess an intrinsic quality which 
renders them religious (or rosy) whatever the terminology employed to describe 
them. So is the “rosiness” of an experience – that is, its being religious or 
spiritual – an intrinsic characteristic of the experience, or is it an ascribed 
characteristic? Is it in the nature of the Rose that it points to or signifies some-
thing “Other” beyond the subjectivity of the person undergoing the experience; 
or is the belief that it so points and signifies simply a construct in the subjective 
world of the individual projected outwards but with no objective correlate? 
Reverting for now to the term “religious experience” as being the more 
familiar, the issue of whether “religious” is an ascribed or an intrinsic property is 
the subject of a book-length investigation by Taves (2009), and here I can only 
offer a couple of thoughts, no more than hints, as to how the sensus transcend-
entis model might contribute to the debate. 
There are various possibilities concerning ascribed and intrinsic: it could be 
that “intrinsic religious experiences” is a null set, that there are no such things in 
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reality and that all so-called “religious experiences” are “religious” only through 
ascription. Or it could be that there really are intrinsically religious experiences, 
but that some other experiences which are not really intrinsically religious get 
mis-identified as being religious and so are “religious experiences” purely 
through ascription. But there is also the possibility that some experiences could 
be mis-identified in the opposite direction: ones which are intrinsically religious 
but are not recognised as such, or are dismissed as being, say, a “by-product” 
of the “electrochemical functioning of the brain” (Lewis-Williams 2010: 154). 
What, for example, is one to make of author Philip Pullman’s reporting that he 
has had experiences that seemed transcendental (see account X5 in chapter 
3)? As he believes that there is only a materialist universe, he does not con-
strue the experience as indicative of a “spiritual world”; if there are experiences 
which are intrinsically religious, then Pullman’s experiences would at least be in 
the frame, though he does not ascribe religiousness to them. 
What can the proposed sensus transcendentis model contribute to the 
ascribed/intrinsic dichotomy? First, to propose, as the model does, that spiritual-
ity, which includes the experiential (i.e. the vertical/diameter) dimension, is 
grounded in our biological being is not the same as explaining away spirituality 
simply as an evolutionary artefact with no objective correlate, any more than the 
recognition that our visual system is an evolutionary product explains away as a 
fiction the objective world that we see – on the contrary, we would not and could 
not have evolved a visual system without there being an objective, external 
world as the correlate of the evolving visual system. By this analogy, our 
evolved capacity for spirituality would appear to be tracking something that is 
more than a purely fictional, subjectively created artefact, a something other or 
a something there, which would support the “intrinsic” pole of the “intrinsic or 
ascribed” dichotomy.  
However, as discussed in the last chapter, natural selection operates on 
usefulness not truth, and “[w]hat works, what succeeds, is what wins” (Ruse 
2006: 245). This would suggest that if it is useful for the human organism 
(useful in the evolutionary sense of promoting survival and reproduction) to 
undergo certain experiences which present themselves as having a particular 
intrinsic quality, then our experiencing those experiences as religious is no 
guarantee that they are intrinsically religious. Since the evidence presented in 
chapter 11 strongly suggests that there is a positive correlation between 
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religion/spirituality and health, there is selection pressure for us to construe 
experiences as intrinsically religious, even if they aren’t. This supports the 
ascribed pole of the dichotomy, or at least counterbalances the previous 
argument supporting the intrinsic pole. 
Then again, though, it does not follow from the fact that natural selection 
operates on usefulness rather than truth that the deliverances of the sensus 
transcendentis have to be false, it is merely that they do not come with a 
money-back guarantee of being 100% true. The “usefulness not truth” argument 
should put us on guard against naively taking everything at face value, which is 
the stance of “critical realism” (Bhaskar 1998) referred to in the introduction, but 
it does not require the rejection of all truth claims: to repeat McKay and 
Dennett’s conclusion to their discussion of the evolution of misbelief, “although 
survival is the only hard currency of natural selection, the exchange rate with 
truth is likely to be fair in most circumstances” (2009: 509). That is, our evolved 
mental mechanisms can be expected to deliver true (or true enough) beliefs 
most of the time, which swings the pointer back towards the intrinsic pole for 
construing the religiousness of religious experiences or the rosiness of Roses… 
towards it, but not all the way back. 
And there I will leave it. By now the reader’s ambivalence detector mechan-
ism will be working flat out if it is functioning properly, since there is consider-
able ambivalence around the issue. Nevertheless, the sensus transcendentis 
model, particularly if further empirical evidence were to arise in support of its 
postulated existence (I have in mind an extension of the “intuitive theist” work of 
Kelemen [2004] and the “preparedness hypothesis” of Barrett and Richert 
[2003] referred to chapter 11) offers a possible approach to investigating the 
ascribed/intrinsic dichotomy which, as far as I know, has not previously been 
suggested. Others may wish to develop it. 
 
3. Consequences for religious (un)belief 
This follows on from the previous section, but asks a more drastic question: 
does (or would) the existence of a sensus transcendentis so relativize religious 
belief as to render impossible genuine commitment to any one tradition? To 
answer this I will use an analogy. Wearing another hat, I am a poet, and I write 
in English. Similar to many Englishmen, I have only a smattering of school-boy 
French, and a few ill-pronounced Italian phrases; but it would be crass of me to 
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claim that English is the only true language for poetry and all the rest are 
barbarous and degenerate. I fully recognise that every other languages is a 
valid medium for poetry, and I wish I were fluent in German so I could read 
Rilke in the original – poetry is notoriously difficult to translate. But I have no 
desire to try writing poetry in any language other than English – it’s hard enough 
as it is without trying it in a foreign language. Nothing against Italian and 
German and the rest, but when it comes to writing poetry I have to stick to the 
language I know, and seek to improve my skills in its use as the years go by. 
And what of the knowledge that my ability to use a particular language came 
about through the functioning of an evolved “language acquisition device” 
responding to the stimuli from the linguistic community into which I was born? 
Does that somehow invalidate my poems written in English? Does it cause me 
to decry the use of any language whatsoever? Of course not. I will continue to 
write in English, and if I finally get round to learning German and reading Rilke 
in the original, I may well be inspired by his use of language, though it’s German 
not English, and be enriched by it. If I studied hard and immersed myself in the 
literature of Germany I could theoretically, I suppose, one day try my hand at a 
poem in German; I could even decide to adopt German as my main language 
and commit myself to using it instead of English. Overwhelmingly unlikely, but 
theoretically possible – and the knowledge of there being a language acquisition 
device would not make the slightest difference. 
The analogy is obvious though of course not exact, for, unlike religious 
exclusivists, speakers of English, German or Italian do not often claim that 
speaking their language is necessary for salvation/enlightenment/liberation/ 
fulfillment. But even if such claims were made for a given language, it would not 
be necessary to accept such pronouncements even whilst continuing to 
appreciate that the language still fulfilled its function. Similarly, though the 
sensus transcendentis model would appear, if anything, to strengthen the view 
that no one tradition can plausibly claim unique status, that does not require the 
abandonment of all traditions. It might make one look afresh at one’s religion, 
and shift from a literal to a mythological understanding of its propositional 
statements (Hick 1977), but it would not – or need not – cause it to cease being 
one of the multi-dimensional routes to meaning, purpose and value. And the 
point is this: knowledge that there are paths other than your own, and knowl-
edge of how come there are other paths (the pluralism thesis), and knowledge 
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of how come we are aware in the first place of there being paths (the sensus 
transcendentis) – none of this logically requires an abandonment of all paths.  
There is another question, though: would acceptance that there is a sensus 
transcendentis necessitate taking up a commitment to a tradition? That is, 
suppose someone who finds all religion utterly repugnant is somehow 
persuaded by the arguments of this enquiry that he indeed has, as part of his 
evolved mental architecture, a module, the sensus transcendentis, that detects, 
infers, construes intimations of transcendence in the total environment - should 
that reader, on the strength of it, get himself measured up for a new suit of 
sackcloth and ashes? Start taking instructions in the teachings of the Hebrew 
Bible, the New Testament, the Quran, or the Pali Canon? 
It doesn’t follow. Of course it doesn’t. What the sensus transcendentis model 
makes clear is that being open to experiences (“focal” or “background”) of 
meaning, purpose, value, the sacredness and wonder is part of our evolved 
human nature, but logically it cannot be part of the model to make pronounce-
ments about itself nor to impose any obligation on the individual to respond to 
its deliverances in a given way. 
 
B: Contribution to evolutionary psychology  
It would be overstating the case to claim that the current enquiry makes a major 
contribution to evolutionary psychology, but there is one point worth making. It 
has become increasingly clear from all the reading that has gone into the 
development of the sensus transcendentis model that most evolutionary 
theorists work with a very “thin” conception of religion and spirituality. It is 
nearly always considered in terms of supernatural agency, whether of a god, or 
gods or ancestral spirits, with the other dimensions, though acknowledged by 
Barrett (2004), Boyer (2001) and Wilson (2002) to be important, receiving 
considerably less coverage. Ethics apart, that is, but the evolutionary explor-
ation into ethics is an area in its own right, not requiring, though sometimes 
acquiring, a religious connection either as underpinned by religion (Barrett 
2004) or parasitized by religion (Boyer 2001).  
To focus on supernatural agency not only leaves non-theistic religions such 
as Buddhism and Jainism outside any explanatory system based on that con-
ception, but it is simply “shallow and incomplete” (Wilson 2002: 3) to take 
religion to mean belief in supernatural agency. As Wilson goes on to acknowl-
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edge, religion involves honouring spirituality, which refers “in part [to] a feeling 
of being connected to something larger than oneself” (2000: 3). The “something 
larger than oneself” need not be construed as something supernatural. 
Meaning, purpose and value are not supernatural; they are to be found or 
inferred in human experiences in this world. Meaning, purpose and value may 
be said to transcend the physical world of which we are organic part, but they 
are, to repeat a paradoxical expression used earlier, immanently transcendent.  
When they focus on supernatural agency as though it were the essence of 
religion, evolutionary theorists (of which I am one) are in danger of missing, or 
dismissing, the spirituality of which the various manifestations of religion have 
been the traditional vehicles. The sensus transcendentis model privileges 
spirituality over religion, and may contribute to shifting the evolutionary focus 
away from the latter and towards the former as being integral to human nature. 
 
Conclusion 
The development of the model of the sensus transcendentis is based on the 
assumption that a scientific investigation of the world and of human nature is 
perfectly valid in its own terms and need not be seen as antithetical to spirit-
uality, but on the contrary can contribute to an understanding of that phenom-
enon. By challenging and offering an evolutionary alternative to the sensus 
divinitatis model of Plantinga (2000), and contributing not only to the ongoing 
debates about religious pluralism in particular, but also, although more gener-
ally and indirectly, about the nature of what are generally known as religious 
experiences (“Roses”), the model potentially influences several areas of 
interest in theology, religion and spirituality. It does not, however, claim to be, 
and should not be read as, an argument either proving or disproving wholesale 
the specific claims of all or any one religious or faith tradition.  
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Chapter 12: Of final comments 
 
When I started this enquiry, I had the vague notion that evolutionary psychology 
and spirituality should be able to speak to each other, since I found the former 
an exciting and plausible (though controversial) scientific discipline which 
promised to help illuminate the structure of human nature, and the latter as 
being, though ill-defined, an essential ingredient or component or dimension of 
human existence. But what they would have to say and how was unclear: had 
that been clear at the outset, I suppose, there would have been no point on 
embarking on the last six years of reading, thinking, discussing, writing, re-
writing, re-re-writing, and regularly feeling overwhelmed. 
I already had an inkling of Hick’s pluralistic views, having read a number of 
his books over the years; and Kantian epistemology had long interested me, 
particularly because of its underpinning Personal Construct Therapy (Kelly 
1955), an approach to psychotherapy of which I was a practitioner (Procter 
1985). However, I had not knowingly heard of the sensus divinitatis before a 
chance conversation in the theology department at Exeter University brought it 
to my attention. I had a smattering of knowledge of sociobiology and evolution-
ary psychology, mainly from Wilson (1978, 1998) and Pinker (1998; 2002), but 
had not really taken in the idea of the intuitive faculties such as intuitive physics 
and intuitive psychology until I came to write a draft about human nature, when I 
speculated about there being another faculty which I referred to as “intuitive 
spirituality”. The sensus divinitatis conversation helped crystallize that idea and 
give a clearer shape to what I was trying to do. 
It did mean, however, that a number of other issues I thought would have 
more prominence faded into the background because of pressure of time and 
maximum word length of the thesis. In particular, I had envisaged a consider-
ably longer section on ethics, exploring different ethical theories and discussing 
how consonant or otherwise with evolutionary psychology each was. It is there-
fore of particular interest that Hauser (2006) draws upon and discusses Hume 
(2000 [1739]) Kant (1959 [1785]) and Rawls (1971) in his development of an 
intuitive morality, finding that the empirical evidence favours the last-named with 
his “justice as fairness” concept coming closest to what appears to be our 
default, intuitive faculty. I had also envisaged a wider consideration of ethics as 
pertaining to our relationship with the non-human world. Much ethical discourse 
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concerns itself with human-human interaction, but it can be argued (and I would 
support the arguments) that ethics is equally applicable to how we humans treat 
not only non-human animals but all aspects of creation, including (for example) 
forests, oceans and mountains. Enlightened self-interest, of course, suggests 
we should be wise in our care for and use of them; but at a deeper level there is 
the issue of their intrinsic, not simply instrumental, value (Rolston III 1988). 
Spirituality as relating to the rest of creation (Fox 1983) is therefore another 
huge area I have reluctantly not addressed. 
I had also intended a longish discussion on what contribution the phenom-
enon of spirituality could make to an understanding of evolutionary psychology, 
rather than the single comment I have made; but I cannot give even an outline 
of what else I might have written, since I have no idea of what the answer could 
be. I realise I am setting myself up for a cynical riposte that the answer is simple 
– nothing; but that is unsatisfactory. At the very least it would concern itself with 
meaning, purpose and value about which evolutionary psychology per se 
seems to have a pretty negative view along the lines that they are illusions 
foisted on us by natural selection (Bering 2011). That might become the starting 
point for another research project – or it might not. I do have an allotment to dig, 
after all, and poems to write. 
Finally, it remains to be seen whether the sensus transcendentis model can 
be expanded, developed or modified in due course in the light of continued 
developments in evolutionary theory involving epigenetics (Carey 2010), “evo-
devo” (Carroll 2005), and developmental systems theory (Oyama et al 2001), 
but it seems to me important that, whatever the actual mechanisms which have 
brought it into being over the immense stretches of evolutionary time, the 
phenomenon of human spirituality is understood and explored as being firmly 
rooted in our evolved human nature.  
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Appendix I: Personal Construct Psychology 
Personal Construct Psychology (PCP – also known as Personal Construct 
Theory [PCT]) was developed by the psychologist George Kelly (1955) and 
further elaborated by, inter alia, Bannister and Fransella (1986), Fransella 
(2004), and Procter (1981; 1985; 2008). With the same basic premise as critical 
realism, PCP not only provides a coherent theory base but also has given rise 
to a range of practical techniques and strategies for those involved with 
counselling and psychotherapy, the context in which I encountered and used it 
as a member of a psychotherapeutic team under the guidance of Harry Procter 
(1985).  
The philosophical position that undergirds PCP is a Kantian-esque epistem-
ology called “constructive alternativism”, which holds that reality objectively 
exists (i.e. it is not a mental creation) but that there are always different, or 
alternative, ways in which we can interpret or construe that reality – things, 
events, experiences, people, concepts, values and so forth, and (as with critical 
realism) we “cannot contact an interpretation-free reality directly. We can only 
make assumptions about what reality is and then proceed to find out how useful 
or useless these assumptions are” (Bannister and Fransella 1986: 6).  
Kelly encapsulated PCP in a “Fundamental Postulate” with eleven 
corollaries. The former states that “a person’s processes are psychologically 
channelised by the ways in which he anticipates events” (Kelly, quoted in Button 
1985: 3), a laboured way of saying that an individual has expectations about 
events (a term which includes everyday actions and experiences) based on 
previous experience, and we can “understand human behaviour and experience 
as the consequence of our attempts at anticipating future events” (1985: 3-4). In 
the light of evolutionary psychology I would add that the expectations we have 
are based not solely on our individual experiences but also on innate 
expectations engendered by our evolved “mental modules” (see chapter 7). 
This fundamental postulate is elaborated in a series of “corollaries”, four of 
which are as follows: 
The dichotomy corollary states that “A person’s construction system is 
composed of a finite number of dichotomous constructs” (Kelly, quoted in 
Bannister and Fransella 1986: 12). We make sense of the world through our 
perceiving similarities and differences, and this gives rise to dichotomous 
constructs. For example, I may experience Joe and Mary as similar to each 
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other in their both being “warm-hearted” but different from Bill who is “a cold 
fish” – so one construct that I apply to other people is “warm-hearted” as 
opposed to “cold-fish” (which in future I will write as “warm-hearted----cold-fish”). 
This dichotomy, however, does not mean that I simply have two boxes, one 
labelled “warm-hearted” and the other ”cold-fish”, into one or other of which I 
shove everyone. The “warm-hearted----cold-fish” construct acts as a dimension 
along which I construe other people (and myself) as being positioned, and 
although I construe Joe and Mary both as being “warm-hearted” when 
compared with Bill, when I compare Joe and Mary with each other I construe 
Joe as very warm-hearted and Mary as fairly-warm-hearted but not as warm-
hearted as Joe. 
A construct, then, is essentially an act of discrimination, but our construing – 
our application of a construct – can occur in many different ways, behaviourally, 
affectively, somatically as well as verbally or with the intellect. Compare a baby 
responding to the face of its mother by turning towards her and gurgling, and 
that same baby responding to the face of a stranger by turning away and crying. 
The entire response of the baby constitutes its construing: “when a baby is 
scared by an unfamiliar face, the reactions and feeling of fear are just as much 
part of the construct of scary versus safe as any descriptive or dictionary 
definitions of these terms. The bodily reactions, the tensing, the crying and 
scared feeling are all part of a single human experience/reaction that is 
governed by the application of the construct” (Procter 2008: 2 – emphasis in 
original). Words such as “scary” and “safe” are often referred to as constructs, 
but strictly speaking they are the verbal labels of constructs (and even more 
strictly speaking, a “construct” is the entire dimension of, say, “safe----scary”. 
Both poles comprise the construct). 
The organisation corollary states that “[e]ach person characteristically 
evolves, for his convenience in anticipating events, a construction system 
embracing ordinal relationships between constructs” (Bannister and Fransella, 
1986: 11). A person’s constructs are not just a haphazard bundle, but are inter-
related, and one type of inter-relatedness is conveyed in the notion of 
constructs being “subordinate” and “superordinate” to one another in hier-
archies. Consider the following set of possible constructs to explain those 
phenomena commonly termed “religious experiences”: 
A) naturalistic explanations------religious explanations 
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B) natural religion----revealed religion;  
C) psychological explanations-----non-psychological explanations;  
D) Freudian-type explanations-----Jungian-type explanations.  
 
 
Diagrammatically, they link together thus: 
naturalistic explanations------------------------------------------religious explanations 
       ¦              ¦ 
       ¦              ¦ 
psychological ----non-psychological     natural religion----revealed religion 
       ¦ 
       ¦ 
Freudian-----Jungian 
 
and we can see that: 
Construct “B” (natural------revealed) is subordinate to construct “A” 
(naturalistic------religious) in that both poles of “B” fall under the “religious 
explanations” pole of “A”. 
Construct “C” (psychological------non-psychological) is also subordinate to 
construct “A”, since it falls under the “naturalistic explanations” pole of construct 
“A” 
Hence construct “A” is said to be “superordinate” to both B and C. 
Construct “D” is subordinate to “C” since both Jungian and Freudian 
explanations are examples of psychological explanations. 
Thus “C” is a subordinate construct with respect to “A”, but superordinate 
with respect to “D”. 
And so forth. But – note that the above is illustrative based on my personal 
constructs. They may not coincide with how you construe the various possibil-
ities; your personal construct system may well have different linkages. 
 
The range corollary states that “[a] construct is convenient for the anticipation of 
a finite range of events only” (Bannister and Fransella 1986: 13). Constructs 
have a range of convenience, namely those people, situations, things etc to 
which they are applicable, and a focus of convenience, namely those people, 
situations, things etc to which they are maximally applicable.  
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Some constructs have a wide range of applicability – a common example 
would be “good----bad” which is applicable to people, football games, apples, 
ideas, poems, governments and so forth; whereas other constructs have a 
limited range of use: “petrol-driven-----diesel” being applicable to types of 
engines and the like, but not much else. The “focus of convenience” refers to 
those events/things situations/referents to which the construct is optimally 
applicable; and the “range of convenience” refers to everything else to which it 
can usefully be applied. And clearly there is a whole area of potential 
experience to which a given construct is simply inapplicable. To adapt an 
example from Bannister and Fransella, a construct of “domestic furniture-------
office furniture” would have a range of convenience including swivel chairs, 
desks, tables and the like, but “the whole construct would exclude sunsets, 
battleships, acts of heroism and candyfloss which are outside the range of 
convenience of the construct; they are not subsumed under either pole of it” 
(1986: 14 – italics in original).  
These notions of focus of convenience and range of convenience are 
applicable to the use of the terms altruism and selfishness as understood within 
both an evolutionary context and a moral context, since the original “focus of 
convenience” of the construct “altruism-----selfishness” lay within the moral 
sphere, but since the advent of the “selfish gene” concept (Dawkins 1976) the 
range of convenience has extended to the genetic sphere, such that there are 
now two foci of convenience of the construct, in the moral sphere and 
evolutionary sphere respectively.  
The commonality corollary states that “[t]o the extent that one person 
employs a construction of experience which is similar to that employed by 
another, his psychological processes are similar to those of the other person” 
(Bannister and Fransella 1986: 17). Although the “P” of PCP is “personal”, this 
corollary explicitly addresses the fact that we are not isolated monads; that our 
ways of construing considerably overlap with many other people’s ways of 
construing, even though there are idiosyncratic aspects; and what is expressed 
in this corollary is further extended by the work of Procter, who has developed 
the idea of a family construct system (Procter 1981); and who has also 
addressed the issue of whether “some constructs are not personal but 
universal?... For example if we take blue versus red. There are cones in the 
retina that fire to these wavelengths of light. However, even here we are talking 
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about a personal construct when we are referring to the occurrence of the 
construct in an actual situation” (2008: 6). That is, the construct is personal in its 
application in a given situation, yet it has a universal aspect. Procter’s choice is 
particularly interesting in that pan-cultural colour identification is one of the 
“mental modules” postulated by evolutionary psychologists. 
These, along with the Fundamental Postulate and the other corollaries, 
make up the bare bones of PCP. Because its basic assumption is that although 
the world is real, there are different ways of construing it, the way is opened up 
for the possibility of re-construing – that is, of developing different ways of 
construing a given situation, event, person, belief, problem and so forth, and as 
a therapeutic approach a wide range of techniques have been developed to 
facilitate reconstruing –but this is not the place to pursue that aspect of PCP. 
For current purposes, it is sufficient to recognise the utility of the general 
structure of the theory, and its main terminology.  
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Appendix 2: Heresy 
 
The following appeared a few years ago on the “Ship of Fools” website (ship-of-
fools.com), winning a poll for the best religious joke. I have somewhere seen it 
attributed to American comedian Emo Phillips.  
 
I was walking across a bridge one day and I saw a man standing on the edge, 
about to jump. I ran over and said: “Stop. Don’t do it!” 
“Why shouldn’t I?” he asked. 
“Well, there’s so much to live for. Are you religious?” 
He said, “yes.” 
I said: “Me too. Are you Christian or Buddhist?” 
“Christian.” 
“Me too. Are you Catholic or Protestant?” 
“Protestant.” 
“Me too. Are you Episcopalian or Baptist?” 
“Baptist.” 
“Wow. Me too. Are you Baptist Church of God or Baptist Church of the Lord?” 
“Baptist Church of God.” 
“Me too. Are you original Baptist Church of God or are you Reformed Baptist 
Church of God?” 
“Reformed Baptist Church of God.” 
“Me too. Are you Reformed Baptist Church of God, Reformation of 1879, or 
Reformed Baptist Church of God, Reformation of 1915?” 
He said: “Reformed Baptist Church of God, reformation of 1915.” 
I said: “Die, heretic scum,” and pushed him off. 
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Appendix 3: Pete and Dud on Religion 
Peter Cook and Dudley Moore, along with Jonathan Miller and Alan Bennett, 
came to prominence in 1960 in the ground-breaking revue “Beyond the Fringe”. 
In their TV show “Not Only… But Also” they regularly appeared as Pete and 
Dud, two cloth-capped ignoramuses pontificating on all manner of subjects 
including Life, Art, Sex and – as in this extract – Religion.  
 
 
Pete:  I often wish He'd manifest Himself a bit more, you know, in the sky. 
Dud:  Yer, it'd be nice is every now and again He parted the clouds and in a 
golden burst of sunshine gave you a wave. 'Hello down there, you can 
believe in me’. 
Pete:  I asked the Reverend Stephens about this, and he said 'Much as God 
would like to keep manifesting Himself, He daren't you see, because it 
debases the currency.' He can't go round all the football matches and 
fetes and everything, so He limits Himself to once in a million years if 
we're lucky. 
Dud:  Well, you've got to be careful about over-exposure. Course you know, 
actually, Pete, I wish I'd never been told about God at all cause it 
means we can't get away with nothing, doesn’t it? I mean you've been 
told about Him, you know He's there or you think He's there, and you 
can't really mess about then, can you? 
Pete:  You can't. 
Dud: No, and what about the people who haven't been told about God? 
Pete:  Well, I asked the Reverend Stephens about this, and he said that if you 
haven't been told about God, Dud, you're laughing. If you don't know 
good from evil then you're away. You can do anything you bloody well 
like. There’s these people in New Guinea for example. They wander 
about with nothing on and they commit adultery, steal, and covert their 
neighbour’s wife, which everyone wants to do. As there are no vicars 
about, to tell them everything, they can’t be got at, so they go up to 
heaven whatever they do. This means all these foreigners are getting 
up to heaven, and perfectly decent blokes like you and me, who have 
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never even committed adultery, we can’t get up there. We’re being kept 
out by these Guineans. 
Dud:  You see in that case, Pete, it’d be a crime to tell people about God. 
Pete: I’ve never told anyone about God. 
Dud: I haven’t told anyone, I haven’t mentioned it to a soul, Pete. 
 
 
 
                                                                               (Cook and Moore 1971:90-91)
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Appendix 4: Let There Be Light 
I wrote the following sketch several years ago, and have performed it in cabaret 
on a number of occasions. Originally the target was “liberal theology”. 
 
Interviewer (Sitting in a chair. His guest is in another chair. He addresses the 
audience.) Good evening and welcome to tonight’s edition of ‘OK 
God, What’s It All About Then?’ – the series in which we explore 
contemporary perspectives on religion. Tonight it’s the turn of 
Religious Pluralism, and my guest is the well-known Religious 
Pluralist, Dr Gustav Weltanschauung. Dr Weltanschauung, I would 
like to start by asking you the central question concerning 
Religious Pluralism, namely: how many Religious Pluralists does it 
take to change a light bulb? 
Dr. W. None whatsoever. That’s because Religious Pluralists do not 
believe in the existence of objectively real light-bulbs. 
Interviewer You deny their very existence? 
Dr. W. Oh yes! And then again: oh no! You see, I don’t deny one’s 
subjective experience of light bulbs! Of course not! We all like to 
get well lit up from time to time, don’t we? I know I do. But to talk 
of an objectively real light bulb up there, somehow stuck on the 
ceiling, sort of thing – well, I think we’ve outgrown such nursery 
school fantasies of illumination, haven’t we? 
Interviewer So if someone comes to you asking for your advice about light 
bulbs, how would you respond? 
Dr. W. Well, I would encourage such a person to develop their own 
personal light-bulb; to seek out and switch on their inner filament. 
Interviewer Right... Now, I understand you also hold controversial views about 
the creator or inventor of the incandescent light-bulb – Thomas 
Edison. You claim he never actually existed? 
Dr. W. Well, extremely erudite scholarship, mainly by me, has thrown 
considerable doubt onto his historical reality. You see, key 
features in the recorded life and work of Thomas the so-called 
Edison are actually pre-figured in the Ancient Babylonian papyrus 
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unearthed only a few years ago in the children’s section of 
Waterstones. 
Interviewer That’s the text known to us as Harry Potter Rewires His Ancient 
Babylonian Dwelling Place? 
Dr. W.  Correct. 
Interviewer And you see this text as proof of the essentially mythological 
status of Edison? 
Dr. W.  Exactly. What we call ‘Thomas Edison’ is simply a personification 
of the light-bulb archetype.  
Interviewer What is your attitude towards those who reject the whole notion of 
Thomas Edison and seek illumination from other sources? 
Dr. W.  Well, we are of course luminously pluralist, seeking as we do to 
encompass many light-bulb traditions: incandescent, fluorescent, 
energy-efficient... 
Interviewer Flash? 
Dr. W.  Well, if you must. Anything goes. But the point is that all of these 
are equally valid paths to ultimate luminescence. 
Interviewer Dr Weltanschauung, let me ask you this: when the time comes to 
change one’s personal light-bulb, where exactly do Religious 
Pluralists stand? 
Dr. W.  On a chair, like everyone else. But it is of course a metaphorical 
chair! Obviously we don’t believe in objectively real chairs. 
Interviewer (looking pointedly at the chairs they are sitting on) Obviously. 
Dr. W.  That would be absurd! We Religious Pluralists metaphorically 
stand on a metaphorical chair in order metaphorically to change a 
metaphorical light-bulb. I trust that is clear? 
Interviewer Oh yes. Metaphorically. Well, thank you Dr Weltanschauung for 
an... illuminating glimpse into the world of light-bulbology. (to 
audience) Now, I started with the question “How many Religious 
Pluralists does it take to change a light bulb?” To end, I leave you 
with another questions: “How many light bulbs does it take to 
change a Religious Pluralist?” Thank you and good light… er, night. 
 
        © Richard Skinner 2003 
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